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The present thesis is an investigation into the 
nature of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life.
One of the author*s main aims is to use terms that cover 
at the same time the sociological and the psychological 
aspects of democracy and totalitarianism. Thus, the term 
"way of life1 is meant to imply a particular social and 
cultural pattern as well as a particular type of behaviour 
and personality.
The analysis of the process of democratisation of 
the ancient Athenian community and of modern American, 
Prench and British societies led me to the following 
main ideas: A. Every process of democratisation leads
to a flexible society, i.e., to a social structure open 
to change and novelty, and yet, preserving its own basic 
character. B. Every proces of democratisation leads to 
an individualised pattern of life. The economic and 
political individualism, the religious individualism 
initiated by the Reformation, the individualism in art
and philosojjhy are various aspects of this basic drive 
towards individualisation. C. Every process of democratisation 
is connected with a strong drive towards the rationalisation 
of the pattern of life. A diminution of the power of tradition, 
a rational economy, a rational administration and type of 
authority, a rational mode of thought which counterbalances 
the power of religion (“secularisation) are all characteristic 
aspects of this. D. The process of democratisation is Closely 
associated with periods of social and spiritual prosperity.
In conclusion, the democratic way of life is, at the socio­
logical level, characterised by a flexible, rational, dynamic 
and individualised social organisation of a group of individuals.
The terms used to describe the sociological aspects of 
the democratic way of life were subsequently transposed to 
the psychological plane, to describe the democratic behaviour 
and the democratic type of personality. Thus, it is pointed 
out that individuals living in periods of democratisation, 
or in constituted democratic societies have a more flexible 
mental structure then the individuals living in other types 
of society. The mental functions dominating the process of 
adjustment to a democratic world are reason, intellect and 
intelligence. The particular meaning of these terms is 
revealed by contrasting the mental structure of such individuals 
with that of the individuals living in the medieval or the 
modern totalitarian societies, The individuals living in 
a democratic v/orld are confident in the power of their mind;
I
their behaviour is conditioned to a rational and "inner"
type of social authority which, is described as the authority 
of law, as conscience, or as "constitutional morality".
In conclusion, the democratic personality has a strong ego 
structure, the ego being a general concept which covers all 
the main individualising functions of the human mind. This 
type of personality is at the same time the result and the 
cause of an individualised world.
In contrast to democracy, the totalitarian way of life 
is characterised, on the sociological plane, by a rigid 
social organisation. The mind of the individuals belonging 
to a totalitarian world is rigidly organised round one idea 
or feeling; their behaviour is determined by irrational 
emotional factors even when at the surface they display a 
strong tendency towards rationality.
Nazism and Communism are two totalitarian ways of life
characteristic of our time. Both are rooted in the same
state of mind, i.e., in the feeling of insecurity aroused
in the members of various national groups, or economic
classes, as the result of their failure to adjust themselves
to a rational social organisation, or to a dynamic and
$
unstable pattern of life. Nazifh. is in essence a reaction
against an individualised an rational pattern of life and
an escape into irrationality. The "emotionalisation" of
the pattern of behaviour in every sector of life constitutes 
/
its main trait. Thus, the Nazi way of life is characterised 
by a type of society based on primitive emotional bonds, by 
an emotional attitude towards authority and by an emotional
*logic expressed in a mythical kind of thought*
Communism solves the same "basic problem of contemporary 
man in a different manner* The need for security manifested 
in the modern working classes' and in certain sections of 
modern Russian society has led, not to an escape into irratio­
nality, but to an excess of rationalisation. An excessively 
rational economic and social system and a rigid pattern of 
historical development are the main aspects of this.
A new type of onsciousness - class consciousness - 
appears which is the instrument by which the Communist type 
of man organises his world rigidly according to the schemes 
of a rationalistic conception of life*
The thesis presents a comparative study of the democratic 
and totalitarian ways of life rather than the study of 
democracy an totalitarianism in themselves. G-enerally 
speaking democracy can be regarded as the individual’s 
and group’s adjustment under conditions of leisure, 
totalitarianism as the individual’s and group’s adjustment 
under conditions of stress.
The factual data on which this study is based are 
furnished by the analysis of various democratic and 
totalitarian civilisations, supplimented by the results of 
a series of recent psychological researches based on 
questionnaires, interviews and clinical observation.
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I N T R O D U C T I O  N.
History is a picture gallery 
containing few originals and a great 
many copies.
Alexis de Tocqueville
The present study as a whole has the character 
of an introduction. For, in spite of the effort 
of adducing as many factual data as possible in 
support of the main theses, expounded mjit, I still 
remained in the end with the vivid impression that 
the study opens many more problems than it solves.
If there is any positive result brought about by 
the present study, this is to show how a social 
psychologist opens the door to the study of the 
political structures of various modern societies.
That is why in this introduction it would be advisable 
to outline the main ideas which guided the author’s 
mind •
Sociology and Psychology. One of my first con­
cerns was to find or to build up a common ground 
between sociology and psychology and thus to look at 
the problem of democracy and totalitarianism from 
two points of view at once. From the very outset I 
felt the need to escape a purely political approach 
and to speak about democracy and totalitarianism
totalitarianism (Fascism and Communism) as ways 
of life. Needless to say, I have been aware of the 
difficulty any one has to face when working with such 
a general and vague concept as that of a way of life. 
But on the other hand, it was obvious to me that a 
common ground between two disciplines so different 
and opposed in their approach could not be found 
without resorting to a less specialised and less 
precise vocabulary. The concept of "way of life" 
includes both a specific social and political structure 
and a specific type of behaviour and personality.
It seems to me that many difficulties involved in 
the study of the democratic and totalitarian ways of 
life can be considerably diminished by acquiring the 
technique of thinking on two planes, sociological and 
psychological. Consequently my next concern was to 
establish a series of correspondences between the 
sociological and psychological aspects of the 
democratic and totalitarian ways of life. Thus, 
starting with the analysis of a series of phenomena 
characteristic of various periods of democratisation 
both in the ancient and modern worlds, I was led to 
the idea that democratisation is closely associated 
with a series of processes by which the common pattern 
of life of a group of individuals becomes flexible.
The transitions from the medieval to the modern economic
economic system, from the rigidly organised medieval 
community to the dynamic society, gradually created 
in the Western world since the Renaissance, from a 
stable spiritual world dominated by religion, to a 
world permanently open to changes and revisions, 
as science progresses, are in fact aspects in the 
process of flexibility of the culture-patterns of 
Western societies. Democracy is consequently defined 
as a flexible society, i.e., a social structure open 
to change and novelty, and yet preserving its own 
basic character.
Since flexibility has thus been established as 
one of the key concepts in the sociological aspects 
of the process of democratisation, I transplanted it 
on to the psychological level and applied it to the 
mental structure of the individuals living in a 
historical period of democratisation or in a con- • 
stituted democratic society. It seemed to me that the 
transition from a non-democratic to a democratic period 
is also closely connected v/ith an increased degree of 
flexibility in the mental structure of man. Thus, the 
mechanism of adjustment of the medieval man - if one 
can speak in such general terms - was dominated by more 
or less fixed types of reaction and his mind was more 
rigidly organised than that of modern man round certain 
habits, prejudices, sentiments and ideas. On the other
other hand, the mind of the individuals living in 
the modern era becomes more and more dominated by 
mental functions and structures which makes it 
possible for them to adjust to a complex and changeable 
world. One of these structures is reason which I 
described as the individual’s capacity to grasp the v 
order of change, and the unity in variety.
Intelligence is another function required for the 
adjustment to a world dominated by change and novelty. 
Consequently the individual living in the modern 
world, i.e., the man who creates and maintains the 
democratic way of life, makes more and more use of 
intellectual, and less and less of emotional and 
instinctive functions in his adjustment. As the 
result of this his own mental structure is rendered 
more flexible, i.e., more adaptable to a changeable 
environment.
The analysis of the same historical periods 
revealed the fact that the process of democratisation 
led gradually to an individualised social and cultural 
pattern. Economic and political Individualism, 
religious individualism since the Reformation as well 
as individualism in art which started with the 
Renaissance and culminated in Romanticism, are basic 
features in the culture-patterns of Western.societies. 
And here again I transferred the concept of individual-
individualisation on to the psychological plane.
I therefore, endeavoured to prove that the mind of 
modern man becomes more and more dominated by 
structures and traits which individualise his 
behaviour. I have borrowed from psycho-analysis 
the concept of the ego with the intention of covering 
under one term the main individualising traits and 
structures of the human mind. The growing tendency 
noticed in the members of modern societies to 
individualise their adjustment to the various aspects 
of their world led me to the conviction that the ego 
became more and more dominant in their mental 
structureo
All periods of democratisation are characterised 
by strong tendencies towards the nationalisation of 
the pattern of life. The tendency towards a rational 
type of economy, towards a rational type of social 
authority, expressed in its purest form in the 
authority of lav/, and a rationalistic type of thought 
are the main aspects of this. On the psychological 
plane one can easily observe that the mental structure 
of the individual belonging to these periods is 
dominated by reason; rations.l attitude towards 
authority and toward his fellow beings, rational 
attitude towards things and towards the world as a 
whole are the main characteristics of this type of man.
The combination of the processes of individualisation 
and of rationalisation, both being characteristic 
of the historical periods of democratisation,leads 
to 8, crucial point regarding the mental architecture 
of the democratic personality. The behaviour of this 
type of personality, his social behaviour in 
particular, is guided by a rational and individualised 
type of authority. One can call it the authority of 
reason, of conscience, or simply, inner authority.
I have noticed also that almost all periods of 
democratisation are periods of social and spiritual 
prosperity. This led me to the idea that one of the 
mental characteristics of the individuals living in 
democratic societies consists in a strong feeling of 
security. .This is displayed as self-confidence, and 
trust in the power of the human mind. The conviction 
that his own mind is the best guide to his actions is 
deeply rooted in this type of man.
Democracy and Totalitarianism. Fascism and
Communism are products of our time. This means that 
some sociological traits of the modern world as well 
as some psychological traits of the individuals 
belonging to it, must be common to both, democracy 
and totalitarianism. Many processes, sociological 
and psychological, which were necessary for the 
democratisation of the way of life in Western Europe,
1Europe, have, in different circumstances, contributed 
to the creation of a totalitarian way of life.
The creation of a flexible and individualised social 
structure, the weakening of tradition^, the decreasing 
importance of prejudice and emotionality in the 
social life of contemporary man, the confidence in 
reason have all led directly or indirectly to the 
creation of a totalitarian way of life. Change and 
fluidity in the structure of society are important 
traits of the democratic way of life; the feeling and 
the desire of change are also important categories of 
the democratic frame of mind. They are, however, 
counterbalanced in the mind of the individual by the 
deep conviction that his mind can understand and master 
his environment, however rapid its transformation.
Hence the feeling of security and freedom characteristic 
of the democratic man.
But not all social groups and sub-groups belonging 
to our contemporary world could adjust themselves to a 
flexible pattern of life. Moreover, in many individuals 
and groups the change and fluidity of the pattern of 
life aroused the feeling of instability and insecurity; 
the desire of change has thus turned into anxiety of 
change, the feeling of freedom has become fear of 
responsibility. Thus, the frame of mind of modern man 
suffered a. radica.l change which in the long run resulted
/ y ;
resulted in a new type of adjustment individual and 
collective, fascism and Communism are two of the most 
characteristic aspects of this type of adjustment.
The basic trait of the fascist way of life and 
of the fascist personality consists in an increased 
importance of the emotional factors in individual and 
group behaviour. Since reason proved incapa,ble of 
organising a changeable and complex environment the 
whole pattern of life underwent a process of de­
rationalisation. A social structure based on 
emotional primitive bonds, emotional attitudes towards 
authority, irrational and magic way of thinking in 
the field of culture are aspects of this process. 
Compared with the drive towards rationality, 
characteristic of the democratic way of life, Fascism 
is a symptom of regression in group behaviour.
Communism is rooted in the same human situation. 
The solution is however looked for in a different 
direction. The anxiety created in the modern working 
class by a series of disruptive changes- and by the 
effects of a rational economy, the tension created in 
various sections of the modern Russian people by a 
long series of inner conflicts characteristic of the 
Russian culture pattern, the insecurity created, in the 
backward areas of poverty, have all resulted in an 
increased tendency towards rationalisation. A super-
super-organised economic system, from which "the 
crises are forever eliminated", a rigidly organised 
state, a fixed pattern of historical development, are 
all meant to cure the basic insecurity from which many 
social groups belonging to the contemporary world 
suffer. The same crises in the rational pattern of 
democracy has led in some cases to an escape into 
irrationality and the unconscious, while in others, 
to an increased effort towards rationalisation.
How to adjust himself to an increasingly fluid pattern 
of life while retaining his basic frame of mind, is a 
problem which the men belonging to a democratic world 
have sometimesfailed to solve.
Though the expression has not been used, this 
study is permeated with the idea that Fascism and 
Communism are group adaptation syndroms. The 
evolution of modern civilisation have reached a point 
at which the equilibrium, i.e. the adequate adjustment 
of some individuals and groups cannot be attained 
but in the following two ways: (a) a resurrection 
of the primitive instinctive and emotional forces of 
the mind, and (b) a desperate effort to increase the 
control of consciousness and reason over all aspects 
of human behaviour. The former can be considered 
as syndrom of regressive group adjustment, while the 
latter, a syndrom of "progressive adjustment". But
10
But regressive,(or to the right) and progressive,
(or to the left) has the same meaning when the 
movement starts from a state of flexible equilibrium. 
The main result is in both cases the same, i.e., a 
rigid organisation of the pattern of human life. In 
the first case this was done in the name of the blind 
forces of instinct and feeling, in the second, in 
the name of the omniscient human reason.
Though this may over-simplify the whole problem, 
it would, however, be useful to consider democracy 
as a group adjustment under conditions of leisure, 
and totalitarianism as a group adjustment under con­
ditions of stress. Hence the feelings of ease and 
freedom involved in the democratic way of life and the 
feeling of effort and rigidity involved in the 
totalitarian way of life. This may serve as an answer 
to the questions whether, in Communist societies, 
individual freedom arid the flexibility of the pattern 
of life are merely matters of time, and, whether the 
individual born and brought up in these societies feels 
as free as the individual born in democracy. The 
reality is that the totalitarian way of life is the 
fruit of stress and anxiety. As such it contains in 
itself the seeds of rigidity; it cannot develop but 
within its own character, or collapse.
/
Psychology and History. History was my main 
source of information. The Athenian community and 
civilisation, the beginning of American society, 
the French Revolution and certain aspects of modern 
British civilisation furnished the material for the 
democratic way of life. The German community under 
the Nazi regime and contemporary Soviet society 
formed the empirical basis for the study of the 
Fascist and Communist way of life. Certain aspects 
in the evolution of the modern Western world, the 
evolution of the working class in particular, added 
also material for the study of Communism.
This approach to a psychological subject seems 
anachronistic in our experimentalist era. An 
experiment with small social groups in the manner of 
Lewin.or Moreno would have perhaps carried greater 
conviction for many psychologists. I toyed with the 
idea for quite a while and finally I had to give it 
up. fhe reasons are many. Firstly I could not help 
recognising that with regard to the democratic way of 
life and even to the mental structure of the democratic 
personality I have learned much more from locqueville, 
Edmund Burke, Max Weber, Sombart, F.H.Knight than from 
Lewin and Moreno. As for the Communist and the 
Fascist ways of life and personality types I had in 
front of me the published works of the leading repre-
representatives of these movements as well as the 
living examples'of Soviet and Nazi societies, Mo*fc 
useful were my own experiences, for I have lived 
successively under three political regimes: 
democracy up to 1938, Fascism from 1938 to 1944, and 
Communism from 1944 to 1948, As I was keenly 
interested in, and often deeply involved in, the 
political life of my country of birth (Roumania) my 
own experiences have offered significant material 
for the study of the democratic and totalitarian 
ways of life. The experiences gathered from my diplomatic 
missions in various Western countries have also 
furnished material for the present study,
I am under the impression that the experimental 
approach to group psychology has very seldom furthered 
the understanding of the phenomena pertinent to this 
field. The experiments set up to demonstrate the 
specific type of organisation and authority in a 
democratic or authoritarian group revealed less, and 
that in a much more confusing manner, than what I 
previously knew from the observation of everyday life 
and from the study of various democratic and totali­
tarian civilisations. It seems that the psychologists 
and the sociologists concerned with this approach are 
much more interested in trying out a method - the 
experimental method - than in the furthering of human 
knowledge in this field. The instrument has become
become more important than v/hat it is supposed to 
serve* Thus I soon discovered that it was a feeling 
of reality that led my way towards history in order 
to study some important aspects of group behaviour. 
This gave me the opportunity of studying the patterns 
of life of various groups on a natural scale, and 
in their most accomplished forms. I could select 
my examples of democratic and totalitarian societies 
in a manner which enabled me to make an idea about 
the main sociological and psychological factors 
characteristic of the two ways of life. After I had 
thus framed my concepts of the democratic and 
totalitarian ways of life I subsequently made use of 
the main results furnished by recent psychological 
researches on this matter, based on experiments, tests 
questionnaires, interviews and clinical observation* 
The main results obtained by the analysis of various 
historically realised democratic and totalitarian 
societies were on the whole supported and completed 
by those obtained by the methods mentioned above*
I found this proceeding useful, and if the present 
study has a message it is to persuade the social 
psychologist to appeal as often as possible to history 
in the historical forms of various civilisations he 
will find a fertile ground for the study of human 
social life.
Methods * I started the study of the democratic 
and totalitarian ways of life by the analysis of a 
series of concrete cases of democratic and totalitarian 
civilisation. Athenian, American, French and British 
democracies are in the first category. Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia are in the second. But my main aim 
was to use these specific social forms as empirical 
ground for investigating into the nature of democracy 
and totalitarianism* I have therefore consciously 
attempted to build up "ideal types" of democracy and 
totalitarianism. One can say that at this stage of my 
study T applied the method of "phenomenological 
reduction", i.e., from the mass of empirical data, 
sociological and psychological, I gradually proceeded 
towards the determination of a few central features 
characteristic of the democratic or totalitarian ways 
of life. I may have been arbitary, I may have made 
mistakes, but the conviction that this was the best 
way of organising a rich and often incoherent material 
offered by the study of history did not for a moment 
leave me throughout my work on the present study.
Thus, I have found that the processes of social and 
cultural flexibility, or rationalisation and of 
minimisation of power are characteristic of all 
democratic societies. The processes of social and 
cultural rigidity, of the "emotionalisation" or super­
rationalisation of life and that of the concentration
concentration of power'are, on the other hand, 
characteristic of all modern totalitarian societies. 
Finally, I transposed all these on the psychological 
plane and defined what one may call an ideal type 
of democratic or totalitarian behaviour and 
personality.
I did not stop here in my search for the ideal
type* Aiming at finding terms by which to cover
sociological, psychological and spiritual phenomena,
I defined democracy as an ethical way of life.
Human personality and inter-personal relation form the
basis of the scale of value in such a society. The
essence of democracy is human dialogue. Thus I tried
to point out the futility of defining democracy in
terms of liberal economy. A way of life based on
economic values is basically individualistic and as
such it cannot form the essence of democracy. It
was only during the liberal period of Europe that
homo economicus put on an ethical mask. Thus he
worked himself into believing that by persuing his
own interests he aimed at the happiness of the many.
porely
Democracy is not'■ afreligious way of life either, for, 
this is based on "logos1* i.e., the absoption of the 
human essence into a transcendental order. A 
balance between the divine and secular order was 
necessary in order to make a democratic way of life
life possible. And finally, democracy is not a 
political way of life the essence of which lies in 
the external character of social authority. Strong 
religious and political elements are found in a 
totalitarian way of life. But what really constitutes 
the essence of totalitarianism is its complete 
impermeability to an ethical way of life as described 
afeove.
In order to complete the picture of the ideal types 
I described democracy as a way of life dominated by 
the feelings of ease, naturalness which arose from a 
certain harmony in the pattern of life. The Greek 
term ’’eukosmia" and what the French mean by ’’douceur des 
moeurs" are adequate expressions of this state of 
affairs. The totalitarian-way of life is, on the 
other hand pervaded by extreme emotions, by the 
feeling of effort and rigidity, and by the tension 
aroused by an ambivalent attitude in life, i.e., the 
feeling of unlimited power alternates with the feeling 
of impotence, the feeling of insecurity is carefully 
covered by an inflated sense of adventure, the fear 
of chaos is strongly repressed by rigid organisation.
The empirically minded sociologists and 
psychologists may find fault with a certain detachment f 
from facts and a certain tendency towards abstract 
thinking displayed throughout this study. I can only
only say that this was necessarily implied in.my 
approach. Here I touch upon another point regarding 
the method used in this study. My approach was an 
inteijgalist one. I wished in the first place to see 
the democratic, the fascist and the Communist ways 
of life as parts of a whole, or as stages in the 
unfolding of the historical process of contemporary 
civilisation. I was often under the impression that, 
concentrating too much on their interrelation, I 
missed certain important aspects of my subject. But 
I regarded this as a necessary limitation and "parti
i
pris" of my work. What I should like to stress here 
is that my intention was to present a comparative 
view of the democratic and totalitarian ways of life 
rather than the study of democracy, Fascism and 
Communism in themselves.
I have avoided any "reductionist” view of democrac 
and totalitarianism and of contemporary European 
civilisation in general. The temptation was great to 
consider with Marx the economic process, or with 
Max Weber the religious * factors, as the basis of 
modern civilisation and to infer from this the psycho­
logical changes in modern man. But this would have 
implied that I as a social psychologist know much more 
than I do in fact know. That is to say, I know that 
one specific factor of modern civilisation can be
be considered as the originator or the cause of 
others* This assumption forms the basis of a 
reductionist point of view. I refrained as much as 
possible from any reductionist attitude be it called 
economism, idealism, sociologism - in the manner of 
Karl Mannheim for instance - or even psychologism.
I do not know, for instance, whether a series of 
sociological phenomena characteristic of the process 
of democratisation preceded in time or whether they 
caused the psychological phenomena, characteristic 
of the same process. I have considered the historical 
process as a whole and pointed to its various aspects, 
economic, sociological, spiritual and psychological, 
without assuming that they determined each other in a 
specific manner and order. My assumptions were that 
they belong to a structure and that they are conditioned 
by the whole to which they belong.
A reductionist attitude requires metaphysical 
ferment and a considerable power of belief which I 
do not possess. Throughout this study I was unable 
to decide what is more important in the historical 
process; the sociological or the psychological factors, 
society or the individual. If I have to say something 
about this problem, my conviction is that behind all 
this - the individual, society, psychological and 
sociological factors - there lies the process of
of history itself which in its unfolding relies at 
one time on individual,while at others, on supra- 
individual factors.
What I have just said is connected with a certain 
point in my approach, namely, with my political 
prejudices, it is only fair to say that I started 
the present study with a strong prejudice for 
democracy. [Political prejudices substitute the native 
country of a political refugee). And although these 
prejudices have not diminished in vigour, yet, with 
the advance in the present study they became mingled 
with the conviction that the totalitarian forms of 
our times sprang up by a certain necessity from the 
historical process. I am referring to the psychological 
and moral concept of necessity. Consequently as true 
child of my age I became partly resigned in front of, 
and partly terrified by the "monster” of history. I 
seem to read in a new context the meaning of the 
ancient myth: Chronos creating, and then eating his
own offspring. Sometimes this inner tension burst out 
in emotional attitudes and value judgments.
Before closing this introduction I feel I have 
to mention the extent to which I am aware of the main 
shortcomings of the present study. The canvas on 
which I chose to paint was too large; my ability to 
deal with historical facts was often too limited, and
and the extent to which I could rely on psychological 
research in this field was insignificant. I can 
sum up all these difficulties by saying that the 
nearer I came to the end of this study the more I 
realised that 1 was at the beginning. It is with 
this feeling that I closed the last chapter.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY.
Je vois que les Liens et les maux se 
repartissent assez egalement dans le monde.
Les grand riches disparaissent ; le nombre 
des petites fortunes s'accroit; les desirs et 
les jouissances se multiplient; il n fy a plus
s
de prosperites extraordinaires ni de miseres 
irremediables. L'ambition est un sentiment universel, 
il'y a peu d'ambitions vastes. Chaque individu 
est isole et faible; la societe est agile, prevoyante 
et forte; les particuliers font les petites choses, 
et l'Etat d'immenses.
Alexis de Tocqueville.
jLt «0
T
THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE.
"Our city is thrown open 
to the world".
Pericles.
Democrac.y as a Frame of Mind* Democracy as a political 
concept can he described in terms of methods or techniques 
of government. "We are called a Democracy - says Pericles 
in his funeral speech- for the administration is in the 
hands of the many, and not of the few". Formulae such 
as government of, by, and for the people, the sovereignty 
of the people, universal suffrage, papular and responsible 
government, and others are often used for the description 
of democracy.
But in spite of this rich and colourful collection 
of formulae, anyone attempting to define democracy has an 
almost impossible task. The reason for this lies in the 
fact that the validity of all fundamental concepts normally 
involved in such a definition has been seriously challenged 
by various historical conditions in which democracy has 
been realised. Even Aristotle, while agreeing that the 
main feature of democracy consists in”the election of 
magistrates by all, out of all", becomes involved in a 
long/
discussion about the meaning of the concept of 
"the many". Finally he has to specify that the 
many who rule in a democracy "are also poor", while 
the rich, who govern in aristocracy, are "at the 
same time few in number". (Politics. Transl. Benjamin 
Jowett. Oxford and Clarendon Press IV,p.l52).
Today it would be easy to prove that decisions 
taken by "the many" - who are also poor - are not 
necessarily democratic. During the last century 
some absolutist monarchs were in favour of extending 
the right to vote to the propertyless classes in the 
hope that they would be more conservative, i.e., more 
in favour of the absolutist regime, than the well-to-do 
classes. 1.
I. . Max Weber mentions such cases in "The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization". English Translation 
by A.M. Henderson. Wm. Hodge & Co. Ltd., Edinburgh.
Last Chapter. Ignazio Silone, dealing with this problem, 
gives the example of King Humbert of Italy who increased 
the electorate from 150,000 to two millions for the obvious 
reason that an electorate of two millions who were poor 
and illiterate was more easily manageable than the former 
one. (The School for Dictators, Engl. Transl. by Davis 
and E. Mosbacher, London, Jonathan Cape, 1959, p. 264).
The results of a series of modern "plebiscites"
leads inevitably to the conclusion that universal suffrage,
or decisions taken by majorities are but political
instruments which can serve democracy as well as other 
forms/
of government. One has therefore to take into account 
a number of factors influencing the behaviour of the 
people in political matters in order to specify under 
what conditions the majority act democratically. Thus 
one has to specify first of all that the concept of 
majority enters into the definition of democracy only 
to the extent to which the many possess, and know how 
to make use of, political power in their community.
This obviously means something more than a simple political 
equality contained in the formula "one man one vote".
Self-government is undoubtedly an essential feature 
of democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, amongst others, 
lays particular stress on this. In the people's interest 
and participation in the life of their community, in their 
wish and capacity to conduct their own affairs, he sees 
not only the spring, but also the main guarantee of 
democracy. On this point he goes as far as to distinguish 
between self-government and good government, i.e., 
government carried on by an enlightened group,in the best 
interest of the people. A democratic reform, or democratic 
action in general, has to "be brought about not only with 
the assent of the people, but by their hand". (On the State 
of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789. Transl. 
Henry Reeve, London, 1873, p. 203.)
Now/
How this is obviously true, but it requires 
certain qualifications. In order to make their society 
"by their hand" the members of a group have to possess 
considerable experience in, and knowledge of, public 
administration. They need also certain institutions 
which allow them to take a share in the king of their 
society. But they need something more than this; they 
need a specific frame of mind, i.e. certain experiences, 
attitudes, prejudices and beliefs shared by them all, 
or by a large majority.
Before describing the main features of this frame 
of mind, it would perhaps be necessary to state that 
we are not prepared to reduce the concept of democracy 
to it alone. A specific state of mind is always involved 
in a democratic society, but this can hardly be grasped 
and judged unless it is translated into enduring institutions. 
We are, however, of the opinion that the safest guarantee of 
a democratic way of life is to be found in a frame of mind. 
Without this, democratic institutions cannot grow ; if 
they are introduced from outside, their life is short.
Examples to prove this are easy to find. The rapid decline 
and final death of Middle and East European democracies, in 
the period between the two World Wars, was not caused 
primarily by the weakness of the democratic institutions 
existing/
in these countries. Sometimes and in some places the 
democratic, mechanism of government was as good as 
anywhere else. And yet in most of these countries 
democracy was voted out after a short life• One must 
infer from this that the frame of mind of the people 
was unsuitable for such a regime.
1. One of the basic traits of the democratic 
frame of mind can be described as the feeling of change.
The feeling shared by the members of a community, that 
their personal, and their communal life as well, are in 
a state of permanent transformation and re-adjustment 
forms, so to speak, the first category of the democratic 
frame of mind. Due to this the individual regards his 
society as an open structure, ready to keep pace with the 
process of general change, and with the changes taking 
place in its members in the first place. We classify this 
trait of the democratic frame of mind as a feeling, because 
of its general and undifferentiated nature. Considering 
its origins one can call it also a habit of mind, i.e., 
that particular habit of mind, shared by the majority of 
the members of a group, to adjust themselves, and to adjust 
the structure of their society to the ever changing 
conditions of life.
It is obvious that the individuals could not have 
acquired/
such a habit had they not lived through periods of
considerable historical change• Thus the democratic
regimes are normally preceded by periods of great
change which affect the structure of society as a
whole. Greek democracies followed a period of
radical transformation in the structure of Greek
th
societies. During the Vlllth and Vll centuries 
there took place the transition
from the primitive patriarchal to an aristocratic 
social organisation. A period of great changes 
started then, which culminated with Cleisthenes1s 
political reforms. New colonies and big cities were 
founded, new classes and ways of life made their 
appearance. A similar historical pattern applies to 
the Western world in the period preceding the rise of 
modern democracies. The Renaissance is but the apex 
of a long process of change. High above all new forms 
of life stands the capitalist economy which, due to 
its rapid development, induces in many individuals - 
in the inhabitants of the town in particular - the 
feeling of change, novelty and social growth. There 
was a flow of new things, new ideas, new aspirations 
and new forms of life for which one needed not only an 
open mind, but an open and fluid social pattern to 
integrate them all. 
it/
It is this feeling of change and social dynamism 
which formed the basic element in the mind of the first 
emigrants to America who, after cutting off all their 
connections with the old society, made full use of it 
in building up the first modern democracy. In Prance 
there was needed a revolution before this frame of 
mind, of which the feeling of permanent change and 
transformation was a component, found expression in 
new social institutions. In England the process was 
slow, but obviously in the same direction.
The individual belonging to post-&enaissance 
societies had to develop to a maximum his capacity 
for adjustment to change and novelty. It is because 
of this that the feeling of change becomes fundamental 
category of its mind. Sometimes the effects of this 
feeling remain unconscious, at other times they are 
projection at the conscious level as a theoretical 
construct. Thus the same feeling of change which was 
a basic trait of the democratic frame of mind, became 
articulated in a theory of evolution or a philosophy 
of progress. It is very easy to prove the existence 
of such a phenomenon in modern culture-patterns, for 
there is no other period in human history in which a 
greater concern is shown with the rational formulation 
of/
the phenomena of change and evolution. In the early 
stage of this period Vico made the attempt towards the 
articulation of this deep mental category of modern 
man in a philosophy of history, later on, Diderot, in a 
philosophy of progress, and later still, Hegel does the 
same thing by laying the foundation of a logic of change 
and evolution. Though it is generally held that the 
Greeks were less aware of the changeable character of 
things, one can hardly say that their mind remained 
completely unaffected by the feeling of change. The 
philosophical doctrine of Heraclitus and Thucydides * 
profound sense of history are characteristic from this 
point of view.
On the social plane the feeling of change is 
articulated in the conviction, and in the social 
behaviour resulting from it, that society is an open 
structure in a state of permanent readiness for change. 
"Our city is thrown open to the world" says Pericles 
about his democratic Athens.
2. The feeling of change cannot be regarded as 
an isolated trait; the social and cultural behaviour 
generated by it is moulded by other categories of the 
democratic frame of mind. Thus, the feeling of change 
and/
'ID
i
any other category of the democratic frame of mind |
are parts of a whole • i
The individuals who create or live in democracy 
do not only hold the belief that their society is in 
perpetual change, but also that this change is the 
direct result of their own activities. Consequently j
the feeling that society grows from within, by the
i
activity of its members, individuals and corporate j
bodies, can be considered as another category of the |
democratic frame of mind. This manifests itself under 
many formso Firstly the individuals who create and !
live in a democratic organisation possess that habit jI
of mind according to which they take it for granted j
that the growth of society is determined by endogenic j
I
factors. Secondly, they hold the belief that the j
relationships between them naturally crystallise in a 
common pattern of life which will finally harmonise 
the interests of everyone of them. Thirdly, and this j
is partly implied in the previous point, these individuals j 
act on the assumption that the activity of each of them j
is equally necessary for the life and development of j
i
their own society.
|
Like the feeling of change, the feeling that the ■
j
growth of society is determined from within by the 
activity of its members rests on a series of habits of 
mind/ I
formed in certain communities by a long historical 
process. The first condition leading to the formation 
of these habits of mind in some ancient Greek communities 
is to be found in that complex of factors which define 
the so-called genius of the race. Suffice it to mention 
the Greeks’ fondness for public meetings, and their 
creative capacity in the field of social relations, 
in order to prove this point. But there were a series 
of other, more concrete, factors which contributed to 
the formation of these habits of mind. Most important 
of all is the rise and development of the middle classes 
in Athens, which was accomplished by the beginning of 
the Vth.century. To these classes belonged individuals
who reached and preserved their position in the existing 
society by their work and intelligence; moreover it was 
due primarily to the specific activities carried on by 
these individuals that new forms of life appeared in the 
midst of an old patriarchal society. It was therefore 
only natural for these individuals to possess in a higher 
degree than others the feeling that society on the whole 
grows from within by the activities of its own members. 
The kind of activity they led awakened in them earlier 
than in other sub-groups the conviction that they are 
the creators of their society.
There/
There is another aspect of the Greek society of 
that period that contributed towards the formation 
of the belief that the structure of society is based 
on the participation of its members. This consists 
in the need and the effective experience of social 
co-operation which stood at the origin of the type of 
organization known as "Polis". The "PO.lis” rose as 
the union of several rural settlements representing 
tribal groups and families. (The process is known as 
"Synoecism". A. Croiset j Les Ddmocraties Antiques.
Paris, F laminar ion, Ed. 1909 p. 275)* This would have 
been impossible without a long and successful experience 
in co-operation, and co-ordinated social action, which, 
we presume, resulted in the feeling that society was 
in a high degree a matter of common activity and 
agreements dictated by the nature of common interests 
and experience.
In European societies, the source of these habits 
of mind is to be found in the experience gained by the 
inhabitants of the towns in the administration of their 
common affairs. The administrative autonomy of the towns 
is a characteristic feature of Western medieval society. 
(According to Tocqueville the French village also 
enjoyed a certain degree of local autonomy). In England 
the/
system of local autonomy was preserved throughout the 
modern era. It is therefore little wonder that the 
"bourgeois” played such an important part in the 
building up of Western democratic societies. For, 
like the Greek member of the middle classes, the modern 
bourgeois possesses in a high degree the feeling that 
he cannot only conduct, but even create his own society.
It is not too difficult to find how the belief 
that society is a matter of co-operation originated in 
the mind of modern man. The need for, and the 
experience of co-operation among various social groups, 
divided and antagonised by a system of privileges, 
against an autocratic monarch formed in fact an 
important feature in the rise of modern societies 
and states. This was noticed throughout the rise of 
the British modern state, and formed at the same time 
the central motive in the prelude to the French 
Revolution. In the example of co-operation between the 
"three orders" set forth, in 1787, by the province of 
Dauphiny, can be grasped the pattern of a new society 
resulting from the common activity of, and agreements 
among its components, i.e. of a society which builds up 
its form from within. It is this social pattern that 
lurked in the minds of the Pilgrim Fathers leaving the 
old Continent.
When/ i
When they settled down in America they put it into 
practice in its purest form. There was no constituted 
body or class within their small groups; the individual 
had to be not only a soldier in the protection of his 
own society, but also a pioneer in the making of it. 
Later, the French Revolution repeated the same pattern 
when breaking down the old social order to its basic 
units, the individuals, and subsequently trying to 
build up a new society from the net of inter-individual 
relationships. The conviction that each individual 
is a maker of his society is a basic trait of a 
democratic frame of mind*
At the cultural level this trait is articulated 
in various forms. In the feeling that each individual 
is, in his own way, an agent in the making of his society 
lies the seed of both the doctrine of equality and that 
of freedom. With regard to the former we are only too 
well aware that in its most radical form, as total 
equality, or equalitarianism, it is not necessarily a 
feature of democratic society. We cannot, however, 
help noticing that certain equalitarian conceptions 
arose in the culture-pattern of every community in 
process of democratisation. In some communities, whose 
members/
showed particular inclinations towards rational 
thinking, such as the Athenian and the French 
communities, equality was worked out into an ideal 
concept and considered as specific to a democratic 
way of life. Equalitarian tendencies formed also a 
specific feature in the early American society.
There they crystallised in the doctrine of equal 
rights, or more recently, in the concept of equal 
opportunities. Movements such as that initiated 
by the Levellers show clearly that the ideal of 
equality formed an important feature in the early 
stages in the democratisation of the British community. 
The lure of such an ideal was, however, short-lived, due 
to the congenital inclination of the British people to 
empirical thinking. Equality was considered as an 
"abstract right". (Burke).
As for the doctrine of freedom one can say that 
it can be found in every democratic culture-pattern.
Its origins lie, as stated before, in the conviction 
that the structure of society is not based on a 
permanent and fixed order, and that, on the contrary, 
it results from the activity of each of its members, 
from their common experiences, from their interactions, 
deliberations and agreements. This conviction is 
obviously itself the structuration of a great variety 
of/
experiences in self-government which certain 
communities as wholes, or certain parts of a 
community, had gained.In Athens, the doctrine^ of 
freedom crystallised, depending upon the various 
stages of social evolution, in concepts such as : 
isegoria (equality of speech), isonomia (equality 
before the law), isocratia (political equality), 
parrhesia (equality and freedom of speech). In 
Western society its most typical crystallisation is 
seen in the doctrine of economic liberalism. But 
whatever its expression, the doctrine of freedom is 
rooted in the deep belief - which forms an essential 
category of the democratic frame of mind - that the 
structure of society rises from, and develops in the 
function of the experiences and will of a number of 
individuals living together. From the same conviction 
springs up the conception that society is ultimately a 
matter of "contract" which formed one of the basic 
ideological pre-requisites in the process of democratisa- 
tion of modern societies.
3 • From what has been said so far one can easily 
infer that a democratic frame of mind contains also a 
specific attitude towards authority, as one of its 
categories./
To start with, one can say that the basic element of 
this attitude consists in the feeling of instability 
and relativity of power and authority. One would 
perhaps understand better this aspect of the democratic 
frame of mind if one described it as the awareness, 
present in various degrees in the members of a certain 
community, that the holding of power and authority 
implies the concession made by one part to another 
part of the community. In other words it implies 
a process of delegation.
As for the historical context of this trait one 
can say that the feeling of the unstable and relative 
character of political power was certainly aroused by 
those periods of rapid transformation and social unrest 
preceding some democracies. The contest of power 
between the Eupatrids and the kings, on the one hand, 
and among the Eupatrids themselves, on the other, had 
certainly something to do with the presence of this 
feeling in the minds of the Athenians. The same can 
be said about the struggle between the European aris­
tocracy and monarchy, and between the Church and State. 
But this is not all. On the contrary it would be easy 
to prove that in certain circumstances the contests
of power, and social instability do not necessarily lead 
to/
the feeling of the relative character of authority.
The formation of this specific attitude towards 
authority in Western man is in fact determined by 
a complex of circumstances. Most important of all 
is the process of secularisation which, as will be shown 
later, shook the foundation of absolute authority in 
the mind of modern man.
Interpreting the process of democratisation as it 
took place on the Continent - in France in particular- 
one is often inclined to believe that the feeling of 
the relative character of power and authority, so 
characteristic of modern man, comes mainly as a reaction 
from the absolutist regime preceding the democratic era. 
Thus the early meaning of democracy was more than
opposition to the privileges of the old powers, the 
clergy and the feudal nobility; hence the negation of 
those values which served to uphold their position1*.
(A. von Martin, The Sociology of the Renaissance. Kegan- 
Paul, London 1945, p.4). In fact the reaction against 
permanent and absolutist power constitutes only one 
element in the composition of the democratic attitude 
towards authority and power. This lies at the basis 
of that aspect of the democratic attitude towards 
authority which has been called "negative freedom", and 
which/
is in fact a natural outcome of the struggle for 
liberation from an authoritarian regime. In this 
respect one has to recognise that the democratic 
attitude towards power and authority contains the 
seeds of anarchy which may grow out into trees whenever 
the soil is favourable. There is no need to prove 
this by examples.
But, as just stated, this is only one aspect - 
the negative one - of the democratic attitude towards 
authority. The social experience leading towards 
:fche creation of modern democracies show clearly that 
the attitude towards authority could not be a negative 
one exclusively. The authority based on absolute 
power was undoubtedly negated, but another type of 
authority took its place. This is the internal authority 
of reason and conscience. One can speak in this case 
about a displacement of authority which is characteristic 
of modern man; the confidence in, and reliance on 
external and divine authority was gradually transformed 
into confidence in, and reliance on the powers of human 
reason and conscience.
But human reason and conscience are not social 
authority in themselves. Here comes an important point 
in the formation of that aspect of the democratic frame 
of mind/
which refers to the nature of social authority, The 
experiences in self-government, in building up new 
social forms and groups, characteristic of some modern 
Western communities, implanted into the individual 
the conviction that the authority resting on the 
principles of the human mind - logical and moral - can 
be imparted to other individuals by deliberation. The 
same experiences implanted also the conviction that the 
authority founded on the individual’s reason can be 
concentrated by an act of common will, and conferred 
as such upon a man, a party, or an institution. In 
other words, authority can be represented.
Therefore, the essence of the democratic attitude 
towards authority consists in the concept of that inner 
and personal authority which is an individualised 
authority. This authority can be concentrated by 
agreement and conferred upon a representative. Hence 
the social order is a representative order. It ought 
also to be said that authority is conferred, yet never 
entirely transferred. This is due to the conviction 
shared by every individual member of a democratic
community, that he himself is an agent in the making
of his society; hence the exercise of social power is to
him an act of agreement by deliberation, rather than an
of assenting* Whenever a community of people are 
ready to transfer the power and authority to a 
leader or a party there is an obvious proof that they 
lack the democratic frame of mind, even when this 
transfer is carried out by impeccable democratic 
methods. The best example of this kind is furnished 
by the German people of today. They had once transferred 
the power to Hitler, and the great numbers of votes 
given to Adenauer in September 1953, gives us ground to 
believe that they are ready to repeat the act. It is 
either the people !s lack of confidence that they can 
create their own society "by their hand", or the 
existence of some other factors that make it impossible 
for them to resist the transference of power and its 
concentration in the hands of a few.
The articulation on the social plane of the 
feeling of the relative and representative character 
of power and authority is seen in the doctrine and 
practice of the division and balance of power, in the 
decentralisation and minimisation of power which are, 
in one form or another, present in all modern democracies.
4. This last category of the democratic frame of 
mind can be described as an attitude of confidence in 
reason. But before saying anything on this account we 
have to recognise the fact that we are aware of the 
existence/
of a widely-spread opinion according to which a 
democratic way of life must necessarily he rooted 
in an empirical attitude in life. It would follow 
from this that the organisatioh of social life according 
to a rational order is the very opposite of democracy. 
British society is often mentioned as an example which 
proves the close connection between empirical thinking 
and democracy. Moreover, formulae such as "Laissez- 
faire", "wait and see", and above all the concept of 
individual freedom which applies to all democracies 
testify to the same connection between empirical 
attitude in life and democracy.
But when we speak about the democratic frame of
mind we axe only secondarily interested in the cultural
or ideological aspect of democracy. It is true that
some democratic nations are addicted to an empirical
while some others to a rational way of thinking. But
this difference is not as deep as is often thought, for,
the action of a free individual in a flexible society
is always carried out on the deep - often unconscious -
presupposition that it leads to, and ends in a rational
order, i.e. that this action will be finally adjusted
to a harmonious social pattern which reveals the norms 
of/
reason. This is waht we mean here hy the feeling of 
confidence in reason; it is a constitutional element 
of the individuals mind which sometimes is manifested - 
at the cultural level - as the cult of reason, some other 
times as a strong conviction that "an invisible hand" 
leads man on to the right path. Very often it appears 
as blind confidence in order, i.e. the very opposite of 
the fear of instability and chaos.
There is no need to show how these feelings, all 
of them being various aspects of confidence in reason, 
have been manifested in various modern societies since 
the Renaissance. It would perhaps be useful to mention 
here that the process of secularisation has something to 
do with this. The decline of the faith in the trans­
cendental (divine) reason has gradually been compensated 
in the mind of modern man by a stronger confidence in 
the imminent order of the universe. During the Renai­
ssance this feeling of confidence is inspired by the 
belief in the existence of two kinds of reason: the
cosmic reason which assures the order in the physical 
universe, and the human reason which has the double 
function of recognising the order of the cosmic reason, 
and at the same time, of creating a rational order in
the universe. With the advance of the modern era the 
latter/
function becomes more and more emphasised. Thus the 
confidence in the creative power of human reason, 
reached a peak when the process of democratisation 
began.
Since we have to come back later on to the problem 
regarding the relationship between reason and democracy, 
we must try now to answer the question : How did this
category of the democratic frame of mind originate 
in modern society ? While we retain a purely psychological 
point of view, it would be necessary to start by saying 
that the feeling of confidence in reason was necessary 
as a balancing factor in the mind of the individual who 
had to adjust himself to a world of change and novelty’, 
it was necessary for this individual to develop the 
belief that there was an order and stability behind the 
change, and that there were certain regulative principles 
which put a check upon change. Therefore free individual 
action and flexible, open, and even atomised society are 
for this type of man not only possible but even safe since 
they obey a certain fundamental order. Whatever the 
change may be, certain basic principles, certain "fun­
damental human rights" have to be respected. This deep 
conviction is knitted in the ideological pattern of many 
democracies. 1« British democracy seems to be
1. Tocqueville rightly notices that the democratic 
nations/
are fond of general ideas. The democratic historians 
resort much more often to "general causes" than the 
aristocratic historian*. (Democracy in America. Trans 1. 
by H. Reeve. IT of. Alfred^. Knopf, Chap.AX).
an exception. But in the light in which we regard 
here the democratic frame of mind, this exception seems 
to be only apparent. Bor, while in other communities 
the individuals show their confidence in a set of 
principles expressed by a rational doctrine, in the 
British community, they place their confidence in a 
form of practical reason, i.e. in a set of norms, 
traditions, "prejudices” and "prescriptions". While 
in the former case the change is checked and guided 
by the order of reason, in the latter, the "expediency" 
in life has to compromise with the order of "permanence", 
stored in a body of prejudices and prescriptions. It 
is the confidence in this order that compensates for the 
necessity of adjustment to a world of change and novelty.
If one replaces the expression "confidence in reason" by 
"confidence in a fundamental order", this often over­
stressed difference between the British and other democratic 
frames of mind becomes considerably diminished.
The individuals living in a world of rapid change, 
and in a dynamic social structure in particular, develop, 
apart from the feeling of confidence in a fundamental order, 
a/
series of habits of mind which facilitate an adequate 
adjustment to a changeable environment. This is 
another important source of the need of reason in 
modern man. For reason is that complex of mental 
functions, or habits by which the individual is able 
to grasp the unity in diversity, and the order of 
change. Perhaps the term habit is not entirely 
adequate in this context, for it implies a certain 
rigid organisation of the forms of reaction and 
adjustment. Reason on the other hand presupposes a 
high degree of mental flexibility which enables the 
individual to compare things, to establish differences 
and identities, and finally to compromise. This 
complex of operation makes necessary the development 
in the highest degree possible of that mental structure 
which can establish by a system of relations a formal 
order between events, or things so as to make adjustment 
possible. Hew events demand new relations, and con- 
sequently re-adjustment.
At the root of this type of adjustment one can
certainly find the belief that there is a certain order
in the nature of things. This belief was, as we have
seen, displayed by both the Greek and modern man. On
the other hand, this type of adjustment would hardly
have been possible without the feeling of confidence in 
the/
capacity of human hand, and without a strong feeling 
of security, both individual and collective.
The confidence shown by modern man in the power of 
his mind was in many ways justified. For, throughout 
the modern era he grew more and more convinced of the 
fact that his mind is flexible enough not only to 
make possible his adjustment to an immediate environment, 
but also to grasp connections between the elements of 
this environment so as to foresee and master the course 
of events. The development of positive science during 
the modern era is the main aspect of this phenomenon.
To account for the feeling of security one has to 
start from the fact that the historical periods leading
^ re,
to democratisation the periods of progress and prosperity 
There is no need to bring proofs in the support of this 
assertion with regard to Athenian, British and American 
societies. And though the same thing can be said about 
Western society as a whole, during the post-Renaissance 
period, many people are still inclined to think that the 
economic frustration of the French lower class were 
among the main factors leading to the democratic changes 
initiated by the Revolution. This is not however the 
opinion held by Tocqueville - and he was followed by 
many others - who produces sufficient facts to prove 
■that the period immediately preceding the Revolution was 
on the whole marked by considerable prosperity, l). it
therefore he safely said that it was this general 
state of prosperity that aroused first in man confidence 
in himself and in his society.
1. "...•in no one of the periods which followed
the Revolution of 1789 has the national prosperity of 
France augmented more rapidly than it did in the twenty 
years preceding that event" (The State of Society....»
p. 212).
It is of course difficult to work with such vague 
concepts such as economically frustrated communities.
But if one can rely on the observation of a series of 
recent events in European history, we can conclude that 
it is very seldom that an economically frustrated people 
fought for the overthrow of an authoritarian order. The 
contrary can be said; the need of security, normally 
frustrated in such people, causes them to accept and 
cfeate a rigid authoritarian order. We hope to prove 
this, in the second part of this study.
There is a strong sense of security, both individual
and collective, involved in any process of democratisation.
This will come out clearly from what we have to say at a 
later stage. For the moment it will be enough to point 
out that this sense of security is aroused by the
expanding character of society, and by the conviction,
shared by many inidividuals, that the human mind is 
flexible enough to organise the experience in any field 
of reality. This flexible character of the mind is 
expressed/
by a particular structure whose function it is to relate 
the data of environment, to compromise between their :
various aspects, to organise them so as to make adjust­
ment possible. This structure has been called reason; ;
today one can speak about intelligence, or the ego as 
fulfilling approximately the same functions. We shall !
I
see later that the mental structures which can be called I
reason, intelligence, or the ego have gradually come into
i
the foreground of the mental life of modern man. They 
are the most suitable tools for adjustment to a flexible 
society, and to a changeable universe.
The confidence in reason being a basic category of 
the democratic frame of mind becomes articulated in a 
great variety of forms at the social and cultural levels. 
Most aspects of the democratic culture-pattern are deeply
I
affected by rationalistic thinking. Even more striking is |
the fact that any democratic period is marked by a general j
i
tendency towards rationalising the field of social re- j
lations. In any democratic community the conviction is j
widely spread, that society can be organised according to 
rational ends, that the people meeting together and 
deliberating upon their own interests can find common goals 
and ways of action which make an equal appeal to everyone of 
them. One can further on say that every democratic comm- j
unity is founded on the conviction of its capacity for j
j]
self-legislation, i.e. the/ j
conviction that any diversity of of interests can 
finally be solved in a compromise, that any new 
experience can emerge in a general scheme of action.
The first Puritans landing on the barren coast of 
Hew England (1620) had the strong conviction that, 
by their combination into a "body politick1', they 
could "enact, constitute, and frame such just and 
equal laws, ordinances and acts, constitutions and 
offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most 
meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony 
(From the constitutive act signed by this group 
of immigrants. Quot. from Tocqueville ; Democracy in 
America, p. 35. Italics ours.)
This section regarding the constitution of the 
democratic frame of mind can be concluded as follows;
The individuals belonging to a group in process of 
democratisation uphold the conviction that their society 
is a self-legislative body, and that its individual 
members can formulate their own interests in a common 
pattern of life. This pattern is flexible so as to 
include them all, and to remain still open to new 
experiences, and to new wishes the individuals may have 
in the future. The power of self-legislation and the 
flexible character of its organisation form two main 
features of a democratic community.
Psyche and History./
Psyche and History. We have begun the study of 
democracy with the description of the democratic 
frame of mind, and thus established that its main 
traits consist in the feeling of change, in the deep 
conviction that the individuals make their society 
"by their hands", in the relative and representative 
character of social power and authority, and in the 
confidence in reason. In doing so we have left the 
impression that democracy is a purely psychological 
reality. This may be true, but it would be wrong to 
understand by this that democracy, ancient or modern, 
or the democratic way of life in general, sprang up 
from the mind of some particular individuals and groups, 
like Athena from Zeus' head. What we really mean when 
saying that democracy is a psychological reality is 
that any democratic institution, and any democratic 
organisation, is prepared by a series of inclinations, 
feelings, convictions and habits of thinking in the mind 
of the people long before its historical realisation#
At a certain period, and in a certain historical context 
these mental elements are translated into institutions 
and modes of social behaviour which together form a 
democratic society and a democratic way of life. This 
happened in various Greek communities and in various
modern nations. We are prepared to go even further and 
say/
S2>
that, when this frame of mind is lacking,democratic 
institutions cannot grow; if they are introduced from 
outside they are likely to be mutilated or to disappear 
altogether after a short time. The example of various 
Greek cities, where democracy was introduced by the 
Athenians (Samos) the example of Mexico, where the -early 
American democratic institutions failed to take root, 
the unsuccessful attempt towards the demoeratisation 
of Germany and of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, 
can be adduced as proofs» Democracy grows out of its 
own soil. This means that it requires specific 
experiences and specific mental changes in a community 
before appearing as historical reality.
But, on the other hand, one can say that the 
democratic frame of mind is itself a historical product. 
In the previous section we have endeavoured to show how 
the feelings, the dispositions, the beliefs and the 
habits of thought which make up the democratic frame 
of mind have grown out of a series of experiences 
characteristic of certain communities and certain 
historical periods. Thus, the conviction that society 
is a flexible and open structure, the confidence, common 
to the members of a group, that they can make their 
society by their hands, are mental products gradually 
built/
up in societies undergoing a process of rapid growth, 
in which there exists an intense process of cooperation 
between its members, and in which, at least a number of 
the individuals have a considerable amount of experience 
in self-administration. This happened in a series of 
Greek and modern communities. This shows that the 
democratic frame of mind is itself determined by 
sociological factors, a fact which seems to contradict 
the assertion made in the previous paragraph that 
democracy is the product of a particular frame of mind.
We have obviously reached the heart of the dilemma,
sociologism-psychologism, which we lay no claim to have
solved. We might however minimise the importance of
this dilemma by the following formulation of our problem:
It is obviously true that the democratic frame of mind
developed and became articulated as the result of a
particular pattern of experiences. In modern societies
these experiences are furnished by an expanding and
rational economy, by quick social changes, and by certain
political methods. But these experiences have no meaning
in themselves. Moreover, in the flow of historical
process they are more or less disconnected events. Here
comes the creative characters of the mind. The mental
factors resulting from the experiences characteristic of
a rational economy, and of a changeable society formed 
an/
integrated structure with those resulting from the 
experiences in self-administration, social co-operation, 
etc. And it is the integration of these factors into 
a whole that forms the basic layer of a democratic 
frame of mind. Thus, the members of some modern 
communities have gradually become aware - most of them 
have felt this unconsciously - that the type of social 
order which suits them best is a flexible society, i.e. 
a society open to changes according to the conditions 
of life of its members. But at the same time, the people 
became aware of something even more important, i.e. that 
they can realise this type of society for the simple 
reason that they discovered in themselves inclinations, 
feelings and habits of mind which directed them towards 
this end. They expressed this in a simple manner :
A society based on flexible order, on the participation 
of every one of its members, a society capable of self­
legislation, with a representative form of authority, 
in a word, a democratic society, was necessary because 
it corresponded to human nature. Apparently they were 
little aware of the fact that human nature, as they 
defined it, was formed by a long process, and, in specific
historical conditions• In the next chapter we shall try 
to/
describe the main aspects of the social and spirital 
world which contributed most to the formation of the 
democratic mind and of the democratic way of life 
of modern European man. At the same time, we shall 
endeavour to throw light on an opposite process, 
i.e. how this mental nucleus of democracy grows up 
into history. The way a democratic frame of mind 
grows into history can be thought of in a manner 
similar to the way this first chapter grows into 
the present book.
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C H A P T E R  II.
A FLEXIBLE SOCIETY.
Italy, always delighted in a
new thing, has lost all stab­
ility ; a servant may
easily become a king.
Aeneas Sylvius.
Some Economic Aspects in the Flexibility of Socio­
cultural Patterns in Modern Europe. In what follows
we propose to give a brief account of the most important
economic changes taking place in post-Renaissance 
Europe in order to show the degree of flexibility 
acquired by the socio-cultural patterns of various 
European societies as a result of them ctongea . It 
would perhaps be advisable to state at the very 
beginning that on no account do we wish to create the 
impression that the economic factors are the most 
important elements in the structure of a society and 
even less so in the democratisation of Western Europe. 
One of our main endeavours is to keep away from any 
"reductionist” approach to human society, economic or 
otherwise. The flexibility of various European socio­
cultural patterns is due to a complex process from which 
we detach, for the time being, the economic aspects.
Many sociologists, even among those who cannot be 
called/
materialistically-minded, are inclined to describe 
in economic terms the main changes which have taken 
place in European civilisation since the Renaissance. 
They consequently speak of a new type of economy 
which grew up as a result of the Renaissance and 
which has since dominated the modern way of life.
For Alfred von Martin, for instance, the mediaeval 
system in the field of economy was based on small units, 
on "the order of small men, peasants and artisans, who 
by the work of their hands earned their keep, in 
accordance with the necessities of their rank, their 
traditionally fixed needs". (Op. cit. p 8.) The 
large mediaeval estates did not bring any specific 
note into this system, due primarily to the indolent 
mode of life of their owners.
The important fact should be noted that mediaeval 
economic activity, be it that of the "small men" or of 
the landlords, is primarily agricultural. The typical 
economic unit is, as Max Weber calls it, the "budgetary 
unit" meaning that both production and exchange are 
orientated towards, and limited by, the immediate 
necessities of consumption. The individual is completely 
dependent upon the group for his subsistence, while the 
group itself is dependent upon long, traditionally 
organised modes of economic activity. Therefore the 
whole/
system provides both the individual and the group 
with but a small degree of freedom in their respective 
spheres of activity.
It is against this background that the modern
capitalist economy developed. The first step consists
in the accumulation of large fortunes due to a series
of historical circumstances, the commerce between
European cities and foreign lands being the most
important of them. The new type of fortune is measured,
not in land, but in money. Y.'e shall deal in the next
section with the important part played by money, as a
means of exchange, in the flexibility of various European
socio-cultural patterns. For the moment we attempt to
sketch the main changes produced in the economic field
by the capitalist system. To start with, the basic
economic unit In such a system is no longer the budgetary
unit, but the profit-making unit, or enterprise. 1).
Consumption no longer sets a limit to production. On
1). Aristotle to&ches upon a main difference between a 
budgetary and a profit-making unit when speaking about 
two functions of money: a. selling in order to buy, and 
b. buying in order to sell. (G-. Thomson, Aeschylus and 
Athens. London p. 351).
The terms subsistence and exchange economy do not 
cover entirely the concepts of budgetary and profit making 
units.
the contrary, the central tendency is to increase
production above the level of consumption with the aim 
of/
its commercialisation. Production should he market- 
orientated, i.e., adapted less and less to the 
consumers needs - which have in time become themselves 
conditioned by production, i.e., manufactured - and 
more and more to the competition with other profit- 
making units. The man belonging to this type of 
economy is, as ?/. Sombart says, dominated by rational 
gain-seeking (G-ewinnstreben), a fact that differentiates 
him sharply from the man belonging to a pre-capitalist 
age. Thus, the new economic order has gradually changed 
important aspects in the structure of man and of his 
society. Hew drives have been installed into the way 
of life of European communities which resulted in a 
high development of the flexibility and dynamism of 
their social and cultural structures. Rationalisation 
and competition are amongst the most important of these 
drives. Let us say a few words about each of them.
A profit-making enterprise explains by itself the 
nature of competition. Since a full examination of this 
point is obviously beyond the interest of this chapter, 
we would rather focus our attention on the following 
specific questions. How can one account for the fact 
that the economic order, based on profit-making enterprise, 
promotes the individual as its operational unit^, thus 
turning/
the whole economic system and the whole way of life 
into a field of competition, emulation and rivalry 
between individuals ? Iiow can one account for the 
fact that the old economic order, based on guild 
organisation, with price fixing and compulsory 
corporisation, became, in the modern era, broken down 
into as many units as there were individuals with 
self-initiative ? In other words, how does the new 
economic order become individualised ?
The first answer to these questions is suggested 
by the rational character of a profit-making enterprise. 
The enterprise consists in an organised action towards 
an end, implying choice of means and the possibility of 
calculating the value of each step towards the achievement 
of the end, What really matters is the end in view, and 
for this, prominence is given to the individual's 
initiative and abilities, rather than to his birth and 
rank. In no other historical period has human society 
been dominated by stronger and better defined rational 
ends than these, for their fulfilment, no socio-cultural 
factor is required, no particular faith, no particular 
ideology, no status, save two factors inherent in the 
ends themselves s money and intelligence. Intelligence 
is purely formal in character, i.e. its main function 
is to weigh and organise any circumstances of life which 
may/
lead to the chosen end*
The individualising tendencies in the economic
order are expressed first of all in the system of
ownership. Max Weber considers, for instance, the
expropriation of workers of the means of production,
taking place at the beginning of the modern age, as
one of the main aspects of the rationalisation of
economic activity. (By rationalisation he means
chiefly the organisation of an activity in the view
of a maximum of efficiency). Whether this phenomenon
debd-
hasfin the long run proved to be rational, is a table 
question. But it has certainly proved the value of 
the individual as a centre of initiative in the 
economic field, and in more than one way. It has, 
in the first place proved the superiority of the 
individual owner of the means of production over the 
mediaeval corporated group. This superiority is 
measured in rapidity of decision, in willingness to 
accept risks, and,on the V7hole, in the owner's capacity 
to harmonise his effort with the intrinsic requirements 
of the profit-making enterprise• For it is generally 
agreed that many commercial and industrial enterprises 
were built up by the savings of thrifty individuals.
-‘-he system of dividends, for instance, is often regarded 
as a method of rewarding abstention from immediate
satisfaction,/
r r%
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and thus an incentive for increasing the original 
capacity of enterprise by building up an ever-growing 
working capital. Collective management and ownership 
cannot adapt themselves so rapidly and thoroughly to 
the conditions required by the efficiency of enterprise.
The very same process, i.e. the expropriation
of workers of the means of production, resulted in the
loosening of the ties between the individual and his
community of work;on the one hand, and his society in
general,on the other. This is mainly due to the role
played by money in the new economic order which
gradually created a new type of social integration.
Both the owners, as profit-makers, and the workers,
as wage-earners, have to a great extent reduced their
social bonds to those which could be expressed in
terms of money. In what follows we shall deal with
the part played by money in the evolution of the modern
economic order, and of modern society in general. But
before anything else we have to say that our interest
is confined to the two following aspects of this
important problem. To what extent has money contributed
t° the rationalisation of modern European societies;
and to what extent has its influence rendered the patterns
of these societies more flexible, therefore more liable 
to/
democratisation?
As we have already mentioned, the rationalisation 
of an action consists in its organisation in the view 
of a maximum of efficiency. The process of rational­
isation presupposed the following conditions : a), clear 
ends in action, b). freedom of choice among alternative 
means, (assured in the economic field by free markets), 
c). a minimum of waste, d). systematic control over 
the various steps and conditions of action. Since all 
these presuppose the capacity to calculate, money is 
obviously the most adequate means of rationalisation 
of human action in general and of economic action in 
particular. The reason for this is that money offers 
the greatest possibility of calculating the elements 
and the stages cf action in order to increase its 
efficiency, hhen the components of an action and their 
inter-relations are expressed in money^ that action 
reaches a maximum of rationality. In this case the 
pattern of action is reduced to money-accounting which 
is obviously an ideal example of rational action.
The rational organisation of economic action 
has gradually become a prototype of organisation in 
modern society as a whole. Calculability, rentability 
and efficiency have become the dominant norms in the 
evolution of this society0 hax feber is one of the 
first/
to draw attention to this important phenomenon.
He considers the concept of rationality as one of the 
key concepts in the understanding of capitalist economy 
and of modern society as a whole. Phenomena of an 
exceptional importance in contemporary society such 
as those of bureaucratisation and free labour, are, 
for him, the results of this drive for rationalisation 
dominating the modern world„
With regard to the part played by money in 
rendering the pattern of modern societies flexible 
we distinguish the following points.
A. There is no need to insist upon the flexibility
of an economic order based on money as a means of
exchange. It seems enough to mention the difference
between natural and monetary economy regarding the 
flexibility of transaction, or the role played by the 
"budget” in the capacity of an economic unit to adjust 
itself to various conditions. Due to money, the process 
of exchange has become more flexible, i.e. more adjust­
able to the interested parts.
Bo The relationship between the individual and 
his community affected by the increased importance of 
money in modern societies. Firstly, the relationship 
between the individual and the institutionalised
authority of his society, the state became more flexible,
objective, at the same time, since they began to 
be arranged in terms of money. This is the case 
of the individual’s obligations to the State, paid 
in income-tax, as compared with his duties towards 
the landlord, in a feudal system. The obligations 
paid in money are more flexible because they can be 
more easily adjusted to the particular conditions 
of each individual, than can feudal duties. They are 
also more objective in the sense that they take the 
character of a deal, with no feeling of personal 
obligation, as was usual in a feudal system.
C. Money was often used as a means of buying
liberty for the individual, i.e. the periodic duties
towards the landlord were paid once and for a3.1, in a
round sum of money. The social status of the individual
was, by this, radically changed. ( Money was used to 
buy freedom, not only for the individual, but sometimes 
for a whole community. He case of Louis XIV who commer­
cialised the municipal liberties of the Steadrw towns is 
well-known.) (See Tocqueville; The State of Society, p.53)»
L. Money induces a high degree of flexibility 
not only in the relationships between individual and the 
State, but also in inter-human relationships in general.
An Interhuman relation stated in terms of money gains in 
flexibility because it can more adequately be defined 
than/
any other kind ox human relation* Firstly, it 
lasts only as long as money is involved, i.e* as long 
as there are paying and paid agents in it. Secondly, 
the engaged parties are psychologically dependent 
on one another only to the extent to which they are 
paid, or to which they pay. Their personality can 
remain outside the system of relationships. Thus the 
relationship between employer and employed, is in 
principle not one of domination-submission, but one of 
a formal and impersonal system of obligations on both 
sides. The relationships are not loaded with either 
social factors such as status and class, or with 
psychological factors such as superiority-inferiority.
The use of money has already contributed to tha$ technique 
of inter-human relations by which the individuals can be 
related to each other without engaging their personalities, 
or engaging them as little as possible.
S. Another aspect of the influence of money is
seen in the great capacity for individualisation
characteristic of the modern way of life. Work, abilities,
consumption, etc. when expressed in money become so
flexible that one could fix the place of every individual
on the dimensions described by them. This brings a
high possibility of differentiation between the individual
members of the group, and consequently a high degree of 
formal/
freedom. It brings, on the other hand, a widening 
of the socio-cultural space, creating specific scope 
for the personality of each individual. This is, as 
we shall see later on, an important condition of 
democratisation.
F. Under the impact of money, every human 
relationship tends to become a "transaction". This 
allows better opportunity for the individual to find 
his right place in a net of relationships. It allows, 
also, more scope for change and improvement in the 
pattern of social relationships. It is not by chance 
that the theoretical founders of modern democracies 
stress the "transactional" or the "contractual" character 
of human society, and of the State in particular.
Society is, in their view, an agreement which can be 
broken and re-formulated as many times as the parts 
decide to do so. This is the highest degree of 
flexibility human society has ever achieved.
G. There is another aspect of the impact of money 
upon modern life brilliantly analysed by George Simmel 
(Philosophie des Geldes). This can be stated briefly
as the supremacy of the category of quantity in modern 
civilisation. The tendency characteristic of modern 
science to look at the quantitative aspect of phenomena
is at least partly a result of this trend. The idea 
of/
steady progress, by adding new small quantities to 
the old stock, is another aspect of the same phenomenon. 
Most suggestive is Simmel’s opinion that democracy, 
with its central concept of majority, is a financial 
conception of life. It is number that counts. In 
this consists author attempt to link democracy with a 
specific economic system which is, in our own view, a 
far too narrow perspective.
H. Much more significant for a democratic way 
of life is the lack of the "formal character of money". 
(Simmel). Money knows no social norms; it tends to 
confer power add prestige to anyone who possesses it, 
no matter what his class and status. Due to this 
particular quality, money produced in a relatively short 
period a real revolution in a society rigidly organised 
for centuries. During and more so after the Renaissance 
the individual could move upwards and dowawards within 
his own society according to his luck in the matter.
Thus money has infused the development of modern societies 
with a new tempo. This caused not only flexibility, but 
even instability in the structure of these societies. 
Already in the Renaissance, Aeneas Sylvius seems to grasp 
the essence of the era opening up under his eyes when 
writing about his own country: "Italy always delighted
in a new thing, has lost all stability.*.; a servant inay 
easily become a king". (Quot.from von Martin op.cit.p.5).
Now let us pass on to the second aspect of the 
modern economic order which contributed to the flex­
ibility of the pattern of modern societies, thus 
preparing the ground for democracy. This consists 
in the competitive character of modern economic activity.
The sources of the modern competitive spirit lie 
in the gain-seeking which constitutes one of the central 
features of the modern economic system. Due to this 
drive, the rigid mediaeval economic order was gradually 
transformed into a fluid structure in which the individuals 
position was determined by his capacity to resist and to 
break the attack of his competitors.
There are two aspects in the evolution of the 
modern competitive spirit which, due to their close 
connection with the flexibility of the pattern of modern 
societies, deserve special attention : 1). Competition 
as the driving force of economic activity, and 2). 
competition as an "ideal" or as a regulative principle 
of modern life.
1. Competition is originally a technique indis­
pensable to the profit-making enterprise.' This means that 
the main motive of economic activity is the drive for 
profit, and that one of the principal methods of achieving 
this is competition, But due to a series of factors 
inherent/
in the modern economic system, competition has become 
in itself a motive of economic action. (An autonomous 
motive). This wouSd imply that one can act economically 
for competition's sake, or, for the values involved 
in the struggle with other individuals, and for the 
prospective pleasure of winning over one's opponent.
Some economists go as far as to define the essence of 
economic activity in modern society, as a "competitive 
game" (Fr. H. Knight. The Ethics of Competition. Allen 
and Unwin, 1935). This seems to us to give an exag­
gerated importance to the competitive spirit in modern 
capitalist society. In fact, the central motive of 
economic action in this society has always been the 
maximisation of income. But this, nevertheless, shows 
clearly the fact that one of the most characteristic 
aspects of the modern economic order consists in a 
perpetual race between the individual members of a 
community. It also shows the dynamic and flexible 
character of a society based on such an economic system*
2. It has been said very often that modern man is 
an economic man. This implies that his world-outlook and 
his culture-pattern are dominated by economic values.
That is why many students of contemporary civilisations 
speak about economic action and values as ideals of life, 
and about economic, or competitive ethics as a type of 
ethics/
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prevailing in the contemporary world. We cannot enter 
into the discussion of this important aspect of contemporary 
life, For our present purpose it seems enough to point 
to the undeniable fact that, in modern societies, economic 
value has gradually become an independent and finally a 
dominant value•
The first step towards the independence of economic 
value from other values consists in the conviction, 
rooted in long practice, that economically-orientated 
action can more easily attain its own aim when separated 
from religious, political or moral considerations. Hence 
the autonomy of economic value from other socio-cultural 
values. Max Weber sees in this another characteristic 
aspect of the rational nature of capitalist economy,
"When economically orientated action - he writes - is 
dominated by a religious faith, by warlike passions, 
or by attitudes of personal loyalty, and similar modes of 
orientation, the level of rational calculation is likely 
to be very low", (op, cit. p. 194).
The explanation may vary, but the fact remains clear 
that the economic values and the economic style of life 
gain more and more independence, and finally supremacy, in 
the modern world. As early as the beginning of the 
Renaissance in Italy, the Popes had to aquiesce in the 
fact that money-making and finally, the style of life 
created/
by the business man , had their place in society side 
by side with other styles of life such as that of the 
monk or of the warrior*
One of the important aspects in the evolution 
of the economic way of life in the modern world is seen 
in the battle between the economic and political order 
of modern societies. This is, in fact, the struggle 
of the individual against the State with the aim of 
freeing his economic purposes from any constriction 
other than that imposed by a free market. In this 
process lies the origin of what has been called the 
negative aspect of modern liberty (Simmel), i.e« -the 
tendency characteristic of modern man, to reduce to 
the lowest possible degree the function of the state 
and of government in his society so as to create as 
large as possible an arena of free competition between 
individuals.
This negative aspect of modern liberty - the 
withdrawal of the State - was strongly supported by a 
series of events taking place at the beginning of the 
modern era. Thus an "avalanche" of geographical and 
scientific discoveries has resulted in the loosening 
of the ties between the individual and his society. 
Moreover, these discoveries aroused in the individual 
the feeling of a permanently open frontier for his
initiative and imagination. There, in the new territories
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social organisation had a relatively small importance 
for the success of the individual's actions, which were, 
at least at the beginning, economic actions. This 
strengthened the feeling that "getting ahead in the world" 
(Knight) as an individual is a supreme command for 
economic action and for life in general,,
But the same events and strivings, characteristic 
of the economic order at the beginning of the modern era, 
aroused in modern man something much more significant 
from our specific point of view, i.e. the feeling of 
the fluid character of his society. Ttee- Stein became 
more and more aware of the flexibility and provisionally 
of society as a pre-established structure of life in a 
group. Thus the feeling that the individual can build 
up his own society wherever he goes became an important 
element of his mind. All depends entirely upon the 
capacity of agreeing with others. This state of mind 
is certainly due, to a considerable extent, to the impact 
of the modern economic way of life based on competition.
Due to the influence of the economic type of action, 
the whole social life had the tendency to style itself 
after the model of the market. Today one very often uses 
the expressions "market-society", or "competitive society" 
in order to describe the particular features of modern 
society. This means from our own point of view, that 
the socio-cultural pattern of modern societies has been 
gradually/
mdivided up in to as many units as there are individual 
members. Bach individual member works on the assumption 
that getting ahead in the world as an individual, in 
competition with other individuals, is the supreme norm 
in life, and that the structure of society grows 
naturally out of the net of competitive actions. Society 
is, in fact, a huge compromise, a general contract.
In conclusion we can say that, as a result of the 
competitive spirit and the drive of rationalisation, 
new processes take place within European societies which 
hasten their democratisation. First of all '‘time" becomes 
an important dimension of life in society. This phenomenon 
so revealing for the flexibility of a socio-cultural 
pattern, deserves much more attention than we are able to 
pay in this study. Due to the new tempo, infused in 
modern society mainly by the spirit of competition, 
quickmindedness and alertness have become fundamentally 
important human qualities. Thus time has added a new 
dimension to the socio-cultural space in which the 
individual can be differentiated. Great possibility 
of individual differentiation means flexibility in the 
socio-cultural pattern, i.e. a democratic condition of 
the first order. There is no wonder that it is in the 
Italian cities of the Renaissance that for the first
time, the big tower clock, significantly placed in the/ 
nearjP
vicinity of the market, started to strike each quarter 
hour. The new type of society, the flexible society, lives 
in time.
• Closing our discussion of the economic aspect of the 
flexibility of the modern European socio-cultural pattern 
we should like to dwell briefly on the system of private 
land-ownership. The reason for this lies in the particular 
significance this aspect of economic life has for the 
democratisation of modern societies.
An important step forward towards the flexibility 
of modern economic order has been made with the "division 
of big estates into small-holdings. land for those who work 
and live in it constituted one of the main points of the 
programme in European democratic movements. It also con­
stitutes one of the most expressive formulae of the indiv­
idualisation of the modern economic order. As a result of 
this, one of the main sectors of modern economy has been 
broken down into individual units consisting of small­
holdings run by the head of a family.1).
1). The fact that in the eighteenth century the Drench 
peasant "not only ceased to be a serf, he had become an 
owner of land" is considered by Tocqueville among the main 
causes of the Revolution. (State., of Society.. »p*29). This 
was the case neither in Germany, where the peasants were 
still literally "ascripti glebae", as in the Middle Ages.
Hor in England, where "there had been peasant landowners, 
but, the number of them had considerably decreased".(Idem, 
p.30). It is the aspirations and the struggle of these 
peasants towards the liberation of their land from the 
burdens imposed upon it by the nobility and the Church that 
Tocqueville considers an important factor driving towards the 
Revolution.
A similar phenomenon is noticed in the Athenian Commun­
ity. During Cleisthenes' rule, there grew up a class of 
peasant&holders of land, a fact which constitutes an import­
ant aspect of the process of democratisation taking place 
during that period. (Qroiset. Op. Cit. p. 57).
The organic link between personality and ownership 
characteristic of an agricultural economy based on 
small-holdings makes this system, in many respects, 
more flexible than that of capitalist economy. For 
the peasant, or the farmer has a natural capacity to 
adjust his standard of living to the supreme interest 
of his independence as a land possessor. A series of 
restrictions and losses are more easily supported by a 
small household than by a large agricultural unit 
working on a capitalist model. That is why an agricultural 
economy of capitalist type is far more sensitive to 
cyclical fluctuations than an agricultural economy based 
on peasant farming.
The flexibility of the system based on small house­
holds is primarily due to its individualised, almost 
personalised, character. The individual, peasant, or 
farmer, extends his personality to his own possession; 
he is often identified with the "possessor" of the land. 
Unlike the industrial worker or the capitalist, who are 
ready to blow up the whole economic system when^ e^ sfil 
they feel that it no longer suits them, the peasant 
perishes or survives with his possession. From this 
organic quality of the system springs up the "mystic" 
bond between man and land which made many people - 
Spengler/
for instance - believe that land owndership is the 
only natural form of possession, i.e. the only adequate 
basis for the development of man as an individual and as 
a group. (Spengler makes a distinction between "Besitz" 
(property) as a means of self-realisation, and "VermtTgen 
(possession or fortune) as an end which transforms man 
into a means. JAHRE der BNTSCHBIDUHG (Quot.Ed.p.71).
Some of the makers of the French Revolution saw also 
in the formula "land for everybody", and a society 
based on self-sufficient small holders, artisans and 
shopkeepers, the strongest guarantee of liberty. Saint 
Just grows enthusiastic whenever he touches upon this 
point. The highest happiness offered by the Republic 
consists, according to him, in "la volupte d'une cabane, 
d'un champs fertile cultiv^ par vos mains, une charrue, 
un champs, une chaumiere a l ’abri de la lubricite d ’un 
brigand, voila le bonheur" (Saint Just Quoted by J.L« 
Talmon The Origind of Totalitarian Democracy, Seeker and 
Warburg London, 1951 p. 162). There is one aspect of 
rural economy based on the system of small holdings which 
has a particular significance today for a democratic 
way of life . The system of " pare e Hat ion" has undoubt­
edly led to individualism in this economic sector. But
from the psychological point of view it is important to 
know/
that this has not necessarily led to a competitive 
system of the industrial and commercial type. With the 
exception of a few highly industrialised countries, the 
peasant does not see himself, in his work, or in his 
relationship with others, under the perspective of the 
market society, i.e. in competition. His land, his 
cattle, his household are primarily "his own".
This gives him the feeling of a complete independence 
and unity rather than that of being related to, or in 
competition with, others. In his way of life the accent 
falls on the independence and uniqueness of human 
personality, rather than on its quality of being a member 
in a group. This does on no account mean that peasant 
society is not integrated. It means only that the 
integrating factors are of instinctive, traditional, and 
above all of moral character; they are not subject to 
formal reason and practical arrangements, as is normally 
the case in industrial society. The basis of society 
being, so to speak, assured, the prevailing tendency of 
each member of a peasant society is to be himself, to 
grow into himself. He seldom feels the need of giving up 
part of his personality by joining various types of 
"organisations" whose purpose it is to protect him from 
others, for the simple reason that he does not live in a 
c ompetit ive/
world.
A type of society made up by small-holders 
contains in itself protective measures against two 
anti-democratic trends inherent in the structure of 
modern commercial and industrial society : the trend 
of super-organisation, and its opposite, disintegration. 
This system refuses over-rationalisation by its own 
nature, i.e^the tendency to put efficiency, economic 
and social, above everything, and to organise the 
group accordingly. The peasant, as landowner, cannot 
be rigidly organised in a system of production in which 
he is reduced to an executant. Any rationalisation 
of agricultural economy has to start by the expropriation 
of the peasants which amounts to their "mutation'* into 
a completely different social class. This is the last 
blow given to democracy by contemporary totalitarianism.
On the other hand, peasant society, of all societies, 
needs the least super-organisation for the simple reason 
that it does not suffer from the disintegrating effects - 
of competition.
Political Aspects of Flexibility. One often says that 
the Renaissance marks the transition from "community" to 
"society". Since lack of space does not allow us to 
discuss/
critically the foundation of this thesis, the use of 
the terms "community" and "society" in this study is 
but a convenient way of pointing out a series of 
differences between mediaeval and modern society.
Size is often believed to be the main difference 
between community and society. Though important from 
a psychological point of view, size is, in our opinion, 
not a necessary difference between these two types of 
social organisation. The real difference consists in 
their respective degree of flexibility. A community is 
a relatively static and rigid type of socio-political 
organisation. It is based on a traditional - normally 
authoritarian - type of authority. Life in a community 
is dominated by religious or quasi-religious ways of 
thought. There, time is not an important dimension of 
life. "Everything temporal is to it no more than a 
parable, a symbol of the metaphysical, and nature is but 
a reflexion of the transcendental", writes A.von Martin 
about the mediaeval community. (Op. cit.p2).
The basis of human relationships is in a community, 
primarily emotional. The individuals are linked together 
by bonds of blood, community of faith, mystic ties with 
the land, and by an age-long tradition. The attitude 
towards authority in particular is saturated with emotional 
factors, always involving certain hierocratic elements.
The inner/
structure of a community often though not necessarily 
shows rigidity resulting from strong barriers between 
sub-groups. The barriers may separate different 
classes, different castes, or simply the rulers from 
the ruled. Authority has a strong subjective character. 
The main reason for this lies in the fact that the 
relationship between ruled and rulers is regulated by 
emotional factors such as indiscriminate confidence, or 
fear, rather than by rational and practical arrangements.
This leads us to the following important point:
The passing from community to society means a-gain in 
rationality of human social and political organisation® 
By analogy with the use of the concept of rationality 
in the previous section, we can say that this implies 
first of all, the structuration of a group of individuals 
in the function of a series of conscious common ends.
The degree of consciousness of the common ends is such 
that they are not only postulated by, but experienced and 
expressed in a manner adequate to each individual member. 
Thus, the individual’s conformity with the organised 
action of the group does no longer spring from tradition 
and emotional compulsion, but from deliberation. As a 
result of this, the individual has "conscious legitimate 
expectation" from his conformity with the common ends. 
(Knight, op. cit. p. 335).
We have previously mentioned that the process of 
rationalisation implies self-knowledge of the group.
A long period of stability in the life of the group 
leads to the emergence of a set of common ends and 
common modi vivendi. 'when the individuals become 
aware of this, i.e. when they become awarejof the fundam­
ental conditions of their life together, we say that the 
self-consciousness of the group appears.
The self-consciousness of the group, as described 
above, constitutes a basic condition of self-legislation, 
in a political sense. In this case the individual 
members of the group are capable of knowing the ends 
common to them all, or to a majority of them, and of 
working out techniques for their fulfilment. When the 
common experience and the common ways of action in a group 
are formulated in a set of general principles, one usually 
says that the group has a constitution. This means that 
the group has agreed "upon a process and a mechanism for 
securing agreement on particular issues". (Knight Op. cit. 
p. 342).
Self-knowledge, which results in self-legislation, 
induces a high degree of rationality and flexibility in the 
organisation of the group. The first implication of this 
is that the main issues regarding the organisation of 
the group can becomepational ends for each of its members.
also implies that the pattern of organisation of the 
group has become flexible to the extent of being more 
or less adequately represented in each individual 
member. j
We cannot stress strongly enough the idea that 
without the crystallisation of the common experiences 
of the group into rational ends, in the mind of its 
individual members, the passage from community to 
society is not possible. In this very phenomenon lies j
the main difference between these two types of social 
organisation. While,in a community, the common ends are 
mainly unconscious, buried in tradition or in emotional 
factors, in society, they are conscious and rational*
Their rational character does not necessarily mean that 
they are weak; it only means that their nature is such 
as to allow deliberation on them, and consequently 
personal adjustment. In other words they allow a democratic !
i
way of conformity. (1). '
]
(1). This is the proper place to stress again the idea 
that what has been said so far in this section, though 
founded on a series of historical cases, defines rather 
an ideal case of flexibility in the political structure 
of a group. It imples for instance that its structure j
is sensitive to each member of the group. This only shows j
the difficulty involved in the definition of socio-political 
concepts. One has to postulate th@ "ideal type", other­
wise the organisation of the empirical material is almost 
impossible.
In what follows we try to describe various political 
aspects/
in the drive towards flexibility characteristic of 
the pattern of modern society. There is one process 
which shall be dealt with in particular, i.e. the 
minimisation and decentralisation of power.
Minimisation of power results from the extension 
of the sphere of political decision in a group from one 
man to a section of the population, and finally to the 
people. Under its negative aspect the same process 
can be formulated as the limitation of the power 
concentrated in a certain sector by its diffusion in 
all sectors of society. These are some of the main 
modes of minimisation of power, most of them being 
characteristic of modern societies.
A. Even in mediaeval absolutist society one can 
find certain processes which lead in the long run to 
minimisation of power. This is seen not so much in the 
transfer of kingly power by the creation of nobility, 
as in the rise of an administrative body. The exercise 
of power, in a feudal system, led to the creation of an 
administrative body and bureaucracy which, due to its own 
technical training, one the one hand, and to the incapacity 
of the landlord, on the other, was allowed more and more 
initiative and independence. This resulted in the limit­
ation of the effective power of the lord. This specific 
form of minimisation of power might be considered as a
characteristic/
aspect in the rise of British Democracy. Albert Beebe 
Yfhite represents an extremist view on this point. 
(Self-Government at the King's Command. Univ. of 
Minnesota Press, 1933). In his view, the sources of 
self-government and democracy in England should not be 
looked for in the wish and the struggle of the people 
to rule themselves. This is a common belief which 
cannot be proved with facts taken from the history of
England. Self-government and the positive drive in
$
the people for ruling themselves id the result of 
the habit of mediaeval English kings to use local 
people of all classes in public affairs.
As a result of this, the people were trained in the art 
of government. r,The thesis is - writes White - that 
English kings, working in what they believed to be their 
own personal interest, so used the English people in 
government, laid upon them for centuries such burdens, 
that they went far towards creating the Englishman's 
governmental sense and competence, that Borman and 
Angevian royal training has been more potent than an 
urge to self-government in Anglo-Saxon blood”, (p. 2).
One of the conclusions is that ".. the early House of 
Commons was a royal creation to meet the royal needs”.(p.2)
B. The political system of ”collegiality” is a 
rudimentary/
K',
form of decentralisation of power. It implies that 
the decision of one chief can he delayed or vetoed by 
another. (The system of Ephors, of the Consuls in Rome 
and that of the "Gapitani del Popolo" can be taken as 
an example?). In some cases the disposition of a 
monocratic authority can be carried out only after 
formal consultation, and approval of another specific 
type of authority. A particular case of l,collegialitylt 
is when the chief is primus inter pares. Advisory bodies 
to a monocratic chief - Senatus Romanus for instance - 
and the Privy Council are other forms of "collegiality".
The significance of "collegiality", as a form of 
authority, is from our point of view, the following.
Though in no sense a specific democratic phenomenon, 
"collegiality" produces a certain (limited) minimisation 
and diffusion of power. This is the result of competition 
for the position of power. Collegiality implies a 
plurality of candidates for the same office, and a 
number of persons in the same office whose spheres of 
authority are not always well-defined. Max Weber is 
of the opinion that it was in terms of collegiality that 
the separation of power in England started. (The appro­
priation of governing power by the privileged groups, and 
the financial need of the monarchs led to the necessity 
of consultation and of compromise over the budget).
C . The/
C. The rise of opposition as a legally constituted 
body is certainly one of the most important steps towards 
the minimisation of power. Opposition implies open 
contest of power and authority within a social organis­
ation.
Thus opposition rises naturally from the exercise 
of power, i.e. it is inherent in the dialectic of power. 
Any concentration of power in a group gives rise not 
only to a passive resistance in various sectors deprived 
of power, but also to an active tendency to oppose, 
weaken and destroy the power-holding body. And as the 
power has an accumulative tendency, so has the opposition.
Considering some concrete circumstances contributing 
to the rise of opposition in Modern Europe it seems that 
its origin lies in the tendency of monocratic authority 
to strengthen, rather than to weaken its power. Absolutist 
rulers were naturally interested in having round them 
opposing groups in order either to keep themselves well 
informed, or to play the opposing interests against each 
other. But the advantages drawn by these rulers from 
their role of intermediary were inevitably counteracted 
by a gradual minimisation of their power. This was the 
natural result of the well-known game of making con­
cession to the weakest in order to keep the strongest in 
check./
Finally in Western societies it was through the 
representative bodies of various groups that a real 
opposition to monarchy was formed. In England, the 
system of the two Houses of Parliament and in France 
the representative bodies of the three estates formed 
the basis of the minimisation of absolutist power.
P. A political party is an association of individuals 
with the ultimate end of securing power for its leaders.
We cannot enter here into the analysis of different types 
of political parties. We confine ourselves to a brief 
description of the significance of these parties for the 
process of minimisation of power. In principle the 
existence of more than one party in a group implies that 
power is divisible. This formal condition comes to an 
end only when a party assumes all the power for itself.
The origin of political parties lies in the organ­
isation of various sub-groups- classes, occupational 
groups, national or family groups, etc. on a political 
basis, i.e. with the view to securing power within the 
whole group. But whatever their origin, the parties 
have to define their position in the group as a whole 
by formulating in one way or another their manner of 
exercising power. This is in fact, the normal technique 
of recruiting their supporters. In this lies another 
aspect of minimisation of power in the sense that power
becomes/
conditioned by a certain formulation, i.e. it is 
obtained and maintained only when moulded into a 
programme which,in time, becomes itself a preamble to 
the position of power.
33. The highest degree of minimisation is obtained 
when power is diffused from a small circle into the 
whole group. In this case, the consultation of the 
members of the group makes the authority legitimate.
In other words, power lies with the group as a whole, 
and is being granted to a few by the mechanism of 
representation. The highest degree of diffusion of 
power is expressed by the democratic principle of formal 
political equality, or by the formula "one man, one vote".
The system of universal suffrage cannot by itself 
guarantee the diffusion of power implied in the formula 
one man, one vote* This is seen in many cases of 
plebiscite. The fact that, by plebiscite, authority 
draws its power from the group, does not necessarily lead 
to minimisation of power in the group. Sometimes the 
high degree of confidence shown by the people in their 
leader may incite the latter to concentrate unlimited 
power in his hands. This certainly happens when the 
attitude towards authority is strongly emotionalised andu 
when the whole political structure of the group rests on 
emotional/
rather than rational factors«
We take again the opportunity of stressing the 
idea that democracy is first of all a way of life, i.e., 
that democratic mechanisms and techniques, though 
faithfully applied, may lead to forms of authoritarianism, 
if the way of life of the group contains powerful anti­
democratic tendencies. Strong emotional integrating 
factors are examples of this*
IT. The most important technical means for attaining 
and maintaining the minimisation of power are : lo
Short terms of office for the power-holding group, or 
personality. 2. Liability to he recalled at any time.
3. A strictly defined mandate for the conduct of office*
4. Obligation to give account and submit any unforeseen 
matter to the people (through its representative bodies)*
5. Administrative decentralisation.
All the forms of minimisation of power mentioned 
above produced various degrees of flexibility in the 
political structure of modern societies. Concentration 
of power renders the socio-political structure of a group 
rigid in the sense that the majority of individuals live 
within social and political forms in the creation of which
rv
they did not take part. Minimisation o^ diffusion of 
power, on the contrary, offer to each individual member 
the possibility of moulding the structure of his own 
society.
C H A P T E R  111*
THE PARADOX OP DEMOCRACY.
Bntre une societe de fer et une 
de glace ou de porcelaine il n*y 
a pas A choisir.
Diderot.
Freedom and Order. As has been pointed out in the 
first chapter, democracy is closely related to an 
empirical attitude in life. Such as attitude implies 
primarily that the flow of life is very little, if at 
all, hampered by pre-established norms or patterns*
One. can even say that the only sense of direction in the 
life of the individual, or of the group, is to be found 
in the stream of experience* Thus, an empirical attitude 
in life involves the highest degree of freedom for the 
individual, freedom which is circumscribed only by the 
limits of its own experience. Formulae such as "laissez- 
faire”, "wait and see" or "getting ahead in the world" 
which have been at various times applied to various 
aspects of the democratic way of life, express this 
basic freedom. The degree of spontaneity and liberty 
enjoyed by the members of a democratic group in their 
political, economic, religious and moral manifestations 
may/
easily give them the impression that the only source 
of norms and restrictions in life lies in themselves, 
in the limits of their own experience.
And yet one can hardly define democracy as a way 
of life based on a purely empirical attitude in life. 
Common observation shows that democratic institutions 
and a democratic way of life grow more strongly and 
more rapidly in those communities whose members do 
more spontaneously than the members of other communities 
what they ought to do. Moreover, the process of 
democratisation met with better conditions in those 
communities in which the building up and the maintenance 
of a common pattern of life was facilitated by various 
factors, historical, geographical or psychological,
This obviously suggests that democracy presupposes a
- not necessarily rationalistic - 
attitude as well, i.e. that the life of the individual 
within the group, and the evolution of the group as a 
whole, are enlightened by certain norms and principles. 
Therefore the concepts of freedom and spontaneity have to 
be applied in a specific manner, to a democratic way of 
life; one has to say that freedom means freedom to 
integrate and plan, in a social sense, while spontaneity 
means the possibility of choosing between given solutions.
both-cases the paradox is obvious. 1*
1. It is no wonder that the ancient Greeks were 
the real creators of the democratic way of life. For 
one of their most outstanding mental features consisted 
in their equal capacity to enjoy and enrich the forms 
of life through the senses, and, at the same time, to 
grasp more clearly than any other people the great 
framework of life and the basic principles of human 
experience in general.
This basic paradox is reflected in all the main 
aspects of a democratic way of life. A characteristic 
instance is given by Aristotle when trying to define 
freedom and equality as two fundamental concepts of 
democracy. Both concepts are for him easily definable 
on a purely rational level. But he asks himself how 
can one define these concepts on an empirical level, 
i.e. how are freedom and equality possible in a given 
community ? In practice freedom clashes, according 
to him, with order. In other words, it contradicts 
the existence of a given pattern of life. Equality, 
on the other hand, comes up against hierarchy, excellence 
and even justice. The only way out is in a paradoxical 
formulation of these concepts. Aristotle does not 
hesitate to take this course by defining democratic 
freedom as freedom within the law. (Politics. English 
Transl. by Benjamin Jowett, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Book IV, 4, and 14.) With the concept of democratic 
equality Aristotle seems to be in even more serious 
trouble. His doubt is aroused by the question : How can 
one/
Orealise and maintain equality amongst the members of 
a group ? Should it be "created", if it is not found 
in the natural condition of the community ? Consider­
ing the emphasis Aristotle lays on the institution 
of ostracism, and the prominence given by him to the 
opinion of Periandery the tyrant of Ambracia, on this 
matter, equality is in his eyes more of an "ought”, 
an ideal product of reason, rather than an empirical 
condition of life1! But what sort of equality is the 
equality created by political measures ? This implies 
that, when equality is not observed the "stronger^ones" 
use their power to maintain it, or to create it again,
 ^ThrasybuTus asked Periander for advice about the 
troubles caused in his state by outstanding people*, 
Periander did not speak a word, but in front of 
Thrasybulus' herald cut off the tallest ears of corn 
till he brought the field to a level. Thrasybulus 
understood from this that he had to cut off the heads 
of the principal men in his state.(Arist.op.cit.111.
13. p. 130).
The same kind of situation is even more clearly 
demonstrated by modern European democracies. The 
authors of the French Revolution, both the ideologues 
and the politicians, concentrated their main effort on 
the question of how to work out the pattern of life 
of free men in a free society. Though they all regard 
freedom as an empirical condition of human life, they 
were almost obsessed with the principles by which 
freedom is guaranteed. They prescribed freedom for 
the/
individual, but wanted at the same time to make certain '
that he acted in accordance with what was required of
i
him as a member of his society. Thus the politicians 
worked for the liberation of man from the chain of 
society, and displayed at the same time an even greater j
zeal for the building up of such (social) "Institutions"
by which man is forbidden to act except freely. These !
I
apostles of freedom came finally to contradict themselves 
and formulated in the crudest way possible the basic 
paradox of democracy : the terror of freedom. If this 
means anything, it is that freedom as an empirical 
condition of human existence cannot be realised and
I
i
maintained but by a certain degree of organisation, 
i.e. rationalisation of life.
The paradoxical character of democracy results 
from two socio-psychological processes necessarily j
involved in the democratisation of a community. Democracy i
1I
requires the crystallisation of the experience in a j
group of individuals in a common pattern of life, and j
the liability of this pattern to be expressed in terms j
of conscious rational ends. This we call the process j
of rationalisation. But democracy requires also that |
the common pattern of life should be flexible enough as ;
to be adjusted to the world of each individual member of !
the group. In this consists the capacity of the social j
pattern to individuate. The processes of rationalisation/
and individuation oppose each other, yet they complete 
each other in the structure of the democratic way of 
life. Let us analyse their nature more closely.
Rationalisation. Many aspects of the process 
of rationalisation were touched upon in the previous 
chapter, particularly when describing the difference 
between ’’community'* and ’’society'*. It was stated 
there that the crystallisation of the experience of 
a group of individuals into a common pattern of life 
is a necessary condition for the existence of both 
community and society. The main difference between 
community and society lies in the nature of the common 
pattern of life. In community, this pattern is made 
up of irrational factors. The individual is linked 
with other individuals in a common life by instinctive 
and emotional ties; he is rarely conscious of the 
nature of these ties, and even if he were conscious, 
he can exercise little if any control upon them. . The 
individual is driven from behind into the pool of 
communal life by being unable to discuss the motives 
of, or to deliberate on the aims of his life in a group. 
His personality submerges itself in the structure of 
his community.
The main characteristic of society is, on the other 
hand, that the patterns of communal life can be formulated 
as conscious ends./
It would perhaps not be entirely accurate to say 
that in society, as distinct from community, tradition 
loses its grip upon the mind of the individual. The 
important thing is, however, that in society, the store 
of common experience is from time to time projected 
into conscious goals existing in the minds of the 
majority of the individuals. Due to this, an important 
part of the commmn pattern of life is decided at 
the conscious level of the individuals' mind. This 
does not necessarily imply that the individual is always 
aware of the common interests and goals which uhite him 
with the other members of the group; it implies only 
that he can find such interests and goals and that he 
can express them in such a manner as to correspond to 
certain constitutive rules of the human mind. Firstly, 
the individual is aware of his own interests, and those 
of other members of the group, secondly, he is ready 
to deliberate with others, and to compromise in order 
to find both, a community of interests and a common way 
of action towards their achievement. Consequently, 
one can say that the main difference between community 
and society lies not as much in the fact that, in the 
latter, the individuals are conscious of their common 
interests, as in their readiness and capacity to 
formulate by deliberation their common experiences and 
interests/
as conscious goals and to organise their group 
accordingly. In this lies the basic condition of the 
process of rationalisation.
Social institutions in general can be considered 
as embodiments of the common ends of a group of 
individuals. But the rational nature of the interests 
and goals which tie up a group of individuals becomes 
more transparent when they are expressed in programmes 
of government, or, generally speaking, in a plan for 
conducting their common affairs. For in this case it 
is obvious that a number of individuals form an 
organisation to the extent to which they have found, 
and agreed upon a series of common ends. The^ type 
and the duration of their organisation is dependent 
on the duration and the nature of their goals. The 
highest degree of rationality in the structure of a 
group is attained when the individual members decide 
not only upon the best course of their action, but 
also upon the most adequate form of their organisation 
for the achievement of their common interests and ends. 
Thus, a series of general principles and laws are 
established. In these lie the origins of the process 
of self-legislation by which the group assumes for 
itself the function of framing laws, ordinances and 
constitutions, from time to time, as shall be thought
convenient/
to the general interests.
Though there is no apparent need to prove
that the formulation of a common pattern of life in
a body of laws, or in a constitution, represents a
high degree of rational organisation, it would be
advisable, in view of later developments of the 
present chapter, to throw a certain light on the 
rational character of laws. This character derives 
from the fact that they are established in the function 
of conscious ends shared by the members of a group.
Each individual is therefore supposed to know the 
purpose of the law; the authority of the law is based 
on the evident character of its purpose. (In this lies 
the main difference between laws and customs; the 
individual performing a custom is not conscious of the 
purpose of his behaviour). The rational character of 
a law is also seen in the abstract and impersonal 
character of its authority. Thus, both the application 
of, and obedience to laws are primarily rational acts 
involving as few emotional factors as possible which 
would otherwise be unavoidable when the authority is 
personal, i.e. a king or a leader.
Common observation shows that almost all groups 
in process of democratisgtion manifest strong tendencies 
towards a rational type of organisation. This is seen 
in: A) the application of certain abstract principles 
to/
the social and administrative organisation of the 
group, B) in the ease with which the group can 
formulate its pattern of life in a system of laws, 
i.e. in a high capacity for self-legislation, and C) 
in a general trend existing in the culture-pattern 
of the group to condition the individual's social 
behaviour to a formal and abstract type of authority 
represented by the laws.
A). The Athenian community, while still at the 
beginning of its democratisation, was fully re-organised 
on a rational basis. Cleithenes broke down the old 
organisation of local groups, consecrated by tradition 
(Fratries), making use of an almost geometrical scheme 
in the building up of the new organisation. He was 
guided in his reform by the requirements of a rational 
administration exclusively. It is important to notice 
that, at the basis of the first modern democracy, 
American society, one can find the same type of rational 
organisation. The federal system itself can be adduced 
as the main proof. There was no tradition and no 
emotional factors that caused the inhabitants of the 
various American States to form a nation and to unite 
into a federal system. "The American perople", "The 
Federal government'* were at that period but concepts 
covering a rational necessity ; the Union was an 
"ideal notion"/
and the Federal Government depended on "legal fictions". 
(Tocqueville: Dem. in America p. 166). There is no 
need to prove the existence of similar processes in 
eighteenth century French society. There, the main 
aim of the 1789 Revolution was to demolish the old 
order based on tradition, and to frame a new society 
within the principles of reason. Consequently, a 
new administrative order sprjjtng up from the requirements 
of a rational organisation. Even social authority 
itself was wrapped up in an abstract concept, the 
sovereignty of the people. 1).
1. Trends towards a rational order are noticed 
long before the Revolution. A highly centralised 
administration, the system of "intendants" in particular, 
and the use of statistics in order to improve the 
efficiency of the administrative apparatus, noticed 
throughout the eighteenth century, are the main aspects 
of this. Tocqueville rightly points out that the 
Revolution did not create, but strengthened these trends.
There is another aspect of this general drive 
towards rationalisation worth mentioning. Any group 
entering upon a process of democratisation changes its 
internal order, from one based on the right of birth, 
to onefbased on the right of wealth. In Athenian society 
this change started with Solon and culminated in 
Cleisthenes' reform. American society starts off on 
this!foot from the very beginning, and any later attempt 
towards the establishment of a land aristocracy was 
doomed/
-bo failure. The French Revolution brought to an end 
the old social order, based on privileges conferred 
by birth. In Great Britain, a similar process took 
place at a slower pace throughout the modern era.
This specific change demonstrates the often mentioned 
connection between democratisation and the rise of 
the middle classes.
Whether the above change took place gradually 
or abruptly the results were the same: A rigid
organisation, based on traditional and irrational 
factors, was transformed into a more flexible 
organisation based on the initiative and intelligence 
of the individual members of the group. As shown 
in the previous chapter, a social order in which the 
^ economic factors play an important part becomes liable 
to rational organisation.
B.) The drive of a group towards a rational 
type of organisation is seen also in its capacity 
for self-legislation. We are here referring primarily 
to the ease and rapidity with which some groups of 
individuals can express their common experiences and 
interests in a set of general principles which they 
regard as authoritative guides for their subsequent 
social action. The important thing should be emphasised 
that these general principles represent in an abstract 
form, i.e. as laws, the interests of all members of
group, or at least, of a majority of them. The task 
of the' legislator - who may he an individual or a 
selected body of professionals - is merely to give 
expression to a series of already crystallised forms 
of collective experiences and interests. After the 
law is enacted, the individual members of the group 
feel and behave as if they themselves were its authors.
An exceptional facility for self-legislation 
is a distinctive mark of narly all social groups in 
process of democratisation. . Athens had, according to 
Aristotle, no less than eight constitutions from Solon's 
to his own time. (See "The Constitution of Athens", 
Transl. by Kurt von Friz. Hafner, N.Y. 1950). This 
means that within this period, Athenian society had 
re-formulated eight times its basic principles of 
organisation, not mentioning the multitude of more 
specific laws. The early American society showed an 
extraordinary zeal and facility for law-making. The 
same phenomenon is noticed in French society during the 
revolutionary period in particular. This quality of 
a social group in process of democratisation often 
became a vice in a eonstituted democratic society; the 
ability of a group of individuals to formulate their 
common interests in a set of general principles and 
laws turned into an excessive readiness to abandon laws 
hardly/
\Q$
put in application and to coin new ones* Thus, 
the instability of laws is a characteristic feature 
of Athenian society. The same phenomenon is noticed 
by Tocqueville in America* "The facility and excess 
of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our 
governments are most liable”. (Tocqueville quoting 
r,The Federalist" Op. cit. p« 206). Jefferson himself 
was aware that the instability of laws was "a serious 
inconvenience" (Ibid. p. 206). On this subject 
Tocqueville concludes s "I-Ience America is, at the 
present day, the country beyond all others where laws 
last the shortest time. Almost all American constit­
utions have been amended within thirty years"#(Idem p. 
257).
Instability of laws may be considered easily as 
a weak point in the organisation of a group; it may 
spring from, and lead to social instability. But the 
same phenomenon is an obvious trait of a democratic 
pattern of life. By their facility to change old, 
and to make new laws the individuals keep the structure 
of their society open to new conditions of life, hence 
ready to mould itself according to the ever-changing 
wishes and interests of its members. The facility of 
law-making characteristic of certain groups is based 
mainly on a series of traits corni/ion to their members* 
The individuals belonging to these groups sho?/ an 
exceptional/
inclination towards public meetings, towards 
discussions and debates; their interest in and 
knowledge of public affairs rank higher than in 
the individuals belonging to other groups. The 
Athenians, the Americans, and since the end of the 
eighteenth century, the French, can be given as 
typical examples. These are important qualities 
in the individual members of a democratic society*
C). The tendency to condition the individual's 
social behaviour to a formal and impersonal type of 
authority noticeable in all groups undergoing a process 
of democratisation, constitutes another aspect in the 
process of rationalisation. The prominent place given 
to judiciary institutions and the respect paid to the 
law are common characteristics of these groups. Athenian 
society distinguished itself - at least after Solon - 
by the existence of a great number of law courts and 
tribunals as well as by the readiness of the Athenian 
citizens to resort to law on any matters touching the 
maintenance of public order. Cleisthenes was praised 
above all for the way in which he succeeded in instilling 
respect and obedience to laws in the Athenian citizens.1).
1. Most characteristic in this respect was the 
institution of "Euthynos". Each tribe appointed an 
"Examiner" (Euthynos) whose task it was to sit during the 
regular market hours at the statue of the eponymous hero 
and collect the charges against the magistrates ?/hich 
any citizen had the right to make. The "examiner" had 
then to bring the charges to the local judges. (Aristotle. 
The Athenian Const. Ed. Quot. p. 49).
America offered from the very beginning the 
example of a society dominated by the judiciary 
power. While the legislative and the executive 
powers were minimised by decentralisation, the 
judiciary was, on the contrary, concentrated in the 
Federal Courts and in the Supreme Courts of the 
United States. There is no other modern society 
more concerned than American society with methods and 
institutions by which the laws can be enforced. "The 
majesty of the law", as Tocqueville puts it, is 
certainly a distinctive mark of this society. (Op. cit. 
p. 139). And since the expression "the majesty of the 
law" is mentioned, it should be said that this can also 
be applied to modern British society. The specific way 
in which this can be understood will be dealt with at a 
later stage.
hi conclusion one ca,n say that all democratic 
societies have conditioned the obedience of their 
members to the abstract and impersonal authority of 
the law. In Athens, Great Britain, and in Continental 
democracies, this process was possibly only after the 
individual's obedience was deconditioned from the personal 
authority of an absolute ruler. In America this process 
was to a lesser degree necessary.
The creation of an abstract-impersonal form of 
authority was due mainly to a series of measures of 
rationalisation/
to which democratic societies were submitted. Rational 
methods in administration, rational principles in the 
making and the application of laws, and respect for 
the law, are the most important to them. These measures 
have induced in the people the need and ability of using 
reason in their social adjustment.
Thus, Athenian citizen could hardly use his instincts 
or feelings in his adjustment to the "administrative 
system of "demes", as he normally did in his adjustment 
to the old system of "fratries". A "deme" was an 
abstract unit appealling to him only as a rational 
necessity. The same can be said about the attitude 
of an American citizen towards "Federation", and to a 
great extent, about the attitude of a Frenchman of the 
Revolution period, towards the supreme reality of his 
society, "the people". Like the authority of the 
law, the "Eederal" authority and "the sovereignty of 
the people" are primarily based on the individual’s 
capacity for grasping the meaning of these concepts. 
Speaking simply, we may say that he used his power of 
discrimination to find the necessity of its conformity 
with the kind of order on which its society was based.
This takes us straight into the nature of the process 
of individuation which, like rationalisation, is normally 
found in the democratisation of a group. |
Individuation: The adjustment to a rational type of j
authority and to a rational social order is fully
only when the individual experiences the principles 
on which the authority and the order of his society 
are based# as constitutive principles of his mind; 
only when his social conformity springs from logical 
coercion and inner evidence. This is the result of 
the process of individuation which operates in an 
opposite direction to that of rationalisation.
The process of individuation depends on two 
categories of factors,, one belonging to the social 
order, or to the pattern of life of the group, the 
other to the mental structure of the individual.
A pattern of life is not an undefinable abstraction 
for it cannot exist unless it crystallises in various 
specific forms. One can even speak about a tfnisus 
formativus" inherent in the pattern of life of every 
society, in the sense that the net of inter-individual 
relationships has the tendency to crystallise in a series 
of more or less definite forms of life. Thus, the 
pattern of life of a community develops as a series 
of inter-individual forms of life normally called 
social values and institutions. A series of common 
drives, desires and aspirations, plus a series of 
experiences related to them, form structures of their 
own which subsequently act as organising schemes for the 
individual’s experience. Consequently the individual's 
behaviour in the economic field is moulded by the
values and institutions of his community, his behaviour 
in the sphere of political life is moulded by the 
political values of his community, his attitude towards 
life and the world as a whole is moulded by the religious 
values dominant in his group. In this ’way the individual's 
experiences are patterned in certain specific directions 
characteristic of his society. E. Spranger described 
six fundamental forms: religious, theoretical, aesthetic,
economic, political and social, in which the pattern of 
life of a group can be expressed. These forms are at 
the same time six fundamental models after which 
individuals can mould their personality. Needless to 
say, Spranger has not exhausted the number of forms in
♦
which the formative urge of a common pattern of life 
can express itself, for, the formative urge of a common 
pattern of life is by no means confined to social and 
cultural values. It crystalises also in living models 
such as outstanding personalities, or specific groupings, 
religious political cultural, etc. It crystalises in 
"schools" or trends of thought. In principle a common 
way of life can materialise in each individual member of 
the group to the extent to which the individual can live 
according to the requirements of his group, and yet 
retain his individuality.
Here we touch upon an important aspect of the 
process of individuation, which explains the close 
connection between it and a democratic way of life. The j
distinctive character of a democratic way of life, 
consists in its capacity to crystallise in as many 
forms as there are individual members of the group.
This is properly speaking the process of individuation.
It would be inaccurate, however, to infer that 
because of its capacity for individuation,a democratic 
social order is completely atomised, and that a democratic 
pattern of life does not contain anything beyond and 
above the individual. Its capacity for individuation 
should be seen entirely in the function of its flexible 
nature. Though a democratic pattern of life has its 
own character, not reducible to its individual members, 
it has, at the same time, the ability to integrate new 
conditions of life as they come, and above all the ability 
to adjust itself to the condition of life of its members, 
or to the majority of them. Flexibility, in this case, 
means not onlyjchangeability and expedience; it cannot 
be defined in fact but as a paradox^ i.e. the capacity 
inherent in a social order, or in a collective way of 
life, to integrate into itself the individual with his 
own interests, and to contain at the same time an inter 
and supra-individual order. 1.
1). In the capacity to be flexible lies the main 
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian way 
of life. For, a totalitarian way of life cannot indiv­
iduate. If it takes concrete shapes, in a personality 
or a party, this structuration becomes exclusivist.
The leader, or the party are, in this case, neither an 
individuation nor a particularisation of the common way 
of life,/
-  Ill
■but the way of life as a whole is its absolute form.
As will be shown at a later stage, a totalitarian way 
of life is always "outside" the individual members of 
the group. In order to adjust itself the individual 
has first to lose his identity. This is mainly because 
a totalitarian way of life grows up without the partic­
ipation of the members of the group. Sometimes the 
common pattern of life is borrowed from another community 
and forcibly applied; sometimes it is the pattern of 
life of the same‘community revived by a process of group 
regression (Nazism). At other times this pattern of 
life consists in a rigid crystallisation of the experiences 
of a sub-group which has been subsequently applied to 
a large community living in different historical and 
geographical conditions. (Contemporary Communism). In all 
these cases the common pattern of life is external to 
the majority of the individuals and as such cannot but 
partly be introjected by them.
But, as stated before, individuation depends upon 
factors existing in the individual himself. In a 
democratic society the individual’s mental structure 
is flexible. This makes it possible for him to adjust 
himself to the social order of his group and to the 
pattern of communal life and remaining himself at the 
same time. The individual possesses habits of mind by . 
which he can easily compromise between his own interests 
and those of others. The same habits of mind allow him 
to establish a balance between his own personality and 
his society as a constituted whole.
Lacking a better word we are inclined to use in 
this context the concept of introjection, but without the 
motivation attributed to this term by psychoanalysis. 
what in the first place we mean is that a social order or 
a communal way of life has to be internalised, or intro­
jected by the individual in order to become democratic.
By/ —  _________________________
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this the individual's' attitudes towards their society 
are radically changed; they feel that the institutions 
of their society, the laws which regulate its course, 
and the authority which applies the laws spring up 
from their own life, and correspond to their fundamental 
expectations from life. The adjustment to their society 
is determined less by external coercion, and more by the 
internal authority of reason.
Needless to say, the introjection of social order 
and the experience of social authority as inner authority 
does not necessarily imply the individual's identification 
with his group. The structure both of society and of the. 
individual's mind, being flexible, adjust themselves to 
each other. Introjection merely makes the individuals 
feel that they.are the authors of the order on which their 
society is based. Introjection enables them to compromise 
between their personal freedom and the order of their 
society. 1.
1). Many people believe that individuation-intro- 
jection is a matter of time. Moreover, any common way 
of life is at the beginning external to the individual 
members of the group, but becomes in time assimilated and 
therefore democratic. Communism, for instance, will become 
the natural way of life of Russian people, and will there­
fore be based less on external coercion and more on 
individual spontaneous reaction. The present organisation 
of the Bolshevik Party, as a permanent "avant guarde” of 
the people does not support this belief. But one can 
hardly overlook the great concern of the Bolshevik regime 
with the process of individuation-intrejection. The cult 
of "heroes” as embodiments of a Communist way of life and 
the techniques‘of indoctrination can be adduced as proofs 
of this. And yet, the pattern of life is not flexible 
enough/
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(to individuate and to be introjected. The individual 
who joins the party organisation has to undergo a 
process of '’transfiguration1 (Lenin).
Inner Authority as the Check of Freedom. The process 
of individuation-introjection shows that any democratic 
way of life presupposes a preliminary organisation of 
the individual’s mind so as to form in him, apart from 
the habit of conforming, the disposition towards 
voluntary action in the interest of his community.
What really lies at the foundation of this mental 
readiness, whether reason or sentiment, or a blend of 
both, is hard to decide. Important is the fact that 
such a phenomenon can be detected as a preliminary 
condition of every historical process of democratisation.
Grote ( G . )  hits very near the mark when considering 
the phenomenon of "constitutional morality” as the keynote 
of Athenian democracy. In this consists, according to 
him, the greatest achievement of Cleisthenes’ constitution­
al reform. For it is due to this reform that the Athenian 
citizen became infused with that readiness towards 
voluntary action in the interest of his community. Here 
is the admirable description given by Grote of this 
process: ”It was necessary to create in the multitude, and 
through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, 
that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term 
constitutional morality - a paramount reverence for the 
forms/
\u\
of constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities 
acting under and within those forms, yet combined with 
the habit of open speech, of action subject only to 
definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those 
very authorities as to all their public acts- combined 
too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every 
citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the 
forms of constitutions will be not less sacred in the 
eyes of his opponents than in his own”. G-rote sees the 
same phenomenon at the basis of modern Democracies, ’This 
co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint - 
of obedience to authority, with unmeasured censure of 
the persons exercising it - may be found in the aristocracy 
of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy 
of the American United States : and because we are familiar 
with it, we are apt to suppose it a general sentiment; 
though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to 
establish, and diffuse among the community, judging by 
the experience of history. (History of G-reece. John
xroUjjJ
Murray, London, 1862,*pp.131-132.)
It seems that Henry Jones Ford seizes upon the same 
fundamental condition of a democratic way of life, i.e. 
the infusion of the individual’s mind with the pattern of 
life of his group, when writing: ’Where liberal institutions 
have been successful they seem to have been dependent upon 
some p:ast discipline maintained by coercive authority”.
/
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(Representative Government. Quoted by A.Beebe White 
0po cit. p. 130)
It would take too long to show how the "liberal
institutions" in France were dependent upon the past
discipline forced upon the people. It is enough to
mention that the long tradition of a strongly centralised
government had something to do with this. France became,
«
before any other nation of Europe, an organised nation, 
and a community of people conscious of their unity. No 
wonder therefore that the French Revolutionaries made 
constant appeal to the social consciousness and patriotism 
of the Frenchmen: they were certain that every Frenchman
would find in himself the guide to his social action, and 
thus, the liberties bestowed upon the individual by the 
Revolution would be used in the interest of the whole 
community.
It is much more interesting to see the development 
of this phenomenon - which can be called "constitutional 
morality", internalised social authority, or simply, respect 
for the law - in American society* This society offered 
at its very outset a unique example of the enforcement of 
a drastic code of laws upon the individual. The code of 
laws promulgated, for instance, by the State of Connecticut, 
in 1650, starts with the penal laws and it is entirely 
based on the Holy Writ. "Whoever shall worship any other 
God - starts this code - than the Lord, shall surely 
be/
II6
put to death'1. The death penalty was provided also for 
blasphemy, sorcery, adultery, rape, an outrage offered 
by a son to his parents. Intercourse between unmarried 
persons was severely repressed by whipping, pecuniary 
penalties and subsequent marriage; lying was checked by 
flogging, or a fine; the attendance on divine service 
was compulsory.
Tocqueville remarks that "the legislation of a rude 
and half-civilised people was thus applied to an enlight­
ened and moral community".(0p« cit. p*37). But that is 
not exactly the point. It is that these tyrannic laws 
caused to form in the individual’s mind not only a strong 
respect for the laws in general, but also a clear awareness 
of certain fundamental principles upon which the life of 
his community - and of any human community - was based*
The individual grew conscious of the fact that certain 
principles cannot be denied whatever the degree of freedom 
he may be allowed in various fields of social life. This 
check put upon his action, thoughts and feelings, comes 
from an inner authority.
Tocqueville evidently touches upon one of the main 
characteristics of a democratic personality, and of a 
democratic group, when saying that in American civilisation 
of his time combined harmoniously the "spirit of religion"
U) i %
whfch "the spirit of liberty". By the spirit of religion 
he understands the main binding forces of a community of 
people; these are included here, in the first place, the
I l l
reverence for certain fundamental principles on which 
human society rests, and the respect for the laws and 
institutions through which these principles work. By the 
spirit of liberty he means first of all individual freedom, 
political and economic. Tn American society the former 
is the guide of, and the check put upon the latter. "Under 
their (American) hand-writes Tocqueville- political 
principles, laws, and human institutions seem Malleable, 
capable of being shaped and combined at will. As they go 
forward the banners which imprisoned society and behind
which they were born, are lowered..... a field without
horizon is revealed..." Then he continues: "But having 
reached the limits of the political world the human spirit 
stops by itself; in fear it relinquishes the need for 
exploration; it even abstains from lifting the veil of the 
sanctuary; it bows with respect before truths which it 
accepts without discussion". "Thus in the moral world 
everything is classified, systematised, foreseen and 
decided beforehand; in the political world, everything 
is agitated, disputed and uncertain". (Op. cit. pp.43-44).
In conclusion one can say that a way of life based on 
the presupposition that the individual is free and independ­
ent, and that he is the author of his society, cannot arise 
and be maintained unless a new type of social authority is 
formed. This is the inner authority lying in the mind of 
every individual. The work of this authority is seen in 
the individual’s respect for the principles on which human
Soci'eAv • is k se.<?( tvifc It--* &
"prescriptions” and "prejudices”, or for certain rational 
principles which regulate the life of his society.
Without this type of authority, freedom,and therefore 
democracy, is not possible ; it would quickly change 
into anarchy, or tyranny.
A democratic way of life requires therefore a specific 
type of personality, i.e. an individual who possesses in 
himself the authority and the order necessary for the 
maintenance of his society. It is only as a result of 
this that society can dispense with, or at least reduce, 
the use of coercive authority. The "virtuous citizen" on 
whose shoulders the french revolutionaries placed the 
weight of the new society, the "virtuous individual”, 
so often mentioned and desired by Jefferson, and the 
"characters" which according to Brjake form the essence of 
democratic life, are but various specimens of this 
personality. It is the distinctive mark of this personality 
to do freely what ought to be done in the general interest 
of his society and of mankind. The individual possessing 
such a personality responds, consciously or unconsciously, to 
the existence of a double front in human life, a front of 
empirical reality and expediency, and one of ideal and 
permanence. This quality which is characteristic of a 
democratic way of life will be dealt with more fully in 
the next chapter.
C H A P T E R  IV
IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY.
o\A
With-vision the people perish.
Rationalism. The current use of the term ideology 
shows that it implies not only an abstract intellectual, 
but also a practical order, a body of ideas which 
determines in the mind of the individual a particular 
type of social action and a particular way of life.
The concept of ideology, used in this sense, is opposed 
to the basic tenets of democracy.
But, because democracy cannot be described in terms 
of a specific ii^deology, one cannot say that it has no 
specific ideological character, or that ideas and theories 
are to it no more than the straw which it uses for its 
bed. It would, however, be necessary to state from the 
very beginning that what is characteristic of democracy 
is not a specific idea or theory, but a specific cultural 
climate. In what follows we shall describe certain motives 
of thought and certain intellectual attitudes which are, 
in our opinion, inherent in a democractic way of life.
Democracy is usually associated with rationalism.
The main reason for this is that both modern and ancient 
democracies rose and developed in historical periods in 
which a rationalistic way of thinking was predominant.
The most powerful rationalistic element in modern
/
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modern democracies consists in the assumption, which 
forms the -touch-stone of modern philosophy, that every 
individual has in himself the capacity of reaching 
general ideas. The political implication of this is 
that the private interests of an individual can be 
expressed in such a way as to form, a common body with 
the interests of others, sometimes with the interests 
of all members of his group. Therefore matters of common 
interest can be solved by deliberation with the whole group.
Prom this first tenet of modern rationalism to the 
assumption that human history and society are rational, 
and that there is in the nature of man a series of 
universal traits discovered by the American revolutionaries 
of 1'7.83, is a far cry. Today it is quite obvious that 
the former assumption does not necessarily call/^or the 
latter. Yet, considering the historical contexts of some 
modern democracies, one can readily agree that, from a 
psychological point of view, these two aspects of modern 
rationalism were closely interwoven. The belief that 
individual reason is but a fragment of universal reason, 
that all human nature is essentially the same, and that 
there are fundamental "rights", was a psychological con-
A
dition which settled to a great extent the fate of 
American and French democracies.
There is no need to discuss the question whether the 
basic tenets of modern rationalism have in the long run 
been favourable to a democratic way of life. A series of
/
of "experiments” in social organisation characteristic 
of the modern era have shown that it is one thing to 
hold the conviction that the world rests on a rational 
order, and another to act upon human society with the 
purpose of making it fit into that order. On the other 
hand, it would he only fair to recognise the difficulty 
of knowing to what extent one can hold the conviction that 
human history has a rational pattern and at the same time 
to resist the temptation of wilfully directing and 
correcting the course of history in order to fit its own 
pattern. The examples of Plato in Syracuse, of 
Robespierre in Prance, and of Lenin in Russia seem to 
prove that this temptation cannot easily be kept in check.
But the fact that the rationalistic creeds which 
presided over the process of democratisation of many 
modern societies have later parted company with a democratic 
way of life, does on no account mean that empiricism in 
itself has been more successful in this respect. The 
critics of modern rationalism have sometimes come much 
too quickly to the conclusion that the anti-democratic 
trends visible in many contemporary societies, such as 
political totalitarianism or the super-rationalisation of 
industrial life, are but the tribute paid by contemporary 
man to the rationalistic creeds of the eighteenth century.
It is obviously true that totalitarianism, planning, over­
rationalisation, etc., follow the pattern of modern
modern rationalism, but their success is, at least 
partly, explicable as a reaction from those modern 
philosophies rooted in the creed that the world has to 
be taken "as it is", and that the supreme principle is 
to go ahead in life with no awareness of any established 
values which give direction to human action.
As we have suggested elsewhere, democracy is rooted 
both in a rational and in an empirical attitude to life. 
First of all, democracy is not incompatible with the 
idea of a pre-established order in history. It is not 
the existence of such an order, but the relationship 
between it and the empirical condition of human life that 
really matters from a democratic point of view. A dynamic 
balance and harmony, as opposed to identity, or to an 
irremediable conflict, between a pre-established order 
and an empirical plane of life, forms one of the most 
characteristic traits of modern democracy. The ideological 
climate of modern democracies is based on a dualism which 
expresses itself differently according to historical and 
sociological circumstances. Human action taking place in 
such a climate contains inseparably both an element of 
permanence and of local and relative expediency.
The Socio-psychological Sources of Cultural Dualism.
One has to look far back for the sources of the dualism 
lying at the basis of Western civilisation in the Christian 
conception of a religious-sacred and a secular plane of 
life. But as the religious aspect of a democratic way of /
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of life wil£ form the topic of a special section, for 
the moment, we would rather concentrate our attention 
on the secular aspects of this problem. One notices 
in modern Western culture a parallel development of two 
trends of thought, one dominated by the category of 
’’the universal", the other by that of "the individual".
One emphasises the rational and universal order in the 
understanding of the world, while the other, the con­
tingent and the individual character of existence * Ihe 
evolution of the former trend reached a peak in the 
period of the Enlightenment. The latter trend follows 
more than one line in its development. Its roots lie in 
the moral value assigned to the human individual by 
Christianity. To this was added gradually the individualistic 
drives inherent in modern economy, the empirical 
orientation of modern science, the individualistic tend-
dividualism of the Reformation and the revival of the con­
cept of ancient democracy during the 18th century.
The first attempt to balance these two trends which has 
direct bearings on the cultural climate of modern democracies,
Various attempts in the same direction are also made by a 
series of conceptions and philosophies connected with so- 
called liberal democracy. Locke's concepts of "reason", 
’’natural rights”, or "natural law” are on the whole meant 
to establish a certain harmony between the universal and
encies of the art of the Renaissance,
• H
is to be found in the C&tesian concept of individual reason
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and individual, between public, or general and private 
interests. But the balance established by this type of 
thought is at best a precarious one. The main concern of 
liberal democracy has always been the individual. And 
it is in the interest of the individual as such that the 
theoreticians "liberal democracy took the trouble to 
create the belief that the individual acting on the basis 
of his own interests is not only harmless for the general 
interest, but even serves that interest, the belief that 
a man who is guided by self-interest is also "led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which is not his 
intention". (A.Smith).
Much more significant for the cultural climate oj 
democracy is the balance between "the universal" and 
"the individual" produced by Rousseau ar\d Romantic thought. 
Though fully aware of the incompatibility between various 
aspects of his personality and a democratic way of life 
we hold the conviction that Rousseau's thoughts and 
personality foreshadow,in many respects, a type of thought 
and personality which is characteristic of modern democracy. 
Both Rousseau's thought and personality disclose a mental 
structure articulated at the same time by the culture 
pattern of the Enlightenment, based on the concept of 
universal order, and by the individualistic trends 
developed since the Renaissance which form the nucleus of 
modern liberalism. In this way he can be considered as a 
prototype of Romantic personality whose basic formula was
was "individualised reason". Leaving aside, for the 
moment, a series of problems aroused by the later develop­
ment - in Hegel and ^arx in particular - of the concept of 
universal reason, one can easily grasp that Rousseau’s 
thought contains in itself the psychological ingredients 
of democratic behaviour. It presupposes that type of 
personality which has in itself both the condition of its 
own independence and freedom, and the pattern according to 
which' this freedom has to be used in order to fit into the 
common way of life. A democratic way of life implies, 
according to Rousseau, individual freedom within a well- 
defined pattern; freedom for the individual’s will provided 
that h e wills also the "general will". Rousseau wants 
democractic freedom as in Athens, but for a Spartan type 
of citizen.
The totalitarian elements involved in the concept of the 
"general will" have often been pointed out. But whenever 
one takes an integral view of Rousseau’s thought one finds 
it difficult to brand the author of "Emile" as one of the 
fathers of modern totalitarianism. The main difficulty 
seems to arise from the fact that Rousseau was definitely 
not an integrated personality; the democractic elements of 
his mind could not form an harmonious structure. In this 
respect Rousseau was a typical example of a personality 
lacking the reality function. This is primarily shown by 
his tendency to fall towards two extremes. Re sacrifices 
everybody for his own interests, and, at the same time,
time, sacrifices himself for the interest of "humanity", 
he lies in seclusion, and, at the same time, makes public 
his own personality in all its nakedness. (This remarkable 
need for sincerity and authenticity is by no means an 
authoritarian feature.) He is equally impressed by the 
rational aspect of human life and by its spontaneity.
"Emile" and "The Contract" appeared in the same year as if 
to stress the dual articulation of life. The fact that 
"the universal" and "the particular", reason and feeling, 
the pattern of communal values and the aspirations of his 
own individuality could not be balanced in him is not 
necessarily a sign of totalitarian trends in his personality. 
The lack of integration in his personality is due to a 
great extent to sociological rather than psychological 
factors. Had Rousseau lived in a society in which individual 
freedom was a recognised value he would very likely have 
been an integrated personality. Re would certainly have 
suffered less from the need of making a case of his most 
"personal" drives, habits and feelings. Perhaps he would 
not have written "Les Confessions".
Aspects of Dualism in British Society. It is much more
difficult to see the sources of dualism in the cultural 
climate of British democracy. The rationalistic element 
which is so prominent in French democracy shines here 
through its absence. Even if one admits a certain connection 
between Locke's concept of "natural rights", i.e. men 
living together according to reason, and the cultural climate
climate of British democracy, this situation is not 
very much changed, due mainly to the meaning of the 
concept of reason in this context.
In spite of this, a basic dualism is inherent in 
the cultural climate of British democracy. The terms 
of dualism are, however, different from those noticed 
in French democracy. In British democracy the integrative 
factors lie not in reason but in tradition, not in a 
set of general principles explicitly defining the nature 
of man, but in a store of communal values, institutions, 
ceremonials, and in "unspoken understandings which 
regulate so much the common life" (Sir Fred Clarke.
The Educative Society, London p.75)*
The norms of life established in tradition are 
evidently empirical in their origin. But it would be 
a mistake to judge the function of tradition by this 
alone in British society. For, one does not require 
great perspicacity to notice that in this country 
tradition has a super-empirical function. The 
traditional way of life, be it expressed in habits of 
tKnight, prejudices, or the law of the land, moulds 
with a greater precision than any regulative principle 
of reason the whole range of experiences of the 
individual and of the group. If in France, or in the 
United States of America, individual freedom is 
guaranteed and limited by a body of rational principles
principles of a ’'written" constitution, in Great 
Britain this is done by a set of "unspoken under­
standings" .
The dualism lying at the basis of the cultural 
climate of British democracy is defined in terms of an 
established order expressed in tradition, and in the 
novelty of every human experience, in terms of "the 
old" and "the new". And it is the balance between 
these two terms that constitutes one of the basic 
features of the cultural climate of British democracy. 
This balance is expressed in the English sense of 
gradualness, i.e. in that kind of flexibility in the 
English culture pattern and in the mental structures of 
the individuals belonging to it, which makes possible 
a smooth transition in both senses between "the old" 
and "the new", ^he fact that the modern English State 
has not grown upon the ruins of medieval society, as 
did some continental states, but has grown by the 
assimilation of that society, is often given as an 
example of this sense of gradualness. The British never 
give up an old form of life unless the new one is strong 
enough to fight the old and to assume for itself the 
authority of tradition. But during this fight the new 
form gradually fashions itself after the old one, while 
the old form takes on new characters. This process is 
slow and continuous. Thus, change in social life
life does not imply 9. reconstruction of the whole 
world outlook in the light of "the new order" which 
presents itself as a new "Messiah", but a slow, yet not 
blind, flow of life. The British concepts of form and 
order mean tradition; the concept of change means 
evolution.
There is another aspect of the dualism in the 
cultural climate of British democracy worth mentioning. 
Its terms are the individual and the law. We hasten 
to say that these terms are not as different as they 
appear from those of tradition and novelty if one bears 
in mind the connection between tradition and law 
characteristic of this country. The British have 
solved the opposition between social order and individual 
freedom by an equal respect for the supremacy of the law 
and of human personality. Referring to the origin of 
this trait in the cultural climate of British democracy, 
Giuseppe Maranini writes: "Throughout the Middle Ages 
the English people had assimilated, synthetised and 
expressed in social realities and political institutions 
both the Roman faith in the "law" and the Christian 
faith in the human personality". (Miti e RealitsS^della 
Democrazila. Studi Politici. Anno 1. No.l. 1952 p.92)
Due to this basic dudism, British democracy has been, 
on the whole,less inclined than other modern democracies 
to fall into the extreme of a "rugged individualism",
or of an authoritarian order. Even when a strong 
State and a strong law were necessary - the recent 
measure of nationalisation can be taken as an example - 
means were found to put them first of all into the 
service of the human personality.
Democracy and the Philosophy of Compromise.
Jose Ortega-y Gasset sees in Kantianism the philosophy 
of a merchant, for its inryzfer structure is based on 
"bargain”: [bargain between the outside and inner world, 
between an a priori and an a posteriory between a 
transcendental and an immanent plane of life. We 
consider critical idealism as one of the most adequate 
expressions, at the philosophical level, of the 
cultural climate of democracy. Dualism, balance and 
compromise, which are fundamental concepts in critical 
idealism, shown its connection with a democratic cultural 
climate.
Knowledge is, according to critical idealism, a 
compromise between two structures, the intellect and 
the sensibility, between a rational and an empirical 
condition of human life. Dualism in the field of 
knowledge is ensured by the formal character of the 
intellect. The categories of the intellect, though 
necessary conditions of any knowledge, are empty forms 
unless they realise themselves in a compromise with 
experience. Thus, critical idealism gives no justification
/
justificatjidn for a totalitarian conception of the 
world, i.e. for that tendency of the human mind to 
create a pure rational order in life.
The basic dualism of critical idealism seems to 
be lost in the field of moral action. This is at 
least the impression made by Kant’s Romantic followers, 
who assume that, according to Kant, an action is moral 
only so far as it conforms to its ideal pattern as 
expressed by the Categorical Imperative. Consequently 
in the field of moral action the two orders of 
existence, rational and empirical, are identical.
But how far the Romantics - including Marx^-were justified
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in holdingVfolitical action, is quite a different 
matter.
The meaning of Kantian ethics should be looked for 
in quite a different direction. If it has a political 
implication, that cannot be other than individual 
freedom. Like "les philosophes” and like Rousseau in 
particular, Kant cannot conceive freedom but for the 
individual who is aware in one way or another of the 
pattern of human action in general. This awareness is 
made possible by the office of the Categorical 
Imperative. As an "authonomous personality M each 
human being has the inner capacity for free action 
in the line of human interest in general. This proves 
that dualism is not superseded even in moral action.
For the concept of "authonomous personality” implies 
that the individual qua individual fulfils the 
General will.
^here is another aspect of critical idealism which 
shows its close connection with a democratic cultural 
climate. This refers to the picture of man emerging 
from it. Man has, according to this philosophy, a 
highly differentiated and heterogeneous mental 
structure. There is a high degree of independence 
between his faculties, namely, between his intellect, 
feeling and will. It is only fair to say that this 
picture of man is not entirely a creation of critical 
idealism. Kant himself is not quite satisfied with 
the state of discord between human faculties. He is, 
however, not very successful in his attempt to 
reconcile them. The independence of human faculties 
means, briefly speaking, that human will does not 
always "will” what human intellect "knows", and 
vice versa, and that human feeling does not necessarily 
follow the same path as human intellect and will.
If one could give a more extensive application to a 
well-known Hascalian expression one would say that 
each faculty has its own "reason”. The image of 
man emerging from this is certainly not that of a 
monolith. If he is a united structure this is the 
result of a series of compromises and balances between 
various factors, Man j_s a forum for debate rather than^
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than a platoon of execution.
It is Romantic philosophy, as a reactior^rom 
Kant, that worked out the picture of a monolithic man 
who foreshadows in many respects the contemporary 
totalitarian man. Hegel’s main point of discontent 
with critical idealism consists in the gap created 
by this between human faculties. If, on the moral 
plane, man can be aware of the universal order of 
existence, Hegel cannot see any reason why the same 
man could not be capable of knowing the absolute 
order and willing it at the same time. Thus, dualism 
withers away, leaving room for monism, with its funda­
mental concept of identity between the inner and the 
outer world, between a transcendental and an immanent, 
an ideal and natural order. Knowledge is no longer a 
compromise between man and the external world, and 
social action does no longer spring from a compromise 
between various wills, but from an absolute order lying 
at the basis of things. One of the political impli­
cations is that non-conformity, even partial, with that 
order, cannot be called individual independence or 
originality, but sheer ignorance and finally deviation. 
These are some of the main premises of modern mofitism, 
idealistic or materialistic, which can be considered as 
the background of totalitarianism of the right or of 
the left.
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Religion and Democracy, -^ here is a widespread 
belief that religion gives rise to.and supports,anti- 
democractic trends in a culture pattern by its 
resistance to change and by its attachment to a form 
of absolute authority. This is not entirely true.
The part played by religion in a culture-pattern is, 
in the first place, determined by its relations with 
other factors of the pattern, and only in the second 
place by its body of doctrine. There are religions, 
or stages in the evolution of a religion, which contributed 
actively to the creation of a democractic way of life. 
Christian religion can be taken as an example.
Because of lack of space we have to confine our 
present discussion to that .aspect of Christianity which 
has contributed most the rise of the cultural 
climate of modern democracies. This consists in the 
Christian conception of the double structure of human 
life. The existence of a transcendental and an immanent 
order in life has created in the individuals and the 
groups belonging to Christian civilisation a series of 
tensions and dynamic balances which have in the long run 
prepared the ground for the rise of a democractic way 
of life.
The ideals preached by Christianity, though working 
as regulative principles in life, belong to an order 
beyond the grave and as such they can never be realised
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realised at the empirical level of life. The ideal 
of universal brotherhood can be taken as an example.
Thus a dualism is created in life which under specific 
historical conditions becomes a positive element in 
the cultural climate of democracy. This took place 
at that moment in the evolution of Western man when a 
balance was created between the transcendental and the 
immanent dimensions of life. Historically speaking 
this phenomenon resulted from the procees of secularisation 
of life started by the Renaissance.
It would be a mistake to consider the process of 
secularisation as synonymous with that of the 
democratisation of Various European communities. This 
would simply imply that the less importance given to 
the sacred and transcendental dimension of life the 
more intensive the process of democratisation. Present- 
day Communism shows the fallacy of this supposition.
The democratic significance of secularisation consists 
in the fact that this process has resulted in the 
diminution of the religious aspect of life, thus making 
possible a balance between the transcendental and 
immanent, sacred and secular, ideal and real aspects of 
life. Tt is the balance between these two dimensions 
and not the substitution of one by another, that 
prepares the ground for a democratic way of life.
What is the origin of this balance?
/
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During the Middle Ages the whole realm of human 
life was under the domination of a religious, trans­
cendental order. It is due to the Renaissance and 
the Reformation that important aspects of life were 
secularised. We have already mentioned how modern 
economic activity escaped from under the tutelage of 
the Church, and thus provided man with new ends in 
life as strong as the religious ones. Already in the 
early Renaissance, the Catholic Church was ready to 
find a compromise between the guiding values of a 
religious, and those of an economic way of life.
Making money was an "acceptable” way of life provided 
that those engaged in. it fulfilled certain obligations 
towards the Church. The same readiness for compromise 
is seen in the artistic field. The taste for a secular 
art- an art whose value lay in itself - grew side by 
side with the taste for a religious art. If, on the 
one hand, the artists of the Renaissance accepted the 
religious symbols as means for expressing their 
artistic emotions, on the other hand, religion itself 
threw open its gates to many aspects of secular life 
as seen through the eyes of those artists. In the 
political field a long series of conflicts, and com­
promises between religious and political authority, 
ended finally in the separation of the State from the 
Church, thus bringing secularisation in another 
important aspect of life. /
One of the most important psj^chological results 
of the separation between religious and secular life 
was an increase in man’s self-awareness and 
responsibility. After the shrinking of the authority 
of the Church as a result of the Reformation, Western 
man as individual and group, became more and more 
conscious that he had to create standards of action 
and values in life for himself. Even in the religious 
field the Reformation laid the responsibility of 
salvation on the individual's shoulders. This aspect 
in the evolution of Christianity and of Western man 
in general has formed the object of many important 
studies, most of them agreeing upon its great sig­
nificance for the development of the Western democratic 
way of life. Max Weber, for instance, sees, among others, 
an increased distance and tension between "ideal" and 
"real" as the result of the secular spirit of the 
Reformation. One meaning of this is that the fall of 
the authority of the Church had increased in man the 
consciousness of the necessary effort to adjust himself 
to the ideal order upheld by his religious convictions.
One of the outlets of this inner tension was in a drive 
towards work, enterprise and production which lies in 
fact at the basis of modern capitalism. Erich Fromm 
sees in the increased self-responsibility resulting 
from the spirit of the Reformation, not only a demo­
cratic phenomenon, but also the very root of the fear
fear of freedom in contemporary man which, as we 
shall see later, constitutes a main condition of 
present day totalitarianism.
Both the increased distance between "real” and 
’’ideal" and the fear of freedom show that the process 
of secularisation aroused in man an urgent need for 
the reformulation of the problem of salvation at a new
cultural and psychological level. How could the
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individual,^ from the traditional tutelage of the 
Church, lead his life so as to obtain salvation? The 
answer to this question was: by the guidance of an 
inner evidence which gave him the sense of value in 
life under any circumstance, thus the secularisation 
of life caused a unique spurt in the development of 
modern man’s conscience. Since in this phenomenon 
lies the main democratic significance of secularisation 
let us analyse it in some detail.
A specific psycholigical ^process is closely 
connected with the growth of conscience in modern men. 
The minimisation of the power of religion has been 
parallelled by the displacement of an external and 
absolute type of authority by an inner authority.
The insecurity aroused in man by his emancipation from 
the divine order characteristic of the Middle Ages lies 
at the basis of this process. As the result of this 
displacement, man’s reliance on the supreme power and 
wisdom of God was at least partly transformed into
reliance of human power and reason; the faith in 
God became faith in man. Modern rationalism and 
humanism are the direct outcomes of this displacement. 
Psychologically, secularisation became possible to 
the extent to which the transcendental order was 
rendered immanent, to the extent to which the historical 
process itself became redemptive, and to the extent 
to which the individual's conscience took upon itself 
the task of guiding and organising life.
One might believe that, because of its close 
connection with the process of secularisation, the con­
science of modern man is oriented mainly towards the 
relative values of life, and that its main function is 
to guide and organise man's actions towards the achieve­
ment of a series of secular values artistic, economic, 
political, etc. In this case the structure of modern 
conscience is thoroughly historical, i.e., it is but a 
means of justification of what happens on the empirical 
plane of life. This is not the case. Proofs can easily 
be found which show that part of the contents of modern 
man's conscience are of transcendental order, and that 
due to this fact he has made permanent efforts to guide 
and organise-his life according to ideal ends. The 
presence of these ends in his conscience is due to the 
displacement and the introjection of the religious 
transcendental order. The makers of American democracy
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democracy fought the old regime in the name of the 
law of God which they read in their consciences 
(John Brown, for instance,) "The rights of man” 
have the same character of sacredness as the voice of 
God. The supreme respect for human personality lying 
at the basis of British democracy is rooted in the 
Christian conception of human life. The humanitarian 
conscience of the French revolutionaries offers 
also ample proofs of its religious extraction. Their 
language discloses this, even when their actions take 
on an anti-religious character. The frequent use in 
political contexts of expressions such as "evangile", 
"credo”, "martyrolog^", "Bonne Nouvelle de liberte", 
show that their conscience was impregnated with the 
values of the transcendental world of Christianity.
(See P. Brunot: Histoire de la Langue Francaise,
Tome IX pp. 623 and following.)
We stop here with the analysis of modern man's 
conscience. Its main trait consists in its dual 
character, in the sense that it is the source of two 
types of values, namely, a set of transcendental-ideal 
values and a set of immanent empirical values. The 
conscience of modern man is a dynamic structure whose 
main task is to produce a dynamic balance between a 
transcendental and an empirical order of life. Due to 
his specific structure, modern man has the capacity of 
adapting himself both to a transcendental and an immanent
/
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immanent order of life. He is able to combine the will 
of God with the necessities of life. Needless to say, 
this/C/as not possible before the process of secularisation 
started* For, as we have already shown, it was 
primarily due to this process that the will and the 
reason of God based on the external authority of the 
Church was introjected and transformed into inner 
authority* This unconscious process strengthened the 
conviction that man could govern himself if he only 
had an adequate knowledge of the laws of his mind.
The belief in the power of self-government, individual 
and collective,and the belief that man can act freely 
under the only "sovereignty of his developed conscience", 
(Lord Acton) form the basic feature of the cultural 
climate of democracy.
In conclusion we stress the main idea of this 
section as follows; Christianity became a strong 
element in the cultural climate of democracy at the 
moment when, due to its historical evolution, a balance 
was created between the religious and secular planes of 
life* The process of secularisation has made this 
possible. But it is the balance between religious and 
secular life, not secularisation in itself, that matters 
for democracy. Without secularisation, Western man 
would have remained in an immature state and unconscious 
of his ability for self-government. Too much 
secularisation and the total abolition of the divine
divine order of life has aroused in man uncertainty 
and a morbid need for dependence* Deprived of the 
security of belief in a transcendental order, he has 
linked his destiny, by the ties of absolute faith with 
a series of empirical forces. In this lies the origin 
of modern secular myths which form an important 
psychological ingredient in contemporary totalitarianism* 
Faith in the human species, in a nation, in a social 
class, in a race, in a providential leader, in an 
ideology, has successively compensated for the total 
lack of faith in a. super-human divine order. It is 
worth noticing that those European communities whose 
religious development led more easily towards the 
balance between religious and a secular life were ready 
earlier than other communities for the process of 
democratisation. "It hath been the wisdom of the 
Church of England..* to keep the mean between two 
extremes”, says an old document. (Church of England, 
the Preface to the Authorised version.) At that time 
the extremes were: an excessive drive towards
secularisation represented by most of the Protestant 
sects, and the religious absolutism of Rome. It is no 
wonder that this community has opened up the road to 
modern democracy both in their own country and in 
America.
Secularisation was necessary up to the point at 
which European man gained the conviction that he could
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could follow from an inner impulse the pattern of 
reason and moral life instilled into him by centuries 
of Christian civilisation. This is the real function 
of the so-called modern conscience which forms the 
nucleus of democratic personality.
Ethics and Democracy, The main problem regarding 
the relationship between democracy and ethics lies 
in the question: how can the individual act in the 
interest of the group having the motives of his own 
action in himself? In other words, how is it possible 
for a mora,l end to be of an inter-individual character, 
and yet not to lead to individual self-alienation? 
Answering these questions from a psychological point 
of view one can say that freedom in the moral field is 
possible for the main reason that, due to the process 
of individuation, the individual has in himself the 
capacity for acting according to general ends.^"^
v J If moral law is nothing but introjected communal 
values it would follow that personality is not a forum 
of free decision and consequently the feeling of 
spontaneity characteristic of moral action is but a 
psychological resultant of the conformity to necessity. 
This would seem to weaken the ethical foundation of 
democracy. A few details on the process of introjection 
would perhaps help to dispel this impression. First 
of all there is no introjection without projection.
The child does not in fact introject the father figure 
as an objective reality. The introjected figure is 
the result of a series of needs and desire of the child 
blended with a series of expectations which the father 
has from him. The same process takes place in the 
integration of a social norm in a democratic cultural 
climate. The introjected social norms are experienced 
by the individual as his own conscience; they are not
not only a mirror of external coercion and authority, 
but also a projection of his own individuality.
Conscience is at least partly the expression of the 
individual in his relationships v/ith others in various 
circumstances. -H is not only a result of the 
individual adaptation, but also his own self-realisation.
One usually says that in such circumstances the 
individual acts according to reason. Needless to say, 
this does not necessarily imply the identification of 
the individual with general ends. One of the main 
assumptions of democracy is that the individual knows 
and realises these ends as an individual. This shows 
clearly the main feature of democratic ethics. This 
type pf ethics can neither spring from, nor lead to, 
monism, for monism implies the identity of the 
individual with the general interest. Democratic ethics 
presuppose a basic dualism, a balance between the 
individual and society, personality and humanity, 
freedom and order. Today this basic dualism is more 
clearly noticeable than ever for the simple reason that 
in some democratic societies its terms tend to fall 
apart and thus to form two separate ethics, a univer- 
salistic and a relativistic ethics. The idea should, 
however, be stressed that these ethical trends are found 
in one form or another in any democratic cultural 
climate, ancient or modern.
One often makes the mistake of speaking about Greek 
ethics, the ethics of perfection. Such an expression 
can be truly aijplied only to a certain Greek period, i.e.
to a pre-democratic, Homeric culture-pattern. With 
the rise of the middle classes in Athens, which 
reaches its peak in the democratic period, this 
ethical ideal was parallelled by another. The end 
of life consisted not only in doing glorious things 
at any cost, but also in "getting ahead" in the world 
by a series of compromises between various empirical 
conditions of life. The existence of the two ethical 
trends is fully tested by the clash between Socrates 
and the Sophists, by the clash between two conceptions 
of military action and of glory, that of Alcibiades 
and that of Nicias. Socrates himself bears witness to 
the existence of the two ethical trends, for he speaks 
about two types of gods, his own god, the source of 
absolute truth and good, and the gods of the city, as 
the representatives of the communal values empirically 
crystallised in traditions and institutions. He 
realises that in man these two trends should work 
together; after spending all his life preaching his 
own god he willingly dies for wronging the gods of the 
city.
In modern democracies ethical dualism is disclosed 
by the co-existence of Christian ethics, of universal 
brotherhood, and of the individualistic ethics of com­
petition. There is no need for entering into a detailed 
description of this phenomenon. Suffice it to say that 
in modern democracies these two trends, though opposed
exposed to each other, have worked together for a 
long time.
Democracy represents, from the ethical point of 
view, a dynamic balance between an ethic^of the 
absolute and an ethics of empirical life. When this 
balance is upset, democracy itself is threatened.
After the Periclean era the two ethics fall apart.
The ethics of the absolute takes the way of idealism 
through Plato, while the ethics of expedience is 
developed by the Sophists. The ethical ideal is con­
sequently divided. The man of that period had to 
choose between living according to reason or excelling 
in the expediency of life. Today one of the greatest 
weaknesses of modern democracy is seen in the conflict 
between Christian ethics and the individualistic ethics 
of competition.
Democracy and the Double Dimension of Life. The 
dualism found in nearly all aspects of a democratic 
cultural climate leads us to the conclusion that the 
structure of a democratic way of life is defined by two 
dimensions, one ideal and transcendental, the other 
empirical and immanent. The first can be referred to 
psychologically as the feeling of transcendence, per­
manence and sacredness in life. The implications of 
this dual charactercf life are many. We can mention 
only the most important of them.
A. A way of life based on two dimensions, as 
described above, develops in man the tendency and 
the ability to adjust himself to comprehensive and 
distant goals* Distance and comprehensiveness, 
however, do not, define the real character of these 
goals, but their ideality. Some goals of life 
belong to a transcendental order. This is not 
simply a paradigmatic order (Mannheim) or a pre- 
established plan of life. The order prescribed by 
these goals, though acting upon life, is irrealisable 
in the sense that it over-flows by far the empirical 
condition of life. As a result of this, human life 
has a timeless as well as a historical character.
This endows the individual and the group with a high 
level of aspiration and a particular dynamism in life.
B. The first sign of the present of a trans­
cendental order in the cultural climate of democracy 
is seen in the fact that a series of fundamental con­
cepts of democracy do not get their full meaning 
except on a purely ideal plane. These are the con­
cepts of freedom, equality and fratennity. We have 
seen elsewhere that Aristotle’s difficulty in defining 
these concepts came exactly from his tendency to look 
at them from an empirical point of view.^^
focqueville regards the gradual development of 
the principle of equality in modern society, as ”a
providential fact .... it is universal, it is
lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference....” 
(Democracy in America, p.6)________________  /
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Freedom,equality, and fraternity are realised only 
in the man's work and hope for freedom, equality, 
and fraternity. To become disillusioned because 
they do not become realities means not understanding 
their basic character and their function in human 
life. The attempt to realise them by any means - 
the realisation of "equality" in contemporary 
Communism for instance - springs up from the same 
ignorance.
C. The double dimension of life is one of the 
main sources of tolerance, as a value of the European 
democratic culture. Living within the frame of high 
ideals, and being aware of their unrealisable 
character at the same time, moreover, measuring one’s 
actions against these ideals, leads in the long run 
to a strong feeling of self-limitation and humility. 
This feeling, applied to inter-human relationships, 
promotes understanding for, and tolerance towards 
one’s fellowmen.
It is difficult to follow on a psychological 
plane how this process has taken place in various 
modern communities. It took more than a millenium 
until the spirit of humility instilled in man by 
Christianity became tolerance in everyday life.
An analogy may help us to understand this phenomenon. 
It is a fact of common experience that tolerance 
towards oneself and towards others increases with age.
The adolescent shov/s little tolerance to himself and 
to others because his life is rigidly guided by far- 
distant ideals. The tolerance of the grown-up comes 
from his ability to grasp compromises between an 
ideal and empirical conditions of life. This age 
was reached by Western civilisation during and after 
the Renaissance by the process of secularisation.
D. It is worth mentioning another important 
significance of the double dimension of life for 
psychology. Modern psychology rightly depicts the 
human mind as having a double structure, the 
Unconscious and the conscious. These two structures, 
though opposed, compensate each other. At a later 
stage we shall see the importance of this phenomenon 
for a democractic form of behaviour.
E. A democratic way of life began to prevail in 
V/estern civilisation at the moment when a balance 
between the two dimensions of life was achieved. The 
supremacy of one dimension, transcendental or 
immanent, leads to the end of a democractic and to the 
beginning of a totalitarian way of life. The Fascists 
suppressed the transcendental dimension of life by 
the secular myths of leadership and race. The 
Communists call the transcendenta.1 dimension empirical 
and immanent and work accordingly. In this way any 
ideal is turned into an immanent aim, into a political 
slogan. In both types of social organisation life is
ISTo
is unidimensional.
The Scale of Values in Democracy, It is 
difficult to imagine a democratic way of life 
flourishing in a cultural climate dominated by a single 
value. In the Western culture-pattern the condition 
of the independence of, and of the balance between 
its cardinal values was laid down by the Renaissance,
As a result of this, the main social and cultural 
values were emancipated from the supremacy of religious 
value. In what follows we intend to give a table of 
the cardinal values of modern civilisation pointing 
also to their specific functions,
1. Religious value is characterised by the feeling 
of dependence from a supra-individual and trans­
cendental authority. Its fundamental trait is defined 
by the concept of the sacred. The actions determined 
by religious ends are intended to fit into a pi\emanent 
sacred order, i.e., to bring salvation. Prom the social 
point of view, religious value is integrative. 
Anthropological researches show that everywhere, and at 
all times in history, God or the gods are the same for 
a given social group as a whole and that they compel 
the individual members to behave in a. certain specific 
way, thus increasing the coherence of the group.
f
2. Aesthetic value is basedbn the concept of form.
It has often been said, and we are inclined to support 
the view that the category of individuality is essential
essential for aesthetic value. The main aim of an 
aesthetically orientated action is to re-create the 
world as seen through the experiences of an 
individual. Romatic art is the best demonstration 
of this point of view. During the Romantic period, 
a creator of art and indeed every work of art was 
considered as a perspective of the universe. In an 
aesthetic act the individual is too much concentrated 
on himself. That is why Spranger defines the aesthetic 
type of fwan as egotistic and anti-social. This seems 
to be an exaggeration, but it is nevertheless true 
that aesthetic value is not socially integrative.
3» Scientific value is rooted in the tendency to 
adapt oneself to the immediate empirical conditions 
of life. Its fundamental category is that of "under­
standing", i.e., of establishing relationships between 
the elements of the empirical world. But in spite of 
this, the ultimate aim of scientific action is not to 
build up a unitary picture of the world.- Scientific 
activity is essentially analytical; it is firstly 
concerned with fragments of existence, called facts or 
experiences, and only secondary with their organization 
into a united v/hole. The unity attained by the 
interrelation of facts is provisional and relative.
This unity is entirely dependent on facts. Change, 
progress and relativity are basically scientific 
concepts„
/
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An analtyic attitude towards the world is 
obviously disintegrative for the simple reason that 
it increases the feeling of instability and fragment­
ariness in life* The rapid tempo introduced by science 
into modern life, though it once helped to render 
flexible the pattern of modern societies, is today 
considered as one of the main causes of social 
instability and disintegration.
4. Political value is essentially integrative*
Any action determined by political ends takes place 
at the group level, i.e*, it is meant to make the 
individual act as a member of a group and the group 
act as a unit. The feeling of belonginess and coercion 
and the consciousness of an external authority are 
necessarily involved in political action. That is 
why there seems to be an obvious connection between 
religious and political values. Both of them contain 
the element of external authority and coercion, but 
their methods of coercion differ.
5* Moral value is also essentially integrative. 
Action pursuing moral ends springs from the consciousness 
of being member of a group* As distinct from religious 
and political,moral action is guided by internal 
authority (conscience).
i*V"
6. Economic value is/modern societies^ dis­
integrative* It is rooted in the individual drive for
for acquisition and ownership* Contemporary 
Communist experiments have not yet invalidated the 
assumption that Homo econornicus is not a social man.
The evolution of the scale of values since the 
Renaissance shows firstly a permanent tendency of all 
values towards a certain independence from religious 
value, secondly, a tendency towards autonomy existing 
in each cardinal value, and thirdly, a tendency 
towards a certain balance between integrative and 
disintegrative values. All these trends are closely 
connected with the process of democratisation.
The separation of aesthetic from religious values 
was, as mentioned before, already noticeable in the 
early Renaissance. The Italian painters of the 
Renaissance populated the church with common faces 
seen in the street. ’’The saints themselves appeared 
as ”bons bourgeois” (von Martin op.cit* p*26.)
(See for instance the evolution of the human face 
from the earlier periods to Cimabue, Giotto, Signorelli 
and to Raphael). A new approach to nature, no longer 
religious, but aesthetic, appeared during the same 
period. The ideal of the Renaissance ’’literati” was 
to disengage themselves from any kind of "ordo” and 
to lookrfat the world as personality, as an !'uomo 
singolare” or ’’unico” who shaped the world according 
to his own style. The independence of aesthetic value 
reaches a peak in Romanticism, when in fact it 
dominatejall other values. /
The liberation of science from the control of 
religion took place during the same period. The 
full significance of this phenomenon cannot be 
discussed here. But, on the whole, the rise of 
science has brought with it considerable interest 
in the empirical and practical conditions of life.
It has increased also the confidence in human power, 
a belief in unlimited progress. All this was 
paralleled by a disregard towards the transcendental 
order of life and by a unique readiness for change.
The separation of political value constitutes 
a long process culminating in the separation of the 
State from the Church. Symptoms of the dominant 
part played by political value were seen in many
modern dictatorships. But the supremacy of political
vs,
value over all other values is clearly realied in 
contemporary totalitarian societies.
During the humanistic period of the Renaissance
there took place the separation of moral from
religious value. In this humanism can be found the
basic condition of various "secular ethtics".
During that period the Christian virtues were gradually
%
paralleled and counterbalanced by formal "virtu", 
signifying "initiative and ability and all forms of 
dynamic strivings by the individual"* (von Martin 
op.cit. P.39) "Eloquentia" and "sapientia" for 
instance were qualities equal t© their value to
value to Christian virtues.
We have already dedt with the separation 
of economic from religious value.
In conclusion we should like to point out the 
following indeas. One of the main conditions of a 
democratic cultural climate was laid down by the 
separation of the cardinal cultural values from 
religious value. This process was completed by a 
certain degree of autonomisation of each value. As 
the result of this process, Western man has acquired 
the feeling of plurality of ends in life, and the 
conviction that he as an individual in a group has a 
certain degree of freedom in choosing the supreme 
goal in life. In this lies an important condition 
of a democratic cultural climate which we call 
cultural heterogeneity. Its full psychological 
significance will be seen at a later stage. For- the 
moment we can say that cultural heterogeneity is a 
condition of mental flexibility and tolerance which 
are two aspects of democratic behaviour. In order to 
realise the importance of cultural heterogeneity it is 
enough to consider what are the possibilites of growing 
up asapersonality in a cultural climate dominated by 
religious value and what these possibilities are in a 
cultural climate whose cardinal values are in a 
dynamic balance. The number of roles an individual can
1S&
can play is considerably greater in the latter 
case, a fact which increases both the flexibility 
of the social pattern and the degree of individual 
freedom,,
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C H A P T E R  V.
T H E  C A R D I N A L  S O C I O - P S Y C H O L O G I C A L  C O N C E P T S  
O P  D E M O C R A C Y .
T h e  c i t i z e n s  s h o u l d  b e  m o u l d e d  t o  s u i t  t h e  
f o r m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h e y  l i v e .  P o r  
e a c h  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  a  p e c u l i a r  c h a r a c t e r  w h i c h  
o r i g i n a l l y  f o r m e d  a n d  w h i c h  c o n t i n u e s  t o  p r e s e r v e  
i t .  T h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  d e m o c r a c y  c r e a t e s  d e m o -  
- c r a e y ,  a n d  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  o l i g a r c h y ,  c r e a t e s  
o l i g a r c h y ;  a n d  a l w a y s  t h e  b e t t e r  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  
t h e  b e t t e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .
A r i s t o t l e .
T h e  c a r d i n a l  s o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n c e p t s  o f  d e m o -  
- c r a c y  a r e  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  c r i t i c a l  m i n d ,  
o b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  l e i s u r e .  I t  w o u l d  b e  p e r h a p s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
s t a t e  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  b e g i n n i n g  t h a t ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  w e  c a l l  t h e m  w c a r d i n a l M ,  a  c e r t a i n  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  i n  
t h e i r  s e l e c t i o n  w a s  u n a v o i d a b l e .  W e  c a n  h o w e v e r  o f f e r  
t w o  r e a s o n s  f o r  o u r  c h o i c e r  f i r s t l y ,  t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  h a v e  
b e e n  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  e v o l u t i o n  o f  
m o d e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  a n d  s e c o n d l y ,  t h e y  a r e  i n  m a n y  w a y s  
b o r d e r - l i n e  c o n c e p t s  b e t w e e n  s o c i o l o g y  a n d  p s y c h o l o g y .  
B e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  t w o  r e a s o n s  w e  a r e  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  a n y  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  d e m o c r a c y  s h o u l d  
s t a r t  w i t h  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e s e  f o u r  c o n c e p t s .
I n d i v i d u a l i t y .  A  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  f r o m
/
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a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t a n d p o i n t  i m p l i e s  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  s t r u c t u r e  
a n d  o f  m o t i v a t i o n .  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  f o r m e r  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t n s t r u c t u r e " ,  a s  a  
s u b s t a n c e  t h a t  d e f i n e s  b e s t  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .
I t  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  r e f e r  t o  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  
t o  a  s t r u c t u r i s i n g  p r o c e s s ,  i . e . ,  a s  t o  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  t o  s h a p e  a n d  i n t e g r a t e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  w a y  t h e  
v a r i o u s  d a t a  o f  h i s  e x p e r i e n c e s .  A s  a  s t r u c t u r i s i n g  
p r o c e s s  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i m p l i e s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  u n i q u e n e s s .  
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  c o n c e p t  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t , i f  t h e  
p s y c h o l o g i s t  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  a  c e n t r e  
o f  m o t i v a t i o n ,  o r  a s  a  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  s y s t e m ,  h e  m a y  
l e a v e  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  t h e  s t u d y  o f  h u m a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  t o  t h e  
s o c i o l o g i s t ,  b i o l o g i s t  o r  e c o n o m i s t .  H o w  h u m a n  a c t i o n  i s  
d e t e r m i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  b e e n  t h e  m a i n  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i s t  
o f  a l l  t i m e s .
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  c a n n o t  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  a d e q u a t e l y  w i t h o u t  l o o k —  
- i n g  a t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  c o n c e p t .  O n e  o f  t h e  
f i r s t  e x a m p l e s  o f  a  c i v i l i s a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  o f f e r e d  b y  a n c i e n t  A t h e n s .  W h y ,  a n d  h o w  
t h i s  h a p p e n e d  a r e  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  a d d  t o  " t h e  G r e e k  m i r a c l e " .  
M a n y  p e o p l e  a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  s t r e s s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  f a c t o r  i n  
t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  t r e n d s  o f  G r e e k  
c i v i l i s a t i o n .  K i t t o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h i n k s  t h a t  t h e  r i s e
o f  t h e  t o w n - m a r k e t  h a d .  m u c h  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h e  a n c i e n t  G r e e k s  a s  "  a  r a c e  o f  b r i l l i a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a n d  o p p o r t u n i s t s " .  ( T h e  G r e e k s .  P e n q u i n .  p . 7 0 ) .  O n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  m u c h  i s  t o  b e  s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  p a r t  p l a y e d  b y  
r e l i g i o n  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  t r e n d s  
o f  G r e e k  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  W e  h a v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  c o n f i n e  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  i m p o r t a n t  p r o b l e m  t o  t h o s e  o f  i t s  a s p e c t s  
w h i c h  l e a d  u s  a s  q u i c k l y  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a n d  d e m o c r a c y .  T h u s ,  
t w o  a s p e c t s  o f  G r e e k  c i v i l i s a t i o n  h a v e  a n  e x c e p t i o n a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  f r o m  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  i . e . ,  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  
o f  " m a n 11 a s  a  d o m i n a n t  f o r m  o f  e x i s t a n c e ,  a n d  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  a  f r e e  a g e n t  i n  l i f e .  O n e  c a n  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e s e  p r o c e s s e s  b y  a n  e x a m p l e  t a k e n  f r o m  a  d r a m a  
c r e a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r i o d  o f  A t h e n s ,  i . e . ,  
A e s c h y l u s *  " O r e s t e s " .  O r e s t e s ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
t h i s  t r i l o g y  e m e r g e s  g r a d u a l l y  o u t  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  
s u p e r - h u m a n  f o r c e s  w h i c h  d e c i d e  u p o n  h i s  a c t i o n s ,  a n d  
d e s t i n y ,  i n t o  a  w o r l d  w h e r e  m a n  d e t e r m i n e s  h i s  o w n  a c t i o n s .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  o f  h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  h e  i s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  
o f  t h e  m o r a l  l a w s  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s e  w h i c h  a s s e r t  t h e m s e l v e s  
i m p e r s o n a l l y  ( a  c r i m e  o u g h t  t o  b e  p u n i s h e d ) .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  
s t a g e ,  h e  p l a y s  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  m y s t i c  f o r c e s  o f  l i f e  
( F u r i e s ) ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  t h i r d ,  h e  a p p e a r s  a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
b e f o r e  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  A t h e n i a n  c i t i z e n s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  b e  
f u d g e d  f o r  h i s  d e e d .  I n  t h i s  w a y ,  t h e  f i r s t  i m p o r t a n t ^
• !6t> -
i d e a  i s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  m e n  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  G o d s  
-  O l y m p i a n s  o r  F u r i e s  -  s e t t l e s  m a n ' s  d e s t i n y .
B u t  t h i s  g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  m a n ' s  p o s i t i o n  
i n  t h e  c o s m o s  d o e s  n o t  e x h a u s t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h i s  t r a g e d y  
h a s  f o r  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  h u m a n  i n d i v i d ­
u a l i t y .  O r e s t e s  i s  a c q u i t t e d  f o r  h i s  c r i m e  b y  t h e  
A r e o p a g u s ,  b u t  t h e  v o t e s  o n  e i t h e r  s i d e  -  g u i l t y  o r  
i n n o c e n t  -  a r e  e q u a l ;  h e n c e  t h e  j u d g e s  a r e  n e i t h e r  f o r  
t h e  r i g i d  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  m o r a l  l a w s ,  o f  w h i c h  
O r e s t e s  w a s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  w h e n  p u n i s h i n g  t h e  c r i m e  o f  h i s
m o t h e r ,  n o r  f o r  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  m y s t i c  f o r c e s  w h i c h ,  i n  s p i t e
o f  t h e  m o r a l  l a w s  d e m a n d  O r e s t e s '  p u n i s h m e n t  a s  t h e  m u r d e r e r  
o f  h i s  m o t h e r .  T h e  v e r d i c t  m e a n s  s i m p l y  t h a t  p u b l i c  
o r d e r  p r e v a i l s  u p o n  p e r s o n a l  v e n g e a n c e  a n d  f a m i l y  t i e s .
T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  t r a g e d y  i s  n o t  c o n f i n e d ,  a s  
o f t e n  c l a i m e d ,  t o  a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  f a c t ,  i . e . ,  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
o f  A t h e n i a n  s o c i e t y  f r o m  a  p r i m i t i v e  c o m m u n i t y ,  b a s e d  o n
t h e  o r g a n i c  t i e s  o f  f a m i l y  a n d  k i n s h i p ,  t o  a  s u p e r i o r  t y p e
o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  f o r m a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  N o  l e s s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i s  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  v e r d i c t  
m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e .  T h e  e q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  v o t e s  o n  
e a c h  s i d e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  r e s t s  w i t h  
O r e s t e s  h i m s e l f ;  h e  a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  h i s  a c t i o n s .  T h i s  c e r t a i n l y  s h o w s  t h e  e m e r g e n c e
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  a n  a u t o n o m o u s  c e n t r e  o f  d e c i s i o n  i n  
l i f e ,  a n d  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  a s  i n n e r  a u t h o r i t y ^
a n d  a s  t h e  m a i n  g u a r a n t e e  o f  o r d e r  i n  l i f e .  H i s t o r i c a l l y -  
s p e a k i n g  t h i s  i s  t h e  s t a g e  a t  w h i c h  G f r o t e  w o u l d  p l a c e  t h e  
r i s e  o f  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m o r a l i t y " ,  w h e n  t h e  G r e e k  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  h a d  a l r e a d y  i n t e r n a l i s e d  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  n o r m s  o f  l i f e  
o f  h i s  c o m m u n i t y .  T h u s  A e s c h y l u s  i n  " O r e s t e f t " ,  l i k e  
D o s t o e v s k y  i n  " T h e  B r o t h e r s  K a r a m a s o v " ,  d e a l s  w i t h  " c r i m e  
a n d  e x p i a t i o n " ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  " c r i m e  a n d  p u n i s h m e n t " .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t ,  i n  a n c i e n t  G r e e k  
c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  m a i n  d e m o c r a t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  w e r e  w o r k e d  o u t  a s  f o l l o w s :  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  
i s  a  q u a l i t y  o f  l i f e  w h i c h  a r i s e s  o n l y  i n  a  s y s t e m  o f  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o t h e r  b e i n g s .  O n e  c a n  f i n d  h e r e  i n  n u c e  
t h e  t w o  m a i n  d e m o c r a t i c  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d -  
- u a l i t y :  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  a n  e n d  i n  i t s e l f ,  a n d  i n d i v i d ­
u a l i t y  a s  " m e m b e r "  o f  a  g r o u p .
A  b r i e f  n o t e  o n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  w i t h i n  W e s t e r n  c u l t u r e  t h r o w s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  
l i g h t  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h i s  c o n c e p t  a n d  t h e  
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  T h e  m a i n  s t a g e s  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  
a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  1 .  T h e  m e a n i n g  o f  h u m a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  d u r i n g  
t h e  M i d d l e  A g e s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  h i g h l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p r o b l e m .
T h e  t h e s i s  h e l d  b y  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l -  
- i s m ,  a n d  b y  h i s t o r i a n s  s u c h  a s  J a k o b  B u r c k h a r d t ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  w h o m  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  a  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  m o d e m  e r a ,  s u f f e r s  
f r o m  c r u d e  " s o c i o l o g i s m " ,  i n  t h e  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  
h u m a n  p e r s o n a l i t y .  B u r c k h a r d t * s  v i e w  t h a t  m e d i a e v a l  m a n ^
d i d  n o t  e x i s t  a s  " i n d i v i d u a l i t y " ,  b u t  a s  " c l a s s " ,  o r  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  c a t e g o r y  i s  o b v i o u s l y  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  o v e r -  
- s t a t e m e n t  o f  s o m e  p e c u l i a r  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  
w o r l d .  I n  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  w o r l d ,  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  i n d i v i d ­
u a l i t y  i s  a  d e r i v a t i v e  o n e ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  i n  
t h i s  w o r l d  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l  f o r m s  o f  l i f e  
e x p r e s s e d  b y  r e l i g i o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  T h e  p l a c e  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  c o s m o s  w a s  t h a t  o f  a n  e x e c u t o r  
o f  a  s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r ;  h i s  o w n  c o n s c i e n c e  a n d  r e a s o n  
a r e  b u t  " e m a n a t i o n s "  o f  t h i s  o r d e r .  T h e  o n l y  m e n t a l  
c a t e g o r i e s  d e f i n i n g  h u m a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  w e r e  t h o s e  o f  
d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  s u b m i s s i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h o s e  d e f i n i n g  m a n  a s  
a " s u b j e c t " ,  o r  a  c i t i z e n  o f  a  w o r l d  r i g i d l y  o r g a n i s e d  b y  a  
s u p r a - h u m a n  f o r c e .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  p r e c l u d e  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  m a n  a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ;  i t  m e a n s  o n l y  t h a t  
s o c i a l l y  m a n  w a s  n o t  a n  a g e n t ,  s a v e  i n  a  c l a s s  o r  p r o f e s s -  
- i o n a l  c a t e g o r y .  2 .  T h e r e  i s  a n  a e s t h e t i c  f l a v o u r  i n  t h e  
R e n a i s s a n c e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  T h e  s t r e s s  f a l l s  
o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l * s  p o w e r  t o  c r e a t e  t h e  w o r l d  i n  w h i c h  h e  
l i v e s *  T h i s  i s  b u t  a n  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  m a n ’ s  
r e v o l t  a g a i n s t  " o r d o " ,  i . e . ,  a g a i n s t  a n y  k i n d  o f  p r e -  
e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r m  o f  l i f e .  O n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  t h e  s p i r i t  
o f  t h e  a g e  w a s  t o  r e p l a c e  " o r d o "  b y  n i s u s  f o r m a t i v u s , 
i . e . ,  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a  s t a t i c  o r d e r  t h e  c r e a t i v e  p o w e r  
o f  l i f e .  T h e  r e v o l t  a g a i n s t  t h e  s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r  
o f  t h e  C h u r c h ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  R e f o r m a t i o n ,  i s  a n  j
a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  l a r g e  p r o c e s s .
T h r o u g h  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  m a n  b e c o m e s  a  f r e e  a g e n t  i n  
h i s  o w n  w o r l d *  H i s  f r e e d o m  i s  b a s e d  o n  h i s  p o w e r  o f  
c r e a t i o n .  T h u s  m a n  t a k e s  o n  h i m s e l f  a n  a t t r i b u t i o n  
g r a n t e d  u p  t o  t h e n  t o  a  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  p o w e r .  T h e  m a i n  
n o t e  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  i s  s e e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  b e l i e f  
t h a t  m a n  i s  c r e a t i v e  a s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l .  L e o n a r d o  d a  Y i n c i ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s p e a k s  o f  a  " R a g i o n e  e o s m i e a " ,  a n d  a  " R a g i o n e  
i n d i v i d u a l e " ,  w h i c h  h e  c h a r a c t e r i s e s  b y  t w o  m o d e s  o f  c r e a t i o n ,  
o n e  f o l l o w e d  b y  M a t u r e ,  t h e  o t h e r ,  b y  m a n .  N a t u r e  b e g i n s  
" d e l l a  r a g i d n e  ( e o s m i e a )  e  t e r m i n e  n e l l a  s p e r i a n z a " ,  w h i l e  
m a n  " b i s o g n a  s e g u i r e  i n  c o n t r a r i o " ,  i . e . ,  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e  
t o  r e a s o n .
A t  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  l i e s  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  r e a s o n  
i s  a  f r a g m e n t  o f  u n i v e r s a l  r e a s o n .  T h u s  i t s  a c t i v i t y ,  
t h o u g h  s t a r t i n g  f r o m  a n  o p p o s i t e  p o s i t i o n  t o  t h a t  o f  u n i -  
— v e r s a l  r e a s o n ,  l e a d s  t o  t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t .  T h e  s p i r i t  o f  
t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  p r e s u p p o s e s  a  p r o c e s s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  
d e s c r i b e d  b y  G r o t e  a s  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m o r a l i t y " •  W h i l e ,  
d u r i n g  t h e  M i d d l e  Ages, t h e  o r d e r  o f  h u m a n  l i f e ,  s o c i a l  
a n d  i n d i v i d u a l ,  r e m a i n e d  e x t e r n a l ,  a s  a n  e m a n a t i o n  o f  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  r e a s o n ,  d u r i n g  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  m a n  r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  t h e  s a m e  o r d e r  w a s  a l s o  i n  h i m s e l f .  T h e  C a r t e s i a n  
c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r e a s o n  i s ,  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  w h a t  w e  
h a v e  s a i d  s o  f a r ,  b u t  a  f i n a l  r e s u l t  o f  a  l o n g  p r o c e s s  o f ^
i n t r o j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  r e a s o n .  T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
d e f i n e d  a s  p o s s e s s o r  a n d  c r e a t o r  o f  t h e  o r d e r  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y  
a n d  w o r l d  f o r m s  a  b a s i c  f e a t u r e  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
3 .  R o m a n t i c i s m  b r i n g s  f o r t h  a  n e w  a s p e c t  i n  t h e  m e a n —  
- i n g  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  U n d e r  i t s  i m p a c t ,  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  c o n c e i v e d  a s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  c a t e g o r y  o f  
t h e  u n i v e r s e .  F o r ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e  u n i v e r s e  e x i s t s  
o n l y  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  f o r m s ,  a n d ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  e a c h  i n d i v i d -  
— u a l i t y  i s  a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l l y  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i t s e l f  i n  a  
s p e c i f i c  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  T h u s ,  t h e  R o m a n t i c  p e r i o d  c a n  b e  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t i c  s t a g e  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  T h i s  i s  m a i n l y  d u e  t o  t h e  
c o n v i c t i o n  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  R o m a n t i c  t h o u g h t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  i d e n t i t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  
l o g i e a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  m i n d  a n d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d .  H e g e l ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a n a l y s e s  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  h u m a n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  i t s  a r t i c u l a t i o n  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
a s  a  w h o l e .  ( P h a e n o m e n o l o g i e  d e s  G e i s t e s ) .
I n  t h e  R o m a n t i c  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  t h e  s t r e s s  
f a l l s  o n  t h e  u n i f y i n g  f o r c e s  l y i n g  a t  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
p r o c e s s  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  T h u s ,  " i n d i v i d u a l i t y *  
m a r k s  t h e  h i g h e s t  p o i n t  i n  t h e  i n n e r  a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  j;
u n i v e r s e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  p o i n t  a t  w h i c h  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i s  a n  \
u n i t e d  w h o l e ,  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  b e c o m i n g  c o n s c i o u s  o f  i t s e l f  f
N o  w o n d e r ,  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d  i s  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  j
o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  e x c l u s i v e l y .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  
R o m a n t i c  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o i n t s  a r e  
i m p o r t a n t :  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  m i n d  i s  " i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  
u n i v e r s a l i t y " ;  h e n c e  h u m a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  t h e  b e a r e r  o f  
b o t h  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  a  u n i v e r s a l  f o r m  o f  e x i s t e n c e .  T h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t a i n s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  h i s  m i n d ,  i n  
a n  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  f o r m ,  t h e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n  o f  m a n k i n d ,  
a n d  o f  h i s  g r o u p .  I n  t h i s  l i e s  t h e  g u a r a n t e e  o f  i t s  f r e e -  
- d o m ,  m o r a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c .
A  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r e s s  h a s  t o  b e  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  m o r a l  
a s p e c t  o f  t h e  R o m a n t i c  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  T h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ,  a s  t h e  b e a r e r  o f  u n i v e r s a l  o r d e r ,  i s  a  m o r a l  
a g e n t  w h e n e v e r  i t  a c t s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  o w n  n a t u r e ;  i t  i s  
f r o m  t h e  m o r a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  " a u t o n o m o u s  p e r s o n a l i t y " .  
( K a n t  i s  a  R o m a n t i c  i n  e t h i c s ) .  T h i s  i s  a  c r u c i a l  p o i n t  
i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  a  m o d e r n  m a n ’ s  c o n s c i e n c e .  T h e  c o n ­
v i c t i o n  t h a t  f r e e  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n ,  o r  a c t i o n  c o n t r o l l e d  
b y  i n n e r  a u t h o r i t y ,  l e a d s  t o  a  h a r m o n i o u s  s o c i a l  a n d  
p o l i t i c a l  w o r l d  f o r m s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n d i t i o n  o f  m o d e r n  
d e m o c r a c y .
4 .  T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
e c o n o m i c  l i b e r a l i s m  i s  a l s o  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  
f r e e  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  l e a d s  t o  h a r m o n i o u s  s o c i a l  p a t t e r n .  
B u t  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  f i e l d ,  t h e  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  a c t i o n  t a k e s  o n  a  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r ,  j
R e a s o n  b e c o m e s  d e v o i d  o f  a n y  c o n t e n t ,  a n d  t h u s  r e d u c e d  t o  !j
a  f o r m a l  f a c u l t y .  B y  t h i s ,  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  h u m a n  I!
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  u n d e r w e n t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  |
t h a t  " i n t e l l i g e n c e "  b e c a m e  t h e  d o m i n a n t  t r a i t  o f  t h e  h u m a n  j
!
m i n d .  A s  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  a n d  R o m a n t i c  c o n c e p t  \
o f  r e a s o n  w h i c h  i n v o l v e  c e r t a i n  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s ,  ji
i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  d e f i n e d  b y  c o n t e m p o r a r y  p s y c h o l o g y  a s  a  
f o r m a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  a d j u s t  h i m s e l f  t o  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  i s  l i t t l e  e l s e  b u t  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h a t  m e c h a n i s m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  a n d  o f  t h a t  t y p e  
o f  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  e c o n o m i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  
o f  m o d e m  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  W e  s h a l l  c o m e  b a c k  t o  t h i s  a s p e c t  j
[jt
i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  m o d e m  m a n .  j
j
5 .  O n e  c a n  d i s t i n g u i s h  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e s  t w o  m a i n
t e n d e n c i e s  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l -  j
\
- i t y .  O n e  c o m e s  a s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  l i b e r a l i s m ,  a n d  i s  j
m a n i f e s t e d  a s  t h e  c o m p l e t e  l a c k  o f  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  i n t e g r a t -  
- i o n ;  t h e  s e c o n d  i s  a  r e s u l t a n t  o f  l o n g  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  a  
m e c h a n i c a l  t y p e  o f  s o c i a l  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
m o d e m  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y .  T h e  f o r m e r  t e n d e n c y  l e a d s  t o  
a n  a n a r c h i c  t y p e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  T h e  w o r l d  i s ,  f o r  t h i s  
t y p e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l , . d e v o i d  o f  o r d e r ;  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  a c t i o n s
!
a n d  a s p i r a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  s u p p o r t e d  b u t  b y  i t s  o w n  w i l l ,  o f t e n  
a g a i n s t  a n  h o s t i l e  w o r l d .  E x i s t e n t i a l i s m  g i v e s  a n  a d e q u a t e  
e x p r e s s i o n  t o  t h i s  a s p e c t  i n  h u m a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .
T h e  s e c o n d  t r e n d  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  c i v i l i s a t i o n  l e a d s ^
t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n  i n d u s t r i a l  t y p e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  
T h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  w o r k  i n  a n  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  h a s  s h a p e d  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i n t o  t h a t  o f  a  p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  
a  c o m m o n  t a s k .
S u m m i n g  u p  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i d e a s  s h o u l d  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t *  
i n  a n c i e n t  A t h e n i a n  a n d  i n  m o d e r n  W e s t e r n  c u l t u r e s ,  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  w a s  d e f i n e d  f r o m  t w o  m a i n  a s p e c t s ;  ( a )  
I n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  a  u n i q u e  e m b o d i m e n t  o f  l i f e ,  a n d  a s  a n  
e n d  i n  i t s e l f ,  a n d  ( b ) ,  I n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a  
g r o u p .  B o t h  a n c i e n t  A t h e n i a n  a n d  m o d e r n  c u l t u r e s  o f f e r  
s u f f i c i e n t  p r o o f s  t h a t  t h e  m a i n  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
w a y  o f  l i f e  c o n s i s t s  i n  a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  
t e n d e n c i e s  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  h u m a n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ;  
i . e . ,  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  a n  e n d  i n  i t s e l f ,  a n d  a s  a  f u n c t i o n -  
- a l  c a t e g o r y .  I n  A t h e n s ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d e m o c r a c y  
w e r e  r i p e  w h e n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  a n  e n d  i n  h i m s e l f  w a s  
c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d  b y  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  " P o l i s * .  w I n  t h e  
w i n n i n g  o f  h i s  l i v e l i h o o d  - s a y s  K i t t o  -  h e  ( t h e  © r e e k )  w a s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  i n d i v i d u a l i s t ;  i n  t h e  f i l l i n g  o f  h i s  l i f e  h e  
w a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  " c o m m u n i s t "  " •  ( O p .  c i t .  p 7 ^ ) .
W h e n  t h e  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  m e a n i n g s  o f  t h e  
c o n c e p t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  u p s e t  d e m o c r a c y  i t s e l f  i s  i n  
d a n g e r .  H e r e  o n e  c a n  g r a s p  a n  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  G r e e k  a n d  W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s .  I n  A t h e n s ,
/
t h e  a c c e n t  h a d  g e n e r a l l y  b e e n  s t r o n g e r  o n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  
a s  a n  e n d  i n  i t s e l f .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  a n a r c h i c  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  
w a s  t h e  d i s e a s e  f r o m  w h i c h  t h i s  c i v i l i s a t i o n  d i e d .  I n  
W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  a c c e n t  s e e m s ,  a f t e r  m a n y  
o s c i l l a t i o n s ,  t o  h a v e  f a l l e n  o n  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a s  f u n c t i o n a l  
r e a l i t y ;  c o n t e m p o r a r y  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t i e s  c a n  b e  a d d u c e d  
a s  a  p r o o f  o f  t h i s .
T h e  C r i t i c a l  M i n d .  T h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  c a p a c i t y  t o  a c e e p t ,  o r  t o  r e j e c t  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  
o r ,  t o  t a k e  a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  p r o m p t e d  b y  h i s  o w n  j u d g m e n t ,  
i . e .  ,  b y  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t h e  
f o r m a l  l a w s  o f  h i s  o w n  i n t e l l e c t .  T h i s  i s  o b v i o u s l y  a n  
i d e a l  c a s e  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d ,  f o r  t h e  
f o r m a l  l a w s  o f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  a r e  a l w a y s  i m b u e d  w i t h  d e e p  
u n c o n s c i o u s  f a c t o r s .  W h e n e v e r  s o m e o n e  j o i n s  a  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t y  b y  f r e e  d e c i s i o n ,  o n e  c a n  e a s i l y  f i n d  t h a t  h i s  
d e c i s i o n  w a s  p a r t l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  a  s e r i e s  o f  i r r a t i o n a l  
f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  f e e l i n g s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p ,  f a m i l y  t i e s ,  a n d  
o t h e r s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  c e r t a i n  t r e n d s  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
p s y c h o l o g y ,  t h e s e  i r r a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  p l a y  a  p r e p o n d e r a n t  
p a r t .  W e  h a v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  s t r e s s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  a  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  o r  a t t i t u d e  i s  n o t  d e m o c r a t i c  u n l e s s  i t  i s  d e c i d e d  
a t  t h e  r a t i o n a l  l e v e l  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  m i n d ,  i . e . ,  
u n l e s s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w o r k s  o u t  i n  h i s  m i n d  t h e  m o t i v e  a n d  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  h i s  a c t i o n .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a c t i o n  i n  
a  d e m o c r a t i c  p a t t e r n  r e q u i r e s  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ^
U*i
t h e  c r i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  o f  m i n d ,  b e f o r e  a n y  d e c i s i o n  i s  t a k e n .
T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  g o e s  h a n d  i n  h a n d  
w i t h  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  i n t e l l e c t  i n  m a n * s  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  h i s  
e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  
a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s .  W e  h a v e  a l r e a d y  s h o w n  t h e  w a y  i n  
w h i c h  m o d e m  s o c i e t y  h a s  f a v o u r e d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
i n t e l l e c t  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  i n s t i n c t  a n d  f e e l i n g .  T h i s  i s  
t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n  w h y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a s  a  p u r e l y  f o r m a l  c a p a c i t y  
h a s  b e c o m e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  m e c h a n i s m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  t h e  
m o d e m  w o r l d .  S i n c e  w e  h a v e  t o u c h e d  s e v e r a l  t i m e s  u p o n  
t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  f o r  t h e  m o m e n t  i t  w o u l d  b e  e n o u g h  t o  s t r e s s  
o n c e  a g a i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  w h o l e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
m o d e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  h a s  r e q u i r e d  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t -  
- a n c e  o f  i n t e l l e c t  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a d a p t a t i o n .  R o m a n -  
- t i e i s m  d i d  i n  f a c t : ,  v e r y  l i t t l e  f o r  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  r e -  
- h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  e m o t i o n a l i t y .  F o r ,  e v e n  a f t e r  t h e  
R o m a n t i c  p e r i o d ,  t h e  m o s t  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  f o r m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  
t o  t h e  p h y s i c a l  a n d  s o c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  o f  m o d e m  m a n  w a s  
t h a t  f u r n i s h e d  b y  s c i e n t i f i c  k n o w l e d g e ,  i . e . ,  a  f o r m  o f  
a d j u s t m e n t  b a s e d  o n  " o b j e c t i v e "  o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  w i t h  a s  l i t t l e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  a s  
p o s s i b l e  f r o m  e m o t i o n a l i t y  a n d  w i l l .  T o  s e e  t h i n g s  a s  
t h e y  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r ,  a n d  t o  g r a s p  t h e i r  o w n  
s t r u c t u r e  a n d  l a w s ,  c o n s t i t u t e  f o r  m o d e m  m a n  t h e  f i r s t  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  h i s  a d j u s t m e n t .
I n  n o  o t h e r  c u l t u r e  h a d  k n o w l e d g e  b a s e d  o n  t h e
o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  o n  t h e  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h i n g s  a n d  
e v e n t s ,  d o m i n a t e d  t o  s u c h  a n  e x t e n t  t h e  w h o l e  r a n g e  o f  l i f e  
a s  i n  m o d e m  E u r o p e .  I n  f a c t ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  k n o w n  c u l t u r e s  
-  G r e e k  c u l t u r e  b e i n g  e x c e p t e d  -  ‘' k n o w l e d g e ”  i s  n o t  
p r o b l e m a t i s e d ;  t h e  a c t  o f  k n o w l e d g e  d o e s  n o t  s p r i n g  u p  f r o m  
a  s p e c i f i c  a t t i t u d e  t o  l i f e ,  b u t  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  
s u b m e r g e d  i n  t h e  g l o b a l  a c t  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  a n d  a s  s u c h  i s  
i n t e r m i n g l e d  w i t h  f e e l i n g  a n d  w i l l .  I n  m o d e m  c i v i l i s a t i o n  
k n o w l e d g e  h a s  n o t  o n l y  b e c o m e  t h e  m a i n  a s p e c t  i n  m a n ' s  
a d j u s t m e n t ,  b u t  h u m a n  l i f e  i n  i t s  e n t i r e t y  i s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  
i t .  I n s t i n c t s ,  e m o t i o n a l i t y ,  w i l l ,  a n d  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s  
a r e  a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l .
P r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  p s y c h o l o g y ,  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  
c a n  b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h a t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  w h i c h  i s  c h a r a c t e r -  
f i s t i c  o f  a n  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  T h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e  o f  a n  
i n t e l l i g e n t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  d i s t a n c e  m i n d  
( t h e  o r g a n i s m )  p u t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t i m u l u s  a n d  t h e  f i n a l  f o r m  
o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  o r  i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  
t o  b e a r  t h e  t e n s i o n  a r o u s e d  b y  a  s t i m u l u s  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  
s e a r c h  f o r  a n  a d e q u a t e  r e a c t i o n  r e q u i r e s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  i n  a  h a b i t ,  o r  i n s t i n c t i v e  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n .  A t  
t h e  i n s t i n c t i v e  l e v e l  o f  b e h a v i o u r ,  r e a c t i o n  i s  d i r e c t  a n d  
u r g e n t .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  m i n d  e n j o y s  a  v e r y  l o w  d e g r e e  o f  
f r e e d o m .  A n  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  a  
" d e t o u r "  r e a c t i o n  i n  w h i c h  a  c e r t a i n  d e g r e e  o f  l e i s u r e  i s  
n e c e s s a r y .  T h e  a i m  o f  s u c h  a  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  i s  n o t
/
o n l y  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  t e n s i o n ,  h u t  a l s o  m e n t a l  e f f i c i e n c y .
T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i s m ,  w h i l e  r e a c t i n g ,  d i s p o s e s  o f  
e n o u g h  l e i s u r e  a n d  d e t a c h m e n t  f r o m  i t s  o w n  a c t i o n  a s  t o  
g r a s p  a n d  r e t a i n  t h e  b e s t  w a y s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  
t h e  p u r s u e d  g o a l ,  a n d  t h u s ,  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  o f  
r e a c t i o n  i t s e l f .  A n  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  a  p r o f i t - m a k i n g  
e n t e r p r i s e ;  i t  b r i n g s  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  
n e e d s ,  a n d  a t  ?t h e  s a m e  t i m e  c a p i t a l i s e s  t h e  s u r p l u s ,  f o r  
t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e .  W h i l e  t h e  r e a c t i o n  b a s e d  
o n  i n s t i n c t  a n d  h a b i t  a r e  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  
i n t e l l i g e n t  r e a c t i o n  i s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  f u t u r e ;  p a s t  
e x p e r i e n c e s  a r e  u s e d  i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t :  s i t u a ­
t i o n ,  b u t ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  a t t e m p t  i s  b e i n g  m a d e  
t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  p r e s e n t  s o l u t i o n  w i t h  a s  m a n y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
a s  p o s s i b l e  w h i c h  m a y  a r i s e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h u s ,  a n  
i n t e l l i g e n t  r e a c t i o n  i s  e m i n e n t l y  p r o s p e c t i v e ,  i . e . ,  
i t  t e n d s  t o  b e  o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  d i s t a n t  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
g o a l s .  S i n c e  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  b e h a v i o u r  i s  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  f r e e d o m ,  w e  s h a l l  c o m e  b a c k  t o  i t  a t  
a  l a t e r  s t a g e .
I n  o r d e r  t o  t h r o w  m o r e  l i g h t  o n  i t s  d e m o c r a t i c  f u n c t i o n  
i t  w o u l d  b e  u s e f u l  t o  s a y  s o m e t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
f o r m s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d .
1 .  V a r i o u s  r i t u a l s  o f  t h i n k i n g  e i t h e r  a s  a  p r e l u d e  
t o  a n  i m m e d i a t e  a c t i o n ,  o r ,  a s  a  w t h e o r e t i c a l ”  a t t i t u d e  
t o w a r d s  l i f e  a r e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  f o r m s  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l
/
I'lh
m i n d .  W e  o n  n o  a c c o u n t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  e h a r a e t e r -  
- i s t i c s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  e x c l u s i v e l y .  W h a t  w e  
w a n t  t o  s a y  i s  t h a t  c r i t i c a l  f a c u l t i e s  a r e  b e t t e r  d e v e l o p ­
e d  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e .  P e r i c l e s  g o e s  s o  f a r  a s  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  h a b i t  o f  t h i n k i n g  i n  i t s e l f ,  a n d  t h e  h a b i t  
o f  t a k i n g  d e c i s i o n s  b a s e d  o n  c r i t i c a l  e x a m i n a t i o n  a r e  b e t t e r  
d e v e l o p e d  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c ,  t h a n  i n  a  n o n - d e m o c r a t i c ,  s o c i e t y .  
" F o r  w e  h a v e  a  p e c u l i a r  p o w e r  o f  t h i n k i n g  b e f o r e  w e  a c t ,  
a n d  o f  a c t i n g  t o o ,  w h e r e a s  o t h e r  m e n  a r e  c o u r a g e o u s  f r o m  
i g n o r a n c e  b u t  h e s i t a t e  u p o n  r e f l e c t i o n 1* ,  s a y s  h e  w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  A t h e n i a n s  a n d  L a c e d a e m o n i a n s .
2 .  T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  f o r m a l  l o g i c  a s  a  p a t t e r n  
o f  t h i n k i n g  i s  a n o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  f o r m  o f  t h e  
c r i t i c a l  m i n d .  T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
l o g i c ,  i n  b o t h  G r e e k  a n d  W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  m a y  b e  t a k e n  
a s  a  p r o o f  o f  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  a n d  
d e m o c r a c y .  I n  t h e  f o r m a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  t h o u g h t  l i e s  o n e  o f  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  i n n e r  t y p e  o f  
a u t h o r i t y ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  e v i d e n c e ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f
a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
3 .  D e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  i t s e l f  i s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n -  
— a l i s e d  f o r m  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d .  A s  w e  h a v e  m e n t i o n e d  
b e f o r e ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  r e q u i r e s  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :  ( s )  l e i s u r e  w h i c h  m a k e s  p o s s i b l e  a  
m o r e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  v i e w  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  ( b )  s p e c u l a t i o n s  
a b o u t  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  a n d  y
173
( c )  d e c i s i o n  " t a k e n  i n  a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  A  d e m o c r a t i c  f o r m  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i s ,  i n  i t s  t u r n ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
o f  a l l  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  g r o u p ,  a n d  o n  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  o f  d e b a t e .  
D e c i s i o n  t a k e n  b y  t h e  m e t h o d  o f  f r e e  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  t h e r e —  
- f o r e  a  s o l u t i o n  i n t e g r a t i n g  t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  
i n d i v i d u a l  m e m b e r s .
O b j e c t i v i t y .  W e  h a v e  s h o w n  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  
t h a t  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  i s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  s o c i e t y .
B e a r i n g  i n  m i n d  t h a t  d e m o c r a c y  i m p l i e s  a  s p e c i f i c  c o n c e p -  
- t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  o n e  c a n  e x t e n d  t h i s  f o r m u l a  b y  s a y i n g  
t h a t  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w o r l d  i s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  w o r l d .
© l i s  w o r l d  i s  c o m p o s e d  o f  a  m u l t i t u d e  o f  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  
u n i t s ,  p e r s o n s ,  o r  t h i n g s ,  w h i c h  a r e  f o r m a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
e a c h  o t h e r ,  i . e . ,  t h e i r  m u t u a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  n e i t h e r  e x h a u s t s  
n o r  a n n i h i l a t e s  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  f h e  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  
s u c h  a  w o r l d  r e q u i r e s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  s p e c i f i c  m e n t a l  
f u n c t i o n  —  o r  a t t i t u d e  —  w h i c h  w e  c a l l  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t ­
i v i t y .  f h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  m a y  
v a r y ;  i t  m i g h t  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  a s  t h e  ffa d e q u a t i o  r e i
i n t e l l e c t s * * H ,  i . e . . ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m i n d  
t o  m i r r o r  t h e  w o r l d  a s  i t  i s ,  o r  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  i n t e r p r e t
t h e  w o r l d  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  l a w s  o f  i n t e l l e c t . ( K a n t )
B u t  w h a t e v e r  i t s  d e f i n i t i o n  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y
i m p l i e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a p a c i t y  t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  w o r l d /
nq-
t h r o u g h  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  o t h e r n e s s ,  m u l t i p l i c i t y ,  a n d  o f  
f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I n  w h a t  f o l l o w s  w e  s h a l l  d i s c u s s  
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  a n d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  t r a i t  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  
c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  m i n d  t o  g r a s p  " t h e  o t h e r " ,  
t h e  n o n - s e l f ,  o r  t h e  n o n - i d e n t i c a l  -  b e  i t  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
w o r l d  a s  a  w h o l e ,  o r  s p e c i f i c  p e r s o n s  a n d  t h i n g s  -  a s  h a v i n g  
t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  i n  i t s e l f .  P a r a d o x i c a l l y  
e n o u g h  o n e  c a n  f o r m u l a t e  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  
a s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d  t o  a p p l y  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  
" s u b j e c t "  t o  v a r i o u s  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  o u t s i d e  o n e s e l f .  
N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  t h i s  q u a l i t y  i s  t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t  d e t e r -  
- m i n e d  b y  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  c u l t u r e .  T J p  t o  t h e  a g e  o f  s i x  
t h e  c h i l d  c a n  h a r d l y  g r a s p  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  f o r ,  i n  h i s  o w n  w o r l d ,  t h i n g s  e x i s t  " f o r  
h i m s e l f "  o n l y ;  h e  i s  t h e  o n l y  s u b j e c t  a n d  t h e  o n l y  o b j e c t  
a n d  a n y t h i n g  e l s e  i s  r e d u c e d  t o  h i s  o w n  q u a l i t i e s  b y  w a y  
o f  p r o j e c t i o n .  I f  o n e  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  m a i n  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  p r i m i t i v e  a n d  c i v i l i s e d  m a n ,  o n e  c o m e s  
t o  t h e  s a m e  c o n c l u s i o n .  T h e  s o c i a l  w o r l d  o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  
i s  t o  a  l e s s e r  d e g r e e  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  c i v i l i s e d  d i v i d e d  
i n t o  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  u n i t s ,  i . e . ,  i n d i v i d u a l i t i e s ;  h i s  
p h y s i c a l  w o r l d  i s  n o t  d i v i d e d  i n t o  " o b j e c t s "  a s  d i s t i n c t l y  
a s  t h a t  o f  t h e  c i v i l i s e d .  T h e  p r i m i t i v e  d o e s  n o t  s e e  
f o r m a l ,  b u t  " s u b s t a n t i a l "  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  a s p e c t s /
o f  h i s  w o r l d ;  h e  r e d u c e s  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  t o  a  v a g u e  u n i t y .
T h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  l i e s ,  a t  l e a s t  
i n  m o d e m  E u r o p e a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  t o  k e e p  i n  b a l a n c e  t w o  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  f a c t o r s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  h i s  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  w o r l d ;  o n e  c a t e g o r y  
d e f i n i n g  t h e  " M E " ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r ,  t h e  " N O N - M E " .  O n e  
c a n n o t  s p e a k  a b o u t  a n  o b j e c t i v e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  w o r l d  
w h e n  o n e  c a t e g o r y  i s  r e d u c e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r .
(I)
P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  i s  r o o t ­
e d  i n  a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  p r o j e c t i v e  ( e x t r a c e p t i v e )  a n d  
i n t r o j e c t i v e  ( i n t r a c e p t i v e )  p r o c e s s e s  o f  t h e  m i n d .  T o o  
m u c h  i n t r o j e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  a n n i h i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  " m e "  
f a c t o r s ,  w h i l e  t o o  m u c h  p r o j e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  a n n i h i l a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  " n o n - m e "  f a c t o r s .  T h u s  o b j e c t i v i t y  i s  b a s e d  
o n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  w h i c h  p r o ­
d u c e s  t h e  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a n d  e x t e r n a l  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l .
T h e  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  f a c t o r s  d e f i n i n g  t h e  i n n e r  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s u c h  a s  d r i v e s ,  d e s i r e s ,  
a s p i r a t i o n s ,  e t c . ,  a n d  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  
i s  p r o d u c e d  a n d  m a i n t a i n e d  by t h e  e g o .  T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e *  
e g o  s i g n i f i e s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  t h a t  t h e  m e n t a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i s  s t r u c t u r i s e d  i n  a  u n i t y  o f  i t s  o w n .  B y  t h i s  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  i t s e l f  f r o m  i t s  s u r r o u n d i n g s ,  
w h i c h  c o n s e q u e n t l y  b e c o m e  t h e  g e n e r a l  " o t h e r " .  B u t  t h e  e g o  
m e a n s  a l s o  a  u n i t y  a m o n g  o t h e r  u n i t i e s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  u n i t i e s  
w h i c h  a r e  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  P r o m  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  p o i n t  o f  
v i e w  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  m e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  e g o  
i n  t h e  c h i l d  i s  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  h i s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
o t h e r s ,  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  h i s  f a m i l y  c o m i n g  i n  t h e  f i r s t /
p l a c e .  T h e  s t r u c t u r i s i n g  o f  t h e  c h i l d * s  m i n d  g o e s  h a n d  
i n  h a n d  w i t h  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  h i s  o w n  s e p a r a t e d n e s s  f r o m  
o t h e r s ,  a n d  n a t u r a l l y ,  o f  o t h e r s  f r o m  h i m s e l f .  T h u s ,  
t h e  c h i l d ’ s  e g o  e m e r g e s  a s  a  r e l a t i o n a l  r e a l i t y  b e t w e e n  
h i m s e l f ,  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d  a s  a  w h o l e ,  a n d  " t h e  o t h e r s " ,  
d e f i n e d  a s  o t h e r  e g o s .  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a r e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  o n e  c a n  
e a s i l y  s a y  t h a t  t h e  e g o  i s  a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  c a t e g o r y ,  i . e . ,  
i t  d e f i n e s  i t s e l f  a s  a  p o i n t  i n  a  n e t  o f  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T h e r e f o r e  " t h e  o t h e r "  w h i c h  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  i s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  r i s e  
o f  t h e  e g o .  ( S o c i o l o g i c a l  p o i n t s  o f  v i e w  i n  t h e  r i s e  o f  
t h e  e g o  . a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  G . M e a d ;  M i n d ,  S e l f  a n d  S o c i e t y .  
U n i v .  o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  1 9 3 4 .  a n d  H a n s  G u n t h e r ;  P e r s o n -  
l i c h k e i t  u n d  G e s c h i c h t e .  W a l t e r  B e y s c h l a g .  A u g s b u r g , 1 9 4 7 ) .
I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  e g o  d o e s  n o t  
l e a d  t o  a  s e l f - c e n t r e d  t y p e  o f  a c t i o n ,  a s  o n e  i s  i n c l i n e d  
t o  t h i n k .  T h o u g h  d e f i n i n g  t h e  m e n t a l  u n i t y  o f  a n  i n d i v i d -  
u a l  q u a  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e  e g o  i s  f o r e m o s t  a  b a l a n c i n g  s t r u c t u r e  
w h o s e  m a i n  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  r e n d e r  f l e x i b l e  b o t h  t h e  i n n e r  
d r i v e s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  s o  a s  t o  m a k e  t h e m  f i t  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  a n d  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  s o  a s  t o  a d j u s t  t h e m  t o  t h e  i n n e r  d r i v e s  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  W e  p r o p o s e  t h e  a t t r i b u t e  " o b j e c t i v e "  
f o r  t h a t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  w h i c h ,  w h e n  a n a l y s e d ,  d i s c l o s e s  
a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  i n n e r  w o r l d  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d /
t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  p h y s i c a l  a n d  s o c i a l .  S u c h  a  t y p e  o f  
r e a c t i o n  i s  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  a  f l e x i b l e  s t r u c t u r e  
e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  w h i c h  c o m p r o m i s e s  b e t w e e n  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d .  T h i s  c o m p r o m i s i n g  
a c t i v i t y  i s  s o m e t i m e s  c a l l e d  t h e  r e a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  W e  
p r e f e r  t h e  t e r m  o b j e c t i v i t y  t o  t h a t  o f  " r e a l i t y " ,  f o r  t h e  
m a i n  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  d e p t h  p s y c h o l o g y  
h a v e  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  f a i l e d  t o  m a k e  i t  e l e a r  w h a t  t h e y  m e a n  
b y  r e a l i t y .
I f  o n e  l o o k s  a t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  
o b j e c t i v i t y  o n e  c a n  s e e  i n  a  b e t t e r  l i g h t  i t s  c o n n e c t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  e g o ,  a n d  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  T h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  e r a  
c o n s t i t u t e s  a g a i n  a  c r u c i a l  p o i n t  b o t h  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  i n  t h e  p a r t  p l a y e d  b y  
t h e  e g o  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  m o d e m  m a n .  I n  t h e  
m e d i a e v a l  w o r l d ,  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  a  s t a b l e  o r d e r ,  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a d j u s t m e n t  w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  p o w e r  o f  h a b i t  
a n d  t r a d i t i o n .  T h e r e  w e r e  r a r e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h i c h  h i s  
s o c i e t y  f a i l e d  t o  p r o v i d e  h i m  w i t h  r e a d y - m a d e  f o r m s  o f  
a d j u s t m e n t .  T h e  e g o  p l a y e d  a  m i n o r  p a r t  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  m e d i a e v a l  m a n ,  f o r  t h e  e g o  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h a t  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  h i m s e l f  a n  a c t i v e  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
o f  a d j u s t m e n t ,  i . e . ,  i t  p r e s u p p o s e s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  t y p e  
o f  r e a c t i o n .  T h e  R e n a i s s a n c e ,  c a u s e d  a  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  i n  
t h e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  m a n .  T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f o u n d  .
h i m s e l f  c o n f r o n t e d  b y  n e w  p r o b l e m s 9 i n d e e d  b y  a  n e w  w o r l d ,  
f o r  w h i c h  t h e  o l d  p a t t e r n  o f  b e h a v i o u r ,  t h e  o l d  i d e a s ,  
h a b i t s ,  f e e l i n g s ,  e t c . ,  w e r e  n o  l o n g e r  a d e q u a t e .  H e n c e  
h e  w a s  m o r e  a n d  m o r e  i n s i s t e n t l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  w o r k  o u t  f o r  
h i m s e l f  m o d e s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  h i s  w o r l d ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
m o r e  a n d  m o r e  l i a b l e  a n d  r e a d y  t o  i n d i v i d u a l i s e  h i s  
b e h a v i o u r .  T h i s  m a d e  n e c e s s a r y  a  r a p i d  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  e g o ,  
a n d  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  b y  i t .  F o r  
t h e  e g o  i s  c a l l e d  u p o n  t o  f i n d  a  f o r m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  t h e r e ,  
w h e r e  s e c u r e  b u t  r i g i d  i n s t i n c t i v e  r e a c t i o n  f a i l s ,  a n d  w h e r e  
t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  h a b i t  a n d  o f  c u l t u r a l l y  c o n d i t i o n e d  r e a c t i o n  
i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  W h e n  a d j u s t m e n t  c a n n o t  b e  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d ,  
e i t h e r  l & e c a u s e  o f  t h e  r i g i d i t y  o f  i n s t i n c t s  o r  b e c a u s e  o f  
a  s t r o n g  c u l t u r a l  c o n d i t i o n i n g ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  e g o  i s  
r e d u c e d .  T h e n  t h e  I d  o r  t h e  s u p e r - e g o  -  t o  u s e  t w o  
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l  t e r m s  -  b e c o m e  d o m i n a n t .
T h e  v e r y  c o n d i t i o n  w h i c h  m a k e s  f o r  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  
t h e  e g o  m a k e s  a l s o  f o r  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y .  
O b j e c t i v e  k n o w l e d g e  i s  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
s t e p  t o w a r d s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  a  w o r l d  i n  
c h a n g e ,  a n d  n o v e l t y  r e n d e r s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t ­
m e n t  -  i n s t i n c t s  a n d  h a b i t s  -  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h i s  b r i n g s  
i n  t h e  f o r e g r o u n d  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  t h e  n e e d  t o  
" o b s e r v e "  t h e  a s p e c t s  o f  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t o  g r a s p  t h e i r  
s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d  a b o v e  a l X ,  t h e i r  i n t e r — c o n n e c t i o n s .  
W h a t  i s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  w h a t  i s  t h e  n e w ^
" o r d o *  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  f i t  i n t o  t h e  o l d  p a t t e r n  o f  a d j u s t ­
m e n t ,  a r e  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  l e a d  t o  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  m i n d .
T h e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  m i n d  w i t h i n  
m o d e m  c i v i l i s a t i o n  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
c o n c l u s i o n :  a n  o b j e c t i v e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  w o r l d ,  a n d  
t h e  n e e d  f o r  o b j e c t i v i t y  c a n  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  c o m p e n s a ­
t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  a r o u s e d  i n  m a n  b y  t h e  
f a l l  o f  m e d i a e v a l  o r d e r ,  b a s e d  o n  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  r e a s o n  
a n d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t r a d i t i o n .  T h e  n e e d  f o r  r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  
a  n e w  o r d e r  i n  h i s  w o r l d  s o  a s  t o  e s c a p e  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  
c h a o s ,  l e d  m o d e m  m a n  t o  t h e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  h i s  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t  o n  a  n e w  b a s i s .  H e  b e c a m e  m o r e  a n d  m o r e  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i n g s ,  i n  h o w  t h e y  r e l a t e  t o ,  a n d  p r o d u c e  
e a c h  o t h e r .  D u e  t o  t h i s  n e w  a t t i t u d e  e v e r y  d e t a i l  a n d  
a c c i d e n t  b e c a m e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
w o r l d .  T h e  o r d e r  o f  t h i s  w o r l d  w a s  g u a r a n t e e d  o n l y  b y  
t h e  c h a i n  o f  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a m o n g  t h i n g s  a n d  e v e n t s .  
H o t h i n g  c a m e  f r o m  o u t s i d e .
T h e  i n s e c u r i t y  a r o u s e d  i n  h u m a n  b e i n g s  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d  
b y  t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  o r d e r  h a d  b e e n ,  d u r i n g  t h e  
R e n a i s s a n c e ,  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  a  p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  
l i f e .  I n t e r e s t s  i n  t h i n g s  a n d  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,  
g u a r a n t e e d  n o t  b y  d i v i n e  r e a s o n ,  b u t  b y  f o r m a l  l a w s ,  b e c a m e  
a  n e w  f o r m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  w h i c h  a s s e r t e d  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  
t h e  o l d  r e l i g i o u s  p a t t e r n  o f  b e h a v i o u r .  i d r e a d y  In/
t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  J e a n  B u r i d a n  b o a s t e d  t h a t  h i s  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d  c o u l d  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  
o f  t h e  d i v i n e  a g e n c i e s .  P r o m  t h i s  m e n t a l  a t t i t u d e  g r e w  
u p  m o d e m  s c i e n c e  w h i c h  i s  i n  m a n y  w a y s  t h e  v e r y  e m b o d i m e n t  
o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  o f  m o d e m  t i m e s .  ( H . B u t t e r f i e l d ,  
" T h e  O r i g i n s  o f  M o d e m  S c i e n c e " ,  B e l l  &  S o n s  L t d . ,
L o n d o n ,  1 9  5 0 , p .  7 ) .
I t  i s  w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  t h e  
m o d e m  e r a  w a s  a s s o c i a t e d  a l s o  w i t h  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  s e c u r i t y  
a n d  p r o g r e s s .  T h i s  c o m p e n s a t e d  f o r  t h e  i n s e c u r i t y  a r o u s e d  
b y  s e c u l a r i s a t i o n .  T o  t h e  m a n  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  t h e  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  w e r e  u n ­
d o u b t e d l y  n e w ,  a n d  e v e n  s t r a n g e  b u t  n o t  h o s t i l e ;  h i s  m i n d  
w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  w o n d e r ,  i . e . ,  i n q u i e t u d e  m i x e d  w i t h  
c o n f i d e n c e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b y  f e a r .  T h i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .
A n  o b j e c t i v e  a t t i t u d e  i s  o f t e n  c o n c e i v e d  a s  o p p o s e d  
t o  a  m y s t i c  o r  m a g i c  a t t i t u d e .  T h e  l a t t e r  h a s  b e e n  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  b e i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  p r i m i t i v e  m a n .  T h e  
w o r l d  o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  i s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  m a g i c  m i n d ,  
d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  c o m m u n i t y ;  h e n c e  h i s  m e c h a n ­
i s m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  a r e  c o l l e c t i v e .  ( " C o l l e c t i v e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " ,  a s  L e v y  B r u h l  c a l l s  t h e m . ) .  T h e  w o r l d  
o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  i s  n o t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d  w o r l d ,  f o r  b o t h  
h i s  p h y s i c a l  a n d  s o c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  i s  s e e n  b y  h i m  i n  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  w h o l e .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y ^
c a n ,  t o  a  l e s s e r  d e g r e e  t h a n  m o d e r n  E u r o p e a n  m a n ,  i n d i v i d ­
u a l i s e  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r ;  t h e i r  m i n d  i s  u n d e r  t h e  l e v e l l i n g  
p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e  " T o t e m " .
T h e  o b j e c t i v e  s p i r i t  c r e a t e s  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l i s e s  t h e  
w o r l d .  T h e  u n i t y  i n  s u c h  a  w o r l d  i s  g u a r a n t e e d  b y  f o r m a l  
l a w s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w h i c h  t h i n g s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r .
T h e  m y s t i c  a n d  m a g i c  m i n d ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  d o e s  n o t  s e e  
t h e  w o r l d  a s  m a d e  u p  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  t h i n g s ;  i t  d o e s  
n o t  g r a s p  h o w  o n e  s e p a r a t e  t h i n g  i n f l u e n c e s  a n d  p r o d u c e s  
a n o t h e r  s e p a r a t e  t h i n g ,  b u t  h o w  a l l  t h i n g s  a r e  t h e  p r o d u c t s  
o f  o n e  a n d  t h e  s a m e  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  " T o t e m " .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  
s p i r i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h i n g s ,  t h e  
r e s u l t  b e i n g  t h a t ,  t h e  t h i n g s  r e l a t e d  p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  i d e n t i t y .  
T h e  m a g i c  m i n d  e s t a b l i s h e s  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  t h u s  
a n n i h i l a t e s  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h i n g s .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  m i n d  
o p e r a t e s  w i t h  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  o t h e r n e s s , m u l t i p l i c i t y  
a n d  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  t h e  m a g i c  m i n d  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  
" s a m e n e s s "  a n d  " t h e  w h o l e " .  A s  w e  s h a l l  s e e  l a t e r ,  t h e  
w o r l d  o f  t h e  m a g i c  m i n d  i s  u t t e r l y  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  a
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
T h e  m i n d  o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  i s  d o m i n a t e d  t o  a  g r e a t e r  
e x t e n t  t h s n  t h a t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l o n g i n g  t o  m o d e r n  
W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  b y  s t r u c t u r e s  a n d  f u n c t i o n s  w h i c h  
c o l l e c t i v i s e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a d j u s t m e n t .  P r o m  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e ’ s  b e h a v i o u r  o n e  c a n n o t  e a s i l y ^
c o n c l u d e  t h a t  h e  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  o r  t h a t  t h e  v a r i o u s  s i t u a t i o n s  
i n  w h i c h  h e  m a y  f i n d  h i m s e l f  h a v e  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r .  
H i s  r e a c t i o n s  a r e  g u i d e d  b y  c o l l e c t i v e  f o r m u l a e ,  a n d  a r e  
d i r e c t e d  n o t  a s  m u c h  t o w a r d s  t h e  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  a s  t o w a r d s  a  g e n e r a l  f a c t o r  l y i n g  b e h i n d  t h e  
t h i n g s  a n d  e v e n t s  o f  h i s  w o r l d .  A n y  c h a n g e  i n  h i s  w o r l d ,  
i n  h i m s e l f  a n d  i n  o t h e r s  i s ,  f o r  h i m ,  a n  a c t  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
o f  t h i s  g e n e r a l  f a c t o r .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a n y  a c t  o f  a d  j u s  t -  
- m e n t  t o  t h e  p r i m i t i v e ' s  w o r l d  r e q u i r e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  h i s  g r o u p .  T h i s  i s  a  t y p e  o f  a d j u s t ­
m e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  s u p e r - e g o ,  b e i n g  q u i t e  o p p o s i t e  
t o  t h e  t y p e  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  e g o .  F o r ,  t h e  
e g o  w o r k s  o u t  f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  b y  w h i c h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
s a t i s f i e s  t h e  s o c i a l  n o r m s  w i t h o u t  l o s i n g  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  
s p e c i f i c i t y .  T h i s  i s  a  m o r e  o r  l e s s  f o r m a l  a d a p t a t i o n .
T h e  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n s  a n d  t h e  t y p e  o f  h u m a n  i n t e r ­
r e l a t i o n s  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  s u p e r - e g o  l e a d  s o o n e r  o r  l a t e r  
t o  " G O . e i c h s e h a l t u n g 1 1 ,  o r  " e o m m u 4 i o n ,’ ,  i . e . ,  t o  t h e  
a n n i h i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h i n g s  a n d  
p e r s o n s .  T h e  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  a n d  o f  i n t e r - h u m a n  
r e l a t i o n s  s p r i n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  e g o  a r e  f o r m a l ,  i . e . ,  t h e y  
p r e s e r v e ,  a n d  e v e n  i n c r e a s e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
t h i n g s  a n d  p e r s o n s .  T h i s  w o r l d ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
a n d  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h i n g s  a n d  p e r s o n s  f o r m s  t h e
f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
I t  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  l o n g  t o  p r o v e  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y .  A  c u l t u r e -  
— p a t t e r n  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  m a g i c  m o d e  o f  t h i n k i n g  l a c k s  
s o m e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  T h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  u s i n g  t h i s  t y p e  o f  t h i n k i n g  f a i l s  t o  g r a s p  
a n d  t o  r e s p e c t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  t h e  o t h e r s  a n d  t o  
i n t e g r a t e  h i m s e l f  i n  h i s  s o c i e t y  a s  o n e  i n d i v i d u a l  a m o n g  
o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  e q u a l  t o  h i m s e l f .  H e  l a c k s  t h e  c a t e g o r y  
o f  m u l t i p l i c i t y  i n  h i s  s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r .
E l e m e n t s  o f  m a g i c  t h o u g h t  c a n  b e  f o u n d  n o t  o n l y  i n  
p r i m i t i v e ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y .  
O n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  c o n s p i c u o u s  t r a i t s  o f  t h e  N a z i  p e r s o n a l i t y  
a n d  g r o u p  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e i r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o w a r d s  m y t h i c a l  
t y p e  o f  t h o u g h t ;  t h e  N a z i  w o r l d ,  l i k e  t h e  p r i m i t i v e ,  i s  
d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  t h e  w h o l e .  T h e  C o m m u p i s t  
e u l t u r e - p a t t e m ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  t r e n d s ,  i s  
a l s o  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  t h e  w h o l e .
L e i s u r e .  A s  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  l e i s u r e  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  
i n  s o  m a n y  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  a d v i s a b l e  t o  s t a r t  
b y  s a y i n g  s o m e t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  m e a n i n g  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i t  i n  
t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t .
T h e  e x p r e s s i o n ,  " s e n s e  o f  g r a t u i t o u s n e s s " ,  c a n  o f t e n  
b e  u s e d  t o  i n d i c a t e  c e r t a i n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s  i n  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  l e i s u r e .  T h u s ,  l e i s u r e  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  " u s e f u l n e s s " ,  o r  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l .  I t  
w o u l d  i m p l y  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h a t  a t t i t u d e  o f  m i n d  b y  w h i c h  
s o m e o n e  c a n  e n g a g e  i n  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h o u t  p r e v i o u s l y  t h i n k ­
i n g  a b o u t  t h e  u s e f u l  o r  p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  ^
s u c h  a c t i v i t i e s .  U s e f u l  r e s u l t s  m a y  f o l l o w ,  b u t  t h e y  d o  
n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  e n g a g e m e n t  
i n  s u c h  a c t i v i t i e s .
C o n t e m p l a t i o n ,  o r  t h e  c o n t e m p l a t i v e  a t t i t u d e ,  c a n  a l s o  
b e  u s e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  c i r c u m s c r i b e  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  l e i s u r e .  T h u s ,  l e i s u r e  w o u l d  i m p l y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  
a b i l i t y  t o  d i s e n g a g e  h i m s e l f  f r o m  t i m e  t o  t i m e  f r o m  h i s  
d a i l y  c a r e s  a n d  i m m e d i a t e  d u t i e s ,  a n d  t o  v i e w  l i f e  a s  a n  
o n l o o k e r .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  l e i s u r e  w i d e n s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  
f i e l d  o f  v i s i o n  a n d  m a k e s  h i m  a w a r e  o f  a s p e c t s  i n  l i f e  
w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  c o m p l e t e l y  h i d d e n  t o  h i m  h a d  h e  b e e n  
u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  t h e  n e c e s s i t i e s  o f  e x i s t e n c e .
l e i s u r e  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m a n y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n d  s o c i o ­
l o g i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  F o r  t h e  
s a k e  o f  b r e v i t y  w e  c a n n o t  m e n t i o n  h e r e ,  b u t  a  f e w  o f  t h e s e  
a s p e c t s .
1 .  T o  s t a r t  w i t h ,  l e i s u r e  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d .  W h y  
t h i s  i s  s o  c a n  e a s i l y  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  w h e n  o n e  t a k e s  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  t h a t  t h e  m a i n  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  m i n d  i s  t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  d i s t a n t  a n d  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e  g o a l s  i n  l i f e .  - A n y  f e e l i n g  o f  p r e s s u r e  
m i n i m i s e s  t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  s u c h  a d j u s t m e n t .
l e i s u r e  i s  a l s o  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n ­
i n g  o f  t h e  e g o .  W h i l e  t h e  I d  u r g e s  t h e  m i n d  t o  r e a c t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r i g i d  p a t t e r n  o f  i n s t i n c t s ,  a n d  w h i l e ^
t h e  s u p e r - e g o  t a k e s  t h e  c l a s h e s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  e x i s t i n g  i n  
t h e  c u l t u r a l  m i l l i e u ,  t h e  e g o  r e s o r t s  t o  f l e x i b l e  s c h e m e s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  w o r k  f o r  h i m s e l f  t h e  
f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  l e i s u r e  
i s  n e c e s s a r y .
2 .  T h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  l e i s u r e  a n d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  
w a y  o f  l i f e  i s  i m p o r t a n t  a l s o  f r o m  a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  
v i e w .  T h i s  w i l l  m o r e  c l e a r l y  b e  s e e n  w h e n  w e  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
w a y  o f  l i f e  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n ,  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  a  d e m o o r a t i o  
s o c i e t y .  F o r  t h e  m o m e n t  i t  w o u l d  b e  e n o u g h  t o  m e n t i o n  t h e  
i d e a ,  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  a  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h a t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
c o n d i t i o n  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  
c o n s i s t s  i n  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  s e c u r i t y  a n d  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g  
o f  e a s e ,  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e .  T h i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  
r i s e  o f  a  f l e x i b l e  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  g r o u p ,  a n d  o f  
a  f l e x i b l e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  I n  s u o h  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  a l l o w e d  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  
f r e e d o m  i n  h i s  s o c i a l  a d j u s t m e n t .  T h e  o p p o s i t e  h a p p e n s  
w h e n  t h e  g r o u p  l i v e s  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s ;  i t s  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  b e c o m e s  r i g i d .  T h a t  i s  w h y  o n e  c a n  d e s c ± ! b e  
a  d e m o c r a t i c  g r o u p  a s  a  s o c i e t y  o r g a n i s e d  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  l e i s u r e ,  w h i l e  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  g r o u p  a s  a  s o c i e t y  o r g a n ­
i s e d  i n  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s .
I n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y ,  m u c h  m o r e  o f t e n  t h a n  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  
t o  e s c a p e  t h e  t a s k  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  h i s  b e i n g  a  m e m b e r ^
o f  a n  o r g a n i s e d  w h o l e .  T h i s  a c t  o f  d e t a c h m e n t  g i v e s  h i m
t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  r e l i e f  a n d  l e i s u r e  i n  l i f e  w h i c h  i s  h a r d l y
p o s s i b l e  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y .  F o r ,  t h e r e  t h e  i n d i v i d -  I
u a l  l i v e s  p e r m a n e n t l y  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  h i s  s o c i a l  ?
t a s k .  H o w  t o  b e  ttu s e f u l H ,  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  g r o u p ,  i s  a
I
q u e s t i o n  h a n g i n g  o v e r  h i s  m i n d  e v e n  i n  t h e  m o s t  s e c l u d e d  j
jj
c o m e r  o f  h i s  l i f e .
T h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  
w h i c h  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  l e i s u r e  a n d  t h e  s e n s e  o f  
g r a t u i t o u s n e s s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  c o m p o n e n t s  i n  i t .  H e r e  a r e  
a  f e w  o f  t h e m :
( a )  T h e  s y s t e m  o f  e d u c a t i o n  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  s h o u l d  
b e  m e n t i o n e d  f i r s t .  I t  i s  a n  o b v i o u s  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p e r i o d  
o f  c h i l d h o o d  a n d  o f  t r a i n i n g  f o r  l i f e  i s  l o n g e r  i n  a  d e m o ­
c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  t h a n  p r i m i t i v e ,  m e d i a e v a l ,  o r  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t i e s .  W h i l e  i n  a  p r i m i t i v e ,  o r  i n  a  
t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h  t h e  
s t r a i n  o f  l i f e ,  b y  b e c o m i n g  a  f u l l  m e m b e r  o f  i t s  g r o u p  a t  
a  r e l a t i v e l y  e a r l y  a g e ,  ( i n  C o m m u n i s t  s o c i e t i e s  t h e  
i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  s t a r t s  a t  t h e  a g e  o f  f i v e ) ,  i n  d e m o c r a t i c  
s o c i e t y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s  i n  a  w o r l d  o f  i t s  o w n  u p  t o  
t h e  a g e  o f  a d o l e s c e n c e ,  s o m e t i m e s  e v e n  l a t e r .  T h i s  f a c t  
h a s  a  t w o f o l d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  l e i s u r e .
F i r s t l y ,  d u r i n g  t h a t  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  c h i l d h o o d ,  t h e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  a c q u i r e s  t h e  h a b i t  o f  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  l i f e  f o r  o n e s e l f  
m a y  b e  a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  l i f e  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  o n e * s  s o c i e t y ^
S e c o n d l y ,  d u e  t o  a  l o n g  c h i l d h o o d ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s o c i a l  
c o n d i t i o n i n g  t a k e s  p l a c e  s l o w l y ,  s m o o t h l y ,  w i t h  n o  " t r a u m a * ,  
a n d  f e e l i n g  o f  c o m p u l s i o n ,  a s  o f t e n  h a p p e n s  i n  a  t o t a l i t ­
a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  T h i s  f o r m s  a  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g  '
o f  f r e e d o m ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  a d j u s t m e n t  I
t o  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y .  I
( b )  T h e  d e m o c r a t i c  m e c h a n i s m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  -  e l e c t i o n s ,  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e b a t e s ,  e t c . ,  -  r e q u i r e s  l e i s u r e  f o r  i t s  
a d e q u a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n .
( c )  P r o m  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  
t o  n o t i c e  t h a t  l e i s u r e  b e c a m e  a  v a l u e  i n  b o t h  G r e e k  a n d  
m o d e m  E u r o p e a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s .  T h i s  s h o u l d  c l e a r l y  b e  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f r o m  e i t h e r  l a z i n e s s  a n d  s l o t h ,  o r  f r o m  t h e  
" a b s e n t e i s t "  a t t i t u d e  i n  l i f e  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  
c o n c e p t  o f  v i t a  c o n t e m p l a t i v a . I n  G r e e k  c i v i l i s a t i o n  , 
l e i s u r e  w a s  r a i s e d  t o  a  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e  b y  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  a n d  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  l e i s u r e  w a s  
i n  t h i s  c a s e  a l m o s t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s p i r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y .  I n  
m o d e m  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  l e i s u r e  i s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  j
b y  a  s p e c i f i c  c u l t u r a l  p h e n o m e n o n  k n o w n  u n d e r  t h e  n a m e  o f  j
" a u t o n o m y  o f  v a l u e s "  • I n  G e r m a n y ,  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  w a s  j
i
s i g n a l l e d  —  a n d  e x a g g e r a t e d  -  b y  N i e t z s c h e  a n d  h i s  f o l l o w -  j
e r s  a s  a  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  " K u l t u r "  a n d  " L e b e n " .  T h e  
a u t o n o m y  o f  c u l t u r e  i s  i n  f a c t  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  v a l u e  a t t r i b u t e d
!
t o  t h a t  k i n d  o f  s p i r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y  w h i c h  i s  n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  j
c o n t r o l l e d  b y ,  o r  p u t  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  i
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  h u m a n  l i f e .  F o r m u l a e  v e r y  m u c h  i n  u s e  
t o w a r d s  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y ,  s u c h  a s  " s c i e n c e  f o r  
t h e  s a k e  o f  s c i e n c e " ,  " a r t  f o r  a r t ' s  s a k e " ,  " p h i l o s o p h i a  
p u r a " ,  w e r e  v a r i o u s  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  m o d e r n  
c i v i l i s a t i o n .  A l l  o f  t h e m  e x p r e s s e d  a t  t h e  c u l t u r a l  l e v e l  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  a n d  e a s e  
i n  l i f e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h a t  g o l d e n  p e r i o d  o f  m o d e m  
d e m o c r a c i e s .  N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y  t h e  a u t o n o m y  o f  c u l t u r a l  
v a l u e s  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  a b s e n t  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  t o t a l i t a r i a n  
s o c i e t i e s .  f h e r e ,  a n y  f o r m  o f  s p i r i t u a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  
r i g o r o u s l y  i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  g r o u p  
s u r v i v a l  a n d  p r o s p e r i t y .
r - i d . p v t e i r t i a l .  ' te s a ^ .  ^  '
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C H A P T E R  VI .
M I N E  A N E  E E M O C R A O Y .
P r e s q u e  t o u s  l e s  e x t r e m e s  s ' a d o u c i s s e n t  
e t  s ' e m o u s s e n t .  T o c q u e v i l l e *
T h e  P s y c h o l o g i c a l  M e a n i n g  o f  F l e x i b i l i t y .  W h e n  t h e  
c o m p l e x i t y  o f  l i f e  s i t u a t i o n s  r e n d e r s  t h e  d i r e c t  a n d  
r i g i d  m e c h a n i s m s  o f  i n s t i n c t  a n d  h a b i t  i n s u f f i c i e n t , 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  b e c o m e s  t h e  m a i n  d i m e n s i o n  o f  t h e  p s y c h e .  
T h e  m a i n  s i g n  o f  t h i s  i s  s e e n  i n  t h e  f l e x i b l e  a n d  c o m -  
- p r e h e n s i v e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  b e h a v i o u r .  S i n c e  n o  f i x e d  
t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  f i t s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  w h o l e  p s y c h o -  
- l o g i c a l  f i e l d  o f  p o s s i b l e  r e s p o n s e s  i s  k e p t  i n  r e a d i n e s s .  
T h e  r e a c t i o n  s t a r t s  o f f  b y  e x p l o r a t i o n ,  c a l c u l a t i o n  a n d  
t e n t a t i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  o f  t h e  f i e l d .  F l e x i b i l i t y  i s  
i n  t h i s  c a s e  b u t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  m i n d  t o  
g r a s p  a n d  a d j u s t  i t s e l f  t o  a  v a r i e t y  o f  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
a c t u a l  a n d  p o t e n t i a l .  N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  a t  t h e  i n s t i n c t  o r  h a b i t  l e v e l  o f  r e a c t i o n *
I n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  
i s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  h u m a n  
b e h a v i o u r  i s  p r i m a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  b y  w h a t  h a p p e n s  a t  t h e  
c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e  m i n d ;  i . e . ,  i t  r e s u l t s  p a r t l y ,  
o r  t o t a l l y  f r o m  a n  a c t  o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t
/
i n  d e m o c r a c y ,  a s  i n  a n y  o t h e r  t y p e  o f  s o c i e t y  t h e  a t t i t u d e  
t o w a r d s  o n e ’ s  f e l l o w - b e i n g s ,  t o w a r d s  a u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  t o w a r d s  
s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a r e  r e s u l t a n t s  o f  a  s e r i e s  
o f  d a t a  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e s  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  p r e s e n t ­
e d  b y  h i s  s o c i e t y .  B u t  i n  D e m o c r a c y  t h e  f i n a l  s h a p e  o f  
t h i s  a t t i t u d e  i s  n o r m a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t  
o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n  a n d  c o n s c i o u s  c h o i c e .
W e  a r e  o n l y  t o o  w e l l  a w a r e  t h a t  i n  d e p t h  p s y c h o l ­
o g y  h u m a n  s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r  i s  m o t i v a t e d  m a i n l y  a t  t h e  
u n c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e  m i n d .  B u t  d e p t h  p s y c h o l o g y  
i t s e l f  i s  a  h i s t o r i c a l  p r o d u c t ;  i t  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  m e n t a l  
s t r u c t u r e s  o f  a  t y p e  o f  m a n  w h o  l i v e s  i n  a  c r i t i c a l  p e r i o d  
o f  m o d e m  d e m o c r a c i e s .  T h a t  i s  w h y  i t s  a s s u m p t i o n s  a n d  
c o n c l u s i o n s  c a n n o t  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  i n  c e r t a i n  
h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d s ,  a n d  i n  c e r t a i n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  c o n -  
- s e i o u s n e s s  p l a y s  a  g r e a t e r  p a r t  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  a  m a n ,  t h a n  i n  o t h e r s .  W e  b y  n o  m e a n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i n  
a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  t h e  u n c o n s c i o u s  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t ;  
o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t s  p r e s e n c e  i s ,  a s  w e  s h a l l  p r e s e n t l y  
s e e ,  n e c e s s a r y .  B u t  t h e  m a n ’ s  w o r l d  i s  s t y l e d  b y  c o n -  
- s c i o u s n e s s .  T h u s ,  t h e  s o c i a l  w o r l d  i s  m a d e  u p  o f  i n -  
— d e p e n d e n t  u n i t s ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  w h o  c r e a t e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e i r  s o c i e t y  b y  d e l i b e r a t i o n  a n d  c o m p r o m i s e s ;  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  w o r l d  i s  a l s o  m a d e  u p  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  u n i t s ,
(1)
t h i n g s  a n d  f a c t s ,  i n  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .
/
(1)
F o r  a  m o r e  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s  s e e  Z . B a r b u . :  T h e  H i s t o r i c a l  
P a t t e r n  o f  P s y c h o - A n a l y s i s .  T h e  B r i t .  J . S o c . ,  v o l .  1 1 1 .  
1 ,  1 9 5 2  p p .  6 4 — ? 6 .
I t  s e e m s  u s e f u l  f o r  o u r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e  t o  c o m p a r e  
t h e  r e a c t i o n  t a k i n g  p l a c e  a t  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e  
m i n d  w i t h  t h e  i n s t i n c t  a n d  h a b i t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n .
O n e  o b v i o u s l y  c a n n o t  c h a r a c t e r i s e  t h e  i n s t i n c t  a n d  
h a b i t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  b y  a  t o t a l  a b s e n c e  o f  c o n s c i o u s -  
- n e s s ;  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  v e r y  o f t e n  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  e x e c u -  
- t i o n  o f  a n  i n s t i n c t  r e a c t i o n .  B u t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  a n d  t h e
I
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  s u c h  t y p e s  o f  r e a c t i o n  i s  a l w a y s  u n c o n -  
- s c i o u s .  A n d  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
r e a c t i o n  i n  a  s p e c i a l l y  a d a p t i v e  w a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h i c h  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e  m i n d .  T h e r e  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  o f  a  d e l i b e r a t i v e  n a t u r e ;  i . e . ,  i t  t a k e s  
p l a c e  i n  t h e  w i d e s t  p o s s i b l e  f i e l d  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  m u l t i -
- p l i c i t y  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  
T h i s  i s  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  i n s t i n c t  a n d  h a b i t  t y p e  o f  
r e a c t i o n ,  w h e r e  t h e  t e n d e n c y  i s  t o  n a r r o w  t h e  f i e l d  a s  
m u c h  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  r a p i d i t y  a n d  p r e c i s i o n .
B e h a v i o u r  a t  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  i s  o f  a  p u r p o s i v e  
c h a r a c t e r  i n  t h e  h i g h e s t  d e g r e e .  M o v e m e n t  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
o f  r e a c t i o n  i s  n e i t h e r  b l i n d  a n d  d i r e c t e d  b y  c h a n c e ,  n o r
r i g i d  a n d  f i x e d  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  e l e m e n t  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  
b u t  exploratory a n d  a d a p t a b l e .  S h i s  m e a n s  f i r s t  of a l l ,
t h a t  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  e n d o w e d  w i t h  a
/
f u n c t i o n a l  v a l u e ;  i . e . ,  t h e y  b e c o m e  s t a g e s  a n d  a s p e c t s  
i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a c t i o n .  A g o a l - o r i e n t e d  
r e a c t i o n  i s  n o t  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
r e a c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  c o n t a i n  t h e  f i n a l  s h a p e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  
d e s i g n  o f  t h e  a d e q u a t e  r e a c t i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i s  n o t  d r i v e n  b y  a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r m s  
o f  r e a c t i o n ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n s t i n c t  a n d  h a b i t ,  b u t  
m o v e s  c r e a t i v e l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  a n  e n d .
T r a n s l a t i n g  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  s o  f a r  i n  t e r m s  o f  
g r o u p  p s y c h o l o g y  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  i s  l a i d  d o w n  a t  
t h e  m o m e n t  w h e n  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  u n c o n s c i o u s  i n t e g r a t i v e  
f a c t o r s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  b e c o m e  c o n s c i o u s .  I n t e g r a t i n g  
f a c t o r s  w o r k i n g  u n c o n s c i o u s l y  c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  a n d  b i o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  g r o u p ,  
a s  w e l l ,  a s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r m s  o f  l i f e .  C o n s c i o u s  
i n t e g r a t i n g  f a c t o r s  a r e ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n  
r a t i o n a l  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  w h i c h  i n d i v i d u a l s  
o r g a n i s e  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  a  s o c i e t y .  A c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  o r  
a  b o d y  o f  l a w s  a r e  t y p i c a l  e x a m p l e s  o f  s u c h  r a t i o n a l  g o a l s .
H i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  
i s  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
c o n s c i o u s  r a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  a  g r o u p .  
I n  G r e e c e ,  t h e  p a s s a g e  t o  d e m o c r a c y  i s  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a  c o m m u n i t y  b a s e d  o n  u n c o n s c i o u s  b o n d s  t o  
a  s o c i e t y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  i t s e l f  a n d  i n t e g r a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s
/
o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  r a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .  I n  E u r o p e a n  d e m o c r a t —  
- i s  a t  i o n  a  s i m i l a r  p a s s a g e  w a s  m a d e  f r o m  a  m e d i a e v a l  
c o m m u n i t y  t o  a  m o d e r n  s o c i e t y .  B o t h  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r i o d s  
a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  a  p a s s i o n a t e  s e a r c h  f o r  a  c o n s c i o u s  
r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  i n  s o c i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n .
R e a s o n .  I n t e l l e c t .  I n t e l l i g e n c e .  A n y o n e  a t t e m p t i n g  
t o  d e f i n e  t h e s e  t h r e e  c o n c e p t s  i s  f a c e d  w i t h  a n  a l m o s t  
i m p o s s i b l e  t a s k .  O n e  c a n ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a r d l y  a v o i d  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  s u c h  c o n c e p t s  i f  o n e  w a n t s  t o  g a i n  a n  a d e q u a t e  i d e a  
a b o u t  t h e  m a i n  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e  m i n d  
a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  t h e  p a r t  p l a y e d  b y  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  
t h e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l o n g i n g  t o  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  I n  w h a t  f o l l o w s  w e  s h a l l  l o o k  
a t  t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  f r o m  a  p u r e l y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  
w i t h  t h e  u l t i m a t e  e n d  o f  t h r o w i n g  c e r t a i n  l i g h t  o n  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
T h o u g h  t h e s e  t e r m s  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c o n -  
- t e x t s ,  t h e y  h a v e ,  f r o m  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o m m o n  t r a i t s :
1 .  T h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  r e a s o n , a s  w e l l  a s  t h a t  o f  i n t e l l e c t  
a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o n s c i o u s  
g o a l s  a n d  o f  c o n s c i o u s  e f f o r t  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .  
T h i s  i s  q u i t e  o p p o s i t e  t o  t h e  t y p e  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  b a s e d  o n  
h a b i t ,  s e n t i m e n t ,  o r  p r e j u d i c e s ,  i n  B u r k e * s  s e n s e  o f  t h i s  
w o r d .
2 .  R e a s o n ,  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a r e  c r e a t i v e
/
f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t i i a t  t h e y  a i l  p r e s u p p o s e
c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  d e l i b e r a t i o n  o n  t h e
e l e m e n t s  p r e s e n t e d ) ,  b y  i t ,  a n d  a  p r o g r e s s i v e  c o n s t r u c t i o n
o f  t h e  f o r m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t ;  a l l  o f  t h e s e  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e
f i n a l  f o r m  o f  r e a c t i o n  i s  c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  r e a c t i o n ,
• T h i s  i s  a l s o  o p p o s e d  t o  h a b i t ,  s e n t i m e n t  a n d  p r e j u d i c e ,
t r r e -
w h i c h  p r e s u p p o s e  t h e / e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  u n c o n s c i o u s  f o r m  o f  
r e a c t i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  r e a s o n ,  i n t e l l e c t ,  a n d  i n t e l l i ­
g e n c e  i m p l y  a n  e l e m e n t  o f  e h a n g e  a n d  n o v e l t y  i n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  t y p e  o f  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  t h e i r  
f u n c t i o n  i s  m o s t l y  r e q u i r e d .
I t  i s  n o t  e a s y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  r e a s o n  a n d  t h o s e  o f  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  i n t e l l i -  
- g e n e e ,  w i t h o u t  f a l l i n g  i n t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s y s t e m  o f  t h o u g h t .  
I t  s e e m s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  r e a s o n  c a n  n o r m a l l y  b e  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h a t  c o m p l e x  o f  m e n t a l  f u n c t i o n s  w h i c h  e n a b l e s  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  f i n d ,  o r  t o  e s t a b l i s h ,  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
o r  n o r m s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t .
T h i s  i s  d o n e  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a d j u s t ­
m e n t .  T h o u g h  i t s  u l t i m a t e  p u r p o s e  i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  l a w s ,  a  m e n t a l  a c t i v i t y  d e s c r i b e d  
a s  r a t i o n a l  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s  a n d  
e x p e r i e n c e .  I n  t h i s  c o n s i s t s  -  a s  s t a t e d  b e f o r e  —  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  a n  a c t  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  b a s e d  o n  r e a s o n  
a n d  o n e  b a s e d  o n  p r e j u d i c e  o r  s e n t i m e n t s .  A  r e l i g o u s
/
a t t i t u d e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  p r e s u p p o s e s  a l s o  a  c e r t a i n  o r d e r ,  
b u t  t h i s  o r d e r  i s  n o t  o p e n  t o  e x p e r i e n c e .
S e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  r e a s o n  i s  n o t ,  f r o m  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  a  v e r y  c l e a r  c o n c e p t .  I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  
t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  w h i c h  i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  a r e  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  e x p e r i e n c e ,  b u t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  n o t  
a l t o g e t h e r  c l e a r .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  m e a n i n g  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
r e a s o n  b y  m a n y  m o d e r n  t h i n k e r s  o n e  i s  o f t e n  u n d e r  t h e  
i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i s ,  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t ,  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
r e a s o n  i m p l y  c e r t a i h  v a l u e s  w h i c h  e x p r e s s  t h e  e m o t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  a  g r o u p  o f  p e o p l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  
e m p i r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l i f e .  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  r e a s o n  a r e  i d e a l s  o f  l i f e ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  w h i c h  
c a n n o t  b e  p r o v e d  b y  e x p e r i e n c e ;  m o r e o v e r ,  t h e y  a r e  o f t e n  
o p p o s e d  t o  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h u s , i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m  h a s  b e e n  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  m a n y  c i v i l i s a t i o n s  a  r a t i o n a l  e n d ,  a n d  y e t  
i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  c o n t r a d i c t s  s o m e  o f  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  
e m p i r i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  h u m a n  l i f e .  O n e  c a n  s e e  f r o m  t h i s , '  
t h a t  r e a s o n  h a s  c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  o f  c o n t a c t  w i t h  p r e j u d i c e ;  
i t  a p p l i e s  t o  l i f e ,  g e n e r a l  s c h e m e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  s u p p o r t —  
- e d  b y  t h e  e v i d e n c e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .
I n t e l l e c t  i s  m u c h  m o r e  d e p e n d e n t  o n  e x p e r i e n c e  t h a n  
r e a s o n .  I t  i s  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e ,  o r ,  s i m p l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h a t  
p a r t  o f  t h e  m i n d ,  w h o s e  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  o r g a n i s e  a n d  u n i f y  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l 1 s  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  i t s
/
a d j u s t m e n t .  T h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  i n t e l l e c t  c a n  n e i t h e r  o v e r —  
- l o o k ,  n o r  s u p e r s e d e ,  e x p e r i e n c e .  B u t ,  t h o u g h  d e p e n d e n t  
o n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  i n t e l l e c t  h a s  i t s  o w n  c o n t e n t .  M o d e m  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  u s u a l l y  r e f e r  t o  i n t e l l e c t  a s  t h e  l a y e r  o f  
c e r t a i n  f o r m a l  l a w s .  T h e s e  l a w s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  m a y  h a v e  
a n  e m p i r i c a l  o r i g i n ,  c e r t a i n l y  e x i s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e x p e r i ­
e n t i a l  d a t a  w h i c h  t h e y  o r g a n i s e .  B u t ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  m e n t a l  r e a c t i o n  b a s e d  o n  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  a d j u s t m e n t  f o l l o w  c e r t a i n  p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  n o r m s ,  
i t  i s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t r u e  t h a t  t h e s e  n o r m s  a r e  f o r m a l :  
h e n c e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t a k e s  n o t h i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  e x c e p t  
t h e s e  l a w s  -  n o  f e e l i n g ,  n o  e x t e r n a l  p e r s u a s i o n ,  a n d  n o  
s o c i a l  v a l u e  -  t h a t  m i g h t  i n f l u e n c e  h i s  a t t i t u d e  a n d  h i s  
d e c i s i o n  i n  a  g i v e n  s i t u a t i o n .  A  c o r r e c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  f o r m a l  l a w s  t o  h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  t h e  s u p r e m e  
g u i d e  f o r  h i s  a d j u s t m e n t .
T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
i s  p e r h a p s  o n e  o f  d e g r e e .  G o n t e m p o r a r y  p s y c h o l o g y  
e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p o i n t s  
i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e :  1 .  I n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  a  
f o r m a l  c a p a c i t y ;  2 .  I t s  e s s e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
c a p a c i t y  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h i n g s  a n d  
e v e n t s  ( S p e a r m a n ) ^  a n d ;  3 .  I n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  
o f  a n  o r g a n i s m  t o  a d j u s t  t o  n e w  s i t u a t i o n s  ( W .  S t e m ) .
T h e  m a i n  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  i n t e l l i g e n c e  h a s  
n o  c o n t e n t  o f  i t s  o w n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  a i m  o f  a n  a c t
o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  
p r o p o s e d  g o a l ,  o r ,  m o r e  g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  i n  a d j u s t -  
- m e n t  i t s e l f .  T h u s ,  a n  a c t  o f  s t e a l i n g  o r  a  c r i m e  c a n  
i n v o l v e  a s  m u c h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a s  a  m e d i c a l  d i a g n o s i s ,  o r  
a  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n ; ;  t h e  f a r m e r  w o r k i n g  o n  h i s  l a n d  c a n  
d i s p l a y  t h e  s a m e  a m o u n t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a s  B e r t r a n d  
R u s s e l l  w r i t i n g  h i s  b o o k s .  T h e  r e a l  p r o b l e m  i s ,  h o w  
q u i c k l y  a n d  f u l l y  t h e y  c a n  e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  
e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  f i n d  
t h e m s e l v e s ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t o  w o r k  o u t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  w h i c h  
b e s t  s u i t s  t h e i r  p u r p o s e .  A s  i n t e l l i g e n c e  p r o d u c e s  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t s  t a s k  i s  t o  w o r k  
o u t  s o l u t i o n s  r e l y i n g  a s  m u c h  a s  p o s s i b l e  o n  t h e  e l e m e n t s  
p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  a s  l i t t l e  f e e l -  
- i n g ,  p e r s o n a l  i n c l i n a t i o n ,  o r  p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  o p i n i o n ,  
a n d  a s  m u c h  c o l d  a n a l y s i s  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n  a s  
p o s s i b l e .
T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  a n  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c a p a c i t y  f o r  g r a s p i n g  t h e  
s p e c i f i c i t y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  n o v e l t y ,  o f  a  s i t u a t i o n  
a n d  o f  w o r k i n g  o u t  t h e  m o s t  s u i t a b l e  f o r m  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .  
T h u s , a n y  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i n v o l v e s  a  s t r o n g  t e n d e n c y  
t o w a r d s  e x p l o r a t i o n ,  a n d  a d v e n t u r e ;  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  f r o m  o l d  f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t ,  t h e  b e t t e r .
T h i s  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d i s -  
— c a r d s  t h e  o l d  f o r m s  a n d  r u l e s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  b u t  t h a t  j
h e  k e e p ©  h i s  m i n d  a s  f r e e  a s  p o s s i b l e  f r o m  t h e m ,  a l w a y s  
b e i n g  r e a d y  t o  t r y  t h e m  o u t ,  o r  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e m .
T h e  i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  i s  t o  k e e p  t h e  m i n d  f l e x i b l e  a n d  
r e a d y  t o  r e s o r t  t o  n e w  f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  a s  r e q u i r e d  
b y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .
T w o  b a s i c  t h i n g s  h a v e  t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d  b y  a n  a c t  o f  
i n t e l l i g e n c e :  t h e  m i n d  s h o u l d  b e  q u i c k  i n  d i s c o v e r i n g
t h e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ?  
i . e . ,  i n  g r a s p i n g  t h e  l o g i c  o f  f a c t s ,  a n d  q u i c k  i n  g r a s p i n g  
t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  n e w  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  T h e  f o r m e r  r e q u i r e -  
- m e n t  i m p l i e s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  t h e  h i g h e s t  
d e g r e e  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  t h e  p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
o f  a  s t r o n g  f e e l i n g  o f  s e c u r i t y .
I t  h a s  b e e n  m e n t i o n e d  m o r e  t h a n  o n c e  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  
t h a t  r e a s o n ,  i n t e l l e c t  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a r e  m e n t a l  f u n c t i o n s  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a d j u s h n e n t  t o  t h e  m o d e m  w o r l d ,  a n d  c o n s e -  
— q u e n t l y  t h e y  h a v e  b e c o m e  d o m i n a n t  t r q i t s  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  m o d e m  m a n .  T h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a  s t a b l e  
u n i v e r s e  a n d  a  r i g i d  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  f o u n d e d  o n  d i v i n e  
o r d e r  t o  a  w o r l d  o f  r a p i d  c h a n g e  m a d e  n e c e s s a r y  t h e  a c t i v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  f i n d —
— i n g  o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a n o t h e r  k i n d  o f  o r d e r  l y i n g  a t  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  n a t u r e  a n d  s o c i e t y .  N e w t o n ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  n a t u r e ,  
a n d  R o u s s e a u ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  s o c i e t y ,  a r e  t y p i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  
o f  t h i s  b a s i c  t r a i t  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  m i n d  o f  m o d e m  m a n .
//
|qq
B u t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  t h e  m o d e m  w o r l d  m e a n s  a l s o  
m a n ' s  l i b e r a t i o n  f r o m  a  s e r i e s  o f  o l d  t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r m s  o f  
a d j u s t m e n t ,  f o r m e d  d u r i n g  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  s t a b i l i t y .  T h i s  
m a d e  i t  e v e n  m o r e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  m a n  o f  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  
t o  r e l y  f o r  h i s  a d j u s t m e n t  o n  m e n t a l  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  s t r u c t -  
— u r e a  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h o s e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  
t o  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  w o r l d .  W h i l e  i n  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  w o r l d ,  
f e e l i n g  ( f a i t h )  a n d  h a b i t  p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  i n  t h e  
p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t ,  i n  t h e  m o d e m  w o r l d ,  r e a s o n  a n d  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  t o o k  t h e i r  p l a c e .  M a n  n e e d e d  m o r e  a n d  m o r e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  i n i t i a t i v e  t o  a d j u s t  t o  a  w o r l d  i n  t r a n s -  
- f o r m a t i o n ;  h e  n e e d e d  a b o v e  a l l  m o r e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  
c a p a c i t y  o f  h i s  o w n  m i n d  t o  g r a s p  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
t h i n g s ,  t o  o r g a n i s e  h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  t o  d i s c o v e r  n e w  
f o r m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .  T h i s  i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  t a s k  
o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e .
K o  w o n d e r  t h a t  t h e  s o c i e t y  t h a t  g r e w  u p  f r o m  t h e  s o i l  
o f  t h e  m o d e m  e r a  b e a r s  i n  m a n y  r e s p e c t s  t h e  m a r k  o f  t h a t  
t y p e  o f  s o c i a l  a d j u s t m e n t  w h i c h  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
r e a s o n  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  T h i s  i s  t h e  s o c i e t y  s u i t a b l e  t o  
a n  i n d i v i d u a l  w i t h  a  f l e x i b l e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  r e a d y  t o  
t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  n e w  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  h i s  o w n ,  a n d  o f  h i s  
g r o u p  l i f e ,  a l w a y s  r e a d y  t o  g r a s p  n e w  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
h i m s e l f  a n d  o t h e r s  a n d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e m  i n  t h e  f l e x i b l e  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y .  T h i s  i s  t h e  f o r m  o f  s o c i e t y  
s u i t a b l e  t o  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n f i d e n t  i n  h i s  o w n  j u d g m e n t ,
//
a n d  a b o v e  a l l ,  i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  h i s  m i n d  t o  m o u l d  t h e
s t r u c t u r e  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  O n e
c a n  f i n d  i n  a l l  t h i s  t h e  i m p l i c i t  b e l i e f  t h a t  s o c i e t y  i s
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  c o n s c i o u s  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  b e l i e f  " t h a t  a b s t r a c t
r e a s o n ,  o r  i m a g i n a t i o n  m a y  b e  u t i l i s e d  n o t  o n l y  t o  s t u d y ,
b u t  t o  d i r e c t  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  s o c i e t y 1' ,  a s  t h e  l a t e  f o l l o w e r s
o f  L o c k e  p u t  i t .  ( B u s s e l l  K i r k i  " B u r k e  a n d  t h e  P h i l o s o p h y
o f  P r e s c r i p t i o n " .  J .  o f  t h e  H i s t o r y  o f  I d e a s ,  Y o l .  X I V ,
(i)
N o . 3 ,  1 9 5 3  p .  3 6 7 . ) .  I f  o n e  a d d s  t o  t h i s  ,  n o t  o n l y  t o  
" d i r e c t "  b u t  t o  c r e a t e ,  t h i s  w o u l d  m e a n  t h a t  s o c i e t y  i s  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e .
( 1 )  S t a t e m e n t s  l i k e  t h i s  c a u s e d  B u r k e ' s  f u l m i n a t i o n s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  a g e  o f  r e a s o n .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  h i m ,  s o c i e t y  i s  
t h e  w o r k  o f  P r o v i d e n c e  w h i c h  a s s e r t s  i t s e l f  -  u n c o n s c i o u s l y  
o f  c o u r s e  -  t h r o u g h  t r a d i t i o n ,  p r e j u d i c e s  a n d  p r e s c r i p t i o n s *
C o n s c i o u s n e s s  -  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s  a n d  t h e  D o u b l e  
D i m e n s i o n  o f  L i f e .  T h e  d e c l i n e  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  
l i f e  i n  W e s t e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  i s  m a r k e d ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  t h i n g s  
b y  a n  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  t h e  u n c o n -  I 
- s c i o u s .  T h e  p r o m i n e n c e  g i v e n  t o  d e p t h  p s y c h o l o g y ,  a n d  
t o  p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h i s .
A  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  i m p l i e s ,  a s  s t a t e d  a b o v e ,  a  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  d i m e n s i o n  o f  h u m a n  
l i f e ;  i . e . ,  c o n s c i o u s  m o t i v e s  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  b e h a v i o u r  
a n d  c o n s c i o u s  i n t e g r a t i n g  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  g r o u p  l i f e .  I t  
w o u l d ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e  a  m i s t a k e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  a b s o l u t e  
s u p r e m a c y  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  m e n t a l  l i f e  a s  t h e  m o s t  
a d e q u a t e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  D e m o -
- c r a t i e  m a n  i s  n o t  a  m o n o l i t h :  a  s t r o n g  d o m i n a n c e  o f
c o n s c i o u s ,  o r  u n c o n s c i o u s  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  m e n t a l  l i f e  o f  
a n  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  a  s i g n  o f  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e *  A  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  i s ,  i n  
f a c t ,  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  c e r t a i n  b a l a n c e  a n d  c o m p r o m i s e  
b e t w e e n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .  H e r e  a r e  a  
f e w  a s p e c t s  o f  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n .
W e  a r e  f u l l y  a w a r e  t h a t  t h e  p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c a l  p i c t u r e  
o f  t h e  m i n d  d o e s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  t a l l y  w i t h  o u r  p r e s e n t  b r i e f  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  a n d  u n c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  
t h e  m i n d .  O u r  p r e s e n t  i n t e r e s t  l i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  a n d  t h e  u n c o n s c i o u s  
f a c t o r s  o f  t h e  m i n d ,  a n d  i n  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s  o f  r e a c t i o n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  e a c h ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .  T h u s ,  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  
o f  r e a c t i o n  o r i g i n a t e d  i n ,  a n d  d i r e c t e d  b y ,  a n  u n c o n s c i o u s  
f a c t o r  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  s a m e  w h a t e v e r  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  
t h a t  f a c t o r  m a y  b e .  A n  u n c o n s c i o u s  d r i v e  i m p e l s  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  t o  a c t  r i g i d l y  i n  a n  a t m o s p h e r e  o f  h i g h  t e n s i o n  
H e n c e  t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  i t s  r e a c t i o n .  T h e  o n l y  a i m  a n d  n o r m  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
r e a c t i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  p l e a s u r e  d e r i v e d  b y  a n  i m m e d i a t e  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  t e n s i o n .  C o n s c i o u s n e s s  t e n d s ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  r e a c t i o n  i n  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o s s i b l e  
c o n t e x t  o f  l i f e .  T h u s ,  a n y  r e a c t i o n  t a k i n g  p l a c e  a t  t h i s  
l e v e l  a c q u i r e s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  i n d i r e c t n e s s ,  f l e x i b i l i t y
a n d  l e i s u r e .
I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  o b v i o u s  o p p o s i t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  
m e c h a n i s m s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t ,  t h e  m a i n  f u n c t i o n  o f  c o n s e i o u s -  
- n e s s  i s  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  c o n t r a d i c t ,  
t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .  W h e n e v e r  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  u n c o n s c i o u s  
f a c t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  p r i m i t i v e  i m p u l s e s ,  r e p r e s s e d  d r i v e s ,  o r  
c o m p l e x e s ,  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  m a k e s  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  r e n d e r  t h e m  
f l e x i b l e ,  a n d  t h u s  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  m i n d  f o r  
c o m p r o m i s e .  T h e  g e n e r a l  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  
o f  t h e  m i n d  i s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  e a c h  r e a c t i o n  i n t o  a  w h o l e  
b i g g e r  t h a n  i t s e l f :  b r i e f l y  s p e a k i n g ,  c o n s c i o u s n e s s
p r e p a r e s  t h e  f i n a l  r e a c t i o n  i n  a w a r e n e s s  o f  " t h e  o t h e r " ,  
i . e . ,  o f  w h a t  i s  n o t  " n o w " ,  n o t  " h e r e "  a n d  n o t  " t h i s " .
I * u r t h e r ,  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  t o  c r e a t e  r a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n s ;  i . e . ,  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  a m o n g  v a r i o u s  s p e c i f i c  m e n t a l  
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ,  o r  e v e n t s ,  a n d  t o  r e g a r d  t h e i r  d e v e l o p m e n t  
a s  m e m b e r s  o f  a  w h o l e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  a n  u n c o n s c i o u s  
f a c t o r  i s  h a r m o n i s e d  w i t h  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ^  l i f e .  T h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s  
i s ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t o  c r e a t e  i r r a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n s ;  t h e  
l a w  o f  a  r e a c t i o n  m o t i v a t e d  b y  u n c o n s c i o u s  f a c t o r s  i s :
" a l l  o r  n o t h i n g " ,  " n o w , o r  n e v e r " ;  t h e r e  i s  n o  s e n s e  o f  
b a l a n e e  a n d  h a r m o n y  i n  s u c h  a  r e a c t i o n .
T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i v i n g  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c i v i l i s a t i o n  
i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  a n d  ^
u n c o n s c i o u s  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  h i s  m i n d .  T h o u g h  b a s e d  o n  a  
f u n d a m e n t a l  d u a l i t y ,  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h i s  
i n d i v i d u a l  f o r m s  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  w h o l e .  O n e  c o u l d  s a y  
t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  a p p e a r e d  a t  t h a t  m o m e n t  i n  t h e  
m e n t a l  e v o l u t i o n  o f  m o d e m  m a n ,  w h e n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  
d i m e n s i o n  b e c a m e  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t o  c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e ,  b u t  
n o t  s o  s t r o n g  a s  t o  e n t i r e l y  s u p p r e s s ,  t h e  u n c o n s c i o u s  
d i m e n s i o n  o f  h i s  m i n d .
A  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a s p e c t  o f  o u r  t i m e  i s  t h a t  t h e  
b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  a n d  t h e  u n c o n s c i o u s  d i m e n s -  
- i o n s  o f  m e n t a l  l i f e  h a s  b e e n  u p s e t .  T h u s ,  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
c i v i l i s a t i o n  a n d  t h e  m i n d  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  m a n ,  c a n  n o  
l o n g e r  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  e q u i l i b r a t e d ,  b u t  a s  a m b i v a l e n t  
s t r u c t u r e s ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e y  o s c i l l a t e  b e t w e e n  t o o  
m u c h  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  a n d  t o o  m u c h  u n e o n -  
- s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  T h i s  i s  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  
a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  a n d  o f  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  t y p e  o f  
m a n .  F a c i s m ,  w i t h  i t s  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o w a r d s  m y s t i c i s m  a n d  
i r r a t i o n a l  f o r m s  o f  l i f e ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  p o l e  o f  t h e  
U n c o n s c i o u s ;  t h e r e ,  m a n * s  b e h a v i o u r  i s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  
u n c o n s c i o u s  f a c t o r s .  C o m m u n i s m  s h o w s ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
o s c i l l a t i o n  t o w a r d s  t h e  p o l e  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  O n e  c a n  
s p e a k  i n  t h i s  l a t t e r  c a s e  o f  a  s u p e r - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  ( s o m e -  
— t h i n g  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  c o n c e p t  o f  " s u p e r -  
— r a t i o n a l i t y " }  w h i c h  b r i n g s  u n d e r  i t s  s p e l l  t h e  w h o l e  y
r e a l m  o f  l i f e ,  s o c i a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  a n d  a r t i s t i c .  E x c e s s  
o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  t h e  m a i n  s y m p t o m  o f  a  C o m m u n i s t  c i v i l -  
— i s a t i o n .
T h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p I
i
b e t w e e n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .  T h i s  r e f e r s  j
in ('
t o  t h e  c o m p e n s a t o r y  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  C o n s c i o u s -  i
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- n e s s  i s  m u c h  m o r e  c l o s e l y  t i e d  u p  w i t h  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  i
j j j j
c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  l i f e  t h a n  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s ; ;  *|
't
Iti t s  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  g r a s p  a n d  t o  a d j u s t  t o  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  J
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  i t s  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  t r a n s c e n d e n c e  o f  t h e s e  
c o n d i t i o n s  i s  m a i n l y  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s ,  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  t h a t ,  w h e n e v e r  a n  u n c o n s c i o u s  d r i v e  c a n n o t  h e  
g r a t i f i e d  a t  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  l e v e l  o f  l i f e ,  t h i s  l e v e l  
b e c o m e s  o v e r l a i d  b y  m e a n s  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  t i n c o n s c i o u s
r-
m e c h a n i s m s  s u c h  a s  d i s p l a c e m e n t s ,  s u b l i m a t i o n ,  i d e a l i s a t i o n ,  
a n d  p r o j e c t i o n .  T h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  i s  a  n e w  d i m e n s i o n  o f  
l i f e  w h i c h  g r o w s  a s  a  c o m p e n s a t o r y  w o r l d  t o  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  
o n e ;  t h i s  i s  t h e  w o r l d  o f  d r e a m s ,  o f  r e l i g i o n ,  o f  a r t  
a n d  p h i l o s o p h y .
W e  h a s t e n  t o  s a y  t h a t  w e  a r e  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  s u p p o r t  
t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e  c a n  
e n t i r e l y  b e  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .
W h a t  w e  s h o u l d  l i k e  t o  s a y  i s  o n l y  t h a t  t h e  d o u b l e  d i m e n s -  
- i o n  o f  l i f e ,  e m p i r i c a l  a n d  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ,  i s  e x p r e s s e d ,  
o n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p l a n e ,  b y  t h e  w o r k  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s
/
SLrOl
a n d  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s .  I n  t e r m s  o f  d e p t h  p s y c h o l o g y ,  t h e  
U n c o n s c i o u s  c o n t a i n s  t h e  m e c h a n i s m  o f  i d e a l  f o r m a t i o n  b y  
w h i c h  i t  c r e a t e s  a  c o m p e n s a t o r y  w o r l d  t o  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  
o n e .  A t  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  h i s  m i n d  t h e  c h i l d  h a s  
b u t  a  s e r i e s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e s  p r o v i n g  t h a t  h i s  f a t h e r  d o e s  
t h i n g s  h e  c a n n o t  d o .  H i s  U n c o n s c i o u s  h o w e v e r ,  p r o d u c e s  a n  
i d e a l  f o r m  o f  t h e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s  w h i c h  i s  e x p r e s s e d  a t  t h e  
c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  h i s  f a t h e r  i s  a l m i g h t y ,  
f h i s  f e e l i n g  t r a n s c e n d s  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  l i f e  
a n d  c o m p e n s a t e s  f o r  i t  b y  a n  i d e a l  f o r m  w h i c h  s a t i s f i e s  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c h i l d ’ s  m i n d .
f h e  w o r l d  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s  h a s  a n  a u t o n -  
- o m o u s  a n d  i d e a l  c h a r a c t e r .  f h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  
a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  w i s h e s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
w i t h o u t  t h e r e b y  b e c o m i n g  i t s e l f  e m p i r i c a l .  A  w o r k  o f  a r t ,  
o r  a  r e l i g i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  c a n  e a s i l y  s a t i s f y  a n  u n s u c c e s s -  
- f u l  l o v e ,  o r  f a i l u r e  i n  a  p r a c t i c a l  e n t e r p r i s e ,  a n d  y e t  
t h i s  d o e s  n o t  t a k e  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  e m p i r i c a l  t y p e  o f  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  i . e . ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  f u r n i s h  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
r e a l i s a t i o n  i n  a n  e m p i r i c a l  s e n s e .  H e n c e  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ,  i . e . ,  o f  a n  i d e a l  w o r l d  t h e  o r i g i n s  a n d  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  w h i c h  a r e  i n a c c e s s i b l e  t o  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
B u t  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  
l i f e  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  w o r l d  i s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  a s  s u e h ;  
i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a n  a c c e p t e d  m o d e  o f  l i f e  w h i c h  h a s  i t s  a i m  
i n  i t s e l f .  f h i s  d o e s  n o t  h a p p e n  i n * a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  w a y
/
o f  l i f e .  I n  C o m m u n i s t  c i v i l i s a t i o n  ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  [
I ' i
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e  i s ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  r e p r e s s e d ;
: . i
a n y  i d e a l  f o r m  o f  l i f e  -  a r t ,  r e l i g i o n ,  p h i l o s o p h y  -  h a s  t o  |j
ij
h e  r e n d e r e d  i m m a n e n t ,  t h u s  b e c o m i n g  n o t  o n l y  i n t e g r a t e d  j
w i t h ,  b u t  d i r e c t e d  b y ,  e m p i r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l i f e .  E v e n  j
<
r e v e r i e s  h a v e  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  t h i s .  I n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  
l i f e ,  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  w o r l d  c a n  b e  a t  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  '-I
t h e  e m p i r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l i f e ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i;
'I:
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b e i n g  a w a r e  o f  t h i s .  I n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  w a y  o f  l i f e ,  o n  t h e  •
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  p r o d u c t s  o f  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s  a r e  c o n s c i o u s l y  5
p u t  a t  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  l i f e .
T h u s  t h e  s p o n t a n e i t y  a n d  t h e  f r e e d o m  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e i r  
c r e a t i o n  a r e  l o s t .
" i
T h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  U n c o n s c i o u s ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  e x p o u n d e d  
a b o v e ,  i s  o f  s o m e  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  f r e e d o m .  jj
'■i
I t  p r o v i d e s  o u t l e t s  t o  m a n y  t e n s i o n s  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  n
i n s u f f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  a n d  s o c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  j
L e w i n  a n d  F r e u d  h a v e  p o i n t e d  t o  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  w h i c h  t h e  :j
i m a g i n a r y  l e v e l  o f  l i f e  h a s  i n  m a n y  t e n s i o n s  c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  i n  t h e  g r o u p  b y  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n s  a n d  c o n f l i c t s  !
t a k i n g  p l a c e  a t  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  l e v e l  o f  l i f e .  T h e  p a r t  
p l a y e d  b y  C h r i s t i a n  r e l i g i o n ,  w i t h  i t s  i d e a l  o f  u n i v e r s a l  
b r o t h e r h o o d ,  i n  s m o o t h i n g  t h e  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  i n t e r -  !
- g r o u p  c o n f l i c t s  i n  W e s t e r n  s o c i e t y  c a n  b e  a d d u c e d  a s  a n  i
e x a m p l e .  T h e  d i s p l a c e m e n t  o f  a g g r e s s i o n  u p o n  a n  i d e a l  
f o r m  o f  e v i l  a n d  d a n g e r  ( T h e  D e v i l )  c a n  c e r t a i n l y  b e  y
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  d e c i s i v e  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  r i s e  o f  
t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n c e  i n  m o d e m  m a n ,  T h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  d r i v e s  a t  a n  i m a g i n a r y  l e v e l  p r o d u c e s  
d e f l e c t i o n  a n d  t h e r f o r e  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  f l e x i b l e  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  h i s  b e h a v i o u r .
T h e  P s y c h o l o g i c a l  A s p e c t s  o f  F r e e d o m ,  I t  h a s  b e e n  
s h o w n  p r e v i o u s l y  t h a t  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n t  t y p e  o f  r e a c t i o n  
r e q u i r e s  l e i s u r e ,  a n d  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s  t e n d  t o  
p r o d u c e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n s t i n c t i v e  t y p e .  T h e  r e a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  f o r m s  o f  r e a c t i o n  c a n  b e  
a s s e s s e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  f r e e d o m .  I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  f r e e d o m  
& a s  t w o  a s p e c t s :  ( a )  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m  d i s p l a y e d  b y  
t h e  r e a c t i o n  i t s e l f  i n  i t s  d e v e l o p m e n t  t o w a r d s  i t s  f i n a l  
f o r m ,  a n d  ( b )  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  e g o  i n  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ;  t h e  e g o  m a y  p r e s e r v e  a  c e r t a i n  d i s t a n c e  f r o m  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  e x p l o r a t o r y  p o w e r  o f  t h e  
m i n d .
A n y  s i t u a t i o n  o f  s t r e s s ,  n o r m a l l y  p r o d u c e d  b y  a  h i g h  
d e g r e e  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  m i n i m i s e s  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m  i n  
h u m a n  b e h a v i o u r .  K o e h l e r  a n d  B i r c h ,  a m o n g s t  o t h e r s ,  
n o t i c e d  t h a t  a n i m a l s ,  a f t e r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  f o o d  p r i v a t -  
- i o n s ,  f a i l e d  t o  b e h a v e  i n t e l l i g e n t l y .  T h e  w h o l e  r e a c t i o n  
f i e l d  b e c a m e  n a r r o w e d  d o w n  t o  a  s t e r e o t y p e d  a n d  i n a d e q u a t e  
r e a c t i o n .  T h e  a n i m a l s  " t h r o w "  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  o n e  d i r e c t i o n  
o r  a n o t h e r ,  w i t h o u t  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h e i r  r e a c t i o n s ,  o r  t d  c o m b i n e  t h e m  i n  a  f i n a l  f o r m  o f
/
a d j u s t m e n t .  t i n d e r  m i l d  f o o d  p r i v a t i o n s  t h e  f i e l d  r e m a i n s  
f l u i d  a n d  " t r a n s p a r e n t M ;  t h e  a n i m a l  s e e s  a n d  c a l c u l a t e s  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  i t s  r e a c t i o n s .  ( B i r c h ,  H . G . ;  f h e  
r o l e  o f  m o t i v a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  i n  i n s i g h t f u l  p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g .
G o m p .  P s y c h o l .  3 8 ,  p . 2 9 5  -  3 1 7 ,  1 9 4 5 s ) *  I » e w i n  n o t i c e s  
t h a t  a  c h i l d  w h o  n o r m a l l y  s h o w s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  m e n t a l  
f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  i m a g i n a t i o n  i n  h i s  p l a y  b e h a v i o u r ,  r e s o r t s  
t o  s t e r e o t y p e d  r e a c t i o n s  w h e n  f r u s t r a t e d ;  e . g . ,  t h e  b l o c k s  
a r e  u s e d  m e r e l y  a s  t h i n g s  t o  b a n g  a b o u t .  ( B a r k e r ,  H . ,
B e m b o ,  T . ,  a n d  B e w i n ,  K .  s  F r u s t r a t i o n  a n d  a g g r e s s i o n s  a n  
e x p e r i m e n t  w i t h  y o u n g  c h i l d r e n .  U n i v .  o f  l a .  S t u d .  C h i l d  
W e i . ,  1 8 ,  H o . l ) .
H o w  c a n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m  b e  
E x p l a i n e d ?  I n  a  s i t u a t i o n  o f  h i g h  t e n s i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  
t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  o f  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  d r i v e ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
s e e k s  a n  i m m e d i a t e  a n s w e r .  I n  m o s t  c a s e s  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
g i v e s  w a y  t o  i n s t i n c t .  A n  i n s t i n c t  o p e r a t e s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
m a x i m u m  o f  u r g e n c y ;  " n o w  o r  n e v e r ” ,  ” a l l  o r  n o t h i n g ” ,
” i n  t h i s  w a y  a n d  i n  n o  o t h e r ” ,  a r e  t h e  n o r m a l  f o r m u l a e  
o f  i n s t i n c t i v e  r e a c t i o n .  f h i s  o b v i o u s l y  m i n i m i s e s  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  r e a c t i o n .
A n  o r g a n i s m  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s  b e h a v e s  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r ;  
p s y c h i c a l  e n e r g y  c o n c e n t r a t e s  i n  t h e  f r u s t r a t e d  a r e a  w h i c h  
d i s c h a r g e s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  s h o r t  c i r c u i t .  T h e  s i t u a t i o n  
b e c o m e s  r i g i d  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i s m  s i m p l i f i e s
/
t h e  w h o l e  f i e l d  o f  r e a c t i o n  t o  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  i t s  p r e s e n t  a i m .  T h u s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l * s  
b e h a v i o u r  i s  e n t i r e l y  d e c i d e d  b y  o n e  o f  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  
f a c t o r s ,  t o  t h e  n e g l e c t  o f  t h e  o t h e r s .  F i g u r a t i v e l y  
s p e a k i n g  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  a  m i n o r i t y  r u l e s  o v e r  a  m a j o r i t y .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  f r u s t r a t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  
a n d  i n c r e a s e  o f  p r e s s u r e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o d u c e  a  l o w  d e g r e e  
o f  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f i e l d ,  a n d  c a n  c o n s e q u e n t l y  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  
a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  t o  a n  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  
l i f e .  T h e r e  i s  n o  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  p r o v i n g  t h i s  p o i n t  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v i o u r .  T h a t  i s  w h y  w e  s h o u l d  
l i k e  t o  s p e n d  m o r e  t i m e  i n  w h a t  f o l l o w s  i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h i s  
p r o b l e m  i n  t e r m s  o f  g r o u p  p s y c h o l o g y .
O n e  o f  t h e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  c o n s i s t s ,  
a s  a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d ,  i n  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  
s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  g r o u p .  I n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  g r o u p  b e c o m e s  
f l e x i b l e ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  
r e l a t i o n s  a l l o w s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m .  T h e  A t h e n i a n  
c o m m u n i t y  c a n  b e  t a k e n  a s  a  f i r s t  e x a m p l e .  O f  a l l  G r e e k  
c i t i e s  A t h e n s  a c h i e v e d  t h e  h i g h e s t  d e g r e e  o f  s e c u r i t y  a n d  
s t a b i l i t y .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  s a i d  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  Y t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  A t h e n i a n  c o m m u n i t y  u n d e r -  
- w e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  t h r e a t ,  t h e s e  d i d  n o t  r e a c h  s u c h  
i n t e n s i t y  a n d  d u r a t i o n  a s  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  s y s t e m  o f
/
i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t -  
- l y  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n .
(1)
G r a i s e t  - u n d e r l i n e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  Y t h  c e n t u r y  
t h e  A t h e n i a n  c o m m u n i t y  r e a c h e d  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  s t a b i l i t y :  
® E l l e  ( A t h e n e s )  n * e t a i t  p a s  a l o r s  u n e  c i t e  d e  c o n q S e t e  e t  
d e  c o m b a t ” .  ( O p .  G i t .  p . 7 2 ) .
I n  t h e  s a m e  s e n s e  s e c u r i t y  a n d  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  a r e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a l l  m o d e m  s o c i e t i e s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d s  
i m m e d i a t e l y  b e f o r e  o r  d u r i n g  t h e i r  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n .  S h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  m o d e m  
w o r l d  s t a r t s  i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  e n j o y i n g  t h e  
l o n g e s t  p e r i o d  o f  s t a b i l i t y  i n  E u r o p e ,  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  f r o m  
t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  T o c q u e v i l l e  c o u n t s  i s o l a t i o n  a n d  
s t a b i l i t y  a m o n g s t  t h e  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  A m e r i c a n  
D e m o c r a c y .  T h e  l a c k  o f  i m m i n e n t  d a n g e r  w h i c h  m a d e  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a  s t a n d i n g  a r m y  u n n e c e s s a r y  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
r i s e  o f  B r i t i s h  D e m o c r a c y ,  b y  M a c a u l a y ,  a n d  t o  t h e  r i s e  o f  
A m e r i c a n  d e m o c r a c y  b y  T o c q u e v i l l e .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
s t r o n g e s t  d e m o c r a c i e s  a r e  t o d a y  i n  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  l e s s  
a f f l i c t e d  b y  t h e  i n s e c u r i t i e s  o f  m o d e m  l i f e ,  s u c h  a s  
S w i t z e r l a n d ,  S c a n d i n a v i a ,  a n d  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  c a n  a l s o  b e  
a d d u c e d  a s  a  p r o o f  t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  s e c u r i t y  a r e  i m p o r t -  
- a n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .
W h e n  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  a r e  f r u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e i r  
n e e d  f o r  s e c u r i t y ,  t h e  s o c i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  g r o u p  b e c o m e s  
r i g i d .  E u r o p e a n  m e d i a e v a l  c o m m u n i t i e s  o f f e r  g o o d  e x a m p l e s  
o f  g r o u p s  o r g a n i s e d  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s .  T h e
/
i n s e c u r i t y ,  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e ,  d o m i n a t i n g  E u r o p e a n  
s o c i e t y  a f t e r  t h e  d o w n f a l l  o f  t h e  H o m a n  E m p i r e  i s  r e s p o n s ­
i b l e  f o r  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n .  T h i s  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  
w h y  t h e  C h u r c h ,  a s  t h e  d o m i n a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  m e d i a e v a l  
s o c i e t y  -  t h o u g h  i n  i t s e l f  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  o f  a n  a u t h o r i t -  
- a r i a n  c h a r a c t e r  -  i s  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a n  a u t h o r i t ­
a r i a n  t y p e  o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  a  
r i g i d  f o r m  o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  e x i s t e d ,  a t  t h a t  t i m e  i n  
t h e  a i r .  E a s e i s m  i s  a l s o  g i v e n  a s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  a  g r o u p  
u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s .  T h i s  w i l l  f o r m  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y .  E o r  t h e  m o m e n t ,  
o u r  i n t e r e s t  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  o n  w h a t  h a p p e n s  w h e n  a  
c o l l e c t i v i t y  i s  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s .
A  g r o u p  c a n  b e  f r u s t r a t e d  i n  m a n y  w a y s  i n  i t s  n e e d  
f o r  s t a b i l i t y  a n d  s e c u r i t y .  T h e  f r u s t r a t i o n  m i g h t  b e  
a r o u s e d  b y  a  d a n g e r  f r o m  o u t s i d e ,  t h e  g r o u p  b e i n g  t h r e a t -  
- e n e d  b y  a n o t h e r  g r o u p ,  o r  b y  a  d a n g e r  f r o m  w i t h i n ,  s u c h  a s  
a  p o l i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  o r  s p i r i t u a l  c r i s i s .  T h e  r i g i d i t y  
o f  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e  o f  a  c o m m u n i t y  d u r i n g  t i m e s  o f  w a r  
i s  a  u s u a l  p h e n o m e n o n  a n d  r e q u i r e s  v e r y  l i t t l e  e x p l a n a t i o n .  
T h e  i m m i n e n t  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  a l l o w s  n e i t h e r  l e i s u r e  
i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t a k i n g  c o m m o n  d e c i s i o n s ,  n o r  f r e e d o m  f o r  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  h i s  p a r t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
E v e n  m o r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f r o m  t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  i s  t h e  
f r u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  n e e d  o f  s e c u r i t y  p r o d u c e d  b y  a  d a n g e r  
f r o m  w i t h i n .  A n  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  c a n  b e  t a k e n  a s  a n
/
e x a m p l e ,  T h e  f i r s t  s y m p t o m  o f  r i g i d i t y  i s  s e e n  i n  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  a s  a  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c r i s i s ,  s o c i e t y  b e c o m e s  
d i v i d e d  i n t o  a  s e r i e s  o f  s u b - g r o u p s  ,  o r  c l a s s e s ,  r i g i d l y  
o r g a n i s e d  w i t h i n  t h e m s e l v e s ,  a n d  n o r m a l l y  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  
e a c h  o t h e r ,  T h e  s u b - g r o u p s  a n d  c l a s s e s  a c c u s e  e a c h  o t h e r  
o f  b e i n g  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c r i s i s .  I f  t h e  c r i s i s  i s  d e e p  
e n o u g h  t o  t h r e a t e n  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  t h e  r i g i d ­
i t y  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  p a t t e r n  m a y  t a k e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s p e c t ;  
t h e  g r o u p  a s  a  w h o l e  l o s e s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  w o r k i n g  o u t  
s o l u t i o n s  -  o f  t h e  c r i s e s  -  w h i c h  a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  f r e e  
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y ,  o r  o f  t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  i t s  
m e m b e r s .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  s o l u t i o n s  a r e  o f  a  r a d i c a l  c h a r a c -  
- t e r ; i  t h e y  a r e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a  s u b - g r o u p ,  a n d  a s  s u c h  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h a t  g r o u p  e x c l u s i v e l y .  
T h e  w o r k i n g - c l a s s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s e e s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i n  " t h e  
c o m m u n i s a t i o n  o f  a l l  p r o p e r t y " ,  a n d  n a t u r a l l y  i n  t h e  
" l i q u i d a t i o n "  o f  o t h e r  c l a s s e s ;  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s e s ,  o n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  w o r k  o u t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  s a m e  c r i s i s  i n  
t e r m s  o f  i t s  o w n  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  s e c u r i t y  w h i c h  m e a n s  g r e a t e r  
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  p r i v a t e  e a r n i n g s  a n d  s a v i n g s .  T h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  w h i c h ,  p r e v i o u s  t o  t h e  c r i s i s ,  w a s  d i f f u s e d  
i n  a l l  c l a s s e s ,  t e n d s  n o w  t o  b e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  o n e  o r  o t h e r  
o f  t h e m ,  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  T h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  
i s  t h a t  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  t a k e s  o n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  w h e r e  a  m i n o r i t y  d e c i d e s  u p o n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f
a l l .
/
A  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  e x i s t ­
i n g  b e t w e e n  f r u s t r a t i o n  a n d  i n s e c u r i t y ,  o n  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  
r i g i d  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  i s  s e e n  i n  t h e  
t o t a l i t a r i a n  t e n d e n c i e s  e x i s t i n g  i n  n e a r l y  a l l  w o r k e r s *  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  t o d a y .  T h e  r o o t  o f  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  s h o u l d  
b e  l o o k e d  f o r  i n  a  s e r i e s  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  e v e n t s  
p r e s i d i n g  o v e r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h i s  c l a s s  w i t h i n  m o d e r n  
s o c i e t y .  A  f r u s t r a t e d  f e e l i n g  o f  s e c u r i t y  a n d  a n  a c c u m u -  
- l a t e d  a g g r e s s i o n  p r o d u c e d  b y  v a r i o u s  c r i t i c a l  p e r i o d s ,  
a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y ,  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  b a s i c  
e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  t h i s  c l a s s .  W e  s h a l l  d e a l  
m o r e  f u l l y  w i t h  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  i n  t h e  l a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
p r e s e n t  s t u d y .  F o r  t h e  m o m e n t  w e  c o n f i n e  o u r s e l v e s  t o  
m e n t i o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  f r u s t r a t e d  s e c u r i t y  e x p l a i n s  t o  a  g r e a t  
e x t e n t  t h e  l a c k  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  o f  t h e  s e n s e  o f  c o m p r o m -  
- i s e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o w a r d s  a  r i g i d  s o c i a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h i s  c l a s s .
C o n c l u d i n g ,  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t ;  a n y  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  a n d  a n y  
i n n e r  o r  e x t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  w h i c h  b r i n g s  a b o u t  a  r e a l  t h r e a t  
f o r  t h e  g r o u p ,  t e n d  t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m  o f  i t s  
p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e .  A  g r e a t  f r u s t r a t i o n  c a n  c a u s e  t h e  d i m i n -  
- u t i o n  o f  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e  o f  a  g r o u p  i n  t w o  
m a i n  w a y s s  i t  c a n  p r o d u c e  e i t h e r  a n  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  
a g g r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  f r u s t r a t e d  g r o u p ,  o r  f e a r  a n d  i n s e c u r i t y .  
A n  a g g r e s s i v e  g r o u p  i s  a l w a y s  l i a b l e  t o  r i g i d  m i l i t a r y  t y p e s  
o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  F e a r  a n d  i n s e c u r i t y  i n  a  g r o u p  o f
/
i n d i v i d u a l s  w o r k  v e r y  o f t e n  i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  s a m e  d i r e c t i o n ;  
i . e . ,  t o w a r d s  a  r i g i d  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d  t h e  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  i n  t h e  h a n d  o f  a  " s t r o n g "  
m a n  w h o  i s  r e g a r d e d  b y  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  a  g r o u p  a s  t h e i r  
" s a v i o u r " *  T h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  f e a r  a n d  i n s e c u r i t y  s e e m s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  
f l e x i b l e  t y p e  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  a  g r o u p *  N o  w o n d e r ,  
R o o s e v e l t  l i s t e d  " f r e e d o m  f r o m  f e a r "  a m o n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  w o r l d *
C H A P T E R  V II.
DEMOCRACY AND EVERYDAY LIRE.
" W e  l i v e  a t  e a s e ,  n o t  l i k e  t h e  
L a c e d a e m o n i a n s  w h o  u n d e r g o  l a b o r i o u s  
e x e r c i s e s  w h i c h  a r e  t o  m a k e  t h e m  
b r a v e " .  —  P e r i c l e s .
" L a  v i e  n * e s t  p a s  t r e s  o r n e e  m a i s  
t r e s  a i s e e  e t  t r e s  p a s s i b l e " .  —
•  T o c q u e v i l l e .
L i f e  a n d  P r i n c i p l e s .  T h e  f e e l i n g  o f  e a s e  i s  b y  f a r  
t h e  m o s t  g e n e r a l  t r a i t  o f  m i n d  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y .  
T h o u g h  w e  c a l l  i t  f e e l i n g ,  i t  i s  i n  f a c t  a  p a r a - p s y c h o l o g i -  
c a l  f a c t o r ;  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e ,  
a n d  y e t  c a n  n e v e r  b e  e n t i r e l y  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  t e r m s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  I n  a  d e m o c r a c y ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  . 
o f  l i f e  i t s e l f  h a s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  n a t u r a l n e s s ,  o f  s o m e ­
t h i n g  w h i c h  o n l y  t h e  G r e e k  t e r m  " E u c o s m i a "  c a n  t r a n s l a t e ;  
i t  r a d i a t e s  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  -  p e r h a p s  n e v e r  
f u l l y  a r t i c u l a t e d  a t  a  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  -  t h a t  t h e  p r o b l e m s  
o f  l i f e  c a n  b e  s o l v e d  w i t h i n  t h e  n o r m a l  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  m i n d .  
T h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  s u p e r n a t u r a l  a r e  w e l l  d e f i n e d ,  a n d  t h e r e  
i s  l i t t l e  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  r e s o r t  t o " e x t r a o r d i n a r y "  m e a s u r e s .  
T h u s ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t e n s i o n ,  w h i c h  l e a d s  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t o  a  r i g i d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  l i f e ,  a r e  r i g o r o u s l y  c i r c u m ­
s c r i b e d .  W h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c a n n o t  a c h i e v e  b y  h i m s e l f ,  
h e  c a n  a c h i e v e  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r s .  A n y  t e n s i o n  
i s  i m m e d i a t e l y  a b s o r b e d  i n t o  t h e  w h o l e  o f  l i f e  i n  e x a c t l y ^
t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  a  s l i g h t  p o i s o n  i s  a b s o r b e d  a n d  a n n i h i l a t e d  
b y  a  h e a l t h y  o r g a n i s m .  T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m a n a g e s  t o  k e e p  
h i s  i m p u l s e s  a n d  a s p i r a t i o n s  f l e x i b l e ;  g r o u p s ,  e l a s s e s ,  
o r  c o r p o r a t i o n s  s e l d o m  c r e a t e  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  m u t u a l  
e x c l u s i o n  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s .  S t a t e  a n d  t h e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l ,  o n  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  m a s s e s  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  
d o  n o t  f o r m  s e p a r a t e  p o l e s  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e .
I t  w o u l d  n o t ^ h o w e v e r ,  b e  c o m p l e t e l y  a c c u r a t e  t o  c o n ­
c l u d e  f r o m  t h i s  t h a t  d e m o c r a c y  i s  t h e  r e a l m  o f  s p o n t a n e i t y .  
O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  t h e  g r o u p  s h o w  s t r o n g  
i n c l i n a t i o n s  t o  l i v e  a c c o r d i n g  t o ,  o r  t o  o b s e r v e ,  c e r t a i n  
p r i n c i p l e s  e v e n  i n  t h e i r  e v e r y  d a y  l i f e .  I n  p o s t - w a r  
B r i t a i n ,  m a n y  p e o p l e  b e l o n g i n g  t o  v a r i o u s  c l a s s e s  i m p o s e d  
u p o n  t h e m s e l v e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e s t r i c t i o n  i n  s m o k i n g ,  
p r o m p t e d  m a i n l y  b y  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  o f  t h e  E x c h e q u e r s  
e x h o r t a t i o n s .  I t  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t r u e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  
a  v e r y  c o m m o n  e x a m p l e ,  a n d  t h a t  o n e  m i g h t  w e l l  b e  i n d u c e d  
t o  s e e  i n  i t  s o m e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  s t r e s s ,  o r  e v e n  s o m e  a n t i ­
d e m o c r a t i c  t r a i t s  l u r k i n g  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a y  o f  l i f e .  T h i s  
c o m p e l s  u s  t o  s t a t e  a g a i n  t h a t  w h a t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
d e m o c r a c y  i s  n o t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e ,  o r  t h e  a b s e n c e ,  o f  c e r t a i n  
w e l l - d e f i n e d  p r i n c i p l e s ,  o r  p r e s c r i p t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
r e l a t i o n  e x i s t i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .
O n e  u s u a l l y  s a y s  t h a t  i n  d e m o c r a c y ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
a p p r o p r i a t e s  t h e  n o r m s  a n d  t h e  r u l e s  o f  l i f e  b y  a  p r o c e s s ^
o f  f r e e  a c c e p t a n c e ,  o r  b y  a s s e n t .  T h i s  d o e s  o n  n o  a c c o u n t  
i m p l y  t h a t ,  i n  a  d e m o c r a c y  i t  i s  p u r e  c h a n c e  t h a t  d e c i d e s  
u p o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  b e l i e f s ,  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  i d e a s .  I n  a  
d e m o c r a t i c ,  a s  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  w a y  o f  l i f e ,  t h e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  i s  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a  w e l l - d e f i n e d  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  
w o r l d ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s t i m u l i  a r e  p r e - a r r a n g e d ,  s o  a s  t o  
e n c o u r a g e  o r  d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  
b e l i e f s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s .  T h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
w a y  o f  l i f e  c o n s i s t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s t i t u t e s  b y  h i m s e l f  a  s e l e c t i v e  c e n t r e ,  
i . e . ,  t h e  e x t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
c e r t a i n  b e l i e f s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  l i f e  a r e  o r g a n i s e d  i n  
t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  h i s  o w n  n e e d s .
A s  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
g o v e r n i n g  h i s  l i f e , i t  c a n  b e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b r i e f l y  a s  
o b j e c t i v e ,  o r  c r i t i c a l .  M o r a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  r e l i g i o u s  
b e l i e f s  o r  p o l i t i c a l  i d e a s  a r e ,  i n  d e m o c r a c y ,  i n n e r  c o n ­
v i c t i o n s .  T h e y  d e f i n e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  n a t u r e  a n d  y e t  
t h e y  d o  n o t  e n g u l f  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  f o r  i t  i s  t h e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  h i m s e l f  w h o  a p p l i e s  t h e m .  I n  t h i s  c o n s i s t s  o n e  o f  t h e  
m o s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t r a i t s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  
w h i c h ,  l a c k i n g  a  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t e r m ,  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
a s  o n e  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y .  A l t h o u g h  t h e y  
a r e  " h i s  o w n ”  b e l i e f s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s
n e v e r  p o s s e s s e d  b y  t h e m ; :  h i s  e g o  p r e s e r v e s  a  c e r t a i n  d i s ­
t a n c e  f r o m  e a c h  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h e s e ^ r
p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  b e l i e f s  a r e  a p p l i e d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  c o m p l e t e l y  e x t e r n a l  
t o  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  b e l i e f s ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  d o e s  n o t  
a p p - l y  t h e m  m e c h a n i c a l l y  a s  i f  t h e y  w e r e  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  
o f  P r o v i d e n c e .  T h u s ,  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  P h a r i s e e i s m  n o r  f a t a l i s m  !;. 
t h a t  d e f i n e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  h i s  o w n  k
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l i f e .  P e r h a p s  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  n a t u r a l n e s s  i s  
n e a r e r  t o  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h i s  a t t i t u d e .  T h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  ‘
a w a r e  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  g o v e r n i n g  h i s  l i f e  s p r i n g  f r o m  h i s  
o w n  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  h i s  j;
g r o u p ,  a n d  y e t  h e  a c c e p t s  t h e m  a s  g u i d i n g  f o r c e s  i n  h i s  l i f e .  \ 
P e r s o n a l  P e e l i n g s .  I n  d e m o c r a c y ,  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
c a r r y i n g  o u t  a  s p e c i f i c  t a s k ,  o r  p e r f o r m i n g  h i s  d u t y  a s  a  
member  o f  t h e  g r o u p : ,  d e f i n e s  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  
t w o  f a c t o r s r  t h e  a c c e p t e d  n o r m s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a c t i o n ,  
a n d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  w h o m  h e  i s  i n  c o n t a c t .  T h e  I
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p a r t i c u l a r  w a y  h e  h i m s e l f ,  a n d  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d ,  ;j
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f e e l  a b o u t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a l w a y s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p e r f o r m -  !
' i
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a n c e  o f  h i s  a c t i o n .  T h u s ,  t h e  g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l i f e  j
a r e  n e v e r  r i g i d l y  a p p l i e d .  T h i s  i s  d u e  t o  a  s e r i e s  o f  m o d e s  !j
j
o f  s o c i a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o r  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  r e l a t i o n s  s p e c i f i c  
t o  d e m o c r a c y  w h i c h  w e  c a l l  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s .
W e  c a n n o t  g i v e  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g .  *
W e  h o p e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a f t e r  a  f e w  e x a m p l e s  t h e  m e a n i n g
ti
o f  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  w i l l  b e c o m e
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c l e a r .  F o r  t h e  m o m e n t ,  w e  c a n  o n l y  r e - f o r m u l a t e  a n y
i d e a  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  b y  s a y i n g  t h a t  u n d e r  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s  
w e  u n d e r s t a n d  a  s e r i e s  o f  s t a t e s  o f  m i n d  w h i c h  d e f i n e  t h e  
w a y  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  a  c o m m u n i t y  p e r c e i v e s  h i m s e l f  a s  w e l l  
a s  t h e  o t h e r s  w i t h  w h o m  h e  i s  i n  c o n t a c t ,  a s  p e r s o n a l i t i e s .
T h e  m a i n  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s  a r e  m a n i f e s t e d  u n d e r  t h e  f o l l o w -  ,,
i n g  f o r m s :
1 .  T a c t f u l n e s s  i s  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  t h e  f l e x i b l e  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  a n  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  r e l a t i o n ,  o r  o f  a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n ,  p
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  c o n d i t i o n e d  b y  t h e
i;
s p e c i f i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e m .  i,
J1
T h u s ,  t a c t f u l n e s s  s h o u l d  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f i r s t  o f  a l l  f r o m  j
" t a c t i c s " ,  t h e  l a t t e r  b e i n g  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  t h e  f l e x i b l e  j
c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  v i e w  o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  .j
t o  t h e  m a x i m u m  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  a  f i x e d  g o a l  
w h i c h  p r e - e x i s t s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  d o m i n a t e s  t h e  p e r s o n a l i -  j
t i e s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d .  C o n t r a r y  t o  t a c t f u l n e s s ,  j
5■<
t a c t i c s  i s  d i r e c t e d  o n l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  g o a l  w h i c h  i s  t o  b e  ■?
a c h i e v e d  b y  n e g l e c t i n g  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  ,]
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i n v o l v e d ,  o r  b y  u s i n g  t h e m  a s  s i m p l e  m e a n s .  T h e  d i s t i n c -  j
t i v e  m a r k  o f  t a c t f u l  a c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i s t  i n  t h e  l a c k  !l
!
o f  a  g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e ,  o r  o f  a  g e n e r a l  g o a l , b u t  r a t h e r  
i n  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  t o  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n c e r n e d ,  a n d  a b o v e  a l l ,  i n  t h e  f a c t  \
t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n s t i t u t e  J
v a l u e s  w h i c h  c o n d i t i o n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p a t t e r n  o f  a c t i o n .
T h u s ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  a  t a c t f u l  a c t i o n  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y ^  i
b o t h  i t s  p r o p o s e d  g o a l ,  e x p r e s s e d  a s  a n  i d e a  o r  a s  a  v a l u e ,  
a n d  a  s e r i e s  o f  c o n c r e t e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r s  a r o u s e d  i n  
t h e  i n t e r p l a y  o f  h u m a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  t h e  
c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n .  T h e  m e t h o d  o f  b r e a k i n g  b a d  n e w s  i n  a  
c i v i l i s e d  s o c i e t y ,  w h e n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t r u t h  a n d  r e a l i t y  
h a v e  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  c o m p r o m i s e  w i t h  t h e  f e e l i n g s  a n d  i d e a s  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n c e r n e d ,  c a n  b e  t a k e n  a s  a n  i l l u s t ­
r a t i v e  e x a m p l e ,  o f  t a c t f u l n e s s .  A  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e  
c a n  b e  t a k e n  a s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  t a c t i c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t .  W h i l e  
i n  t h e  f o r m e r ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  p a r t s  c o n c e r n e d  a r e  
f u s e d ,  i n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  i n  e a c h  p a r t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  g o a l  i s  
k e p t  i n  s u s p e n s i o n  w i t h  a  h i d d e n  p u r p o s e  t o  b e  t h r o w n  i n t o  
t h e  b a t t l e  u n d e r  m o r e  f a v o u r a b l e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a n d  t h u s  
t o  w i n  a n  u n d i s p u t e d  v i c t o r y  f o r  i t s e l f .
O n e  o f t e n  s a y s  t h a t  b e t w e e n  t a c t f u l n e s s  a n d  t a c t i c s  
t h e r e  i s  b u t  a  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  d e g r e e .  I t  i s  h o w e v e r  o b v i o u s  
t h a t  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  t h e  a c c e n t  n o r m a l l y  f a l l s  
o n  t a c t f u l n e s s  a n d  r e a l  c o m p r o m i s e  i n  h u m a n  i n t e r c o u r s e ,  
w h e r e a s ,  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  w a y  o f  l i f e ,  t h e  a c c e n t  f a l l s  
o n  t a c t i c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  I n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  w a y  o f  l i f e  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  g o a l s  o f  a c t i o n  d o m i n a t e  
a n d  o f t e n  c r u s h  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  w e l l  
a s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  g r o u p s  c o n c e r n e d .
2 .  P o l i t e n e s s  i s  a n o t h e r  f o r m  o f  b e h a v i o u r  b a s e d  o n  
p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g  w h i c h  i s  i n  f a c t  p a r t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  
t a c t f u l n e s s .  I t  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  a  t a c t f u l  i n t e r v e n t i o n ^
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i n  a  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ,  n o r m a l l y  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  
t h e  p r e s e n t ,  w i t h  t h e  m a i n  i n t e n t i o n  o f  f a c i l i t a t i n g  
t h e  f r e e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l s  c o n c e r n e d ,  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  t h a t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
t o w a r d s  w h o m  p o l i t e n e s s  i s  d i r e c t e d .  T h e  a c t u a l  a i m  o f  
a n  a c t  o f  p o l i t e n e s s  i s  t o  p r o d u c e  i n  t h e  a d d r e s s e d  
i n d i v i d u a l  t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  h e  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  f a c t o r  i n
fc
t h e  ( s o c i a l )  s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  d o n e  b y  a r o u s i n g  i n  h i m  ■ 
t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  h i s  w e a k n e s s e s  a r e  s p a r e d ,  h i s  g o o d
q u a l i t i e s  a r e  n o t i c e d ,  a n d  t h a t  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  -  a s  i t  •
«i
i s  -  o c c u p i e s  a  n e c e s s a r y  p l a c e  i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  P o l i t e -  :j 
n e s s  m a y  b e  t u r n e d  i n t o  f l a t t e r y  i f  f l a t t e r y  i s  n e c e s s a r y  j
t o  p u t  t h e  o t h e r  a t  e a s e .  T h i s  a p p l i e s  t o  c a s e s  i n  w h i c h  ,1
p e o p l e  s u f f e r  f r o m  s o m e  c o m p l e x .  W h e n  b y  e x c e s s i v e  
p o l i t e n e s s  o n e  c r e a t e s  f a l s e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  i n  o t h e r s  t h i s  
t r a i t  c e a s e s  t o  h a v e  a  d e m o c r a t i c  v a l u e .  j
3 .  D e c e n c y  i s  a n o t h e r  f o r m  o f  b e h a v i o u r  u n d e r  w h i c h  i
I
p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s  c a n  b e  s h o w n .  S i n c e  i t  i s  c l o s e l y
< »
r e l a t e d  t o  p o l i t e n e s s  i t  m a y  w e l l  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a n o t h e r  
a s p e c t  o f  t h e  s a m e  t r a i t .  D e c e n c y  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  a  j
t a c t f u l  w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  a  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  v i e w
o f  p r o d u c i n g  i n  o t h e r s  t h e  s a m e  f e e l i n g  o f  e a s e  w h i c h  w e  j
h a v e  j u s t  d e f i n e d .  T h u s ,  w h a t  t h e  p o l i t e  m a n  d o e s  t h r o u g h  ;{
•ij
h i s  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  t h e  d e c e n t  m a n  d o e s  t h r o u g h  h i s  n o n -  i
,j
— i n t e r f e r e n c e  a n d  t a c t f u l  d i s t a n c e  f r o m  o t h e r s .  I n
.1ii
d e c e n c y ,  t h e r e  a r e  c r y s t a l l i s e d  a l l  t h o s e  f e e l i n g s  a n d y
a t t i t u d e s  d e f i n i n g  t h e  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  o t h e r s  
a n d  f o r  a n y t h i n g  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h a t  p e r s o n a l i t y  m a n i f e s t s  
i t s e l f ,  i . e . ,  t h o s e  f e e l i n g s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s  w h i c h  d e f i n e  t h e  
v a l u e s  o f  " p r i v a c y " .  I t  w o u l d  h e  u s e f u l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
b e t w e e n  d e c e n c y  a n d  s e l f - n e g a t i o n ,  t h e  l a t t e r  i n d i c a t i n g  
a n  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  o n e s e l f ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  s o c i a l  a c t .  
D e c e n c y  i s  v e r y  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  w h a t  o n e  u s u a l l y  c a l l s  
t h e  u n a s s u m i n g  a t t i t u d e  o r  c h a r a c t e r ,  w h i c h  f o r m s  a  d i s t i n c t  
i v e  m a r k  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y .  I t  i s  a l s o  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  m e n t i o n  t h a t  a n  u n a s s u m i n g  a t t i t u d e  d o e s  n o t  
m e a n  s e l f - d e n i a l  o r  a b n e g a t i o n ;  i t  i m p l i e s  o n l y  a  c e r t a i n  
s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n ,  a n d  s e l f - e f f a c e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  v i e w  o f  n o t  
d e n y i n g  t o  o t h e r s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  f r e e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  o n e ' s  o w n  p r i v i l e g e d  p o s i t i o n .
O f  a  c e r t a i n  s o c i o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  F r e n c h  s h o w  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  w a y  t h e y  
p e r c e i v e  t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  o t h e r s  i n  a  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  m o r e  
i n  t h e  l i n e  o f  p o l i t e n e s s ,  w h i l e  t h e  B r i t i s h  d o  s o  i n  t h e  
l i n e  o f  d e c e n c y .
T h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  c o n s t i t u t e s  a n o t h e r  a s p e c t  o f
p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s .  I t s  e s s e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r
l a u g h i n g  a t  o n e s e l f .  T h o u g h  i t s  w a y s  a n d  m e a n s  a r e
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h o s e  o f  d e c e n c y ,  t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  l e a d s
t o  t h e  s a m e  s e l f - e f f a c e m e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  f e e l i n g
(1)o f  e a s e  i n  o t h e r s .
(1 )
I n  s o m e  c o m m u n i t i e s  t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
a s  a  h i g h  s o c i a l  v a l u e .  T h e  S c o t s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s e l d o m  
m i s s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  p r a i s i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  f o r  t h e i r  
t t d r y  h u m o u r  w .  I n  t h e s e  e a s e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  u s e s  h u m o u r  
a s  a  s o c i a l  t e c h n i q u e ,  w i t h  t h e  v i e w  t o  e x c e l  r a t h e r  t h a n  
s e l f - e f f a c e m e n t .  B u t  i t  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t r u e  t h a t  t h i s  
k i n d  o f  e x c e l l e n c e  d o e s  s e l d o m  e m b a r r a s s  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  
o f  t h o s e  p r e s e n t .
T h e  l e c t u r e r  i n  h i s  c l a s s  p r o d u c e s  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  e a s e
i n  h i s  a u d i e n c e  b y  e x p o s i n g  j o k i n g l y  h i s  o w n  l i m i t a t i o n s
a n d  w e a k n e s s e s .  H e  m a y  p r o d u c e  a  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  i n  h i m s e l f ,
b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  i n n e r  t e n s i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  h i s  s h y n e s s .
I t a u g h i n g  a t  o t h e r s  c a n  a l s o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  h u m o u r ,  i f  b y
e x p o s i n g  t h e  w e a k n e s s  o f  a  p e r s o n  o n e  p r o d u c e s  t h e  f e e l i n g
o f  e a s e  a n d  s p o n t a n e i t y  i n  o t h e r  p e r s o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e
s i t u a t i o n .  R i d i c u l i n g  o t h e r s ,  a n d  b i g ; p e o p l e  i n  p a r t i ^ l a r ,
c o m e s  i n t o  t h i s  c a t e g o r y .  T h i s  t r a i t  i s  b e t t e r  s e e n  i n
t h e  F r e n c h  ^ e p r i t ”  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h  s e n s e  o f  
(1 )h u m o u r . '  '
(i)
T h o m a s  M a n n  c o n s i d e r s  l a u g h i n g  a t  o n e s e l f  a n d  a t  o t h e r s  
t h e  s i g n  o f  a r t i s t i c  i m a g i n a t i o n ,  a n d  o f  B o h e m i a n i s m .  W e  
a r e  r e a d y  t o  a g r e e  t h a t  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  i m p l i e s  
a  c e r t a i n  " B o h e m i a n " ’ a t t i t u d e  i n  l i f e .  T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  
o n e  o f  t h e  f a c e t s  o f  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  e a s e , l e i s u r e  a n d  
11 d o u c e u r  d e a  f f l o e u r s "  w h i c h  a r e  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  
l i f e  i n  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t i e s  a n d  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  
s o l e m n i t y  d o m i n a t i n g  i n  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y .  ( T . B I a n n ,
-  T a l k  o n  t h e  T h i r d  P r o g r a m m e ,  B . B . C .  ,  1 9 5 2 ) .
T h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t r a i t s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  w h i c h  h a v e  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  
t h e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y .  N a m e l y ,  
t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  r e q u i r e s  a  g r e a t  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  m i n d
/
and an exceptional capacity for objectivity. Both of these 
traits are necessitated by the act of laughing at oneself. 
For, on this occasion, the individual’s mind looks at 
itself with detachment, as if it were an object.
T h e  m o s t  i n t i m a t e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  
h u m o u r  a n d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  i s  s e e n  i n  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  h e l p s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  t h e  
g r o u p  t o  c r e a t e  a n d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  t h e i r  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e .  D u e  t o  t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  
m a n y  t e n s i o n s  a r e  r e d u c e d  w h i c h  o t h e r w i s e  w o u l d  h a v e  l e d  
t o  c o n f l i c t s  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  o r  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  f i e l d .
T h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  p r e v e n t s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f r o m  m a k i n g  
a  s e r i o u s  a n d  i m p o r t a n t  c a s e  o f  h i m s e l f ,  o r  o f  o t h e r s ,  
w h e n  l i v i n g  i n  e x c e p t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  -  f o r t u n a t e  o r  
u n f o r t u n a t e .  T h u s ,  t h e .  s e n s e  o f  h u m o u r  o f t e n  h e l p s  t h e  
B r i t o n  t o  b e  " a  g o o d  l o s e r " ,  a n d  t o  a v o i d  i n  t h i s  w a y  
a  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  h i m s e l f  a n d  h i s  c o m p e t i t o r  w h i c h  m i g h t  
h a v e  l e d  t o  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  b e h a v i o u r  i n  b o t h .  T h e  s e n s e  
o f  h u m o u r  m a y  a l s o  h e l p  t o  a v o i d  t h e  o p p r e s s i v e n e s s  o f  a n  
u n f o r t u n a t e  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
" t r a u m a "  c r e a t e d  b y  s u c h  a n  e x p e r i e n c e .  E v e n  a f t e r  t h e  
1 9 4 0  d e f e a t ,  t h e  F r e n c h  o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  u n f o r t u n a t e  
i n c i d e n t  a s  " c e t t e  d r o l e  d e  g u e r r e " .
H e r e  i s  t h e  p r o p e r  p l a c e  t o  m e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s e n s e  
o f  h u m o u r  p r e s u p p o s e s  a  b a l a n c e d  a n d  s e l f - c o n f i d e n t  m i n d .
H i s  e g o  b e i n g  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c a n  e a s i l y  j
accept the bad as well as the good points of his person- j
ality; the self-defending mechanisms are relatively weak.
The sense of humour transforms personal glory and misfor­
tunes into simple incidents in life. One is strong
i
!
enough not to succumb under the tension normally created j
by such experiences, and one always has the courage to look 
at the other side. Thus the sense of humour makes the 
person who possesses it easy to live with.
Sociologically it is important to point out that the
i
sense of humour is wide-spread among two great democratic 
nations, the British and French. One of the most striking j 
traits of a totalitarian community and personality is 
certainly their lack of humour. This is demonstrated 
by both Razi Germany and Communist Russia. The sense of 
humour has little scope in a culture-pattern, or in a
i
frame of mind dominated by deep tensions. MAlle :
I
Hevolutionare sind humorlos”, says Spengler. (Jahre der
( V 5 "  j
Entscheidung. Munchen, C.H. Beck*s d*e Verlag, 1833, p.143). j 
There has been very little said about the social i
significance of personal feelings. Many consider them i
as simple"mannersH and as such, they refer to the social !
entertainment of a specific social stratum, rather than 
to the structure of personality or to that of a eulture- 
-pattem. Many others think that personal feelings are 
unnecessary relics of an old world and do not fit into the 
structure of a democratic society. Thus, too much j
a  d i s p l a y  o f  s u c h  f e e l i n g  i s  o f t e n  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  s i g n  H i
H''
:V :
o f  i n s e c u r i t y  a n d  o f  a  l a c k  o f  s p o n t a n e i t y ,  ,/
;i;
F o r  u s ,  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s  h a v e  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i a l  l|
a n d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  T h e y  d e m o n s t r a t e  a  j
s p e c i f i c  a t t i t u d e  i n  l i f e  w h i c h  c a n  b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  
i n t e r e s t  i n  h u m a n  p e r s o n a l i t y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  w e  e n t i r e l y  
a g r e e  w i t h  B e r t r a n d  B u s s e l l  w h e n  h e  s a y s  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  
s t r i k i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  C o m m u n i s m  c o n s i s t s  i n  • |
!«j
" a  c o m p l e t e  a b s e n c e  o f  k i n d l y  f e e l i n g " .  ( T h e  I n t e l l e c t u a l  
E r r o r  o f  C o m m u n i s m .  W o r l d  H e v i e w ,  M a r c h  1 9 5 0 ,  p a g e  4 1 ) .
I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y  t h e  i n t e r e s t
i "n !
i s  n o t  i n  m a n ,  b u t  i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o r  i n  t h e  p r e - e s t a b -  ;
l i s h e d  p r o g r a m m e s  w i t h  w h i c h  m e n  a r e  i n t e g r a t e d  a s  n u m b e r s
. i'..
o n l y ,  ii,*! -
I n  d e m o c r a c y  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s e r i e s  o f  e x p r e s s i o n s  
u s e d  i n  e v e r y  d a y  l i f e  w h i c h  d e m o n s t r a t e  i n t e r e s t  i n
j?
h u m a n  p e r s o n a l i t y .  T h u s ,  m o d e s  o f  a d d r e s s i n g  p e o p l e  s u c h  |
a s  " h o w  d o  y o u  d o ? " ,  " h o w  a r e  y o u ? " ,  o r  " h o w  a r e  y o u  g e t t i n g  |
o n ? "  s u g g e s t ,  e v e n  w h e n  s a i d  p e r f u n c t o r i l y ,  i n t e r e s t  i n  %
if
t h e  w a y  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  f e e l s  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n ,  ji?
T h e  a c c e n t  f a l l s  o n  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  f e e l i n g s .  T h i s  i s  
c o m p l e t e l y  l a c k i n g  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  a s  w e  s h a l l  %
L
s h o w  l a t e r .
W e  s h o u l d  l i k e  t o  c l o s e  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i t h  a  b r i e f  f ;
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  o t h e r  e m o t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  w h o s e  p< «  r i4- *
s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p a t t e r n  o f  l i f e  i s  a  /
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  m a t t e r .  S u c h  a r e  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  c o m p l e x e s  
o f  a m b i t i o n ,  J e a l o u s y ,  e n v y  a n d  l o v e .  O n e  i s  u s u a l l y  
i n c l i n e d  t o  a s s i g n  t h e s e  f e e l i n g s  t o  h u m a n  n a t u r e  i n  
g e n e r a l ,  t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e m  a s  h a v i n g  n o  s i g n i f i ­
c a n c e  f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n .  T h e  
C o m m u n i s t s  a n d  e v e n  c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l l y  n o n d e s c r i p t  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  h a v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  c h a l l e n g e d  t h i s  v i e w .  T h e  
C o m m u n i s t s  c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  f e e l i n g s  -  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  
p e r h a p s  o f  a m b i t i o n  -  a s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  
a n d  c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n ,  u s u a l l y  k n o w n  a s  t h e  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s  
w a y  o f  l i f e .  O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  a i m s  o f  C o m m u n i s m  i s  t o  
s u p e r s e d e  t h i s  s t a g e  i n  h u m a n  s o c i e t y .  B u t  a s  t h e  p r o b l e m
s t a t e d  i n  s u c h  t e r m s  i s  f a r  t o o  w i d e  a n d  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  t o  
b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  w e  h a v e  t o  c o n f i n e  o u r  p r e s e n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  
f e e l i n g s .
A m b i t i o n  i s  a  c o m p l e x  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t r a i t ,  L i k e  
s e l f - a s s e r t i o n  a n d  s e l f - r e s p e c t  i t  c a n  e a s i l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
a s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s .  B u t
o u r  p r e s e n t  i n t e r e s t  l i e s  m a i n l y  i n  t h e  o b j e c t  a n d  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  a m b i t i o n .  I n  d e m o c r a c y  t h e  m a i n  o b j e c t  o f  
a m b i t i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  p e r s o n a l  p r e s t i g e .
T h e  w a y  l e a d i n g  t o  t h i s  e n d  m a y  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
s c a l e  o f  t h e  v a l u e s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  e a c h  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n .  
B u t ,  t h o u g h  p e r s o n a l  p r e s t i g e  i s  u s u a l l y  g a i n e d  b y  c r e a t i n g
o r  r e s p e c t i n g  a c c e p t e d  s o c i a l  v a l u e s ,  w h a t  a n  a m b i t i o u s ^
m a n  r e a l l y  a i m s  a t  i s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  s e l f ­
- i m p o r t a n c e  a n d  p e r s o n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y .  A l e i b i a d e s ,  w h o  
i s  t h e  p r o t o t y p e  o f  a m b i t i o u s  m a n ,  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  l a s t  
p h a s e s  o f  a  g r e a t  d e m o c r a t i c  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  s a y s  a b o u t  
h i m s e l f  ,  " A n d  w h e r e  i s  t h e  i n j u s t i c e  i f  I ,  o r  a n y o n e  w h o  
f e e l s  h i s  o w n  s u p e r i o r i t y  t o  a n o t h e r ,  r e f u s e s  t o  b e  o n  
a  l e v e l  w i t h  h i m " .  I t  s e e m s  t h a t  i n  a  d e m o c r a c y ,  a m b i t i o n  
c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  a  d y n a m i c  f a c t o r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  b e t t e r m e n t ,  a n d  o f  
t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  s u p e r i o r i t y ,  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  m a t t e r .  I t  
w o u l d  b e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  i n f e r  f r o m  t h i s  t h a t  a m b i t i o n  
n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d s  t o  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  -  t h e  s u p e r ­
i o r i t y  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  o v e r  o t h e r s  -  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t o  t h e  
w e a k e n i n g  o f  d e m o c r a c y .  I n  d e m o c r a c y ,  a m b i t i o n  i s  a  
g e n e r a l  f e e l i n g ;  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  i t  f o r  h i m s e l f .
T h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  m i n i m i s a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  
o f  p o w e r .  I n  d e m o c r a c y ,  " 1 * a m b i t i o n  e s t  u n  s e n t i m e n t  
u n i v e r s e l ;  i l  y  a  p e u  d ' a m b i t i o n s  v a s t e s " ,  s a y s  T o c q u e v i l l e .  
( D e  l a  D e m o c r a t i e  e n  A m e r i q u e .  P a r i s  C a l m a n n L e v y  1 8 8 8 .  
p . 5 5 4 ) .
T h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  
s o c i e t y .  C o m m u n i s t s  d o  n o t  l i k e  e v e n  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  w o r d  
a m b i t i o n .  I n  t h e i r  s o c i e t y ,  a m b i t i o n  s e e m s  t o  t a k e  t h e  
w a y  o f  s e l f - a n n i h i l a t i o n ;  t h e  a m b i t i o u s  m a n  s a c r i f i c e s  
h i m s e l f  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p r e s t i g e  o f  t h e  p a r t y .  
A m b i t i o n  t h u s  b e c o m e s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  o b e d i e n c e .
I n  o r d e r  t o  s e e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  
b e t w e e n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  i t  i s  
w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  t h e  m a i n  f o r m s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
o f  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  a m b i t i o n .  I n  d e m o c r a c y  a m b i t i o n  i s  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  o w n e r s h i p ,  i n  s o c i a l  
s t a t u s ,  i n  p e r s o n a l  g l o r y ,  a n d  i n  o t h e r  w a y s .  A l l  t h e s e  
a r e  r e c o g n i s e d  v a l u e s .  I n  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  t h e  
o n l y  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  f o r m  o f  a m b i t i o n  i s  i n  o b e d i e n c e  
a n d  f a i t h f u l n e s s  t o  t h e  l e a d e r ;  h e n c e  a  m a n  s a t i s f i e s  h i s  
a m b i t i o n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  h e  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  b y  t h e  
l e a d e r  a s  a  f a i t h f u l  f o l l o w e r .  T h u s ,  i n  d e m o c r a c y ,  
a m b i t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  l e a d i n g  t o w a r d s  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a n d  i n d i v i d u a t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s i z e  
o f  p r o p e r t y ,  s o c i a l  s t a t u s ,  p o w e r  o f  o r i g i n a l i t y ,  e t c .  I n  
t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  i t  l e a d s  t o  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  
s o c i a l  m o n o l i t h  b a s e d  o n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  p o w e r .
J e a l o u s y  a n d  e n v y  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  b y  C o m m u n i s t s  a s  
e m o t i o n a l  r e s u l t a n t s  o f  a n  e c o n o m i c  s y s t e m  b a s e d  o n  p r i v a t e  
o w n e r s h i p ,  i . e . ,  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  l y i n g  a t  t h e  b a s i s  o f  W e s t e r n  
d e m o c r a c i e s .  A s  s u c h  t h e y  a r e  b o u n d  t o  d i s a p p e a r  w i t h  
t h i s  s y s t e m ; p e r h a p s  t h i s  m a k e s  p s y c h o l o g i s t s  s u c h  a s  
Y .  Y .  F r e n c h  a n d  F r .  A l e x a n d e r  c o n s i d e r  j e a l o u s y  a n d  e n v y  
a s  s p e c i f i c  t r a i t s  o f  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  p a t t e r n  o f  d e m o c r a c y .  
( A l e x a n d e r ,  F .  ,  O u r  A g e  o f  U n r e a s o n .  N. Y. J. B.
L i p p i n c o t t .  C o . ) .
I t  i s  h o w e v e r  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s u p p o r t  t h i s  v i e w ,  j
P o r ,  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
j e a l o u s y  i s  w e a k  o r  h a s  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s a p p e a r e d  i n  
C o m m u n i s m .  T h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
f e e l i n g  h a s  t a k e n  t h e r e  a  c o m p l e t e l y  n e w  d i r e c t i o n .  I n  
a  C o m m u n i s t  s o c i e t y ,  i n f i d e l i t y  t o w a r d s  o n e ’ s  o w n  f r i e n d s ,  
w i f e ,  o r  p a r e n t s  i s  o f t e n  e x p e r i e n c e d  a s  i n f i d e l i t y  t o w a r d s  
t h e  p a r t y  a n d  t h e  l e a d e r ,  i f  t h e  p e r s o n  t o w a r d s  w h o m  t h e  
i n f i d e l i t y  w a s  m a n i f e s t e d  h a p p e n s  t o  b e  i n  a  c l o s e r  
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y ,  t h a n  t h e  i n f i d e l .  O n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d  i n f i d e l i t y  t o w a r d s ,  o r  b e t r a y a l  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
d o e s  n o t  a r o u s e  j e a l o u s y  i f  m o t i v a t e d  b y  a  g r e a t e r  f i d e l i t y  
t o w a r d s  t h e  p a r t y .  T h e  i n f i d e l i t y  o f  o n e  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
p a r t y  t o w a r d s  a n o t h e r  i s  n o t  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
c o n c e r n e d  a s  j e a l o u s y ,  i f  i t s  d i r e c t i o n  i s  t o  g r e a t e r  
f i d e l i t y  t o w a r d s  t h e  p a r t y .  T h u s  t h e  t e n d e n c y  i s  t o  
d e p e r s o n a l i s e  t h i s  f e e l i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  a n n i h i l a t e  i t ,  
i . e . ,  t o  t u r n  i t  i n t o  a n  e m o t i o n a l  s t a t e  w h i c h  d e f i n e s  t h e  
a t t i t u d e  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  t o w a r d s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  o r  t o w a r d s  
a  p r i n c i p l e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o w a r d s  a n o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l .
H e r e  w e  t o u c h  u p o n  a n  i d e a  w h i c h  o p e n s  u p  a  c o m p a r a ­
t i v e  v i e w  b e t w e e n  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  o f  t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m .  I n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
s o c i e t y ,  f e e l x i n g s  l i k e  a m b i t i o n ,  j e a l o u s y  o r  l o v e  a r e  
i n d i v i d u a l i s e d ;  h e n c e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  t h e  o n l y  t e r m s  
i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  w h i c h  t h e s e  f e e l i n g s  a r e  e x p e r i e n c e d  
a n d  a s s e s s e d .  A n  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  j e a l o u s  o f  a n o t h e r
/
b e c a u s e  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  n o t  f a i t h f u l  t o  h i m s e l f ,  b e c a u s e  h e  ,i;
d o e s  n o t  r e s p e c t  h i m s e l f  a s  a  p e r s o n a l i t y .  A n  i n d i v i d u a l  
l o v e s  a n o t h e r  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  v a l u e  o f  h i s  p e r s o n ­
a l i t y .  |
T h e  f e e l i n g  o f  l o v e  c a n  b e  g i v e n  a s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i v e  |
e x a m p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  r e s u l t s  
o f  l o v e  i s  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  s e l f - a w a r e n e s s  a n d  s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e . ■i)
1 'l!
W h e n  i n  l o v e  t w o  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  u n i q u e  i n  e a c h  o t h e r ’ s  f
e y e s ;  t h e y  a r e  t h e  s u p r e m e  v a l u e  t o  e a c h  o t h e r .  T h e i r  t
l o v e  i s  c o n d i t i o n e d  b y  t h e i r  o w n  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  a n d  b y  n o t h i n g  
e l s e .  B u t  t h i s  w a y  o f  f e e l i n g  i s  m u c h  m o r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  d e m o c r a t i c  t h a n  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  
V e r a  ( r h e r a s s i m o v a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w a r n s  c o n t e m p o r a r y  S o v i e t
I
w r i t e r s  o f  h a v i n g  l o s t  t h e  h a b i t  o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  l o v e  s t o r i e s ,  i. 
S h e  q u o t e s  f r o m  a  n o v e l  w h e r e  a  y o u n g  m a n  s t o p s  s u d d e n l y  i n  |j
h i s  l o v e  c o n f e s s i o n ,  b y  s a y i n g ,  " T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  r i g h t  }|
f .
m o m e n t ;  I  h a v e  t o  g o  t o  v o t e  o n  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  t a k e n  b y  ']
t h e  f a c t o r y  c o m m i t t e e ” .  ( l i t e r a t u r n a i a  G a z e t a T ^ r  1 9 5 2 ) -
T o l e r a n c e .  R e c e n t  r e s e a r c h e s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  s o c i a l  
b e h a v i o u r  s e e m  t o  s h o w  t h a t  t o l e r a n c e  e m e r g e s  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  i
b a s i c  t r a i t s  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y .  I t s  m a i n  |
a s p e c t s  a r e s  a d h e r e n c e  t o  l i b e r a l  v a l u e s  s u c h  a s  l i b e r a l
!
v i e w s  i n  r e l i g i o n  a n d  f a m i l y  l i f e ,  a n d  l a c k  o f  r a c i a l ,  c l a s s  
a n d  n a t i o n a l  p r e j u d i c e s .  T h u s ,  l i k e  p e r s o n a l  f e e l i n g s ,  ■
nl|
t o l e r a n c e  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h e  s a m e  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  m i n d  w h i c h
j
i s  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  h u m a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  a  j
v a l u e  i n  i t s e l f .
I n  w h a t  f o l l o w s  w e  s h a l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  m a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  
t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n c e  i n  m o d e r n  E u r o p e a n  s o c i e t i e s .
A s  m e n t i o n e d  i n  a  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  o n e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t ­
a n t  s o u r c e s  o f  t o l e r a n c e  i n  m o d e r n  m a n  l i e s  i n  t h a t  t r a i t  
o f  C h r i s t i a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  w h i c h  w e  h a v e  c a l l e d  t h e  d o u b l e  
d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e .  T h e r e  i s  n o  n e e d  t o  i n s i s t  o n  t h i s  
p r o b l e m  a g a i n .  I t  i s  e n o u g h  t o  m e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i d e a l  
d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e  c o n s t i t u t e s  o n e  o f  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  s e l f —  
- l i m i t a t i o n  a n d  h u m i l i t y  i n  m o d e r n  m a n *  M a n  c a n  a c h i e v e  
b u t  a  r e l a t i v e  a n d  p r e c a r i o u s  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  t h e  C h r i s t i a n  
i d e a l s  o f  l i f e ;  h e n c e  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t o w a r d s  
h u m a n  w e a k n e s s  a n d  i m p e r f e c t i o n  w h i c h  f o r m s  a  b a s i c  f a c t o r  
i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n c e .
T h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  m o d e m  w o r l d ,  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  
h o m o g e n e i t y  o f  m e d i a e v a l  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t ­
a n t  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n c e  i n  m o d e m  m a n .  T h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  s o e i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s  c o n ­
t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  c h a n c e  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  i n  t h a t  p e r s o n a l i t y  t o l e r a n t  
a t t i t u d e s  i n  l i f e .  T h e  r e l i g i o u s  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  s e v e n ­
t e e n t h  a n d  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  E n g l a n d  o f f e r s  a  g o o d  e x a m p l e  
o f  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  s o c i o - c u l t u r a l  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  a n d  
t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a t i o n .  I t  i s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h a t  
t h e  m e d i a e v a l  u n i t y  o f  E n g l i s h  s o c i e t y  w a s  b r o k e n  d o w n ^
d u e  t o  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  v a r i o u s  r e l i g i o u s  g r o u p s .  T h e  
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t , m e n t i o n e d  b y  m a n y  s t u d e n t s  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  
i s  t h a t  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n c e  c a n n o t  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
t h e  i n n e r  d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e s e  n e w  r e l i g i o u s  g r o u p s :  o f  a l l
t h e s e  o n l y  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t s  a n d  t h e  l e v e l l e r s  g e n u i n e l y  
b e l i e v e d  i n  r e l i g i o u s  t o l e r a n c e .  R .  N i e b u h r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  t o l e r a n c e  d i s p l a y e d  b y  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d  w a s  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n ;  i n  a  s o c i e t y  s p l i t  u p  i n  
v a r i o u s  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h s ,  e a c h  h o p i n g  t o  p r e v a i l  u p o n  t h e  
e n t i r e  n a t i o n ,  a n d  n o n e  o f  t h e m  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h i s  e n d ,  t h e  o n l y  w o r k i n g  s o l u t i o n  w a s  r e l i g i o u s  t o l e r a t i o n .  
O n e  c a n  s a y  a b o u t  t o l e r a n c e  w h a t  N i e b u h r  s a y s  a b o u t  d e m o ­
c r a c y  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h a t  i n  a  s e n s e  * i t  i s  t h e  f r u i t  o f  a  
c u l t u r a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  p l u r a l i s m  c r e a t e d  b y  i n e x o r a b l e  
f o r c e s  o f  h i s t o r y ” .  ( T h e  C h i l d r e n  o f  L i g h t  a n d  T h e  C h i l d ­
r e n  o f  D a r k n e s s .  L o n d o n ,  N i s b e t  &  C o .  L t d . , 1 9 4 5  p .  8 5 ) .
T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n ,  w h i c h  h a s  j u s t  b e e n  u s e d ,  
m e a n s ,  i f  t r a n s l a t e d  i n  t e r m s  m o r e  p e r t i n e n t  t o  t h e  l a n g u a g e  
o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  o f  
a  g r o u p  t o  a d j u s t  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  c o n t a i n i n g  v a r i o u s  
a n d  h e t e r o g e n e o u s  c o n d i t i o n s .  I t  r e s t s  i n  f a c t  o n  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a n d  t h e  g r o u p s  c a p a c i t y  t o  c o m p r o m i s e  w i t h  
o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  g r o u p s ,  i n  t h e i r  p r o c e s s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t .
P r o m  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t o l e r a n c e  i s  
c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  f e e l i n g s  o f  s e c u r i t y  a n d  s t a b i l i t y .  
T h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  f e e l i n g s  a n d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  j
o f  l i f e ,  h a s  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  p r e v i o u s l y .  O u r  p r e s e n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
t o l e r a n c e  a n d  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  b e t w e e n  
t o l e r a n c e  a n d  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  s e c u r i t y ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r *
W h e n  a n  a t t i t u d e  o r  a  h a b i t  i s  f o r m e d  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  s t r e s s  i t  t e n d s  t o  b e  r i g i d .  A  h a b i t  f o r m e d  i n  e a r l y  
c h i l d h o o d  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  o f  p u n i s h m e n t , o r  t h e  h a b i t s  a n d  
a t t i t u d e s  f o r m e d  i n  t h e  a r m y  c a n  b e  g i v e n  a s  e x a m p l e s .
M a n y  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  a r e  e m o t i o n a l  s y s t e m s  b u i l t  u p  u n d e r  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s ,  i . e . ,  f e a r  a n d  i n s e c u r i t y .  T h i s  i s  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  r e a s o n  w h y  i n d i v i d u a l s  h o l d i n g  s u c h  b e l i e f s  
a r e  i n t o l e r a n t  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  r e l i g i o n .  W h e n  a  s c i e n t i f i c  
c o n c e p t i o n ,  a  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o n v i c t i o n ,  o r  a  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e  i s  f o r m e d  a s  a n  a n s w e r  t o  a  f r u s t r a t e d  n e e d  w h i c h  
k e e p s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  m i n d  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  a  h i g h  
t e n s i o n ,  i t  t e n d s  t o  b e  d o g m a t i c  a n d  a u t h o r i t a r i a n .  A  
p s y c h o l o g i s t  w h o  b e c o m e s  P r e u d i a n  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  o w n  
c o m p l e x e s ,  a  p o l i t i c i a n  w h o  b e c o m e s  a  M a r x i s t  i n  o r d e r  t o  
r e l i e v e  b y  t h i s  a  g r e a t  t e n s i o n  c r e a t e d  i n  h i s  m i n d  b y  h i s  
c l a s s  p r e j u d i c e s ,  a  n e w  n a t i o n a l i t y  t a k e n  i n  o r d e r  t o  s o l v e  
a  s e r i e s  o f  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  t h e  f o r m e r  o n e ,  t e n d  t o  b e c o m e  
d o g m a t i c ,  a u t h o r i t a r i a n ,  o r  c h a u v i n i s t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e
A c u c g a u e  JLUi'ius uxit? px*upt?x* gjrou iiu  i u r  oxifef s  ouu.y o i  x n e s e
p h e n o m e n a .
W h e n ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  a n  a t t i t u d e ,  o r  a  b e l i e f  i s  ^
f o r m e d  i n  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l e i s u r e ,  i . e . ,  w h e n  t h e y  a r e  n o t  H
c o n d i t i o n e d  b y  a  l o n g  f r u s t r a t e d  n e e d ,  t h e y  t e n d  t o  b e  
f l e x i b l e .  T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n -  a n d  o u t - g r o u p  a t t i t u d e s  
a n d  f e e l i n g s  c a n  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t .  I n  T r a n s y l ­
v a n i a ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  w h e r e  t h e  t w o  c o h a b i t a n t  g r o u p s  s u c h
!
a s  R o u m a n i a n s  a n d  H u n g a r i a n s ,  h a v e  b e e n  i n  c o n f l i c t  f o r  
c e n t u r i e s ,  t h e  i n -  a n d  o u t - g r o u p  f e e l i n g s  a r e  e x c l u s i v i s t  I
ij
o n  b o t h  s i d e s .  I n  S w i t z e r l a n d ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w h e r e  
a  s e r i e s  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  h a v e  l e d  t o  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i
a m o n g  v a r i o u s  e t h n i c  g r o u p s ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  h a v e  f o r m e d  
f l e x i b l e  a n d  t o l e r a n t  i n -  a n d  o u t - g r o u p  f e e l i n g s .
N i e b u h r ,  i n  h i s j m e n t i o n e d  w o r k ,  p o i n t s  t o  a n o t h e r  
p r o b l e m  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t o l e r a n c e  a n d  
l a c k  o f  i n n e r  t e n s i o n .  C o m m e n t i n g  o n  t h e  r i s e  o f  r e l i g i ­
o u s  t o l e r a n c e  i n  E n g l a n d  h e  w r i t e s :  M I t  m u s t  b e  a d m i t t e d  !,
i
t h a t  t o l e r a t i o n  i n  r e l i g i o n  c o u l d  n o t  p o s s i b l y  h a v e  b e e n  i
a c h i e v e d  i n  a n y  m o d e m  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  h a d  t h e r e  n o t  
b e e n  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e c a y  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  l o y a l t i e s  4
T o l e r a n c e  i s  t h e  v i r t u e  o f  p e o p l e  w h o  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  
a n y t h i n g ,  s a i d  G i l b e r t  C h e s t e r t o n ,  q u i t e  t r u l y .1 ( O p .  C i t .
1
p . 9 1 ) .  T h u s ,  N i e b u h r  a s s o c i a t e s  r e l i g i o u s  t o l e r a n c e  '
w i t h  t h e  w e a k e n i n g  o f  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h  w h i c h  i s  a n  h i s t o r i ­
c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t r u t h .  H i s t o r i c a l l y  t h i s  
i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s e c u l a r i s a t i o n  t a k i n g  p l a c e
i
i n  t h e  P o s t - R e n a i s s a n c e  E u r o p e a i i  s o c i e t i e s .  T h e  t e n s i o n  /
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  r e l i g i o u s  q u e s t i o n ,  i . e .  ,  w h a t  
i s  t h e  U l t i m a t e  m e a n i n g  o f  l i f e ,  w a s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  r e d u c e d  
i n  t h e  p o s t - R e n a i s s a n c e  m a n .  T h i s  i n  t h e  l o n g  r i m  m a d e  
f o r  m o r e  t o l e r a n c e  i n  h i s  b e h a v i o u r .
S u m m i n g  u p  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  s o  f a r  a b o u t  t h e  p s y c h o ­
l o g i c a l  s o u r c e s  o f  t o l e r a n c e ,  o n e  c o m e s  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
m a i n  i d e a s :  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  i n  b e h a v i o u r  i n  
g e n e r a l  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l * s  a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  l e i s u r e .  T h i s  t y p e  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  d o m i n a ­
t e d  b y  i n t e l l e c t u a l  f a c t o r s .  W h e n ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  
m o d e s  o f  r e a c t i o n  -  a t t i t u d e s ,  b e l i e f s ,  i d e a s  -  a r e  f o r m e d  
u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r e s s ,  i . e . ,  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  
e m o t i v e  f a c t o r s ,  t h e y  t e n d  t o  b e  r i g i d ,  t h u s  l e a d i n g  t o  
i n t o l e r a n c e .
T h e  f e w  r e s e a r c h e s  a l r e a d y  d o n e  o n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  
t o l e r a n c e  g i v e  -  a s  f a r  a s  t h e y  c a n  b e  s y s t a e m a t i s e d  -  a  
c e r t a i n  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  i d e a s  e x p o u n d e d  a b o v e .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b y  E u g e n e  L .  a n d  
R u t h  E .  H a r t l y ,  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  t e s t  o f  s o c i a l  d i s t a n c e  
c o m p l e t e d  w i t h  c l i n i c a l  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  t h e  m a i n  t r a i t s  o f  
t o l e r a n c e  a n d  i n t o l e r a n c e  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1 .  T o l e r a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  h a v e  a  h i g h  n e e d -  f o r  a c h i e v e ­
m e n t ,  a  s t r o n g  t e n d e n c y  t o  a c c o m p l i s h  s o m e t h i n g  d i f f i c u l t ,  
t o  m a s t e r  o b j e c t s ,  h u m a n  b e i n g s  o r  i d e a s ,  t o  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t , 
t o  o v e r c o m e  o b s t a c l e s ,  t o  i n c r e a s e  s e l f - r e g a r d  b y  s u c c e s s f u l  
e x e r c i s e  o f  t a l e n t ,  t o  w o r k  w i t h  s i n g l e n e s s  o f  p u r p o s e ^
t o w a r d s  a  h i g h  d i s t a n t  g o a l .  T h e y  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
i m a g i n a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n n e r  p r o c e s s e s ,  t h e o r i e s ,  a r t i s t i c  
c o n c e p t i o n ,  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  s t u d i e s .  T h e y  a r e ,  f u r t h e r  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  p o s s e s s i n g  s t r o n g  d e s i r e s  f o r  p e r s o n a l  
a u t o n o m y ,  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l a c k  o f  n e e d  o f  d o m i n a n c e ,  s t r o n g  
n e e d  o f  f r i e n d l i n e s s  a l o n g  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  s e c l u s i v e n e s s ,  
f e a r  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  d i s l i k e  o f  v i o l e n c e ;  t h e y  a r e  a b l e  t o  
a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  o t h e r s ;  t h e y  a r e  s e r i o u s  
a b o u t  m o r a l  q u e s t i o n s .
2 .  I n t o l e r a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  o c c u p i e d  w i t h  " o u t e r  
e v e n t s " ,  w i t h  t h e  e n j o y m e n t  o f  c l e a r l y  o b s e r v a b l e  r e s u l t s ;  
t h e y  h a v e  a  t a n g i b l e  m e c h a n i c a l  o u t l o o k .  T h e y  a r e  u n w i l l i n g  
t o  a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  a n d  a r e  r e a d y  f o r  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  
o f  c o n v e n t i o n a l  m o r e s .  T h e y  m a n i f e s t  a b s o r p t i o n  i n  p l e a s u ­
r a b l e  a c t i v i t i e s ;  a r e  e m o t i o n a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  r a t i o n a l ; 
e g o t i s t i c ;  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p h y s i c a l  a c t i v i t y  a n d  b o d i l y  h e a l t h ;  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n c r e a t i v e ;  u n a b l e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a n x i e t y  e x c e p t  
b y  f l e e i n g  f r o m  i t .  T h e i r  p h y s i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  h a v e  a
c o m p u l s i v e  c h a r a c t e r ,  i . e .  ,  t h e y  t e n d  t o  e s c a p e  a n  i n n e r
r
t e n s i o n .  ( H a r l e y ,  E .  a n d  R s  T o l e r a n c e  a n d  P e r s o n a l i t y  
T r a i t s ,  R e a d i n g  i n  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y .  N . Y .  H e n r y  H o l t  
&  C o . , 1 9 4 7 ) .
I t  w o u l d  n o t  t a k e  l o n g  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  d a t a ,  t h a t  t o l e r a n c e  i s  a  t r a i t  n o t i c e d  
i n  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  p o s s e s s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  i d e a s  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  f l e x i b i l i t y
/
i s  m a i n l y  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  i n t e g r a t e d  a t  a  
h i g h  l e v e l  i n  t h e i r  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t o l e r a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i m a g i n a r y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
t h e o r i e s ,  e t c . ,  t h a t  t h e y  w o r k  w i t h  s i n g l e n e s s  o f  p u r p o s e  
t o w a r d s  d i s t a n t  g o a l s ,  c o n s t i t u t e s  s u f f i c i e n t  p r o o f  o f  
t h i s .  I n t e g r a t i o n  a t  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l  a n d  w o r k  i n  
t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  d i s t a n t  g o a l s  s h o w  f i r s t  o f  a l l  t h e  e l e m e n t  
o f  l e i s u r e ,  a n d  t h e  l a c k  o f  t h a t  k i n d  o f  t e n s i o n  w h i c h  
p r o d u c e s  d i r e c t n e s s  a n d  r i g i d i t y  i n  b e h a v i o u r  b y  i t s  u r g e n t  
c h a r a c t e r .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  t a n g i b l e  m e c h a n i c a l  
O u t l o o k ,  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a c c e p t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  d o m i n a n c e  
o f  e m o t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  a n d  t h e  e l e m e n t  o f  c o m p u l s i o n  m a n i f e s t ­
e d  b y  i n t o l e r a n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n s t i t u t e  s o u r c e s  o f  r i g i d i t y  
i n  t h e i r  r e a c t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  o f  i n t o l e r a n c e  i n  t h e i r  
b e h a v i o u r .
D e m o c r a c y ,  A t t i t u d e s ,  a n d  P r e j u d i c e s .  A n  a t t i t u d e
i s  " a n  e n d u r i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  m o t i v a t i o n a l ,  e m o t i o n a l ,
p e r c e p t u a l  a n d  c o g n i t i v e  p r o c e s s e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  s o m e
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l * s  w o r l d " .  ( K r e c h  a n d  C r u t c h f i e l d :
O p .  c i t .  p . 1 5 2 ) *  C o n f i n i n g  o u r s e l v e s  t o  s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e s ,
a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  u s i n g  s i m p l e r  l a n g u a g e , o n e  c a n  s a y
t h a t  a  s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e  i s  a  h i g h l y  o r g a n i s e d  m o d e  o f
r e a c t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s
s u c h
s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t , / a s  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
t h e  s t a t e ,  l e a d e r s h i p ,  e t c .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  s o c i a l ^
p s y c h o l o g y  i s  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  c l e a r .  I t  u s u a l l y  t r e a t s  
c o n s e r v a t i s m  a n d  r a d i c a l i s m  a s  m o r e  o r  l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a s  h a v i n g  s t r o n g  p o l i t i c a l  i n g r e d i e n t s  
i n  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e .  I n  p r i n c i p l e  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s  p o i n t  
o f  v i e w .  T h e  m a i n  t r a i t  o f  c o n s e r v a t i s m  i s  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
c h a n g e  i n  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  m a t t e r s ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  s t a t u s  q u o ,  a n d  a  s e r i e s  o f  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s ,  s u c h  
a s  a  l o w  d e g r e e  o f  o p e n - m i n d e d n e s s ,  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  g r a s p i n g  
t h e  p o s i t i v e  m e a n i n g  o f  a  n e w  e x p e r i e n c e .  A l l  t h i s  i m p l i e s  
l i a b i l i t y  t o  p r e j u d i c e .  R a d i c a l i s m  i s ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  r e a d i n e s s  t o  c h a n g e ,  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  s t a t u s  q u o , o p e n - m i n d e d n e s s .
O n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o n e  i s  i n c l i n e d
t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  r a d i c a l i s m  i s  n e a r e r  t o  d e m o c r a c y  t h a n
c o n s e r v a t i s m ,  a n d  t h a t  c o n s e r v a t i s m  i n c l u d e s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n
e l e m e n t s .  B u t  t h i s  c a n n o t  b e  s t a t e d  w i t h o u t  i n c u r r i n g
t h e  d a n g e r  o f  b e i n g  e q u i v o c a l .  F o r ,  i t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t
f r o m  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  c h a n g e  i n
i t s e l f ,  n o r  t h e  r e a d i n e s s  t o  c h a n g e ,  t h a t  m a t t e r s ,  b u t  t h e
d i r e c t i o n  o f  c h a n g e  a n d ,  a b o v e  a l l ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m
a n d  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  p a t t e r n  a l l o w e d  b y  t h i s
t o  b e
c h a n g e .  I f  t h i s  i s  n o t / t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  o n e  c a n
e a s i l y  t a k e  t h e  c o m p u l s i v e  d y n a m i s m  o f  N a z i  o r  C o m m u n i s t  
s o c i e t i e s  f o r  r a d i c a l i s m ,  a n d  d e m o c r a c y .  I t  w o u l d  m e a n  
a l s o  n e g l e c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r e a d i n e s s  t o  c h a n g e  i s  b u t  
o n e  c a t e g o r y  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  f r a m e  o f  m i n d  a n d  t h a t  i t  j
h a s  t o  w o r k  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r s ,  a n d  t h i s  w a s  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r .
B u t  i n  s p i t e  o f  a l l  t h i s ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  
t r e a t  r a d i c a l i s m  a s  b e i n g  n e a r e r  t o  d e m o c r a c y  t h a n  t o  
C o n s e r v a t i s m ,  b e c a u s e  i t  i m p l i e s  a  h i g h e r  d e g r e e  o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s .  
C o n s e r v a t i s m  c a n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  . b e i n g  
n e a r e r  t o  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  b e c a u s e  i t  f a c i l i t a t e s  a  r i g i d  
a t t i t u d e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s .  B u t  a s  s h o w n  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
p a s s a g e ,  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  c a n  b e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  T h a t  i s  w h y  
w e  s h o u l d  l i k e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  o u r  q u e s t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m a n n e r :  w h a t
m a k e s  a n  a t t i t u d e  d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  w h a t  m a k e s  i t  a u t h o r i t a r i a n ?
A  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  t h e  c u l t u r a l  f i e l d  
i n  w h i c h  a n  a t t i t u d e  i s  f o r m e d  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  i t s  d e m o c r a t i c  n a t u r e .  A  g r e a t  v a r i e t y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  . 
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  v a r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  i d e a s  
a n d  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i v e  f i e l d  o f  a n  a t t i t u d e  c o n ­
t r i b u t e  t o  i t s  f l e x i b i l i t y .  T h e  l a c k  o f  t e n s i o n ,  i n t e r ­
n a l  a n d  e x t e r n a l ,  i s  a l s o  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n d i t i o n  i n  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  a t t i t u d e .  A n y  t e n s i o n  a r o u s e d  
b y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  v a r i o u s  
a s p e c t s  o f  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a  h a s t y  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n t o  r i g i d  a t t i t u d e s .
K . L e w i n  d e a l s  i n  v a r i o u s  s t u d i e s ,  a n d  u n d e r  v a r i o u s  
a s p e c t s  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  h o m o g e n e i t y - h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  j
t h e  l i f e - s p a c e .  H e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  l i f e - s p a c e  o f  t h e
A m e r i c a n  c h i l d ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  c h i l d ,  
a s  p o s s e s s i n g  d e g r e e  o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y .  " T h e  s c h o o l  -  
w r i t e s  L e w i n  -  m a y  b e  a  r e g i o n  o f  r i g i d  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  
l i t t l e  f r e e d o m ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  o f  h i s  f a m i l y  l i f e  
m a y  b e  s o f t  a n d  p r o v i d e  p l e n t y  o f  f r e e d o m . H  T h e n  f u r t h e r ,  
" T h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a s  c o m p a r e d  
t o  G e r m a n y  s e e m s  t o  b e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  r e g i o n s  o f  v e r y  
d i f f e r e n t  d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e d o m  a n d  s h a r p l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b o u n d ­
a r i e s  o f  t h e s e  r e g i o n s .  I n  a  F r o e b e l  n u r s e r y  s c h o o l  i n  
G e r m a n y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  c h i l d  i s  u s u a l l y  m o r e  g u i d e d  
a n d  r e g u l a t e d  i n  h i s  p l a y  a n d  h i s  o u t d o o r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a n  
i n  a  c o m p a r a b l e  A m e r i c a n  n u r s e r y  s c h o o l . ( R e s o l v i n g  
S o c i a l  C o n f l i c t s .  N . Y .  , H a r p e r  B r o t h e r s ,  1 9 4 8 ,  p p .  1 0  - 1 1 ) .
N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  f o r m e d  b y  t h e  A m e r i c a n  
c h i l d  a r e ,  d u e  t o  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  f a c t o r s  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  
t h e i r  c o m p o s i t i o n ,  m o r e  f l e x i b l e  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  m o r e  
d e m o c r a t i c .
T h e  G e r m a n  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  i n t e r - w a r  p e r i o d  
c o n t a i n e d  t h e  m o s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  a t t i t u d e s .  T h e  w h o l e  p a t t e r n  
w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  g r e a t  t e n s i o n ,  a r o u s e d  b y  d e e p  f r u s t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  g r o u p .  T h e  e l e m e n t a r y  n e e d  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  s e c u r i t y  
a n d  t h a t  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  n a t i o n  
w e r e  d e e p l y  f r u s t r a t e d .  A  s e r i e s  o f  e m o t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  
s u c h  a s  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  i n s e c u r i t y ,  l o v e  f o r  t h e  h u m i l i a t e d /
H f a t h e r l a n d " , a d m i r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  L e a d e r ,  h a t r e d  f o r  e v e r y ­
t h i n g  w h i c h  w a s  n o t  G e r m a n ,  h a d ,  i n  t i m e ,  s t r u c t u r i s e d  a l l  
t h e  a s p e c t s  o f  G e r m a n  l i f e  r o u n d  t h e m .  T h e  p e r c e p t u a l ,  
e m o t i o n a l ,  a n d  c o g n i t i v e  f i e l d  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  G e r m a n s  
w a s  g r a d u a l l y  l i m i t e d  t o  a  c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r y  o f  s t i m u l i .
T h u s ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  s o c i a l  a n d  
c u l t u r a l  p a t t e r n  b e c a m e  l o w e r  a n d  l o w e r .  T h e r e  l i e  t h e  
s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  o r i g i n s  o f  s t e r e o t y p e  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  
p r e j u d i c e s  d i s p l a y e d  b y  m a n y  G e r m a n s  d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d ,
i . e . ,  o f  r i g i d  a n d  r e p e t i t i v e  r e a c t i o n s  t o w a r d s  t h e i r  
c o u n t r y ,  t h e i r  n a t i o n ,  t h e i r  l e a d e r ,  t o w a r d s  J e w s ,  e t c .
T h e  e x c e s s i v e  h o m o g e n e i t y  o f  t h e  c u l t u r a l  a t m o s p h e r e  r e s u l t e d  
i n  a n  o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d  s t r u c t u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a n d  g r o u p S  r e a c t i o n s  t o w a r d s  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e i r  w o r l d .  
T h e  e m o t i o n a l  t e n s i o n  e r e a t e d  i n  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  g r o u p  a c t e d  
a s  a  s e l e c t i v e  s c h e m e  f o r  t h e i r ' e x p e r i e n c e s ; s o m e  e x p e r i e n c e s  
r e m a i n e d  i m p e r c e p t i b l e  t o  t h e m ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  w e r e  g r o s s l y
d i s t o r t e d  a n c j k a g n i f i e d .
(1)
V a r i o u s  r e s e a r c h e s  o n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  o f  a t t i t u d e s  
s u g g e s t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  s t r o n g  e m o t i o n a l  
n e e d s  t e n d  t o  f o r m  r i g i d  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  w o r l d .  C a r l s o n ,  H . B . , H a r r i s  R e m i t t e r s  
a n d  E l l i s o n ,  C . E . ,  s h o w  a  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
s t r o n g  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h  a n d  c o n s e r v a t i s m ,  a n d  b e t w e e n  l a c k  
o f  r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h  a n d  l i b e r a l  a t t i t u d e s  t o  l i f e .  L e v i n  
i s  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  a n  e s s e n t i a l  c h a n g e  i n  a  r i g i d  
a t t i t u d e  c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  o n l y  b y  l e s s e n i n g  t h e  p r e s s u r e  
o f  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n a l  a n d  e m o t i o n a l  f a c t o r  o n  w h i c h  i t  i s  
b a s e d .  T h u s ,  t h e  l e s s e n i n g  o f  e n v y  w i l l  l e a d  t o  a  m o r e  
f l e x i b l e  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s .  ( J B ’ e c h  a n d
C T r u t e h f i e l d :  O p .  C i t .  p .  1 7 6 ) .  /
D e m o c r a c y  a n d  L a n g u a g e . F o r  a  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  
o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  a  s o c i e t y  i n  p r o c e s s  o f  d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  
o n e  c o u l d  e a s i l y  u s e  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  m a d e  b y  T h u c y d i d e s  w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s o c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  h i s  A t h e n s ;  1 T h e  
m e a n i n g s  o f  w o r d s  h a d  n o  l o n g e r  t h e  s a m e  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  t h i n g s ,  
b u t  w a s  c h a n g e d  b y  t h e m  ( r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s )  a s  t h e y  t h o u g h t  
p r o p e r . ”  ( T h u c y d i d e s .  T r a n s l .  B .  J o w e t ,  O x f o r d ,  p . 222).
T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  i t s e l f  b e c o m e s  m o r e  f l e x i b l e  
i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  -  i n t e r p r e t i n g  T h u c y d i d e s  b y  S a u s s u r e ’ s  
t e r m i n o l o g y  —  t h e  l i n k  b e t w e e n  " s i g n e ”  a n d  " s i g n i f i e 1 b e c o m e s  
i n  m a n y  c a s e s  l o o s e r .  N e w  m e a n i n g s  a r e  g i v e n  t o  o l d  w o r d s ,  
a n d  n e w  w o r d s  a r e  c o i n e d  t o  d e s i g n a t e  o l d  t h i n g s .
I f  o n e  t a k e s  t h e  F r e n c h  R e v o l u t i o n  a s  a  p r o c e s s  o f  
d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n ,  o n e  c a n  s e l e c t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p h e n o m e n a :  
( F . B r u n o t ,  H i s t o i r e  d e  l a  L a n g u e  F r a n c a i s e . , T o m e  L X ,  p .  623 
a n d  f o l l o w i n g ) .
1 .  T h e  s h i f t  i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a  g r o u p  o f  w o r d s  b y  
t h e i r  d i s p l a c e m e n t  f r o m  o n e  f i e l d  o f  r e a l i t y  t o  a n o t h e r .  A  
s e r i e s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  e x p r e s s i o n s  s u c h  a s  t t e v a n g i l e , f ,  H e r e d o " ,  
" m a r t y r o l o g i e ” ,  f , B o n n e  N o u v e l l e  d e  L i b e r t e ”  w e r e  d i s p l a c e d  
f r o m  a  r e l i g i o u s ,  a n d  i n s e r t e d  i n t o  a  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t .
2.  T h e  t e n d e n c y ,  e x i s t i n g  o n l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  
t h e  R e v o l u t i o n ,  t o  b r e a k  d o w n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e
b y  t h e  i n v a s i o n  o f  w o r d s  a n d  e x p r e s s i o n s  c o m i n g  f r o m  v a r i o u s  
" p a t o i s ” .  T h i s  t e n d e n c y  w a s  c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d  b y  M u n e  
p o l i t i q u e  d e  l a  l a n g u e ”  t o w a r d s  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  w h i c h  w a s j
o b v i o u s l y  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  t r e n d  o f  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n .
3 .  A h  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  l o o s e  c o n n e c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  w o i * d s  a n d  t h i n g s  i s _  s h o w n  a l s o  i n  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  v o c a b u l a r y  w i t h  e m o t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .
T h e  e m o t i o n a l  p o t e n t i a l  o f  w o r d s  s u c h  a s  " n a t i o n ” ,  " p a t r i e ” , 
e t c . ,  w a s  s u c h  t h a t  t h e i r  m e a n i n g  h a d  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t o  o v e r ­
f l o w  a n y  e m p i r i c a l  a n d  l o g i c a l  c o n n o t a t i o n .  T h e y  c o u l d  
b e  t a k e n  a s  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  m a g i c  r a t h e r  t h a n  l o g i c a l  t h o u g h t .  
T h e y  m e a n t  a l l ,  a n d  n o t h i n g ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e .  B r u n o t  
r i g h t l y  c a l l s  t h e m  ” m o t s  i l l u s i o n ” .
F r o m  t h e  s o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  T o c q u e v i l l e  
" r e f l e c t i o n s ”  u p o n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  l a n g u a g e  
i n  A m e r i c a  a r e  o f  e x c e p t i o n a l  i m p o r t a n c e .  ( D e m o c r a c y  i n  
A m e r i c a . :  C h a p .  X T I ) .  A s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f
a n  a r i s t o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  " w h e r e  f e w  w o r d s  a r e  c o i n e d  b e c a u s e  
f e w  t h i n g s  a r e  m a d e " ,  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  
( A m e r i c a n )  h a s  a  s t r o n g  t e n d e n c y  t o w a r d s  c h a n g e .  " I n  t h e  
m i d s t  o f  t h i s  g e n e r a l  s t i r  a n d  c o m p e t i t i o n  o f  m i n d s  m a n y  
i d e a s  a r e  f o r m e d ,  o l d  i d e a s  a r e  l o s t ,  o r  r e a p p e a r ,  o r  a r e  
s u b d i v i d e d  i n  a n  i n f i n i t e  v a r i e t y  o f  m i n o r  s h a d e s . "  O n e  
s e e s  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  a  f l e x i b l e  
d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .
M o s t  r e v e a l i n g  i s  t h e  s p e c i f i c  d i r e c t i o n  i n  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e s e  t w o  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  l a n g u a g e s .  T h e
E n g l i s h  l a n g u a g e  i n  A m e r i c a  d e v e l o p e d  i t s  v o c a b u l a r y  f r o m  
t h e  j a r g o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  m e c h a n i c a l  a r t s ,  o r  f r o n y
t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t r a d e .  I f  n e w  w o r d s  a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
a n  a r i s t o c r a t i c  l a n g u a g e ,  t h e y  a r e  u s u a l l y  t a k e n  f r o m  t h e  
L a t i n ,  t h e  G r e e k ,  o r  t h e  H e b r e w .  A f t e r  t h e  f a l l  o f  
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,  t h e  F r e n c h  l a n g u a g e  w a s  i n v a d e d  b y  n e w  
w o r d s  a l l  h a v i n g  G r e e k  a n d  L a t i n  r o o t s .  I n  t h e  E n g l i s h  
l a n g u a g e  M i l t o n  a l o n e  i n t r o d u c e d  o v e r  s i x  h u n d r e d  w o r d s  
d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  s a m e  l a n g u a g e s .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h e r e f o r e  
t h a t  t h e  r i g i d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a n  a r i s t o c r a t i c  l a n g u a g e  c u t s  
o f f  i t s  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c o n c r e t e  l i f e  o f  s o c i e t y .
T h e  r i g i d  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a n  a r i s t o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  
i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i t s  l a n g u a g e  b y  a  s h a r p  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  l e a r n e d  l a n g u a g e  a n d  a  g r e a t  v a r i e t y  
o f  d i a l e c t s .  T o c q u e v i l l e  m a k e s  t h e  r e m a r k  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
n o  " p a t o i s ”  i n  t h e  N e w  W o r l d ,  a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  d i s a p p e a r i n g  
i n  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  t o u c h e d  b y  d e m o c r a c y ,  w h e r e  w o r d s  c o m i n g  
f r o m  a l l  " p a t o i s "  a r e  i n t e r m i x e d  i n  t h e  c o m m o n  p o o l  o f  
t h e  l a n g u a g e .  T h i s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  i n t e r m i x t u r e  o f  r a n k s ,  
a n d  t h e  f l u i d i t y  i n d u c e d  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  b y  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y *  T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  f l u i d i t y  
a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  
i t s e l f .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  t h a t  
t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o m m u n i t y  i s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
T o c q u e v i l l e ,  i n c l i n e d  t o w a r d s  a m b i g u i t y  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  
w o r d s .
I t  i s  a  c o m m o n  p r a c t i c e  i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  t o ^
m a k e  a  c e r t a i n  i n n o v a t i o n  i n  l a n g u a g e  b y  g i v i n g  “ a n  
u n w o n t e d  m e a n i n g  t o  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  a l r e a d y  i n  u s e . “  T h i s  
i n t r o d u c e s  a  c e r t a i n  a m b i g u i t y  i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  m a n y  
w o r d s ,  a n d  m a k e s  i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  v a r i o u s  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  
m o d i f y  t h e s e  w o r d s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  o w n  p u r p o s e s .  T h e  
r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  s u c h  w o r d s  r e m a i n s  i n  a n  
u n s e t t l e d  c o n d i t i o n .  T h i s  p h e n o m e n o n  a f f e c t s ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  T o c q u e v i l l e ,  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  w r i t i n g  i n  d e m o c r a t i c  
s o c i e t i e s .  F o r ,  t h e r e  i s  a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t e n d e n c y  i n  
t h e s e  w r i t e r s  t o  d w e l l  u p o n  g r o u p s  o f  i d e a s  l e a v i n g  i n  
t h e  r e a d e r  t h e  v i v i d  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  a m b i g u i t y  e x i s t i n g  
i n  t h e i r  m i n d .
C l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h i s  i s  t h e  p a s s i o n  f o r  
g e n e r a l  i d e a s  a n d  g e n e r i c  t e r m s  m e n t i o n e d  b y  T o c q u e v i l l e  
a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
l a n g u a g e .  d e m o c r a t i c  n a t i o n s  a r e  p a s s i o n a t e l y  a d d i c t e d  
t o  a b s t r a c t  e x p r e s s i o n s  b e c a u s e  t h e s e  m o d e s  o f  s p e e c h  
e m l a r g e  t h o u g h t  a n d  a s s i s t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  m i n d  b y  
e n a b l i n g  i t  t o  i n c l u d e  m a n y  o b j e c t s  i n  a  s m a l l  c o m p a s s 1 1 .  
T h e  e x a m p l e s  g i v e n  b y  T o c q u e v i l l e  a r e  “ c a p a c i t i e s “ ,  i n  
a b s t r a c t ,  f o r  m e n  o f  c a p a c i t y ,  w i t h o u t  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  
f i e l d  i n  w h i c h  t h e i r  c a p a c i t i e s  a r e  a p p l i e d ;  “ a c t u a l i t i e s 1 
u s e d  i n  t h e  s a m e  a b s t r a c t  w a y ,  a n d  t h e  F r e n c h  w o r d  
“ e v e n t u a l i t e s “ .  F i n a l l y ,  h e  g i v e s  a s  a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  
h i s  u s e  o f  t h e  w o r d  “ e q u a l i t y ”  i n  a n  a b s o l u t e  s e n s e . ,  T h i s  
i n c l i n a t i o n  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  j
s o c i e t y  " e n l a r g e s  a n d  o b s c u r e s  t h e  t h o u g h t " ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  
t i m e .  " W i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  l a n g u a g e  -  c o n c l u d e s  T o c q u e v i l l e  -  
d e m o c r a t i c  n a t i o n s  p r e f e r  . o b s c u r i t y  t o  l a b o u r . "
T h e  t e n d e n c y  f o r  " a m b i g u i t y "  a n d  " o b s c u r i t y "  i s  
e v i d e n t l y  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a s p e c t s  i n  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y .  I t  r e f l e c t s  a t  t h e  l a n g u a g e  l e v e l  
t h e  f l u i d  p a t t e r n  o f  t h i s  s o c i e t y .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
l a n g u a g e  i t s e l f  p r e s e r v e s  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  e g o  a n d  
c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n .  T h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  a d j u s t i n g  t o  h i s  o w n  e x p e r i e n c e s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
l a n g u a g e  a n d  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  w o r d s  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
t h e  p o w e r  o f  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .  T h i s  a l s o  c o n s t i t u t e s  
t h e  s a f e s t  g u a r a n t e e s  a g a i n s t  " c l i c h e s "  a n d  s t e r e o t y p e s  I 
i n  l a n g u a g e  w h i c h  a r e  t h e  m a r k  o f  a  t o t a l i t a r i a n  c u l t u r e -  
- p a t t e m .
T h e  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  t o w a r d s  v a g u e  
a n d  g e n e r a l  i d e a s  a n d  t o w a r d s  g e n e r i c  t e r m s  c a n  a l s o  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  s y m p t o m  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
b o t h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  t h e  g r o u p *  l e t  u s  t a k e  t h e  
e x a m p l e  g i v e n  b y  T o c q u e v i l l e  r e f e r r i n g  t o  h i s  o w n  u s e  o f  t h e  
w o r d  " e q u a l i t y "  i n  a b s t r a e t o .  A s  w e  h a v e  o f t e n  s a i d ,  o n e  
o f  t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s t r u c t u r e ,  i n d i v i d u a l  
a n d  s o c i a l ,  c o n s i s t s  i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  g u i d e  i t s  e m p i r i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  s e t  o f  e n d s ,  w h i c h ,  t h o u g h  e x i s t i n g  
i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  a c t  a s  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  f o r c e s .  ^
E q u a l i t y  i s  o n e  o f  t h e s e  e n d s .  I n  a  t r u e  d e m o c r a c y  t h e r e  
a l w a y s  i s  a  d i a l o g u e  b e t w e e n  a n  e m p i r i c a l  a n d  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  
d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e .  A s  s o o n  a s  a  c o n c e p t  l i k e  e q u a l i t y
i s  t a k e n  f r o m  i t s  a b s t r a c t  w o r l d ,  a n d  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a n  
i m m a n e n t  ( e m p i r i c a l )  e n d  o f  l i f e ,  d e m o c r a c y  i s  i n  d a n g e r .  
S u p p o s i n g  w e  s p e c i f y  a n d  s a y  "  e c o n o m i c  e q u a l i t y " ,  a n d  
t a k e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  m e a s u r e s  f o r  i t s  r e a l i s a t i o n *  T h i s  
v e r y  a c t i o n  w i l l  l e a d  t o  a  s t r o n g  a n d  p e r m a n e n t  e x e r c i s e
t
o f  f o r c e  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  e c o n o m i c  
e q u a l i t y . .  T h e  d e m o c r a t i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f  s o c i e t y  w i l l  b e  
l o s t  b y  t h i s .  S o v i e t  s o c i e t y  i s  i n  f a c t  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  
a  c o n c r e t e  i m m a n e n t  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  e q u a l i t y *
C H A P T E R  VIII 
•DEMOCRATIC PERSONALITY
H e  s h o u l d  k n o w  h o w  t o  g o v e r n  l i k e  a  
f r e e  m a n ,  a n d  h o w  t o  o b e y  l i k e  a  f r e e  m a n .
A r i s t o t l e .
? ® £ ^ 2h ^ i i ^ _ § ^ ^ i i } ® _ G ^ l t u - r e : - P a t t e r n .  O n e  c a n  c o n c l u d e  
f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s  t h a t  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  
e x p r e s s e s  i t s e l f  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  t y p e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y .  W e  
a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  u n a b l e  t o  g i v e  a  s t r a i g h t  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  c r e a t e s  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n ,  o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e -  
p a t t e r n  c r e a t e s  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y .  M o r e o v e r ,  w e  
a r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  k i n d  o f  q u e s t i o n  l e a d s  
n o w h e r e ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  t i m e  b e i n g  b o t h  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e -  
p a t  t e r n  a n d  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  c o u l d  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a s p e c t s  o f  a  g r e a t  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  h i s ­
t o r i c a l  e v o l u t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  s o c i e t i e s .
T h a t  t y p e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  d e m o c r a t i c  w h i c h  s h o w s  
e n o u g h  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  i t s  i n n e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  i n  i t s  
a t t i t u d e s ,  f e e l i n g s  i d e a s  a n d  a c t i o n ,  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  o t h e r  
p e r s o n a l i t i e s  a s  " o t h e r s ”  a n d  n o t  a s  i t s  o w n  p r o j e c t i o n s ,  
t o  c o - o p e r a t e  a n d  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  w a y  o f  l i f e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  f r e e  e x c h a n g e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  o t h e r s ;  t h a t  t y p e  
o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  w h i c h  i s  f l e x i b l e  a n d  f r e e  e n o u g h  t o  a v a i d
i t s  r i g i d  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n  o f  i t s  o w n  
g r o u p ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  t h a t  g r o u p  i s  e x c l u s i v e  t o w a r d s  
o t h e r  g r o u p s .
T h o u g h  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  r e s e a r c h  o n  1 A u t h o r i t a r i a n  
P e r s o n a l i t y ”  w i l l  b e  m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  d e a l t  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  
p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  i t  w o u l d ,  h o w e v e r  h e  u s e f u l  
t ©  s k e t c h  h e r e  t h e  p o r t r a i t  o f  ” l i b e r a l  n o n - a u t h o r i t a r i a n 1 
p e r s o n a l i t y  e m e r g i n g  f r o m  i t .  T h e  l i b e r a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  -  
w h i c h  i s  b u t  a n o t h e r  t e r m  a p p l i e d  t o  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  
i s  f l e x i b l e ,  i n t r a c e p t i v e ,  a n d  h a s  g r e a t  c a p a c i t y  f o r  
i n t e n s e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I t  i s  o p p o s e d  i n  i t s  
m a i n  t r a i t s  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  w h i c h  i s  
r i g i d ,  e x t r a c e p t i v e ,  r e p r e s s e d ,  c o n f o r m i n g ,  s t e r e o t y p e d  
i n  i t s  t h i n k i n g ,  a n d  i n t o l e r a n t  o f  a m b i g u i t y .  I n  s o c i a l  
b e h a v i o u r  t h e  l i b e r a l  p e r s o n a l i t y  h a s  l e s s  n e e d  t h a n  t h e  
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  t o  p e r c e i v e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e t w e e n  
h i s  o w n  a n d  o t h e r s '  v a l u e s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s .  H i s  r e a c t i o n s  
t o  o t h e r s  w i l l  b e  m o r e  i n d i v i d u a l i s e d , : h i s  e v a l u a t i o n  
m o r e  o b j e c t i v e .  O n  t h e  w h o l e ,  h e  i s  b e t t e r  e q u i p p e d  t h a n  
t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  t o  u s e  s u b t l e  p e r s o n a l i t y  c u e s .  ^ T h e  
g e n e r a l  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  r e s e a r c h  a r e  p u b l i s h e d  
i n  T .  W .  A d o r n o ,  E l s e  E r e n k e l - B r u n s w i k  a n d  o t h e r s ;  T h e  
A u t h o r i t a r i a n  P e r s o n a l i t y .  H .  Y .  H a p p e r  &  B r o t h e r s ,  1 9 5 0  
T h e r e  i s  n o  n e e d  t o  i n s i s t  u p o n  t h e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  t h i s  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  b a s e d  o n  c l i n i c a l  
i n t e r v i e w s ,  p r o j e c t i v e  t e s t s ,  a n d  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  o f  s o c i a l
o f  s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  p u t  f o r w a r d  i n  t h e  
p r e s e n t  s t u d y ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i o u s  
d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n s .
s t u d y  o f  t h e~  — — — —  ^
s t r u c t u r e  o f  s e n t i m e n t s  T . V .  F r e n c h  c o m e s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  '
t h a t  p e o p l e  w i t h r h i g h l y  o r g a n i s e d  p h i l o s o p h i c o - r e l i g i o u s  |
i<
b e l i e f s  h a v e  f i r m  e g o  s t r u c t u r e s .  T h e y  c o n s c i o u s l y  r e c o g n i s e  !
!
a n d  a c c e p t  b o t h  s t r e n g t h  a n d  w e a k n e s s  a s  p a r t s  o f  t h e i r  j
o w n  s e l v e s .  P e o p l e  w i t h  l e s s  o r g a n i s e d  p h i l o s o p h i c o -  
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s ,  a r e ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  j,;.
h a v i n g  w e a k  e g o  s t r u c t u r e s ,  ^ a n d  a  s t r o n g  s u p e r - e g o  s t r u c t u r e ) ;  
t h e y  a c c e p t  o n l y  w h a t  i s  g o o d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  o w n  s e l v e s ,  
r e p r e s s i n g  a n d  s u p p r e s s i n g  w h a t  i s  b a d .  ( v . V .  F r e n c h *  T h e  
S t r u c t u r e  o f  S e n t i m e n t s .  J .  o f  P e r s o n a l i t y ,  1 5 ,  p p . 2 4 7 - 2 8 2 ,  
a n d  16, p p .  78-108 1 9 4 7 . )  if
I n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  a b o v e  d a t a  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  w h a t  h a s  j ||
b e e n  s a i d  s o  f a r  w i t h  r e g a r d  o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t s
:.:l
,  " I 1 H
o f  d e m o c r a c y ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o i n t s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t *  H i g h l y  ^  f !
organised persons have a positive orientation in life; they 
have worked out for themselves a system of sentiments which 
springs up naturally and harmoniously from the basic con­
dition of their personalities. The system of goals and 
aspirations set up by their beliefs integrates their 
personality as a harmonious whole. Consequently, they 
consciously recognise weakness as part of their personalities;:!; 
there is no inner conflict and repression in their minds
f o r ,  t h e i r  e g o s  a r e  s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t o  g u i d e  t h e i r  p e r s o ­
n a l i t i e s  a s  a  w h o l e  o n  t h e  w a y  i n d i c a t e d  b y  t h e s e  b e l i e f s .
L e s s  o r g a n i s e d  p e r s o n s  h a v e  a d o p t e d  t h e  s a m e  p h i l o s o -  
p h i c o - r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  s y s t e m  o f  m o t i ­
v a t i o n  w h i c h  h a s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  g r o w n  f r o m  t h e  s p e c i f i c  
s t r u c t u r e s  o f  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  T h e i r  b e l i e f s  a r e  
c o n v e n t i o n a l ;  m o r e o v e r ,  t h e y  o f t e n  u s e  t h e m  a s  s h i e l d s ,  
f u r n i s h e d  b y  t h e i r  s o c i e t y ,  a g a i n s t  t r e n d s  a n d  t e n d e n c i e s  
i n  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  w h i c h  a r e  a t  v a r i a n c e  a n d  e v e n  i n  
c o n f l i c t ' w i t h  t h e s e  b e l i e f s .  T h u s  t h e y  h a v e  a d o p t e d  a  
s y s t e m  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c o - r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o u n ­
t e r - b a l a n c e  t h e i r  f u n d a m e n t a l  l a c k  o f  r e l i g i o u s  f e e l i n g s ,  
t h e i r  i m m o r a l  w i s h e s ,  o r  t o  c o m b a t  t h e i r  f u n d a m e n t a l  
f e e l i n g s  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  a r a u s e d  b y  t h e i r  a n t i s o c i a l  t e n ­
d e n c i e s .  U n l i k e  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  w i t h  s t r o n g  e g o  s t r u c t u r e  
t h i s  t y p e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  c o n t a i n s  i n  i t s e l f  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  
p e r m a n e n t  t e n s i o n ;  a l l  t e n d e n c i e s  c o n t r a v e n i n g  i t s  s y s t e m  
o f  b e l i e f s  h a v e  t o  b e  s t r o n g l y  r e p r e s s e d .  I n  t h i s  i n n e r  
t e n s i o n ,  a n d  i n  t h e  r e p r e s s i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  i t ,  l i e s  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  a n  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y .  F o r  t h e  t e n s i o n  
i t s e l f ,  a s  a l r e a d y  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  l e a d s  t o  a  r i g i d  m e n t a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T h u s  t h e  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n  r e p r e s s e s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  h a r m o n i s e s  o r  i n t e g r a t e s  t h e  d i v e r g e n t  d r i v e s  
o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y .  O n e  w a y  o f  d o i n g  t h i s  i s  b y  r i g i d l y  
s u b m i t t i n g  t o  fox r i g i d l y  a p p l y i n g  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n s  o f ^  h i s  
- s o c i e t y .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s
7e x c e s s i v e l y  c o n f o r m i s t ,  b i g o t e d  o r  a  f a n a t i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t .
B u t  t h e  m a i n  p o i n t  i n  w h a t  h a s  b e e * s a i d  s o  f a r  i s  t h a t  j
I
t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  r e g a r d s  t h e  f o r m s  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y  [■
a s  h i s  o w n ;  h e  e x p r e s s e s  t h e s e  f o r m s  i n  t e r m s  o f  h i s  o w n  I'
I :
e x p e r i e n c e ,  a n d  a c c e p t s  t h e m  w i t h o u t  a r o u s i n g  a n  i n n e r
i - '
c o n f l i c t ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  l o o k s  h
u p o n  t h e  f o r m s  o f  h i s  s o c i e t y  a s  e x t e r n a l ;  h e  a d o p t s  t h e m  ; ;
a s  s h i l d s  a g a i n s t  h i s  o w n  i n n e r  c o n f l i c t s .  T h u s ,  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  c a s e ,  o n e  c a n  s p e a k  a b o u t  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  c o r r e s p o n -  
d e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  t j
o f  s o c i e t y ,  w h e r e a s  i n  t h e  s e c o n d ,  o n e  c a n  s p e a k  a b o u t  a  ;
b a s i c  -  u n c o n s c i o u s  -  c o n f l i c t .  T h i s  i s  b u t  a n o t h e r  w a y  j j
j.'N
o f  s a y i n g  t h a t  d e m o c r a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  m a k e  t h e i r  s o c i e t y  
n b y  t h e i r  h a n d s ’1 ,  w h i l e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  a c c e p t  fj
i t  f r o m  o u t s i d e .  ill
fjj
7 .  Y .  F r e n c h  a l s o  m a k e s  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  p e r s o n s  
w i t h  h i g h l y  o r g a n i s e d  p h i l o s o p h i c o - r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  s h o w
]vil
g r e a t e r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a n d  g r e a t e r  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h i n  j l
t h e  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  l e s s  u n c o n s c i o u s  ^
c o m p o n e n t s  a n d  l e s s  i n t e n s i t y  t h a n  p e r s o n s  w i t h  l e s s
o r g a n i s e d  b e l i e f s .  O f  e x c e p t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  h e r e  i s  p
i-;j
t h e  f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  f e w e r  u n c o n s c i o u s  e l e m e n t s  i n  j|j
$ ?
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  h i g h l y  o r g a n i s e d  p e r s o n s .  T h i s  m e a n s  i n
|
t h ©  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h a t  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  a r e  a d e q u a t e l y  h
§ j
e x p r e s s e d  a t  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  l e v e l  o f  t h e i r  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  | j
t i
i . e .  t h e  b e l i e f s  t h e y  h o l d  a n d  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  t h e y  d i s p l a y  |
d o  n o t  c o n f l i c t  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e y  d o  n o t  r e p r e s s  t h e  d e e p  
s t r a t a  o f  t h e  m i n d .  T h e i r  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  f l e x i b l e  j
j
e n o u g h  t o  k e e p  t h e  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  v a r i o u s  d r i v e s  o f  I
i-
t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  a n d  t o  i n t e g r a t e  a n y  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h o u t  (
i
t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  i n n e r  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  s t r u c t u r e  ,
i s  n o t  n o r m a l l y  t h r e a t e n e d ,  o r  d e v a s t a t e d  b y  u n c o n s c i o u s  j,
f a c t o r s  s e t  l o o s e  f r o m  t i m e  t o  t i m e  b y  d e f e c t s  i n  t h e  
m e c h a n i s m  o f  r e p r e s s i o n ,  t h u s  c a u s i n g  i r r a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o u r .  f
D e m o c r a c y  a n d J P e r s o n a l i t y  V a r i a t i o n .  D u e  t o  i t s  e l a s -  
t ' i c i t y ,  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  a l l o w s  f o r  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  f,j(
1 'T
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  o f  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  |-
I,;!,
m e m b e r s .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  c a n  d e v e l o p  h i s  ^
o w n  p e r s o n a l i t y  a s  a  u n i q u e  m e n t a l  s t r u c t u r e  r e s u l t i n g  . |
f r o m  t h e  f r e e  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  h i s  e n -
i f  j :
v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  f r o m  h i s  c a p a c i t y  t o
jj'l
a d j u s t  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  t o  h i m s e l f .  T h i s  l i e s  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  :!;i
"jiji
o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n - i n t r o j e c t i o n .  &
B u t  i t  o u g h t  t o  b e  n o t i c e d  t h a t ,  t h o u g h  e l a s t i c ,  a  | !i
f!
d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e  h a s  i t s  s p e c i f i c  a n d  w e l l - d e f i n e d
U
c h a r a c t e r  w h i c h  i t  t e n d s  t o  p r e s e r v e  b y  f a c i l i t a t i n g  t h e  %
p-
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h a t  t y p e  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  w h i c h  b e s t  s u i t s  &
i t .  T h i s  h o w e v e r ,  i s  n o t  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  f o r c i n g  t h e  i n d i v i -  | j
d u a l s  i n t o  u n i f o r m i t y ,  b u t  b y  p r o v i d i n g  a  g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  jji
s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  d i m e n s i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  |
f
c a n  d e v e l o p .  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  d i m e n s i o n s  t h e  f
:;'i
s t r o n g e r  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f ,  a  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  jj
pattern. In what follows we shall deal with the main 
traits of a democratic way of life which facilitate the 
differentiation among the personalities of its individual 
members•
1* A  degree of heterogeneity of cultural influences
regarding the development of the individual’s personality*
r
This results novonly in a high degree of flexibility in 
the mental structure of every individual, but also in a 
great inter-individual variation. The individuals are 
offered various possibilities of developing their persona-
i:i'
lities, according to the various aspects of their culture- 
pattem.
■ i l l
2. The double dimension of life characteristic of a l;j
' 1democratic way of life can be considered as another trait 
facilitating inter-indevidual variation. In democracy, the |
individuals can structurise their personalities round various 
ideal values which are sometimes in opposition to the jf
■' J ;
empirical condition of life in their society; From time to 1j
time the individual can become the citizen of an ideal world© |
This dode of personality integration is allowed by religion, ^
■by philosophy, by art or science to any of which the indivi— |
dual can entirely dedicate his life. The personality inte- ;j
grated with such cultural values represents a specific way j
ij
of life which in democracy, is regognised and accepted as [j
such and not brought down to the empirical level of life
as in a totalitarian society. [s
, 3 .  T h e  p l u r a l i t y  a n d  r e l a t i v e  a u t o n o m y  o f  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s  
c o n s t i t u t e s  a n o t h e r  “ d i f f e r e n t i a l "  t r a i t  i n  d e m o c r a c y .  T h e  
c u l t u r a l  s p a c e  o f  d e m o c r a t  i s  d e f i n e d  b y  a  s e r i e s  o f  
d i m e n s i o n s ,  r e l i g i o u s ,  a r t i s t i c ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  
e c o n o m i c  a n d  m o r a l .  E a c h  p a r t i c u l a r  d i m e n s i o n ,  a n d  e a c h  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t w o  o r  m o r e ,  o f f e r  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  s t r u c t u r a t i o n .  S o m e  o f  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  
p e r s o n a l i t y  t y p e s  a r e ,  a s  E .  S p r a n g e r  h a s  s h o w n ,  d e t e r m i n e d  
b y  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l f s  m i n d  r o u n d  o n e ,  
o r  a  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  o f  t h e  v a l u e s .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  s t r u c t u r e .  I n  a n  
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i s  
n o n e x i s t e n t ;  o n e  v a l u e  i s  s u p r e m e ,  b e  i t  r e l i g i o u s  ( h i e r o -  
c r a t i c  c u l t u r e }  e c o n o m i c  ( c o m m u n i s m J  o r  p o l i t i c a l  ( N a z i s m ) .
4.  T h e r e  a r e  a  s e r i e s  o f  o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
t r a i t s  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  d e a l t  w i t h  e l s e w h e r e .  T i m e  i s  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  d i m e n s i o n  o f  l i f e  o f f e r i n g  a  l a r g e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
f o r  i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n  m o d e m  d e m o c r a c i e s .  
W e  h a v e  m e n t i o n e d  t h i s  p r o b l e m  w h e n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  n e w  
“ t e m p o "  i n f u s e d  b y  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  R e n a i s s a n c e  i n  m o d e m  
s o c i e t i e s .  T h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  m o d e m  e c o n o m y  i s  
c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h i s ,  a n d  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a l s o  a s  
a n o t h e r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t r a i t  i n  m o d e r n  d e m o c r a c i e s .
B u t  s i n c e  t h e  l i s t  o f  t h e s e  t r a i t s  d i f f e r s  f r o m  d e m o c r a c y  
t o  d e m o c r a c y ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  a d v i s a b l e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  t h e  p r o b l e m
o f  . i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n  d e m o c r a c y  a s  f o l l o w s :  a
d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e - p a t t e r n  i s  p l u r i - d i m e n s i o n a l  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  f o r m a t i o n .  I t  i s  o r g a n i s e d
i n  s u c h  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  a n y  o n e  o f  i t s  t r e n d s ,  a s p e c t s  a n d  I
l e v e l s  o f f e r s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  p e r s o n a l i t y ;  e a c h  o f  i t s  p o i n t s  c a n  b e  t r a n s -  ;
f o r m e d  i n  t o  a  “ n i c h e ”  w h i c h  m o u l d s  s o m e o n e * s  p e r s o n a l i t y .
I n  p r i n c i p l e  o n e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  a  c u l t u r e  -  .
p a t t e r n  i s  d e m o c r a t i s e d  c a n  b e  j u d g e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  n u m b e r  
o f  d i r e c t i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  i t s  i n d i v i d u a l  |
m e m b e r s  c a n  b e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d .  A s  s h o w n  i n  a  s e r i e s  o f  ;
p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s ,  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e -  j j
i t j
p a t t e r n  i s  s u c h  t h a t  e v e r y o n e  o f  i t s  m e m b e r s  c a n ,  i n d i v i d u a l i s e j j  
t h e  l a n g u a g e ,  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  a u t h o r i t y ,  t o w a r d s  v a r i o u s  i
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  a l l  f o r m s  o f  r e a c t i o n  |
'1
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  l i f e  i n  t h e  g r o u p .  jj
' W e  h a v e  e h o s e n  p r e s e n t  B r i t i s h  s o c i e t y  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  ,j
i;
o f  i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  I
T h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  a r e  v a r i o u s .  B y  s a y i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  |
l i t t l e  a b o u t  B r i t i s h  D e m o c r a c y  w e  m i g h t  h a v e  l e f t  t h e  
i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  w e  a r e  among t h o s e  w h o  o v e r - s t r e s s  t h e  
a r i s t o c r a t i c  e l e m e n t s  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  B r i t i s h  s o c i e t y .  ;j
T h i s  w o u l d  o b v i o u s l y  f o l l o w  t o o  c l o s e l y  i n  T o c q u e v i l l e * s  
f o o t p r i n t s ,  e v e n , m o r e  t h a n  T o c q u e v i l l e  h i m s e l f  w o u l d  h a v e  ij
d o n e ,  h a d  h e  b e e n  a l i v e  t o - d a y *  I t  m e a n s  a l s o  t o  n e g l e c t  j
a  s e r i e s  o f  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o m m u n i t y  w h i c h  c a n  e a s i l y
, b e  g i v e n  a s  e x a m p l e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  w a y  o f  l i f e .  I n  t h i s  
s e n s e  o n e  c a n  h a r d l y  f i n d ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  d e m o c r a t i c  w o r l d ,  
a  b e t t e r  e x a m p l e  o f  a  p l u r i - d i m e n s i o n a l  c u l t u r e  p a t t e r n  t h a n  
t h a t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o m m u n i t y .  B u t  s i n c e  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  
h a n d l e  s u c h  a  v a s t  s o c i o l o g i c a l  a n d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  r e a l i t y  
w i t h  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t e s t i n g  a n  i d e a ,  i t  v ^ o u l d  b e  a d v i s a b l e  
t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  o u r  p r e s e n t  i n t e r e s t  o n  a  f e w  s p e c i f i c  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a y  o f  l i f e  a n d  t o  s h o w  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
f o r  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  p e r s o n a l i t y  v a r i a t i o n .
I n  B r i t a i n ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e i r  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  c l a s s ^ ^ o r ,  u n l i k e  A m e r i c a ,  a n d
i
( l )  P i e r r e  M a i l l a u d ,  t h o u g h  b r i l l i a n t  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  E n g l i s h  w a y  o f  l i f e ,  c o n f o u n d s  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e  w i t h  ]
c l a s s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  a n d  t h u s  d r a w s  i n a d e q u a t e  c o n c l u s i o n s  |
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c l a s s  d i f f e r e n c i e s  i n  t h i s  C o u n t r y .  £  T h e *  
E n g l i s h  W a y  of L i f e .  O x f o r d  U n i v .  P r e s s .  1945 C h a p t e r  III. |
! j
t o  a  g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  u n l i k e  P r a n c e ,  h e r e  t h e  c l a s s e s  a r e  j
i n  p e o p l e s 1 b e h a v i o u r .  I n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h e i r
t
p e r s o n a l i t i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  t o  a  j
g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  i n  a n y  o t h e r  d e m o c r a t i c  c o u n t r y ,  w i t h  :
'I
t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  A m e r i c a .  B r i t a i n  b e i n g  a  h i g h l y  i n d u s ­
t r i a l i s e d  s o c i e t y ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  t r a i n i n g .  B u t ,  a s  w e  j
d o  n o t  c o n s i d e r  a n y  o f  t h e s e  f o r m s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a s  |
I
s p e c i f i c  t o  B r i t i s h  s o c i e t y ,  w e  c a n n o t  i n s i s t  o n  t h e m .  W e  
B h o u l d  l i k e  i n s t e a d  t o  p a s s  o n  t o  a  s e r i e s  o f  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a y  o f  l i f e  w h i c h  h a v e  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i ­
c a n c e  f o r  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
Let us start with. Al time, and B) hobbies.
A. In the American culture-pat tern, the dynamism and i
variety of life is to a great extent aroused by the extension 
of the present into the future. The rapid tempo of change |
and the hope for to-morrow make the individual permanently j 
awwre of the large range of possibilities for the development ■ 
of his personality. In Britain, the dynamism and variety !
of life are mainly due to the extension of the present to j
j
the past. More than any living nation the British have - j
]
though sometimes unconsciously - an accurate sense of the i
ij
past; of the presence of the past rather than of its pastness.jj 
This renders the life-space of the individual belonging to ;;j
this community richer in possibilities of development. i;il
Things and forms of life which in any other society would j
I
be considered dead, are here alive and endowed with the ;j
same significance and value as the newest ones. In manner |
j !
of dressing, the Victorian style intermingles harmoniously j
J
with Dior’s so that everyone has a great variety at his j
disposal by which to exteriorise his taste and personality. i i
In art, philosophy, and literature, a new architect, a new !
poet or a new novelist, however great he may be, cannot
ggen temporarily weaken in people’s taste and manner or j
J
feeling the continued presence of Wren, Shakespeare or j
ij
Yielding. The British as a community refuse ^ except on j
very rare occasions — to be driven — moved is a better j
word j  by an event, or an idea to the point of acting 
uniformly as a crowd. A “new look” in dressing, art, or \
philosophy, may captivate certain individuals, or even a 
certain section of the population, but seldom the community 
itself, as may happen in other countries. In the streets 
of London, or Glasgow one can see young men dressed after 
the newest fashion of Paris or Eew-York - or so they think; - 
side be side with others whose manner of dressing is but
j
a slight variation on what was fashionable fifty years ago. j
i
Taste in this country cannot crystallise itself in a general j
!
“idea”, and thus regiment the whole community. Por some, j
this is lack of taste; we prefer to call it fondness of variety]
One can even say that in Britain there is a certain
resentment against uniformity. This is seen in many great I
and small things; it is seen in people’s fondness of provin- j
j
cialism, in the pride they take in their system of local j
■i
administration, and in many other aspects of life. In some j
churches of England and Scotland pre-established forms of 
prayer are hardly used; the minister and the congregation i
have, so to speak, to improvise for themselves.
B. The inclination yjidely spread among members of the 
British community to have a hobby, and particularly the 
institutionalisation of this inclination, constitute another 
proof of the possibility for individual differentiation j
offerred by the British culture-pafctern. Por a hobby is
iobviously rooted in the individual’s desire - which is, m  j
this case, supported by his society - of developing his j
personality along a particular line which makes it possible
for him to break away from his role as a member of society, 
and thus, to be himself. Hobbies are, on the whole, expre­
ssions of the feeling of privacy and desire to differentiate 
which are experienced with a unique intensity in this country. 
(Paul Halmos described this aspect of life in Britain in his 
“Solitude and Privacy”. Eoutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1952. Thus, animated by these feelings, the individual 
members of the British community develop their personalities 
in a great number of directions, and in a great variety of 
forms. They earn the mark of “uniqueness” and specificity” 
in a great variety of sports, in bird watching, in horse
and dog racing...... In Great Britain one is “somebody” as
a Cambridge blue, or doing “excellent foot work at cricket”.
To be “oneself”, and “on one’s own” is a tendency which 
deeply affects everybody in this country. There is no other j
j
community in which the individual resents vertical relation- j
j
ships with others with a greater intensity, and relationships j 
of sub- and super-ordination in particular. A clerk, a 
servant, and even a char-1 ady, .when taking up a new job, j
feel that, their first concern is to find “their own” place, j
Their main interest is to find out what they are “supposed 
to do”. Once this is achieved, they have won their inde- j
pendence, for, later on, whenever someone asks for their 
services their first reaction is to make sure whether they 
are supposed to do this or not, and to act accordingly*
Thus, any individual avoids being dependent upon others in
the exercise of his job; he makes himself responsible to 
a kind of abstract authority which consists of certain 
rules and requirements established by agreement, or by 
tradition, and which define “what he is supposed to do”. 
Even waiters in restaurants are obedient to nothing but 
to what they are supposed to do; hence they reduce to a 
minimum their positions as “executants” of the customers 
w i s h e s .  They listen to their customers.as long as they 
need to know “the menu” they want; after that, the job is 
wholly in their own hands, and the customer has no choice 
but to wait and to submit.
If in certain cases the relationships of sub- and 
super-ordination are unavoidable, the general tendency is 
to “localise” them as carefully as possible. If the pupil, 
the student, or even the soldier is compelled to accept 
a position of sub-ordination in the class room, or barracks, 
he is ready to forget all about it, as soon as he leaves 
these places. In any other country a student or a pupil 
would be pleased to greet his teachers, and thus to show 
consideration and even dependence; he would even try to 
catch his teacher’s attention. It seems to be different 
in Great Britain, or at least in Scotland. Here the 
students, or the pupils rarely show such behaviour; when 
out of the class rooms they are “themselves"; no longer
students or pupils.
The taste for local administration, for private
enterprise and personal initiative, for provincialism in 
language, as well as the aversion for general ideas and 
theorising are still strong in this community. There is 
nothing more foreign to their minds than the attempt to 
oppose life with ideas, or to mould its free course through 
a body of doctrine or to a pre-established scale of values.
It is paradoxical to notice that the same community which 
gave birth to Puritanism behaves as if the human mind has 
no power to guide the impulse of life; mind’s activity and 
products are subservient to life as this manifests itself 
in all its variety of individual forms. The greatest 
wisdom is to seize and respect this variety. In theatres j
ahd concert halls, Britons share their applauses almost j
equally among different performers and items. This is a j
j
sign of their understanding of variety rather than lack 
of taste. At a dress show in Britain the models are of |
all ages, all shapes, and of all sizes; the display is for J
everybody, starting with the slender young girl and ending j
with the plump figure of a conscientious house-wife. On , j
■ !!
these occasions one feels the presence of a world of beauty, j
li
(j
of a world of unreal and sublime forms, less than on similar ;
occasions in Paris; instead one has a strong feeling of !
reality and of the great variety of forms under which life |
manifests itself. !
It is only natural that this specific drive for differen- 
tiation should be compensated by a series of tendencies for
integration. To mention only a few examples, this is seen 
in the readiness obvious in every Briton to join as many 
“clubs” as possible, to form associations or to organise 
his activities socially.
The same integrating tendency is seen in the curious 
English fondness for uniforms. In this country, each club, 
each association, each theatre or picture house, has its 
own uniform. We call this tendency “curious”, for, as the 
previous sentence proves, the individualistic spirit of 
these people has turned their fondness of uniformity into 
a real taste for variety in uniforms. Thus the spirit of 
differentiation seems to be triumphant over all. This
i
proves again that Tocqueville was right when describing 
the main trait of British democracy as the drive towards 
freedom and differentiation, as opposed to the drive towards j 
equality characteristic of French democracy. i
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T H E  P S Y C H O L O G Y  O P  N A Z I S ,  M.
"Dort auf der Insel kein Staat, sondem eine 
Geselschaft freier Privatmenchen, die Geschafte machen, 
hier am der Greuze nach Osten, mach "Asien" HiJ^ein 
Staat im strengsten and anschpruehvollsten Sinne, 
aus der Tradintion der Ritterordem erwachsen, welehe 
Ko Ionisation trieben; dort statt der Autorit*&t des 
Staaies der Parlamemtarismus privater Gruppen, hier 
statt des wirtscha ft lichen Liberalisrms die Diszipli- 
nierumg der Wirtschaft durch die politische Autoritat. 
Staat und Partei sind Gegens'dtze, Partei und Autori- 
t&t sind auch. ”
Oswald Spengler.
C H A P T E R  I
DICTATORSHIP OF THE RIGHT.
n nothing appears more surprising to 
those who consider human affairs with a 
philosophical eye than the easiness with 
which the many are governed by the few."
David Hume.
The German political regime of the period between 
1933-1945 is generally known under the name of Nazism or 
Hitlerism. Though lasting a relatively short peiiod of 
time it embodied in its doctrine and practice the most 
characteristic totalitarian trends of our century. Like 
Italian Fascism and many other Fascist movementsfNazism 
was a dictatorship of the right, i.e., a political 
organisation based on exelusivist and aggressive 
nationalism under the personal dictatorship of a leader.
From the political point of view Nazism was 
characterised by the concentration of absolute power in 
the hands of the leader who exercised it by means of his 
awn party organised in a military manner. It was a 
typical one-party system in which democratic electoral 
methods were replaced by occasional plebiscites on issues 
selected by the leader.
From the economic point of view Nazism was a particular 
case of a controlled economy. In principle the system of
of private ownership remained untouched, Free 
enterprise however was considerably limited by the 
interference of the State in the processes of production 
and distribution.
The Nazi regime required the individuals total 
integration with the aims of his group as represented 
by the leader and his party. Nazis were against that 
kind of life which allows the individual a "quiet" 
fulfilment of his social duties. They asked for 
enthusiasm and sacrifice for the. common cause. Nazism 
was firstly a "stato dTanimon (Bussolini) and only in 
the second place a political formula.
At the cultural level Nazism was a case of directed 
culture,with an official ideology, coined by the leaders 
of the Party enforced upon the whole cultural activity 
of the community. The cultural outlook had a strong mystic 
character, without being religious; it was idealistic, and 
yet not oriented towards spiritual values; it called itself 
revolutionary, and in spite of this it was not progressive, 
but on the contrary, traditionalist. The ideal of man was 
embodied in the strong man or in the possessor of political 
power.
Contrary to democracy, the main process taking place in 
Nazi society consisted in the concentration of power and 
in a rigid structurisation of the entire pattern of life.
In order to explain this and its bearing on Nazism, we 
propose to analyse the main aspects of the concentration of
of power in contemporary European society.
Economic Aspects of the Concentration of Power. Two 
main trends in European economic liberalism can be 
connected with the concentration of power: the accumulative 
character of wealth, and the weakening of the State as a 
result of economic individualism. Since the weakening of 
the State by economic individualism implies a series of 
political factors we shall deal with it in the next section.
The accumulative character of wealth is one of the 
intrinsic features of the system of economic liberalism 
in the sense that "wealth can be used to get more wealth" 
(Knight). As a consequence of this, the economic system 
which is generally considered as the core of individual 
freedom has gradually developed within itself a series of 
factors which have in the long run worked against the 
system as a whole. The system of monopolies, for instance, 
made possible the rigid organisation of the whole economic 
field according to the interests of a few individuals, thus 
rendering the free activity of others difficult, if possible 
at all.
All the main remedies for the repercussions of economic 
individualism show in various degrees the concentration of - 
power in the hands of the State. Here are the most 
important of these remedies.
A. A series of protests against individual inequality 
resulting from economic individualism came firstly from
from various labour movements and various groups of 
social reformists, all of them fostering the same hope, 
i.e., that a real politicalquality, obtained by the 
strict application of the formula "one man one vote", 
would in time counterbalance the effects of economic 
individualism. However this hope proved to be vain. That 
is why when later on some of these movements came into 
power they had to resort to direct action in the economic 
field of free enterprise for the realisation of their 
equalitarian purposes. Their economic policy can adequately 
be described as "Steuerpolitik" (Spengler), i.e., the 
correction of the concentration of wealth and of economic 
inequality by the mechanism of taxation. Some of these 
movements resorted for the same purpose to large schemes 
of nationalisation. All political movements included in 
this category are in essence democratic for the following 
two reasons; Firstly, they make use of the machinery of 
the democratic State in order to carry out their economic 
policy. Secondly, they regard the individuals free choice 
of ends and means in order to secure his own happiness as 
an important ideal for human society in general.
B. Communism constitutes another remedy for the re­
percussions of economic individualism. But,unlike the 
former remedy, it abolishes all the fundamental traits of
democratic society. In order to maintain economic equality 
this regime suppresses individual freedom altogether.
G. The remedy for economic individualism offered by
by Fascism is by no means easy to describe* It is in 
essence anti "democratic and yet not touching the principles 
of private ownership and free enterprise. Fascism opposes 
Liberalism as well as Socialism. Mussolini who had a far 
greater capacity than Hitler for rationaling his own position, 
says: "Sow Liberalism is on the point of closing the doors 
of its deserted temple, as people feel that its agnosticism 
in economic matters, its indifference in politics and morals 
would bring about, as it has already done, the certain ruin 
of the States" (Mussolini Le Fascisme. Paris 1933 p.19. )
Two main factors have to be taken into account in order 
to understand the Fascist position in the economic field, 
and the concentration of power involved in this. Firsfc;ly 
the presence in the field of a communist remedy for the reper­
cussions of economic individualism, which aroused in the well- 
to-do classes fear and need for protective measures, and 
secondly a widely spread discontent in the great masses of the 
people which was directly produced by economic inequality.
This latter phenomenon was manifested as equalitarian 
aspirations among the lower strata of various European 
societies. In Italy and Germany both factors were intensified 
by a series of specific social and political circumstances.
As a consequence of the First World War the position of the 
high income groups in Germany, and to a certain extent in 
Italy, was threatened not only by Communism, but also by 
unfavourable international competition. On the other hand 
the discontent of the masses produced by economic
economic individualism was further increased by a series 
of economic crises as a direct result of a lost war.
In consequence of their precarious position the 
economically dominant classes in Germany were ready to 
create or to accept, as the case might be, that economic 
and political formula which promised to protect them from 
both Communism and the effects of international competition.
On the other hand those sections of the population most 
stricken by economic insecurity were also ready to give 
their political support to that man or organisation which 
promised to put a quick end to their frustrations. The 
methods used to this end did not matter. Any method wseewooUW 
the right one provided that it worked. In this way a great 
part of the German people transferred for good their only 
power, the power of voting, to an autocratic leader and to 
an authoritarian organisation in order to be saved from the 
effects of a long period of economic insecurity. In many 
cases this was not a deliberate act, but an inevitable result 
of a series of external circumstances. In many other cases, 
however, this action was prompted by a great disappointment 
with the democratic methods of government. Thus a good 
proportion of the German population resorted voluntarily to 
the establishment of a dictatorship in the hope that 
dictatorship would succeed where democracy had failed*
The only important opposition to the Nazi economic order 
was that of the German working-class organised by the 
Communist Party. Their opposition was prompted by their
their own economic programme. But the resistance of the 
working class was soon broken down. The weakening of the
• f i t t e d
political power of the working class was primarily a long 
struggle between the two working class parties, Socialist 
and Communist. On the eve of HitlerTs victory the workers 
were divided and the Socialist and Communist leaders con­
centrated their main efforts on fighting each other. Often 
the Communists joined hands with the Nazis in their struggle 
against the Socialists. The two-front economic policy 
was another important factor responsible for the weakening 
of the working class resistance. On one side the Mazi 
regime curbed the power of the upper-classes by putting 
their economic aspiration under the protection of the State, 
while on the other, it weakened the resistance of the 
working classes by integrating their economic aspirations 
with the interests of the same State. It is worth 
mentioning that the new State was not the State of a specific 
class^ by the State of the nation represented by the Leader 
and his Party. Thus the Nazi State absorbed in itself the 
power from all stata of the nation.
The two-front policy is the most striking feature of 
Nazi economic order, and it explains to a great extent the 
sudden concentration of absolute power in the hand of a 
group with no political tradition, with no specific social 
basis, and above all, at least at the beginning, with no 
very clear ideas regarding the practical measures to be 
taken in the field of economics. The Party appealed to the
/
fthe well-to-do classes stressing its resistance to any
class programme of economic reform. In the language of
the upper-classes this meant that no revolutionary method
was to be used against them. (See Hitler1s speech to
the German Industrialists. February 20, 1933). To the
lower-classes the Party preached the possibility of a new
type of equalitarianism so as to set at rest their fears
of economic liberalism. (See Hitler* s speech to the
workers of Rhein-Met all-Bor sing plant, Decexpher 10, 1940.)
The socialist flavour of the Hazi economic order was
ostentatiously advertised by a certain check put on free
enterprise, by the system of ,Tcompulsory cartels”, and by
other measures by which the State intervened in the
economic field. And yet the system of profit-making for
the owners of the big enterprises was more flourishing
than ever before. The spirit of private enterprise was
generally encouraged. The State itself created by its
aggressive policy large scope for the expansion of the big
monopolies. The alliance between the State and the big
monopolies was an obvious fact though its terms were never
explicit. In spite of the intervention of the State a
certain degree of economic freedom for the individual
could hardly be denied. But this freedom had its o¥/h 
rules. It meant freedom for small enterprises to be in
cartels with the big enterprises, and freedom for both 
within the limits of the State. nLiberty of the State 
and of the individual in the State”. (Mussolini).
The same regime talked to the working class in a 
different language. It showed great concern for "the 
well being of the masses”, found devices-temporary of 
course - to reduce unemployment and raise wages, etc..
But above all the regime made an unique fight to turn the 
interest of the masses from material values in life. In 
this way a new basis for equality was provided for.
Economic equality was considered unnatural, its methods 
were "extrinsic and mechanical”. The new equality was 
guaranteed by the total integration of each individual 
with the nation and the State. Nazists refuted the 
equalitarian tendencies implied indLass consciousness - 
leading to the classless society - as well as those implied 
in human conscience. These tendencies were replaced - 
psychologically speaking they were displaced - by equality 
and fraternity between the members of a closed group.
The guarantee of equality is given neither by a social 
class nor by a humanitarian consciousness, but by a series 
of bio-psychological factors such as common blood,tradition, 
beliefs, etc., all of them defining the feeling of group 
belongingness. Identification with the nation to the 
degree of annihilation of personal individuality was the 
fulfilment of all equalitarian aspirations.
Economic Theses on Nazism. The nucleus of these theses 
is found in Lenin’s "Imperialism as the last Stage of 
Capitalism” written before the rise of any Fascist State in
Europe (1916). According to Lenin, Fascism was bound to
to appear at a certain stage in evolution of the 
European capitalistic system. Nhen various national 
economic systems, organised in national trusts, could no 
longer find in the colonial territories sufficient scope 
for their development, they would satisfy their intrinsic 
need for expansion by attacking each other. In this way 
the big monopolies of various European nations would pave 
the way for that political regime most capable of 
organising the whole nation for aggression against their 
own competitors. Racial and nationalistic idealogies were 
for Lenin, but suprastructural aspects of these basically 
economic conflicts.
Dr. F. Neumann applying Lenin’s formula in an 
orthodox way to Nazism writes: "German National Socialism
is nothing but the dictatorship of a monopolised industry 
and of the big estate, owners, the nakedness of which is 
covered by the mask of a corporative State" (The Decay of 
German Democracy. Pol. Quarterly 1933, p. 525.)
The same fundamental idea appears in various shapes. 
Sometimes the stress is laid on the tendency of German 
monopolists to eliminate Jewish competition, but at other 
times, on the decline of European capitalism and the con­
sequent intervention of the State in order to save the 
big monopolies from ruin. Charles Bettelheim, among 
others,sees the core of Nazism in the aggressive policy 
of the magnates of German industry disguised by the State: 
"Les monopoleurs ont entre leur mains tous les "leviers de
d© commande” ”L*!Etet dsns c©s conditions n© peut
rien faire contre 1© capital monopoleur, il n£ peut que 
lfaider, etre son serviteur et son valet” writes he in 
his !,L fEconomie Allemande soils le Nazisme: (Libtaitie
Marcel Riviere et Oie, Paris 1946, p.81.)
The idea running through all these views is simple: 
Nazism is in essence an economic phenomenon, and the 
Nazis were but puppets in the hands of German monopolies 
and trusts.
Conclusion to the Economic Section. That support was 
given by German industrialists to HitlerTs regime is an 
incontestable fact. And yet one can hardly explain the 
enormous concentration of power characteristic of this 
regime based exclusively on this fact. The economic 
aspirations and programmes of all other strata should be 
taken into account. The attitude of the Party towards 
private ownership appealed to the big estate owners; its 
respect for private enterprise won the lower middle 
classes, and its policy of full employment brought the 
support of the working classes. Most important of all 
is the Partyfs intermediary position, temporary though 
it was, between the economic interests of the upper and 
lower-classes. In this respect Fascism in general and 
Nazism in particular can be considered as being among the 
first economic and political formulae to draw the greatest 
advantage possible from the contradiction between capital 
and labour in contemporary industrial society. The Nazi
/
Nazi regime does not solve this contradiction. On the 
contrary, it plays on it to its own advantage. Its 
leaders were skilled enough to devise symbolical solutions 
and substitutes for the aspirations of both the upper and 
lower classes. Consequently an "Ersatz" economic regime 
was created, i.e., a forced rhythm in production, a 
policy of subventions, artificial measures in the 
financial field, old and decayed firms were artificially 
kept alive while the rise of new ones was prohibited.
Full employment ensured by war economy, and a vague 
revolutionary language were among other substitutes for the 
aspirations of the lower-classes.
This explains to a great extent why Nazism cannot be 
considered simply as the regime of big industry in disguise. 
It is true that one can see a transfer of power from the 
representatives of German big industry to a political 
organisation. But this does not simply mean a conversion 
of economic into political power, as Lenin would like to 
put it. Power came into the hands of the Nazi leaders 
from more than one section of German society. Nazi leaders 
obtained power by playing various interest groups against 
each other rather than by playing themselves into the hands 
of a specific interest group. This could only be possible 
if these groups had been uncertain of their own ends. This 
was apparently the case. For the post-war social instability 
created in all groups alike, a state of discontent,
discontent, insecurity, and confusion (Meinungchaos) 
which increased their suggestibility and credulity*
It was this state of mind more or less common to all 
classes which was exploited by the Nazi leaders;this
state of mind forms the basis of their power. n ....
Hitler aimed to inv ite the discontented of all classes.
M u c h  of his following still adhered to anti- c a p i t a l i s t
tenets, but he was building up semovement on large scale
Hut- futvdf
subsidies from apolitical itotesds of the heavy industry
and big business." (Sir Lewis Namier: Re Megalomania 
of Adolf Hitler. The Listener, February IE, 1953,p.252) 
The Political Aspects of the Concentration of Power in 
Contemporary European Society. The main argument against 
political individualism is based on the practical 
inefficiency of the democratic^ system: the inefficiency 
of the method of universal suffrage to select the best 
people for the Government, the inefficiency of the 
parliamentary system to cope with the problems and the 
tempo of contemporary life, etc.. Every major difficulty 
experienced in various democratic States has. been in one 
way or other referred to the original inefficiency of 
the system as such. Even the basic assumption of 
democracy, individualised reason, has been violently 
attacked in order to prove that the masses cannot govern 
themselves.
Behind this criticism the belief has steadily grown 
up that only a Government willing and capable of
/
of restraining the freedom of the individual could solve 
the crisis of contemporary society. The realisation of 
this belief has taken, in contemporary society, the 
following main directions:
A. The political power should be taken from the masses 
and given to an elite or to a powerful, sometimes 
providential, individual. The role of the masses is 
primarily that of trusting and obeying their leaders. This 
is the solution taken by the totalitarian movements of 
the right.
B. A programme of government cannot be a subject of 
discussion for the masses. The value of such a programme 
is warranted by a particular awareness of the historical 
progress of mankind which is the privilege of a particular 
economist class and of its leaders. Therefore such a 
programme should be carried out no matter what the attitude 
of the masses towards it might be. The programme itself 
constitutes the principle of authority and the role of the 
masses is only to understand and follow it. This is the 
attitude taken by Communism and in certain respects by 
various socialist movements.
Both these ways (A and B) lead to the concentration of 
power, i.e., the strengthening of the State at the expense 
of the individual and society. In what follows we should 
like to give a brief description of the most important 
aspects of the concentration of power in contemporary 
society pointing at the same time to its significance forf
lb
for the rise of Nazism. '
Even in Great Britain the two tendencies described 
above are obvious. Alderton Pink criticising British 
Democracy front the right, writes: "Nobody I suppose, 
would be prepared to maintain that the British House 
of Commons contains the six hundred best brains of this 
country....” (A Realist Looks at Democracy,London,1930 
p.165) H. Laski criticising British Dem. from the left, 
believes that the attainment of power by the Labour 
Party was bound to result in a radical transformation of 
parliamentary government. In order to carry out its 
programme the Labour Party would have to take vast powers, 
and legislate under them by ordinance and decree: "it 
would have to suspend the classic formula of normal 
opposition" (Democracy in Crisis, London. Allen and 
TJnwin,1933, p.871)
It is worth noticing that contrary to LaskiTs 
opinion, the Labour Party carried out a series of 
important reforms without suspending the democratic 
constitution of this country.
State and Society. It has been often said that the 
French Revolution has indirectly led to the strengthening 
of the power of the State within contemporary French 
society. This is the result of the breaking down of the 
rigid pattern of medieval society and the separation of 
the State from society which were in fact the two main 
achievements of the Revolution.
The central tendency of the Revolution was to replace 
the rigid medieval order by a flexible structure Tifcose 
only components were individuals. The aim of the Con­
stitution of 1791, for instance, was to liberate all 
social forces and to enable them to resolve freely into a 
new harmonious pattern. The pattern was, at least from 
the social point of view, of a classless society. Making 
allowance for his impressionistic language,Spengler is
/
is essentially right when noticing that from Iacobinsm 
to Bolshevism there had been in the v/estern world an 
uninterrupted drive towards the destruction of the society 
based on status and rank, and to wares its substitution by 
an "undifferentiated herd”. Contemporary society has 
obviously lost much of the character termed by Spengler 
"Informsein”. Yet Spengler completely fails to see that 
the effects of the collapse of the old order can hardly be 
followed on a single line of evolution. In spite of a 
certain tendency towards fluidity and even disintegration 
one cannot say that in modern society the "prestige of 
the State" has been steadily falling since the French 
Revolution. On the contrary, in the new type of society 
created by this revolution, the State arises as the sole 
unifying factor and the only compensation for so many 
disintegrating processes.
The French Revolution shows how difficult it is to 
create a flexible social pattern as historically opposed 
to a previous rigid one, preventing at the same time the 
concentration of power. The Jacobin Constitution of 1793 
and the entire development of the integrating factors in 
the revolutionary French culture-pattern offer a clear 
proof of this difficulty. An atomised social system was 
in fact only a temporary target for the Revolution, and 
the presence of powerful unifying forces was soon and 
urgently required if society was to survive. "The General 
Will" postulated by Rousseau as the supreme guarantee of /
of social cohesion was given a more concrete meaning. 
Consequently ’’the People”, "the Nation”, ’’Fatherland” 
gmcL ’’institutions” (Saint lust) and even the proletarian 
(Babeuf) were alternatively considered as embodying the 
’’General Will”* More about the bearings of these concepts 
on the political dictatorship of the right will be said 
later* For the moment we should like to follow the 
strengthening of the State as a need for social cohesion.
To start with v/e should like to say that we cannot 
accept without reservation the conclusions of some con­
temporary thinkers, Talmon is one of them, according to 
whom the French Revolution is in essence a totalitarian 
phenomenon, and Rousseau and Saint Just are but two sen­
timental forefathers of Hitler and Lenin. We should like 
to point only to the idea that the rise of the State as the 
symbol of various forces leading to the concentration of 
power lies in the original pattern of the French Revolution 
and of any modem democratic revolution. Moreover the 
rising power of the States forms one of the basic features 
of a society based on political individualism, and
particularly when individual freedom grows as a reaction from 
an absolutist regime of medieval type. Sooner or later
the State appears as the only brake put on the disintegrating
forces resulting from individual freedom, and the greater
the freedom the stronger the unifying forces of the State.
This is'to show that the Jeffersonian ideal of democratic
democratic government, "he governs best who governs /
least", has a very limited application. In a wide
historical perspective we can even say that it does not 
form the essence of a social regime based on individual 
freedom. For even in America "rugged individualism" has 
rapidly developed towards the growing power of the State 
and "active government". Tocqueville was perhaps the 
only one who clearly foresaw the necessary rising power 
of the State in a democratic society of modern type. "I 
am of the opinion", he says,, "that in the democratic ages
which are opening upon us, individual independence and
liberties will ever be the product of artificial con­
trivance; that centralisation will be the natural form of
Government" (Tocq. quoted by Mayer p.48 op cit.)
The Party-System and the Concentration of Power. The
evolution of the party system shows another trend in con­
temporary European society leading to the concentration of 
power. We mention but two aspects of this important 
process. The first refers to the inner structure of every 
political party in a democratic society, while the second 
refers to the relationship between various political parties 
within the same society.
In his study of the evolution of various parties in 
France and Germany during the second half of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Robert Michels 
comes to the conclusion that all these parties had shown an 
increasing tendency towards the concentration of power within
Z'O
within their own structure (Political Parties. Engl. Transl. 
by Eden and Cedar Paul. N.Y. Heart's International 
Library Co. 1915). Michels calls this process "oligarchis- 
ation".
The main symptons of oligarchisation noticed by 
Michels are: A. The tendency existing in every party, con­
servative liberal or socialist, to base its creative 
activity on a limited number of its members; B. The 
tendency to consider the electorate as a means of obtaining 
power. The main conditioning factors of oligarchisation 
can be summarised as follows: A. The natural tendency
of the leader to organise their party in such a way as to 
consolidate their own position; B. The gratitude of the 
masses towards the leaders; C. The general passivity of 
the masses in political matters. As technical aspects of 
the concentration of power Michels mentions :(a) the 
necessity of the differentiation of the functions within 
the party which results in the detachment of the leaders 
from the rank and file, and (b) the gradual transformation 
of the leaders into "professionals” aspiring to stability 
and irremovability. Finally, Michels cannot refrain 
from the formulation of a law, an antidemocratic law, of 
human society. Oligarchosation is, according to him, 
one of the natural tendencies of human political life.
It arises frcm the necessity to consolidate and discipline 
a political aggregate, and to establish a certain dominance 
of the elected over the electors. "Who says organisation
2.-1
organisation says oligarchy" (p.401.)
Even if we cannot accept such far-reaching conclusions, 
a series of factors regarding the evolution of political 
parties in contemporary society, point in this direction 
by themselves,- Perhaps we have to stress again that the 
process of the concentration of power within a political 
party is only a particular case of a larger process talcing 
place in a society based on political individualism.
Michels rightly notices the existence in every democratic 
party of another process, opposed to that of oligarchisation 
i.e., the tendency to increase the individuals aptitude 
for criticism. He does not seem, however, to be aware of 
the antithesic character of these two processes and of the 
way they condition each other in a democratic society.
There are other aspects in the evolution of political 
parties relevant for the concentration of power. The most 
conspicuous aspect consists in the cumulative character of 
political power. (Power wants more power). As this point 
will be dealt with elsewhere, we pass on to the problem of 
the. relationship between political parties in a democratic 
society and its bearings on the concentration of power.
In some continental democracies the main guarantee of 
political freedom consists in the existence of two or more 
political parties, thus allowing the individual freedom of 
choice. Yet the competitive character of these parties, 
and the fact that they measure their strength against each 
other in numbers of voters, has tended to lead to situations
/
situations in which a party, after winning an absolute 
majority, has maintained power for itself exclusively 
by eliminating all other parties from the political 
field. This happened,for instance,in Germany in 1933, 
and shows another way in which the party system can con­
tribute to the concentration of power. The scheme of this 
process is the following. When a democracy is transformed 
into partitocracy (the rule of the parties,not the rule of 
the people) it may lead to the absolute supremacy of the 
strongest party, and consequently to a one-party system.
The one-party system is the main feature of 
contemporary totalitarianism. Jor a closer understanding 
of this type of totalitarianism one has to take into 
acco;unt thelnner structure of the party that assumed power 
for itself exclusively. As compared with democratic 
parties this is a completely new type of political 
organisation. The usual position of a party in a 
democratic society is that of an expedient or a device 
for government. Though such a social instrument can never 
be a pure instrument, it is in general an intermediary 
factor between society and the State, and it cannot identify 
itself with either. When a party deviates from this inter­
mediary position by identifying itself with either State 
or society it changes its own structure and becomes a 
totalitarian party or rta party of a new type* (Lenin).
In this case the party is no longer an expedient for 
government but rather a model for society. Needless to say,
say, in suck cases society itself changes its character 
by losing its capacity for self-organisation and self- 
government. The impulse for order comes for a particular 
in-group which has detached itself from the rest of 
society and imposes its own organisation upon the whole.
"Majorities”, "Masses" and T,The People" as means 
towards the Concentration of Power. In democracy the 
individual alone is the bearer of political rights. He 
cannot, however, make use of them except by compromising 
with enough people to foim a majority, by his integration 
with "the people", or in some cases characteristic of 
revolutionary periods, by his action in the masses. Ho 
practical measure regarding the organisation of his group 
can be taken save as the result of the will of the majority, 
the will of "the people", of as action of the masses. The 
analysis of these basic problems of democracy reveals 
another aspect of the concentration of power in contemporary 
society.
1. The decisions of the majorities forms one of the 
fundamental conditions of a democratic society. However, 
the question has often been raised whether majorities are 
sufficient guarantees of democratic ways of life. The 
majority may decide (as it actually did in the Post-Periclean 
Athens, and several times in contemporary Europe) to limit 
or to abolish individual freedom by submission to an !
autocratic leadership.
I.if
Who can check the power of the majority in the
name of democratic priniples of life? Answering this
question Tocqueville reveals once more his fears as to
the future of modern Democracy. ( J . S. Mill has a similar
attitudej. He perceives in the early stage of American
and French Democrac^a new type of the concentration of
power,n amed by him the tyranny of the majority. "When I
see", he says, "that the rights and the means of absolute
command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called
a people, or upon a king, upon an aristocracy, or a
democracy, a monarchy, or a republic, I recognise the g e m
of tyranny". (Democracy in America, Q,ut.2d. p.260.) \)
(1) Tocqueville cannot see any other remedy for this 
danger but the application of the principle of the balance 
of power, i.e. any kind of social power should be checked 
by another power. He speaks also about the sovereignty 
of mankind which can occasionally be invoked against the 
sovereignty of the majority or of the people. How this can 
work in practice is difficult to know. (Ibiden - chapter XV)
2. There are some other ways in which the rule of the
majority or of the people may lead to the concentration of
power. The main reason for this lies in the fluidity and 
*  ^ a
instability of political system based on the direct con­
sultation of the people. The revolutionary stages of 
various democracies can be taken as an illustration. During 
such periods power is often exercised directly by the people. 
The politically oriented action of the crowds in the street, 
or decisions taken in big meetings, are various expedient 
ways in which the people may express their will. The 
majority has in these cases an elastic meaning. It is,
If
is, however, systematically invoked by the leaders of 
such meetings and crowds as the will of the "multitude”,
or of the people.
These modes of exercising power and authority result 
in a high degree of fluidity in the political structure 
of society. This is by no means opposed to the purposes 
of a democratic revolution. Yet this situation very soon 
leads to the very opposite of democracy. The big 
oscillations, hesitations and changes of moods characteristic 
of such situations very soon create a general feeling of 
insecurity and fear of chaos. The effect of this is such 
that even the greatest enemies of the old regime, overthrown 
by revolution, desire a quick restoration of order and 
security. It is at this stage that a counter-revolutionary 
stream originates, i.e., the fluidity and insecurity normally 
created by the exercise of power directly by the people 
inevitably ends in a general need for strong authority.
A period of "consolidation” starts in the way. In some 
cases the leaders brought into power by such circumstances 
substitute their personal rule for the rule of the people. 
(Napoleon Bonaparte).
Essentially the same process has taken place at various 
speeds, in nearly all European societies. In principle one 
could say that one of the main aims of democratic society 
is to keep the door of revolution ajar - if the meaning of 
revolution is not necessarily confined to a bloody change.
The political structure of a democratic society has to ^
to preserve that degree of fluidity to make any change 
in the interest of the people possible* irotskirs con­
cept of permanent revolution is in this sense but an 
idealised form of this feature of democratic society.
From the practical point of view the problem of 
the people’s consultation has been solved in European 
democracies by the system of political parties and par­
liamentary representation. The parties represent various 
aspects and configuration, of the people’s interests.
However, the party system and parliamentary representation, 
though correcting to a certain extent the effect of direct 
consultation, do not entirely eliminate the concentration 
of power. This shows that the fruits of a social system 
permanently open to change are essentially the same. The 
incoherent nature of the majority of the people has led 
in many modem democracies to an ever increasing number 
of political parties, from the usual two-party to a forty- 
party, system. The very existence of such a great number 
of political formulae is in itself an element of instability. 
To this has been added a series of other phenomena working 
to the same effect, such as: (a) an ever-increasing 
incoherence of the political action of the people as a 
result of the incoherent action of the political parties 
upon the people; (b) a permanently open opportunity for 
demagogy as a result of the political parties’ competitive 
action for power; (c) a gradual diminution of the political 
role of the people which has often been compensated for 
by a formal cult of the people and of popular support; /
support; and (d) a general disillusionment concerning 
the party-system of democracy.
It would take us too long to go through all these 
points in order to prove that the need for a central 
undivided authority which has been lately manifested 
under various forms in nearly all contemporary societies 
is at least partly derived from this situation. The 
fear of insecurity and the desire for a stable and 
efficient government is perhaps the most general way of 
describing this process. Analysing the structure of 
modern (American and French) democratic society,Tocqueville 
sees its future in two main lines: It is either that
this society enters into an uninterrupted series of 
changes - of which the French Revolution was only the first 
step - one which cannot end but in anarchy, that chronic 
malady well known to the ancient peoples, or that it ends 
in the tyranny of the majority with the possibility that 
the majority itself decide for an authoritarian government.
3. We should like to stress the fact that the 
process of democratisation of European society was from 
the very beginning imbued with the equalitarian aspirations 
of the masses. In some cases - in British Democracy for 
instance - the practical effect of these aspirations was 
retarded and displaced, but its existence can hardly be 
denied. The French Revolution instead considered equality 
as a justified democratic aspiration. Since then the wave 
of equalitarianism has in various forms touched practically
li
practically every European society.
Equalitarian aspirations have aroused in many 
people a negative attitude towards the rise of the masses, 
a fear of the ”vertical invader” as J . Ortega ^4 Gasset 
puts it. The same feeling has often been expressed as 
tfc&fear that a levelling process might destroy Western 
civilisation. In the reaction towards the equalitarian 
aspiration of the masses lies another factor leading to 
the concentration of power. Eirst of all equalitarian 
aspirations have been canalised in the direction of 
economic equality. Socialism and Communism are the two 
main political formulae provided by the Western culture 
pattern for the realisation of economic equality. Both 
of these have made use of a strong State to this end. 
Therefore both of them represent various aspects of the 
concentration of power in Western societies.
But not all equalitarian aspirations have materialised 
in ecohomic equality. Therefore Socialism and Communism 
were not the only political devices for their fulfilment. 
Fascism considered economic equality as artificial, and 
consequently provided a new formula for the fulfilment of 
the equalitarian aspiration of the masses. Equality was, 
according to this formula, possible only by the individuals 
identification with the group. Needless to say, the 
equalitarian aspiration of the masses has led in this way 
to another form of the concentration of power.
/
4. Democracy has introduced in the arena of 
political struggle "the people" as an active factor of 
decision. Eor Rousseau, for instance, the people is a 
monolith, i.e. able to express its will unanimously.
In the first stages of the struggle for democracy, (in 
Erance) the individual foeed from the bonds of medieval 
society, had no other frame of referenc^or his political 
action than the people as a whole. The people*s will is 
the right and lawful way. "The individual becomes lost in 
the mass and fixes his eyes solely on the mighty all- 
embracing vision of the people as a whole". (Tocquevill, 
Quoted by Mayer, Op.cit. p.47)
"The people", though a democratic reality in itself, 
contains a series of factors that may in certain circum­
stances lead to a totalitarian society. This is mostly 
because it represents a primitive concentration of power 
which in modern society could not be completely broken down 
in spite of the democratic devices of the majority, party 
system or proportional representation. It might happen 
that "the people" as a monolith places its trust in one man 
or one party exclusively, and invests him with unlimited 
power. The result is a regression in the process of 
democrat i sat ion or a collapse of democracy.
In what follows we should like briefly to describe 
the main aspects of contemporary European society which 
show how, under various circumstances, "the people" act 
as a monolith and consequently lose the flexibility
/
i>y
flexibility necessary to any democratic society.
A. "The people" might act as a monolith and place 
its fate in the hands of a man or a party when long and 
deeply felt aspirations are not fulfilled, or in 
situations of imminent danger, real or created by propaganda. 
The equalitarian aspirations characteristic of any 
democratic society may serve as examples. In contemporary 
society these aspirations have been gradually (built or 
forced up until they crystallised in a series of political 
programmes for the masses under the forfre of authoritarian 
movements of the right and of the left. Economic insecurity 
or the insecurity characteristic of times of war can also 
produce the same effects.
B. A series of conditions for the growth of "the 
people" as a monolith have been directly created by the 
social disintegration resulting from the practice of 
democracy in various contemporary societies. The incoherence 
of the group and the spirit of "faction" created, on one 
hand, by the action of political parties, and on the other, 
by the pattern of competitive individualism, have in the 
long run aroused in the individual the need for stable 
integration with, and belongingness to the group. This need 
was exploited by various political movements. In Germany
for instance, the Mazi movement satisfied the individuals 
need for belongingness by activating the primitive irrational
layers of human solidarity such as community of blood,
\
feeling, tradition,etc. The result was that this movement/
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movement created in the midst of modern society a community 
of a primitive type in which emotional bonds formed the 
guarantee of social unity® Consequently the machinery of 
democracy b a s e d  on the opinion of the majority, t h e  
electoral system,etc., was discarded. At the new level 
of unity the people acted as an organic whole. Decisions 
on the basis of unanimity and unlimited confidence in the 
leadership were but natural consequences of this position.
C. A long period of conflict between various 
European States and the spirit of international competition 
characteristic of the modem era have also led to the 
increase of the feeling of group belongingness often called 
national consciousness, and has consequently set at work 
that undefinable factor, the people as an organic unity.'
These desires for unity and belongingness which formed
-fyl he Uq.p.1 q
■o^ 'fosdii'/the psychologieaiPmovements had the feeling that they lived 
in nthe century of the masses”, when positive programmes 
meant to catch separate sections of the community formed 
no longer adequate political tools. The task they set 
themselves was to exploit that aspect of social life which 
would gain for themselves not only a section, not only the 
majority, but the unanimity of their community. Any card 
played towards this end was a good one. The situation was 
ripe in Italy and Germany. Mussolini and Hitler did not 
care for majorities; their position was strong enough to 
make it possible for them to liquidate the opposition and 
to abolish the constitution with the passive acceptance of
/
of all. They went far on the way to crystallising the wl}.l 
of their own peoples as a monolith, for any of their main 
decisions could be based on a "plebiscite”. Under Hitlerrs 
regime the German people itself behaved like a tyrant.
"The decrCes of the demos correspond to the edicts of the 
tyrant” (Aristotle Politics IT, 4, p.57. QuatedEd.).
This happens when a dictator knows how to play on the 
frustrated desires of a people.
German Democracy. ¥e are inclined to think that, in 
spite of the existence of certain democratic trends, the 
very meaning of democracy remains foreign to the German 
culture- pattern. Eor it seems that the German community 
has systematically failed to see the possibility of a 
socially organised group, without unlimited exercises of 
power coming from one or other of its sectors. Too much 
power has never been an evil from the point of the leaders 
in this culture-pattern.
It is revealing to notice that the founder of the 
German modern State, Bismarck, though living in the midst 
of a liberal Europe, completely fails to see in Liberalism
t
a value in itself. He conceives Liberalism as a means for 
the exercise of power. One would almost think that 
Liberalism is for him but a technique in the hands of the 
despot. "There are times" - he says in 1881 - "for a 
liberal, and times for a dictatorial Government; as every­
thing is changeable, one cannot expect any eternity on this 
matter". (Bismarck Q,ut. by Spengler: Politische Schriften,^
Schriften,Munchen 1933 p. 148).
It is even, more revealing, and to a certain extent, 
puzzling to analyse the definition of democracy given by a 
German liberal, Max Weber%. In his conversation with 
feudendorf, after the defeat of 1918, he sketches the 
following description of Democracy: ”In a Democracy the
people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen, 
leader says: Now shut up and obey me. People and party
are no longer free to interfere in his business”. He con­
tinues: ”Later the people can sit in judgment. If the
leader has made mistakes, to the gallows with him”.
(Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated and Intro­
duced by H. Gerth and C. Wright-Mills. London, Kegan Paul, 
1948. Q,at, from the introduction.) Though the technical 
aspect of Democracy is not denied one can hardly fail to be 
struck by the rough almost unchecked exercise of power 
allowed in such society. The leader asks for absolute con­
fidence while the people act in the manner of a revolutionary 
tribunal.
0 . Spengler, who in many respects expresses adequately 
the very essence of the modern German culture-pattem, is 
completely blind to the idea of democracy. He cannot con­
ceive of any lasting society without a rigid hierarchy of 
status and rank and without the supremacy of the State 
(Staatshoheit) which automatically eliminates the idea of 
political parties. His ideal of future society is embodied 
in the concept of ”Prussianism” based on the primary bonds /
bonds and general mobilisation of the individual in the 
service of the State. This society should be in a 
permanent state of "Informsein fur eine Aufgabe" (Op.Cit. 
p.136).
Hitler takes the same line when defining "Germanic” 
Democracy as opposed to "Jewish” Democracy as follows:
"In contrast to the"Jewish" here stands the true Germanic 
democracy of free choice of a leader, who takes over all 
responsibility for his deeds and omissions. Here there is 
no voting of a majority for each and every question, but 
only the choice of one man, who must then stake his life and 
fortune on his own decisions. If one should object that 
under this condition it would be hard to find anyone who 
would dedicate himself to such a perilous task, then I have 
only one thing to say "Thank God that therein lies the very 
essence of Germanic democracy - that the very greatness of 
the responsibility frightens off incompetence and weaklings". 
(Mein Kampf Ouat. Gilbert Op.Git. p.53).
The authoritarian element running through all these 
"views" on social organisation forms the pervasive feature 
of German political thought, ifor Germany could seldom con­
ceive for herself another type than a war-time or an 
emergency type of democracy. The emergency character is in 
fact the expression of a series of basic features in modern 
German society. Most important for the understanding of 
this phenomenon is the fact that the Germans were the last
last Western people to attain national unity. Since the 
end of the eighteenth century there has been in Germany a 
permanent problem of unity within the limits of a 
national state. This strong tension towards national 
integration forms a basic element in German totalitarianism# 
The building up of a strong State, the Prussian militaristic, 
ideal of society, the necessity of maintaining quasi- 
medieval symbols of authority, a strong emotionalisation of 
the idea of "Fatherland" and of "Germanic" community, etc. 
are but a few aspects of this historical condition. (The 
need of unity is expressed in the German sociological 
thought as an obsession with the "fundamentals" of human 
society).
The unity anxiety was considerably aggravated during 
the inter-war period due to a partial dismemberment of 
Germany as a result of the Yersaille Peace Treaty, and of a 
series of inner crises, economic and political. From this 
point of view Nazism can be described provisionally as the 
political expression of an ethnic group organised under 
conditions of emergency.
The Social Basis of Nazism. According to the social 
class standpoint in politics Nazism - and Fascism in 
general - is the "revolution" of the lower-middle classes, 
i.e., the political outlook of the German small bourgeoisies. 
Although this approach is akin to the basic tenets of the 
doctrine of economic materialism, it nevertheless clashes
clashes with the orthodox Marxian thesis of Nazism 
according to which Nazism is a political formula worked 
out by the representatives of German industry, in the 
circumstances created by the post-war period- The two 
points of view can hardly stand side by side. Either the 
lower-middle classes are used as material for the 
political manoeuvres of the big industrialists, and played 
a passive part in the rise of Nazism, or Nazism is the 
political outcome of the lower-middle classes* way of life, 
and the economic upper classes adjusted their interests 
to it by an act of opportunism.
In spite of the fact that one of the best known 
psychological theses of Nazism bases some of its main 
assumptions on the class character of this political 
phenomenon we can find little support for any class approach 
to this movement. In the composition of Nazism there is 
such a great variety of social elements that its students 
would be helped greatly if they could see its main features 
at the German group level as a whole in the twentieth 
century historical setting- Social class references would 
certainly be necessary, but only after the general character 
of Nazism had been carefully framed-
The German Workers* Party founded by Anton Drexler in 
1918 (Munich) can be considered as the preliminary 
crystalisation of Nazism. This Party’s policy is one of 
broad socialism. It is in fact one of those parties hastily 
built up to fill the social and political vacuum following th 
defeat of 1918. Then political orientation of the German /
German working-class during that period is anything but clear. 
If there was a general feature of this party, apart from its 
socialistic flavoured ideology, it was a general political 
disengagement in its members, i.e. a readiness to do anything 
about the situation in which they were involved as the 
result of a lost war. The later evolution of the party 
proves this.
Hitler, a completely unknown man at that period, joined 
this party in 1920. Already in 1921 he took over the leader­
ship renaming it as: The German National Socialist Workers* 
Party. (N. S.D.A.P. ). The name itself indicates the work 
done by Hitler within the party between 1920-21, and at the 
same time the political disengagement of its members. The 
party emerged in fact as a compromise, or rather as a con­
fusion between a series of socialistic - proletarian and 
nationalistic factors. This original blend, persisting 
throughout the existence of the Nazi movement, made it 
difficult to insist too much on its class character in the 
usual sense of this expression.
In 1922 the upper structure of the Party took on a 
definite shape. Julius Streicher, a Bavarian schoolmaster 
with socialist views, and suffering from the obsession of 
"the rape of Christian girls by Jews" joined the Party.
During the same year the leadership was completed with Alfred 
Bosenberg, an architect who had fled to Munich from Baltic 
Russia, and who held strong anti-semitic, anti-catholic and 
anti-Russian views, with Rudolf Hess, Herman Goering, Ernst
Ernst Roehm&, Robert Lay and others. Goebbels and Franz 
Frank joined the leadership in 1925.
With such a leadership it would again be difficult to 
detect any definite class feature in the Nazi movement.
On the contrary one can say that one of its most outstanding 
traits consisted in its lack of social bias. The whole 
movement was in a state of political disengagement, i.e., 
it had no definite programme and tried with nebulous phrases 
to catch the most general aspirations of the people as a 
whole. Thus it was the people as a whole that formed the 
social basis of the Party from its very beginning. To find 
an acceptable cure for the privation and humiliation in 
which the German nation as a whole was thrown by the 1918 
defeat, to formulate hopes for the near future, to canalise 
the general state of discontent and aggression, these were a 
few points on which the Nazis founded their social basis.
In 1925 Hitler published the first part of "Mein Kampf",
in which the German people as a whole is depicted as the
Master-Race striking back at its oppressors, World Jewry, the
signatory powers of the Versailles Treaty, Bolshevism. The
concept of World Jewry as the main aggressor was previously
worked out in the "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion", a
fabrication of the Tzarist policy, published by Rosenberg in 
1922.
As a result of its electoral success in 1932 (232 repre­
sentatives in the Reichstag) the Party grew both in its 
doctrine ana membership further towards the upper-olasses.thu
-thus weakening the only serious resistance to its coming 
to power. The Party’s vague economic policy and above all 
its advertised anti-communist leanings, brought in a number 
of industrialists and bankers such as: Fritz Thyssen, I.G.
Farben, Krupp, Hylmar Sohact, von Ribbentrop, etc. The
&
movement seems to have grown now as miniature of the nation, 
as the membership list of 1935 shows: 52.Ip manual workers; 
20.6$ white collar employees; 20.2$ independents; 13$ 
officials; 10$ peasants; 3.4$ others. (Figure taken from 
K.JfMannheimiDiagnosis of Our Time, London. Kegan Paul,1943, 
p.167.) The class structure of German society according to 
the census of 1925 gives the following figure, in millions:
40.7 industrial workers; 10.7 urban middle class; 9 small 
farmers; 2 bourgeoisie including landowners. (Taken from 
¥. ®eieh*,Tha Mass Psychology of fascism. Oregon Institute 
Press N.Y. 1946 p .8 and 9.)
At first sight the composition of the Party seems to 
indicate a preponderantly dominant middle-class element.
On closer examination, however, the two lists can hardly 
be compared. Categories such as: white collar employees, 
independents and officials can only arbitrarily be considered 
as forming together a social class. (-One—h-aa-the-re-fore—to
into- •consideration the usual ...criticism waged . against X  
The class approach to Nazism suffers from the ambiguity 
inherent in concepts such as the middle-class, or the lower- 
middle classes, or petty bourgeoisie which are often applicable 
only in very general terms. Many people considered as
Ho
as belonging to the lower middle classes are either in a 
transitory social status, or form by themselves a category 
floating between the upper and lower classes. The character 
of transitoriness in their status, or simple classlessness 
seems to be more significant for the social basis of Nazism 
than the class character of the German community. The next 
section will deal with this point.
Declasses and Nazism. Igna&io Silone*s views on the dominant 
part played by the "declasses” in the rise and development 
of fascism might well be applied to Nazism. The core of 
Mussolini*s movement was formed, according to him by the 
"arditi", a more or less socially and psychologically 
homogeneous group in post-war Italian society. The group 
consisted of former volunteers, officers and troops, in number 
approximately 20,000. Most of them were delinquents used 
during the war as shock battalions. Many of them belonged to 
the "lumpen proletariate". All were aggressive people who, 
during the war, found in the militaristic way of life the most 
adequate outlet for their personalities. Other categories of 
declasses mentioned by Siione are; Demobilised officers not 
entirely assimilated to the post-war society, numbering 
approximately 160,000 in the period between 1919-21; ambulant 
merchants; black-marketeers, and people with no specific job, 
or with no job at all, simply vagabonds. Students foimed a 
particular category. The well-to-do peasants, and particularly 
those who became so during the war, were also among the first 
supporters of Fascism. They formed a category of their own
/
own cut-off from the rest of the peasantry due to their 
higher level of aspiration on the social scale, and 
particularly by their fear of becoming the victims of the 
agrarian reform then strongly supported by the poor 
peasantry. (See Silone; Der Eascismus. Europa Verlag.
Zurich, pp.62 and following.)
The same social composition is to be found in 
Nazism. The demobilised officers from the German Army,who 
could not, for various reasons, be absorbed by the post-war 
German society, and who found it hard to give up their 
militaristic habits, constituted an important Nazi group. 
Goering was one of them. The declasse'-character is 
noticeable in nearly all other groups forming the movement. 
.The category described as "manual workers" (31.1/0 was made 
up mainly by: "lumpen proletarians", i.e., a group below 
the standards of the industrial workers, and by those 
industrial workers who did not integrate with the structure 
of their own class, traditionally communistic or socialistic 
in orientation. The peripheral elements of every class 
formed the nucleus of Nazism. Typical representatives were 
people such as Ribbentrop, falling between aristocracy and 
bourgeosie, or socially dislocated personalities like Hess 
(bom in Egypt), Rosenberg and Hitler himself. No less 
important are a category of people who, failing to grasp 
the post-war condition of the German society, identified 
themselves with'highly inadequate cancept of their own class. 
The Nazi aristocratic group is in this category; it joined
joined the movement mainly to maintain or to remake the 
position held by the -Junkers in Imperial Germany. Another 
important category is formed by the post-war German youth,
i.e., adolescents freshly free from the authority of their 
own families, with no clear idea about their own or their 
country1s future. And lastly come the "failures", like 
Hitler himself, people with no social status.
It would perhaps be appropriate to describe in a few 
words the common character of all these groups. "Declasses" 
or persons manifesting symptoms of being declasse could be 
considered as all the people who fail completely of partly 
to integrate themselves with one of the institutionalised 
sub-groups of their society. All the individuals coming 
under this category suffer from lack of social attachment.
In this way they can by analogy with psychopathic personalities 
be called socio-pathic personalities. As psycho-pathic 
personalities are liable to all forms of delinquency, so are 
socio-pathic personalities liable to political delinquency 
in particular, i.e., breakers of the social and political 
order of their own society.
Something more will be said about the connection between 
the psycho-pathic and socio-pathic personality at a later 
stage. For the moment we should like to consider socio-pathic 
personality by itself. The fact should be stressed to start 
with that modern industrial society has a great capacity for 
creating socio-pathic groups. Its fluid character and its 
rapid growth are among the main causes of this phenomenon.
The impersonal character of this type of society and the 
mechanical integration of the individual with it can also 
he considered to lead to the same result, lost—war Germany 
found herself in a significant position from this point of 
view. The crises resulting from the defeat of 1918 con­
siderably increased the number of non-integrated groups and 
individuals.
The Nazi movement can be considered meeting point 
for all groups and individuals with an unstable social 
status as a result of a deep disrupting process taking place 
in the post-war German society as a whole. It is therefore 
the classless element rather than a particular social class 
that should first be taken into account for the understanding 
of Nazism. The movement itself represents, by its social 
composition, a fairly adequate cross-section of German society; 
it forms a blend of all social classes though rather through 
the peripheral than through the most representative of their 
members. As opposed to any socialist party - obviously a 
class-party - and to any democratic party based on a 
particular social group, Nazism represents in its structure 
the nation on a small scale. This is one of the first con­
ditions making for its totalitarian character.
The dynamic elements in Nazism is formed by the peripheral,
/ f
declasse and socio-pathic individuals and groups. Their 
common trait consists in their high degree of frustration as a 
result of their failure to achieve a stable social integration. 
This might explain a great deal of their aggressive character 
and their readiness for revolutionary action.
The same general conditions explain the ambiguity in 
the social attitude of the Mazi leaders. They act for a 
new order and yet within the limits of the old one: they 
hate and love at the same time the existing order of their 
own society, They respect the social classes, and at the 
same time they equalise them by their identification with 
the State and Nation. Their political action reflects both 
their desire to integrate themselves with a social class and 
their failure to do so.
There is very little in Nazism that could be ascribed 
unambiguously to the lower-middle classes or to any other 
specific class. Its xenophobia - its anti-semitism in 
particular - might originate in the petty-bourgeoisie^ 
narrow nationalism as well as in the struggle between the 
German and Jewish capitalists. The scale of values and the 
ethics of the Nazi world could be attributed to any class. 
The spirit of adventure, for instance, seems to be closer 
to the upper than to the lower-middle classes. The manner 
in which this was manifested in the Nazi culture pattern 
was certainly nearer to the declasses group than to any 
other, group or class.
Silone is not very far from the truth when he says that 
Fascism tried to please everybody, every main social force 
existing in an "advanced capitalist society”. Simply 
formulated the solution offered by Nazism is this: Any inner 
conflict in society is superseded by the reality of the 
"Nation”.
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C H A P T E R  I I
THE WELTANSCHAUUNG OP NAZISM.
Give me a button and I will make men 
die for it.
Napoleon Bonaparte 
My acts are always based upon a political 
mode of thinking.
Hitler.
The Age of Unreason. There are two fundamental points- 
by which the irrational leanings of a political movement 
can be tested: its attitude towards man and its attitude 
towards society.
The Weltanschanuung of Nazism rests on the assumption 
of the irrationality of human nature. Human action****#:
is guided by instincts, intuition 
and feelings. Will has its ends in itself, and it 
reaches its purposes more adequately if not embarrassed 
by reasoning. Though doubting the ability and power of 
reason, Nazis are neither sceptics nor nihilists. 
According to their convictions, will and feeling provide 
human knowledge and action with a greater degree of 
certainty than reason. Human action^ though basically 
irrational, leads by itself to order, to a new type of 
order. For, while the fundamental category of rational 
order is that of equality, and agreement between equals,
/
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equals, the order springing from the irrational factors 
of the human mind rests on the feeling of "distance** 
(Nietzsche); it expresses itself as power hierarchy. 
Referred to the standards of reason, the Nazi type of 
man is bad, aggressive and barbarous. But these traits 
are in the Nazi value world the spring sources of life.
The man who possesses them is therefore strong and full 
of virtue. His most important virtue consists in the fact 
that he can impose his will by force, and fears force at 
the same time. This human quality becomes the main feature 
of the Nazi way of life. Manfs wisdom is shown in his 
ability to discover the leader and to let himself be ruled 
by him. Needless to say, this wisdom is by no means the 
work of reason. For will and affection guide the people 
towards the choice of their leader, rather than reason.
The leader himself would very seldom,if at all, use reason 
to get the consent of the people. His strongest weapons 
consist in his power and its capacity to fascinate and to 
dominate. "Because it might well happen that force may 
help to create consent, and because in any case there would 
be force if consent came to fail". This statement made by 
Mussolini in the early days of his regime (March 7, 1923) 
reveals unambiguously the Fascist conception of msnj^2^ !^
As to the nature of society, Nazism is radically 
opposed to the rationalist conception of the Enlightenment. 
Social organisation, whatever its size and ends, cannot be 
subject to debate and "contract". One of the great faults
faults of the nineteenth century was to create and 
foster the belief that society could be organised 
rationally by discussions and programmes. As a result 
society has gradually become the prey of the corrupting 
reason of the politicians. The truth is that society is 
founded on irrational factors, its essence lying in the 
primitive emotional bonds which unite a group of 
individuals and which cannot be changed by reasoning.
Society is a mystery of Nature, an "Ungegeben" which reveals 
itself only in symbolic forms and in words loaded with 
emotional forces, in myths, in the action of the group, or 
finally in the personality of the leader. It is on no 
account a matter of reasoning.
Nazis do not believe in the rational nature of this- 
Itory. Therefore, they resort to force in order to 
organise society and to give shape to the historical processes 
Action resulting from force constitutes the only organising 
drive in history. There is no pre-established order or 
scale of values: the pattern of society reveals itself in 
action as a hierarchy of power.
To say that the Nazi of Weltanschauung is a reaction j 
against the nineteenth century rationalism is to over- i
estimate the importance of ideology in this political 
movement. It would also mean to assign to its doctrine
too high a degree of unity. It is true that the Fascists
ideologues made frequent references to the protagonists of
modern irrationalism such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.
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But in spite of this it is very hard to see the development 
of their thought as a systematic reaction from modem 
rationalism. This makes it even more necessary for us to 
construct their world outlook from the implications of 
their statements with regard to various aspects of life.
With the exception of Giovanni Gentile who is in fact a 
rationalist (see "Genesi e Struttura della Societa".
Turino Sansoni 1946) there is no Fascist who had ever made 
the attempt to think out the answers to the fundamental 
problems posed by a Fascist way of life. For Fascism there 
is no Joseph de Maistre, for instance, to throw over the 
fundamental assumptions or Rationalism. Many of the funda­
mental aspects of the Fascist Weltanschauung seem to float 
in. an atmosphere of ambiguity. This is due to various 
causes. First of all Fascism, and Nazism in particular, 
was a short-lived regime. Secondly, ideology was for this 
regime little more than a tool for the exercise of power. 
Thirdly, and this the most important cause, a strong element 
of ambiguity and ambivalence lies at the root of Nazism as 
it lies at the root of any behaviour, individual or 
collective, based on conditions of stress. This idea will 
be taken up at a later stage of this study.
The Totalitarian Society. The Italian Fascists, Gentile in 
particular, rightly invoke the name'of Hegel when defining 
the totalitarian character of Fascist society. The pattern 
of such society is ultimately given by the Hegelian 
"concrete Idea", i.e., the Idea which has reached the state
state of its full realisation. At this stage the con­
tradiction between ideal and real, universal and particular, 
potential and actual, totalitity and multiplicity, is 
superseded. The Idea lives adequately in its concrete 
forms of manifestation and these forms represent adequately 
the Idea, or the whole,they belong to. On the social plane, 
this means that society as a whole of pattern is realised 
in each of its members, and that the life of each individual 
is a particular case in the life of its society, conse­
quently society is not merely a concept, or a general term 
for a multiplicity of individuals, but exists in the same way 
as the individual himself. It has a will of its own, the 
work of which is seen in all integrating and coercive forces 
holding the individuals together and leading them towards 
common ends. Hegel himself gives several examples of society as 
being concrete in its existence. The State is one of these.
The State is for Hegel a category of existence as real as 
the individual himself. (The Monarchy of Friedrich Wilhelm II 
is one example of the embodiment of Idea). There are also 
other manifestations of society as concrete existence thought 
of by Hegel, such as "the People”, as "organic totality" of 
individuals, a great personality or a hero. (Napoleon). In 
the social field as anywhere else the Romantics were at pains 
to prove the existence of general ideas. Consequently the 
State, the people and the heroes are not empty forms or
symbols fo the totality of the individuals, but "concrete 
totalities".
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Although, the Fascists made use of the machinery of the 
State in order to curb the centrifugal tendencies of the 
individual,- the State in itself, being too abstract, too 
formal and too rational, could not adequately incorporate 
"the totality" of individuals. The totalitarian reality 
of the Italia n Fascists in the Corporative Society which 
is an intermediary term between the individual and the 
State. In this way Fascism distinguishes itself from both 
Socialism for which the State is all, and from democracy 
for which the individual is all. The Corporative Society 
is the "concrete Idea", i.e., the form in which the 
individual integrates himself naturally with his group.
The root of this concrete totality should be looked for in 
a series of irrational factors. The individuals are bound 
together by a common tradition, by the mysterious forces of 
the Roman Empire or by the outstanding personality of the Duce.
Nazism the "totality" is created by irrational factors 
exclusively. The main totalitarian category is that of "Das 
Yolk". For Nazism also the state is a means. "It is a basic 
principle, therefore, that the State represents not an end but
a means Its purpose is in the maintenance and advancement
of a community of human beings with common physical and 
spiritual characteristics". (Mein &ampj», quoted by E.B.Huber: 
Verfassungs3foecht des grossdeutschem Reiches - Hamburg, 1939, 
pp.54-55.) The reality of the people imposes upon the 
individuals tasks and duties which prevail upon their personal 
interests. The bonds between the individual and "the people”
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are fundamentally emotional. The way in which the 
totalitarian reality of Nazi society is expressed suggests 
the presence of a magic and symbolic form of thinking.
Words like "Fatherland”, "German" etc. were loaded with such 
an emotional power that the mere perception of them created 
in individuals the feeling that they all are one. The effect 
of such words was similar to that of the Totemic symbols in 
a primitive tribe, or to that of the symbol of the cross among 
the early Christians. The Roumanian Fascists used to symbolise 
their "totality" by a tiny bag ot Roumanian soil which they 
carried with them as a talisman; whenever the bag was shown 
by one of them, there was no sacrifice in the world a
(1)
"legionar" would not make for the interest of his country.
^  We are under the impression that SchellingTs thought may 
more appropriately be connected with the Nazi Weltanchauung 
than that of Ife^ el. The latter is too much of a rationalist.
The Nazi totalitarian reality is rather Schelling*s concept 
of the "Absolute", governed by the law of identity, then the 
Hegelian Idea. It is the whole, prior to its differentiation.
The revival of the Schellingian philosophy in the last years 
of the Nazi era can be adduced as a proof of the connection 
suggested by us.
"The people" as a manifestation of the totalitarian 
reality is however not specific to Nazism. The two specific 
forms of the Nazi totalitarian reality are: A. *Raeer. andB.
The Leader.
A. TRaceT constitutes the most accurate form of totalitarian 
reality. Though the individual submits blindly to the 
dictates of ’Race*, he remains free because it is in his nature 
to do so. TRacef is the voice of the group in him. This is 
the basic assumption on which the Nazi leaders had developed
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developed their own ideas about the Germanic Race. The 
purity of the race came first, for the purer the race the 
stronger its binding forces over the individual. Purity in 
the racial character means first of all superiority in the 
sense that the totalitarian reality is more adequately 
represented. Consequently Nazis made appeal to those racial 
theories which demonstrated the superiority of the German 
Race on the ground of its purity. (Huston Chamberlain).
On the psychological level they had systematically worked for 
the creation of strong positive in-group and negative out-group 
feelings in the members of their own society. (See 4
of the programme of the Nazi Party.)
B. The totalitarian reality is manifested also though 
the personality of the "Fuhrer". "The Puhrer" is first of 
all a charismatic figure. He embodies the will of the people 
and creates binding forces of such a nature that the individual 
cannot fail to integrate totally with the supreme interest of 
his group. "The Fuhrer", though an individual, is the embodi­
ment of the Germanic Race, the "geniale momentum" of the 
German nation. He is"the bearer of the people*s will" or"the 
objective people's will" (Huber, Op.Cit. pp.194a -200.)
As such he is an adequate realisation of the totalitarian 
reality.
In conclusion, the unifying forces of Nazi society, 
whatever their name, are irrational. Consequently they do 
not allow any deliberation concerning the conforming behaviour 
of the individual. The individuals mind cannot be divided 
with regard to their acceptance. Nor can the members of the
the group divide themselves in to pro and oontra and follow 
the decision of the majority* With regard to the interests 
of the group as expressed by "The Fuhrer", there cannot be 
partial or gradual consent, but unavoidable unanimity. The 
formula is all or nothing.
The Scale of Values of Nazism. The dominant value in the 
Nazi Weltanschauung is the political value. This means that 
the most important processes within the Nazi culture-pattern 
are those which create power and authority with the unique 
end of strengthening the unity of the group. In order to 
understand the nature of this phenomenon it is necessary to 
point out that the dominance of political values implies 
social integration produced by external authority. A few 
data regarding the historical background of Nazism will make 
this idea clear.
We have shown in various places that a high degree of 
instability experienced by the German society after the First 
World War ranks among the main historical conditions of Nazism. 
This socially disintegrating process had been translated on 
the psychological plane into an intense, almost morbid, desire 
for unity. The same social instability had been translated 
on the psychological plane in a state of apathy. Arendt 
(Op.Git.p.80) describes this state in German society as 
"verzweifelten TJrteils-unfahigkeit" or "Meinungs-chaos".
Anyone with definite opinions would have to stand the chance 
to become "authority”. Hitler, as we shall see later on, was 
certainly the man. Only unity could counterbalance this state
state of insecurity, Nazism is a political answer to this 
situation. Its leaders had from the very beginning realised 
that there were factors in German society which worked for 
unlimited concentration of power if only that could be shown 
to be in the interest of group unity. The situation called, 
therefore, for the supremacy of the political value in the 
German culture pattern.
Bare exercise of power, i.e. giving orders and seeing them 
carried through, was only one among many other methods used 
by Nazis in order to creat the unity of the group round their 
own party. They resorted to persuasion in all its forms such 
as a strong police, a strong army, and propaganda based on 
scientific methods. A n  realisation in the field of culture, 
their ideology, their arb, their myths, their economic system 
served the same purpose, Le., the unity of the group.
In what follows we should like to analyse the significance 
of the fact that the Nazi culture-pattern was dominated by 
political values.
A. The first implication of this was that the groups as a 
whole was under a condition of stress. Order and unity within 
the group constitute.therefore elementary conditions of survival 
As the flustrating conditions of German society from which the 
Nazi movement sprung were shown before there is no particular 
need to discuss them again.
B. The culture-pattern of a society under stress has not a 
clear and stable scale of values. The explanation of this 
should be looked for in the process of life objectivation. When
When life, individual and collective, is under a condition 
of permanent threat the process of objectivation is poor,i.e., 
life does not project itself in objective norms and values 
which form pre-established regulative ends for the individual’s 
and group’s behaviour. In the pattern of lire characteristic 
of Nazism, human action could not be moulded according to pre- 
established set of values. For the world of values was a 
vacuum. The most striking characteristic of this pattern of 
life was that action had its end in itself; it was the supreme 
value. On the ethical plane this enhanced a chronic crisis 
of human conscience.
This phenomenon has induced many people to see materialistic 
trends in the Weltanschauung of Nazism. Trevor-Roper, for 
instance, calls Hitler r,a complete and rigid materialist”. 
(Hitler’s Table Talk, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1953, 
Introduction p.XXXIII) Ethical materialism, however, can 
hardly be applied to a man with such a strong feeling of 
adventure and so little a sense of reality. We can talk in 
this case about a strange ethical phenomenon which we name 
the "mystique” of action. The urge for action is in Nazi 
society of such an intensity that it could not be fashioned by 
any scale of avlues. This basic urge is manifested in Hitler*s 
fascination with "great” actions and plans. "Great” means in 
this case something "absolute”, something which cannot be 
defined within a definite conception of history, or within a 
certain scaLe of values; it is in fact a purely psychological 
category and as such it can be defined only by the feeling of
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of ’’the extraordinary" "unheard of", "breath-taking"...
The Empire he wants to build up, the "Autobahnen" he wants 
to construct - from Berlin to India and the monuments he 
intends to leave to posterity can hardly be judged v/ithin a 
given system of political, practical or artistic values.
In all his "plans" there, is something beyond reality and 
beyond the human condition.
Any human feeling and any cultural value is regarded by 
Hitler as being subordinated to his "great" actions. He 
speaks about love is "a competition in which the most Nazi of 
he-Germans deserved the most conventionally well-proportioned 
of she-Germans"; children are to him "material of conquest 
and-colonisation"; moral values are simply prejudices. 
(Trevor-Roper, Op.cit.p. XXXIII). In his utter incapacity for 
looking at the events of life in the light of a spiritual 
order, or rather in his incapacity for spiritualising life 
lies the root of Hitler's "lack of human note" that impressed 
so many people who knew him. (A. Holler; Hitler Private, 
Dusseldorf, 1949, refers to this, p.49)
The only thing Hitler unreservedly admires in man is his 
power and will for action. He admires Stalin as "a beast", 
reverences Mussolini for his determination, and the only
The same thing can be said about the Nazi group as a 
whole, r it was not the unity and the action of the group in 
order to achieve certain pre-established ends but rather unity
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unity and action in themselves that formed the basic 
character of Nazi society. As compared with Communism,
Nazism has no philosophy of history* This was subsfoituted 
by the "mystique" of action. "Action has buried philosophy", 
said Mussolini entering Rome. This Marxian slogan was an 
adequate expression of the psychological structure of Nascian 
in general and Nazism in particular.
The mystic of action forms a fundamental trait in the 
Weltanschauung of Nazism. That is why we should like to 
analyse its significance in more detail.
C. The Nazi culture-pattern bears in many respects the 
sign of a disturbing ambivalence in the group situation. The 
feeling of insecurity reaches such a degree of intensity that 
one can say that life and death present equal chances. The 
first term of this ambivalence is expressed, at the ideological 
level, in the "mystique" of action and adventure, while the 
second in the "mystique" of death. Both trends coexist in the 
Nazi Weltanschauung.
To start with it is worth while, mentioning that the success 
in Italy of ^entilefs "activism”fof the philosophy "del atto 
puro" is symptomatic. In ±'1azism we have no such clear concept­
ualisation of existence; there philosophy is almost buried under 
the urge for action. We can, however, find a series of trends 
all of them pointing in the same direction. Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche for instance are officially supported. A series of 
mystic concepts forming the foundation of the racial ideology 
comes under the same category. The essence of these consists in
in their dynamism rather than in their episteological 
function. Concepts such as "Germanic”, "Fuhrer",
"Jewish”, etc. are in essence simple words covering an 
irresistible urge for action.
Faustrs belief that in the beginning was "action”,
which seems to outline an important aspect of the German
culture, reveals at the same time the essence of the
Nazi group frame of mind. For it is not "logos" but
"action” that lies at the foundation of existence.
Hitler is in complete agreement with Mussolini on the
following important point: Action is the starting point
of political society. The people feel their solidarity
and the necessity of social organisation only when they
act in common. Therefore make them act or want to act
before anything else. Common action is all; discussion
and reasoning are a waste of time. Hitler'could never
get tirei- of repeating that his movement is "a political
fighting force” and not "a debating society". Both
Mussolini and Hitler built up a political "movement" before
(1)
having a positive programme of government.
(1). The psychological implication of the priority of 
action seems to be a sympton of strong repression and 
therefore of the dominance of mental structure by 
unconscious factors. Blind will breaking through and 
neglecting the structure of consciousness and of conscience 
is a fundamental trait in a Nazi pattern of life. This 
will be dealt with appropriately at a later stage.
The "mystique" of death forms the other basic trait 
of the Nazi Weltanschauung. Sometimes death is seen
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seen as a positive value, as a beautiful end to an 
heroic act. In one form or another the cult of death is 
noticeable in all Fascist organisations. In Roumania, for 
instance, the "Iron Guard" had instituted the "team of 
death", or "nikadors" as the "elite" of the movement.
The "nikadors" did not hesitate a moment to bring death 
upon the enemies of their organisation, and did not - so 
they said - fear death for themselves.
But in Nazi society death often appears as an 
obsession with the dread of life, as feeling of fear and 
insecurity. Hitler for instance, sees himself surrounded 
by hostile forces; Nature itself hides hostile intentions. 
(See Table Talk pp. 5 and 87). This basic emotional theme 
is instilled into the whole Party: all its members live 
and act under the assumption that their country is about 
to be assassinated by powerful enemies.
This feature of Nazism is crystallised, at least 
partly, in Existentialism. The concept of "Angst", the 
nagation or the ignorance of any objective values - reducing 
thus existence to an individual act of living - are in our 
own opinion traits in German society which enter into the 
structure of Nazism. Martin Heidegger, conscious of this 
fact made - between 1933 and 1936 - a strong attempt to 
raise his philosphy to the rank of an official doctrine 
in Nazism. His failure is perhaps due to the individual­
istic character implied in Existentialism. We still think, 
however, Heidegger was right and the Nazi ideaologues wrong
wrong with regard to the intimate connection between 
Existentialism and Nazism.
D. Nazi ethics is an outstanding example of 
ambivalence. Both life and death as pure concepts are 
considered as supreme values. There is nothing between 
or above to give meaning to life or to death.
In the Nazi Weltanschauung life has its end in itself.
We hasten to say however that there is little of an 
hedonistic or Dyonisian attitude involved in the Nazi 
conception of life. Concepts such as plentitude of life 
or full life with no further determination seem to cover 
what the exponents of Nazi ethics consider as the supreme 
value. The highest degree of life, plentitude, is attained 
in the exercise of power. That is why the ideal man is 
the political man in the sense that he embodies life at 
its highest potential. But this very point shows the 
ambivalence of the Nazi ethics. Bor power has, in the Nazi 
world, a specific meaning. It primarily means struggle 
and fight against dangers and death. Life as an exercise 
of power means "adventure” or "vivere pericolosamente".
Jjaong the early slogans of the Italian Fascists there is 
one most revealing on this matter:SMe ne frego", i.e.,I 
do not care, or more adequately, "I am not afraid".
Death is also a supreme value in the Nazi Weltanschauung 
This is shown in the cult of self-sacrifice, individual and 
collective. But here too we have to notice that in the
Nazi world there is no system of ideal values which gives 
meaning to the act of dying. To die for what? The answer
answer to this question lies in one of the most 
characteristic aspects of Nazi ethics. Lacking a system 
of values which would give meaning to life and death, 
they supply the individual and the group with a series of 
"Ersatz" values. The Party, the Leader,the "Fatherland" 
are among these values. Therefore to live and die for 
them means to realise positive values in life. But as 
long as the Party, the Leader and the Fatherland are not 
themselves integrated in a set of values Nazi ethics 
remain obviously as "Ersatz" ethics. The Party and the 
Leader were ethically free to do whatever they liked with 
the individualTs faith in them; the Party and the Leader 
acted in an axiological vacuum. Their only conscious end 
for action consisted in the enjoyment derived from the 
exercise of power, in the doctrine of total war, or 
"scorched earth war".
E. There is nothing in the Nazi Weltanschauung that 
might give objective support to human action. Action 
derived its goal and strength from itself, according to 
the method of auto-suggestion (Coue). The world from 
beyond is destroyed by the a^theistic mood prevalent in 
Nazi while the imminent spiritual world by their crude 
vitalism. The main cause of this state of affairs should 
be looked for in the incapacity of life to project itself 
in a system of objective values which is, as we have 
already mentioned, one of the important traits of the Nazi 
Weltanschauung. In the same trait is to be found the 
original of the irrationalistic trends of the Nazi
/
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Nazi Weltanschauung. And since a system of values con­
stitutes the natural medium of rationalisation, we can 
attribute to the same trait the Nazi incapacity for giving 
reasons. They would not and could not give "reasons" for 
their actions, since they had no true system of values in 
which to integrate them. The Nazi basic argument "we will 
because we will” translates an important characteristic of 
their own way. of life. They could not formulate their 
action in the function of conventional values, or in terms 
or objective conditions of life, because they were utterly 
incapable of compromise. Anybody attempting to compromise 
was in their eyes a liar and a traitor. The rigidity and 
the urgent character of their action was such that it could 
never be formulated save in terms of its total success. 
Consequently the Nazi had no real use for diplomacy. They 
always iepferred the language of war. Any treaty turned 
in their hands into a Dikfc&jtN.
The main characteristic of human action in the Nazi 
pattern of life consists in the fact that it is not value- 
oriented. Its driving force is always deeply buried in 
the unconscious structure of mind, wherefrom it springs up 
with the force characteristic of compulsive behaviour.
Hence its rigidity.
Myths and Myth-Making in the Nazi Weltanschauung. The 
Nazi world is populated with myths. The myth of the Master 
Race and of the providential leader are the most out­
standing ones. With the .exception of a short x^QTiod at its
very outset, when an attempt was made to revive the old
old German 1.o paganism, all Nazi myths are fabrications 
according to modem scientific prescriptions. The first 
implication of this was that they had to be verified 
empirically. The myth of the Master Bace, for instance, 
remained a myth as long as it mobilised the people in 
order to assert here and now the superiority of the 
Germanic Race.
Hera we have to bring in again the idea of lifeTs 
incapacity to project itself into a system of objective 
values. The post-war German society was so intensly 
obsessed with its survival as a separate group that it 
completely failed to formulate any of its experiences in 
a system of universal modes of life. As such it had no 
open door to humanitarianism. This shows a sharp contrast 
between ^azi and Communist societies. For the working- 
class (wvoiutironary acts on the assumption of the universal 
humanitarian end of its own action, which in turn leads to 
classless society, i.e., to its own sacrifice for the sake 
of humanity. This is not the case in Nazi society. Its 
ends are in itself as a closed group. It works for its 
own superiority and for the subjugation and the annihilab ion 
of the whole world.
The Nazi way of life has no ideal dimension, i.e.it 
has no imminent rational order, like Communism, and no 
transcendental order like democracy. The group is 
absorbed in its own empirical condition of life. Its 
power of idealisation does not go far beyond a series of 
incoherent and loosely-shaped wishes and fantasies about /
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about its vital strivings, its past and future. This 
morbid obsession with itself works its way out in myths 
and in action-anxiety, both being escapes from insecurity 
and fear of deafh. VITA ACTIYA SUB SPECIE MORTIS.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF NAZISM.
Throughout the first part of the present study 
we have found the comparative method useful and 
necessary in order to determine the character of 
democracy as distinct-from sometimes opposed to - 
that of Fascism or Communism. Consequently, many 
psychological aspects of Nazism have been dealt with 
in earlier chapters regarding the psychology of 
democracy. For this reason, we confine the present 
section regarding the psychology of Nazism to two 
problems only* The first refers to Nazism as a 
particular case of regressive group behaviour. The 
second concerns the structure of the Nazi personality 
as a variation in the contemporary type of authoritarian 
personality.
ug h a p t s b  III
KAZXSH AS B E G B S S S I 7 E  B E H A V I O i m .
Me ne fregoI
Early Mussoliniam slogan.
The concept of regression has often been applied to 
the behaviour of the Mazi group and to the behaviour 
of many Nazi leaders. For Gilbert, for instance, 
regression forms the key concept in the understanding of 
Mazism. Consequently, one of the conclusions of his 
study is that Mazism is a pathological phenomenon, i.e., 
a typical case of group maladjustment. We intend to 
reserve for a later stage any discussion concerning the 
psycholo-pathological implications of the idea of 
regression. For the moment we should like to use the con­
cept of regression mainly as a working hypothesis, and to
regard various aspects of the Nazi way of life by analogy 
with what happens in regressive behaviour of the individual. 
To start with, we should like to give a brief description 
of a series of aspects of Mazism wMhh can be interpreted 
as reversions to an early stage In the development of
human society in general and of German society In
in particular.
The German Cultural Lag and Nazism. The Western
democratic institutions could not instantaneously 
absorb and incorporate in its system all the beliefs 
and attitudes characteristic of a previous absolutistic 
regime. "A long tradition of submission to despotism” - 
writes Gilbert -” which had prevailed for centuries in 
Germany, Russia, Spain and Italy had left too strong 
a trace of authoritarian thinking and ego involvement 
among the people and their potential leaders to be 
readily abandoned in favour of the democratic-socialistic 
millenium." (Op.cit. p.12). Therefore the cultural lag 
is, in this particular context, formed by all those 
elements belonging to the absolutist regime repressed 
by the democratic process of modern society. In this
case it can be called the authoritarian lag of modern
. + (1) society.
(1)
W.F. Ogburn, to whom the concept of cultural lag 
is due, uses for its definition formulae such as the 
"imbalance” an invention in one part of the world 
causes with other parts of culture related to it, or 
"the lag in time between the initial change ahd the 
change in the correlated part, or parts of culture".
W.F. Ogburn: "Social Effects of Technology in 
Industrialised Societies" in International Social 
Science Bulletin Unesco, Vo. IV, No.2, p.277.;
The authoritarian cultural lag works within the 
culture pattern of a group in the manner of an uncon­
scious dynamic structure. In a democratic culture the 
people often revert to a despotic rule when the 
democratic formula cannot provide them with an adequate/
adequate satisfaction. The reversion to this old 
pattern of authority is positively meant to bring a 
greater degree of security and stability than that 
available in democracy. The process of ejrversion 
explains to a great extent, the frequent apparition of 
dictatorships in the modern democractic era. Gilbert, 
for instance, refers to the Napoleonic regime as ”a 
reversion to an authoritarian rule after a too drastic 
attempt to impose democracy on an authoritarian culture.” 
Napoleon is considered by him as a proto-type of modern 
dictators.
Nazism is obviously a regressive adjustment of the 
German society of the inter-war period. Yet, we think, 
that one could hardly say that the Napoleonic and the 
Hitlerian regimes belong to the same category of social 
and psychological phenomena, as Gilbert would like to 
suggest. Though not altogether denying the presence of 
some regressive elements in it, one can easily see that 
the substance of Napoleonic dictatorship consists in the 
consolidation of a society deeply disrupted by new and 
advanced ideal. Some elements of a democraetic revolution 
remained throughout this regime, in spite of Napoleonfs 
personal dictatorship. There is nothing of the kind in 
Nazism. Hitler did not consolidate any democratic or 
socialist revolution. If one could speak about a certain 
consolidating action of Nazism, this would be in a quite 
different sense. Nor Hitler made little, if any, use
use of the ”advanced” social, political and cultural 
elements of contemporary society. In this he is 
different from Napoleon and from many contemporary 
dictators of the right such as Kemal Ata Turk and even 
Mussolini. As compared with Hitler, Napoleon was an 
"enlightened” tyrant. This places him in a different 
social and psychological category.
Hitler consolidates German society, threatened as 
it was with disintegration, and none of the consolidating 
factors used by him belonged to the contemporary stage 
of European society. On the contrary these factors 
belong to a predemocratic era, and mainly to a primitive 
type of society. The reversion of contemporary 
German society under Hitler goes back to the patriarchal 
level of social evolution. If every dictatorship in a 
democratic era is taken as a symptom of regressive 
adjustment, then we have to stress the idea that the level 
of regression reached by Nazism is deeper than that 
reached by any other dictatorial movement taking place in 
our democratic era.
Nazism borrows from contemporary civilisation only 
the techniques of the concentration of power and of the 
organisation of a rigid social solidarity. It is in 
this respad? no more indebted to this civilisation than 
modern Japanese society. In both cases the technological 
factor of Western civilisation was used to build up'a 
patriarchal authoritarian society.
As for the ideological factors specific to Nazism it
it is obvious that they were borrowed from certain 
irrational trends of Western civilisation. Tet we have 
to point out again that the ideological factors have a 
peripheral position in Nazism; they are completely sub­
servient to a series of volitional and emotive factors. 
For thought Nazis talked the language of several 
ideologies, as we have shown in an earlier chapter,these 
were simply words used for expedient purposes of 
propaganda. In decisive moments the Nazis thought "with 
their blood" or, according to the maxim of the Roumanian 
Legionaries, "with the axe". Their urge for action 
prevents them from both, an ideological and an empirical 
Krrientatir©^- compromise with the real condition of life. 
They were simply instinctive.
The reversion to medieval absolutist symbol of 
authority i^ only one aspect of Nazi society and nob even 
the most significant one. Undoubtedly the symbol of 
the "Kaiser" as an absolutist ruler, and the Prussian 
pattern of society, both revived by Nazism, are symptoms 
of regression. But the main symbols of power and social 
integration are the charismatic leader and the feeling 
of the "organic unity" of the Germanic group. In this 
way the reversion reached by Nazism goes back to a 
patriarchal type of human organisation. This fact calls 
for an enlargement of the concept of cultural lag.
The concept of cultural lag is based on the social 
function of repression, i.e., a culture-oattem or a way
/
way of life is repressed by another in the evolution 
of a group. The democratic culture-pattern for instance 
had "repressed" medieval absolutism. From the purely 
sociological point of view we can speak about the 
conflict between two culture-patterns, or about the 
oppression or suppression of one pattern by another. 
Psychologically we speak about repression, meaning in 
the first place that the conflict has been internalised 
by the individual, who builds up in his own mental 
structure a repressing mechanism directed against the 
old culture-pattern in such a way that he is integrated 
into the new one. Now, since the repressed culture- 
pat tern forms a dynamic structure in the unconscious it 
may come during period^ of crisis in the evolution 
of the group. Reversion is one of the possible results 
of this kind of situation. Consequently degression 
occurs when a group reverts to an old and repressed 
pattern of organisation because of its incapacity to 
integrate with the pattern offered by its contemporaneous 
historical level.
Nazism is an outstanding example of the way a ^
repressed patriarchal pattern substitutes all other later 
developed social patterns. Firstly the German group under 
Nazism, in its pressing need for integration, had skipped 
over both the secular and pragmatic rationalism \^ich 
forms the essence of modem democratic society, and the 
transcental (.moral) rationalism of medieval society. The
/
The "Terra fema" of the German group’s regression into 
the past is formed by a social pattern based on emotional 
solidarity. At this level the group reaches such a 
degree of integration that it closes itself within a 
world of its own with no capacity for moral standards 
towards other groups. This is the pattern of interhuman 
relationships and group formations characteristic of 
primary groups, such as the small size family belonging 
to modern European society or the big-size family of a 
primitive tribe. We have only to add that this pattern 
has been repressed by or integrated into the rational 
pattern of modern society.
This deep layer of inter-individual relationship and 
group formation cannot be enlightened by any ideology 
in the usual sense of this word. It is accessible only 
to symbolic and mythical forms of representation. Thus, 
what is commonly called Nazi ideology is but a heap of 
myths symbolising a pattern of social integration deeply 
repressed in modern man. The symbols of the individual*s 
identity with the group are expressed by racial myths, 
by the use of uniforms or by the method of "Gleichschaltung". 
The symbol of the paternalistic position of authority is 
expressed by the myth of the providential leader and so 
forth. All these beads of symbolic thought were put 
together on the string of emotional logic.
Mythical Thinking as a Regressive Sympton. Mythical 
thinking consists in a "system" of symbols whose meaning
overflows the empirical and logical condition of human /
human knowledge* 'Take for example the function of the 
concept of "-Jew" in the Nazi world. Its empirical con­
dition consists in the religious difference between a 
-Jew and a Christian. On this basis it can be used as 
discriminative concept. The Nazis, however, built up 
on this empirical and logical basis a long series of 
meanings; Jews are for them the worst enemies of the 
German people, aeu assertion which obviously has little if 
any empirical foundation. Then follows: Jews are the 
worst enemies of human civilisation, and finally, Jews are 
the symbol of evil in the world. "Jew" has in this last 
context a symbolical function. It arouses contempt,hatred, 
aggression, etc. in any situation no matter the empirical 
or logical conditions in which it is used. In the Nazi 
culture-pattern the function of such concepts is neither 
empirically or logically circumscribed. These concepts 
operate under the category of the "whole" in the sense that 
they take their significance from the Nazi world as a whole. 
The Nazi world is really at stake when the y/ord "Jew" is 
uttered. To the extent to which the concept of "Jew" 
participates to the meaning of the Nazi world as a Thole it 
may be considered as a negative form of the concept of 
"Totem".i.e., it defines undiscriminatingly the non-entity
of the Germanic group. The totemic symbols positive and x
.. . Ml
negative constitute the totalitarian basis of Nazi society.
(1)
lor tne function of the category of the "whole" in 
priaitive society seeH. Thurnwald-Sthnologie ttnd ,
Bud Psychoanalyse", in Hanz Prinzhorn: Auswirkungen der 
Psychoanalyse in Wissenschaft und Leben, Der Neue Geist 
Ver., Leipzig 1928.
Mythical thinking overpowers the individual’s mind. 
Symbolic concepts such as those of "Jew", "Germanic", 
"Race". "Fiihrer", etc. can never be submitted enitrely 
to the individual’s po\?er of discrimination. Their main 
function is to create collective states of mind and 
thus to make the individual respond to them as an undis- 
tinguishable member of the crowd or group. In such 
circumstances the individual has no other criterion for 
his reaction save the \yay the group or the crowd feel 
and act. His own mind is in suspension.
One of the main problems of Nazi organisation was 
to facilitate the permanent contact between the 
individual and his group. Consequently a series of means 
of comraunication - or rather of communion - were created 
to this end. The verbal symbols mentioned above con­
stitute only one category of this means. These are word© 
loaded with emotionality so as to arouse in the 
individual a primitive feeling of belongingness. There 
are also other categories of means of communication 
between the individual and the group such as uniforms, 
(Brown Shirts(, insignia, gesture^ ceremonies, cults.
Perhaps the most important of all is the salute "Heil 
Hitler" whose function was to bring any social encounter 
between individuals quickly under the auspices of the 
group. Art was also considered as means of parti-
participation in the group, i.e. art that takes the 
mind off the individual back to a heroic patriarchal 
type of society. Wagner s b , and to a certain extent, 
Stefan Georgia** served this purpose. A certain quality 
of the voice could also be used in order to induce in 
the individual’s mind the feeling of the presence of the 
group: a generally high pitched voice bursting out at 
certain intervals in explosions of rage or pathetic 
invocations as if a secret power from the outer world 
worked behind the speaker. Sometimes completely meaning­
less expressions were used to create in the individual 
the same "totalitarian" states. "EIAT EIAf, ALA" 
(D’Annunzio) was one of those expressions at the sound 
of which the Italian Fascists used to get enraged.
; . In conclusion the language tended under the impact 
of the mythical thought to be governed by a series of 
symbols whose function was to arouse in the individual’s 
mind the overwhelming powers of the totalitarian reality. 
In this way language was no longer a mere instrument for 
the individual to relate and adjust himself to his 
environment and to other individuals qua individuals, but 
rather an instrument to keep his mind under the pressure 
of the group. We can say that the iftythical thought has 
the function of revealing to the individual the presence 
of the group, and a^such it can be considered as a means 
of inter-communion rather then inter-communication,
The Regressive Elements in Socialist Economy. Hitler
Hitler calls His regime "National Socialism". Ifee State 
interventionism is undoubtedly the main socialistic 
feature of this regime.
We should like to suggest in this brief note that 
socialist economy contains in itself some important 
regressive elements. Marx and Engels rightly saw in the 
idea of a socialist-collectivist economy a recurrence 
of a primitive economic system named by them primitive 
communism. The conclusion they drew from this was that a 
socilist system is more compatible with the true nature 
of man than any individualistic system, and further, 
that capitalist economy has caused man's estrangement 
from himself.
The facts show that soejaListic and collectivistic 
features in the economic field appear regularly when a 
society finds itself under conditions of stress. Times 
of war best illustrate this. When its security is 
threatened the group reverts to a lower and less flexible 
level of integration which recalls in many respects the 
pre-individuation period of human society. Socialism 
is one of the modern expressions of this process of 
reversion. It should only be added that the main 
socialistic features existing in the various economic 
systems of today are in fact remants of war economy.
(Max Weber -tfDer Sozialismas. PhtJbus, Yuenna,1918j and 
Peter J.Brueker - "The New Society", London, Heineman, 
1951, offer economic data in support of this thesis.)
The Causes of Regression, The springboard of 
regression consists in the insecurity created by frustrating 
conditions of life. The main function of this mechanism is 
therefore to supply the individual or the group with a basis 
of security. This is the meaning c£ the groupTs or 
individuals withdrawal and the reversion to an old 
pattern of behaviour. In other words, the present 
situation, superseding by its complexity the limit of the 
group1s adaptability, requires the reversion to an earlier 
simpler form of adjustment.
As an example of the way in which the concept of 
regression has been applied to Nazism we should like to 
sketch the main ideas of Fromm*s study "The Fear of 
Freedom". (London, Kegan Paul, 1942} Fromm takes the 
evolution of the experience of freedom within the modern 
world as the starting point of his study. The perspective 
of individual freedom opened up by the Renaissance and the 
Reformation has, according to him, reached in our era a 
critical point. Modern freedom defined itself as a reaction 
from medieval society, i.e., it grew in step with the dis­
solution of the primary bonds characteristic of the small- 
size organisation of medieval community, and in step with 
the weakening of the integrating forces of religion as they 
were represented by the Catholic Church. But -'as Fromm 
notices - if some results of this process have led to modern 
democracy, some others have led to social disintegration. 
Modem society has not supplied the individual with any
/
any integrating values in life strong enough to compen­
sate for the loss of the bonds of the medieval community.
In this way contemporary society has gradually made the 
need for freedom aimless. For in this society the 
individual is free to develop his own potentiality, to 
realise himself, feeling at the same time that there is no 
scope for this freedom, i.e., there is nothing outside 
himself to give sense to his life, and thus to separate 
freedom from vacuum and nothingness. Here Fromm points 
out that as long as freedom meant freedom from (medieval 
anti-individual!stic society) the experience of freedom 
in modern mad had a full meaning. The moment of crisis 
is marked by the projection of the experience of freedom 
into the future, as freedom for. To this type of freedom 
modem society has failed to give a satisfactory answer.
The main sympton of this crisis is shown in the insecurity, 
aloneness and fear of personal responsibility unavoidably 
implied in the experience of freedom in contemporary society 
in which the socially and spiritually integrative values 
are on the verge of disappearance.
The direction in which the crisis of freedom is solved, 
suggests the Dostoevskian formula outlined in "The Grand 
Inquisitor" (Brothers Karamazov), i.e., escape from 
freedom into security by an indiscriminate acceptance of 
external authority. ^
^  Dosfoevski is fully aware of the implication of this 
formula. He pleads for the stability of the revealed 
truth as it is represented by the Church authority, as
as against an individualised contact with God. At the 
same time he is for the priority of security guaranteed 
by secular authority, over individual freedom. In con­
clusion Dostoevski aks for a firm foundation for contemporary 
society achieved by a rigid system of beliefs and 
responsible authority rather than by its being subjected 
to dispute and reinterpretations.
Nazism is, according to Fromm, one of the historical 
forms of this escape frcrn freedom. The individual escapes 
the burdens of freedom and responsibility by his uncon­
ditional surrender to a despot and by his uncritical 
acceptance of a body of secular beliefs and myths arranged 
for him by an authoritarian regime. In some European 
communities the age-long repressed desire for security 
and dependence has burst out and consequently the individual 
is ready to accept or create a model of society which would 
satisfy it. In this case regression consists in the fact 
that the urgent need for integration and belongingness 
provokes a reversion of some groups to a pre-rationalistic 
and pre-Individualistic type of civilisation.
There is no doubt that Nazism is partly determined,by 
the fear of freedom and responsibility in contemporary 
man and by its positive aspect as escape into authoritar­
ianism. Fromm*s only mistake consists in laying too great 
a stress on the importance of this process in the peycho- 
genesis of Nazism. Consequently he cempletely fails to see 
an opposite process which has been taking place in modern 
society parallel to that described by him as "fear of 
freedom". This is the type of integration produced by 
modem society which is - as E. Durteheim suggests - a
a counterbalancing process to the disintegration and 
specialisation inherent in large scale organisations.
’he can talk therefore about the fear of integration, the 
lack of individual freedom and initiative existing in 
contemporary man side by side with fear of freedom and 
responsibility. Philosophies such as Personalism and 
Existentialism, as well as various trends of political 
anarchism, constitute various manifestations of this basic 
condition of contemporary man. Paradoxically enough,this 
process has also contributed to the rise of Nazism. This 
has happened in two main ways: On the psychological level
it has gradually led to the annihilation of the individual 
by the weakening of his critical mind. On the social 
plane it has gradually created a type of civilisation whose 
main characteristics consist in a high degree of inter­
individual dependence - a factory type of society. This 
made it the more easy for the Nazi leaders to create a 
highly integrated society.
In conclusion Prommrs view is useful in illustrating 
one aspect if the dialectics of freedom in modern society.
As long as freeddn is predominantly negative, meaning freedom 
"from", it represents a positive value. The moment it 
becomes prospective, as freedom !lfor,T, it leads to self- 
denial* If the answer required by freedom f,forf is not 
given, it arouses in the individual insecurity, fears, 
aloneness, and consequently desires for belongingness, and a 
desperate need for "Mitsein", as the existentialists out it. 
<«n authoritarian civilisation would be an answer to this
this fear of freedom. This answer denies, however, the 
legitimacy of the question. But on the other h a n d ^  ^ 
positive answer is given, by laying down the sense of 
freedom in a rational order, in a clear-cut philosophy of 
history the final result would be the same, i.e., freedom 
negates itself. Nazism represents the first attitude 
towards freedom in contemporary society, Communism the 
second. We take again the opportunity of emphasising an 
important idea of this study: Nazism results from the
irrational, Communism from the over-rational factors of 
contemporary civilisation.
The Effects of ^egression. The effects of the process 
of regression undergone by German society during the inter­
war period, can be studied under two main headings.
A. The authoritarian character,and B. the process of 
^Gleichschaltung".
A. Fromm considers the concept of authoritarian 
character as the key concept in the psychology of Nazism. 
Generally speaking, the authoritarian character is the 
outcome of the structuration of a series of mental factors 
produced mainly by the process of regression. Anxiety, 
insecurity,^repressed desire for belongingness, 8.*<. are a 
few of them. The main point is that the structuration of 
these factors forms the basis for an individual as well as 
for a social authoritarian character. The latter is defined 
for the first time by Fromm as a structural characteristic 
of a group.
The main trait of an authoritarian character consists /
i
consists in an ambivalent attitude towards authority.
This means that the authoritarian personality and group fall 
alternately or concomitantly into the extremes of dominance 
and submissiveness. On the political plane an ambivalent 
attitude towards authority leads to an authoritarian organ­
isation. For in this type of organisation, based on a rigid 
hierarchy of power, the individual can satisfy both his need 
for belongingness-submissiveness by his complete integration 
with the group and by obedience towards the higher-ups; and 
at the same time his need for dominance towards those below 
him by his status in the system.
With regaxd to the social basis of the authoritarian 
character Frommboncentrates his attention on the lower-middle- 
classes, ?/hich, according to him, form the background of 
Nazism. In accordance with the ideas outlined in a previous 
chapter we should like to rdfrirm ulate this problem as follows: 
The post-war (1918) German group as a whole forms the basic 
social unit affected by a series of authoritarian traits 
produced by the process of regression. Yet at this level the 
authoritarian traits form a loose structure; they are, so to 
speak, in a floating state. The German lower-middle-classes, 
represent a new/ level in the structuration of a series of 
authoritarian traits. The structuration of these traits!at 
this level a more permanent character than in the German group 
in general. The reasons for this are various. The first - 
and this is mentioned by Fromm - consists in the fact that the 
German lower-middle-classes are more intensely affected by the
the process of regression* The economic crisis, 
inflation in particular, had a deeper impact on them.
The second reason, also mentioned by Fromm, is that the 
social and economic position of the lower-middle-classes 
lent itself to an authoritarian character. These classes 
have an intermediary position between the working-classes, 
towards which they show dominance and superiority, and the 
upper-classes which they regard as the very embodiment of 
their social aspirations. The third reason why the lower- 
middle-classes display more than any other class 
authoritarian traits specific to Nazism refers to the 
class structure of the German society as a whole. The 
German working class, like any other European working class, 
had long before the outcome of Nazism built up another type 
of authoritarian character which forms the basis of 
Cominism. In one respect at least these classes 
suffered less than the lower-middle -classes from the 
feeling of insecurity produced by post-war circumstances.
For unlike any other class they had a philosophy of 
history on whieh they hung their desire for security.
The third level in the structuration of the
/ r
authoritarian factors is fomed by the "declasses” group 
of post-war Germany. We find in these people additional 
reasons for insecurity and need for belongingness.
Finally, the highest concentration of authoritarian traits 
is realised in a series of abnormal personalities such as 
Hitler, Hess, Goebels who had displayed throught their
their lives pathological forms of authoritarian behaviour. 
Thus the authoritarian character emerges in four stages 
of intensity and purity. It is seen firstly in a diluted 
form in the German group as a whole, then reaches 
higher and higher degrees of intensity in the lower-middle - 
classes, in the socio-pathic group (declasses), and 
finally in the psycho-pathie group. Nazism rises as the 
integration of these superimposed levels of authoritarian 
behaviour within German society.
B. The Process of "Gleichschaltung”. Technically, 
"Gleichschaltung" is used in order to indicate the process 
of co-ordination and conformation of German organisation 
of all types with the pattern ofthe Party. Ultimately, 
this process led to the identification of the individual 
with the interests of the group as they were represented 
by the leaders of the Party. To start with, one- can 
describe the process of "Gleichschaltung” as the reversal 
of the fundamental values of democracy. For it brings with 
itself the weakening and sometimes the annihilation of all 
the values founded in the concepts of individuality, 
critical mind, objectivity and sense of leisure. As we 
have already discussed the position of these concepts with 
regard to totalitarianism we should like now to pass on to 
a series of specific aspects of the process of 
” Gle i chs ch al t ung.t!
On the intra-individual plane,”Gleichschaltung,f 
produces a rigid-integration of the individual’s mental
mental life round one specific factor. Ih other words 
the whole dynamics of personality comes under the rigid 
control of a single or of a few ideas or feelings, 
loosely symbolised by "Race", "Euhrer” "Fertile rl and”, etc.
This works in the manner of an obsessional mechanism.
One cannot hold ideas if not connected and checked by 
this central factor; one cannot love or hate but in the 
manner approved by it; one cannot perceive save within 
the schemes allowed by it.
On the inter-individual plane the process of 
"Gleichschaltung” works for the identification of every 
individual with his own society and thus for the creation 
of the totalitarian reality. The sense of values in the 
Nazi world is given by the degree of group identification. 
Thus the individual realises himself by self-annihilation.
The regressive elements involved in the process of 
"Gleichschaltung" are better seen when we consider the 
irrational roots of this process. "Gleichschaltung" 
represents a primitive mode of social integration, and it is, 
in this sense the outcome of an inferior type of Superego. 
Flugel describes the function of an interior type of 
Superego as consisting in the individual's identification 
with his environment. In this case the Ego cannot counter­
balance the anarchic and anti-social character of the 
primitive drives of the Id, except by creating forms of 
identification between an individual and the other members 
of his group. In more intelligible words, the Ego produces
produces the illusion that the individual is one and
the same reality with the group. Consequently the
destructive character of his primary drives ultimately
J
turns against himself. A rudimentary Superego is forged 
in this way and is projected in a series of myths about 
the common origins of the. members of the group (descendance 
from the same Gods), a series of cults regarding the 
ancestors, and a common tradition. These are more or less 
the integrating forces operating in patriarchal societies. 
(Fl&gel: Man, Morals and Society, London, Duckworth, 1945) •
The appearance of such a structure in the Nazi group, 
and in German society as a whole, is undoubtedly, the 
result of regression. This primitive Superego is projected 
in the Nazi myths which, following the culture-pattern 
of the twentieth century sometimes take the f o m  of 
scientific theories. These myths are produced by a series 
of integrating drives operating within the German group.
In their turn they strengthen the in-group ties to the 
degree of the individual’s annihilation. All that is good, 
pure and healthy comes from inside the group. Thus the 
individual’s capacity for love is entirely absorbed within 
the group. On the other hand, the same myths help the 
projection of the individuals aggression towards the out­
groups. All that is bad and morbid comes from outside the 
group.
Thus we can say that the process of "Qeichschaltungn 
means the identification of the individual with his group, 
which group in its turn fails to integrate itself at an
an inter-group level,. While the values of self­
centredness' are completely denied to the individual 
they are bestowed upon the group; while freedom and 
spontaneity have no meaning for the individual, the 
group is based on anarchy. For we can say that the 
ultimate meaning of Nazism.comes from its being an 
experiment in absolute freedom - anarchy- for the group. 
In other words it means the structuration of the group 
below the international level of integration which forms 
one of the distinctive notes of modern Western civili­
sation. ‘i‘he norms of group behaviour are determined by 
the group1s obsession with itself rather than by its 
relationships with other groups. For the authoritarian 
group is incapable of compromise and flexibility, thus 
incapable of being aware of the other as equal. "Never 
tolerate the establishment of two continental powers in 
Europe", writes Hitler stressing in this way the need for 
uniqueness in the German group. (Mein Kampf. p.756.
Quoted by Baymond E. Murphy in "national Socialism". 
U.S.A. Government Press Office, Washington,1943, p.55. 
Italics are ours.) The group lives in a monadic 
primitive world fashioned upon the fomula: One group, 
one world.
The Limitations of the Concept of Regression. The 
outburst of a series of irrational factors - mainly 
repressed desire for security and belongingness - has 
undoubtedly created in contemporary man certain dis- 
positions which precipitated the rise of Nazism. As we
we shall see at a later stage the psychology of the 
Unconscious applies well to Nazism. And yet it seems 
difficult, if possible at all, to determine the degree in 
which the irrational factors had contributed to the 
structuration of the Nazi society. It is enough to mention 
some "rational" conditions of Nazism in order to understand 
in what this difficulty consists.
A. . A strong aggressive policy is not necessarily the 
product of irrational factors set free by regression or 
otherwise. It might as well k& based on the reality 
principle and as such resulting from an objective assess­
ment of the international situation, or at least of the 
poliey of other groups with regard to our own. The policy 
of power which animates the U.S.A. in the present circum­
stances is very little, if at all, determined by irrational 
factors. On the contrary, it looks like a realistic 
adjustment to the world situation as created by the post­
war position of the Communist block.
B. A series of social techniques enabling the con­
centration of power in the hands of the few should also be 
taken into account.
C. The potion against Communism, and the structuration 
of various political forces in Germany, as a means of 
resistance, cannot be considered as an irrational factor, 
but rather a rational orientation in the political reality 
of post-war Germany. Many people joined the Nazi movement 
out of a rational -calculation, i.e. they had chosen the
the lesser evel of the two.
D. The role played by international capital in the
post-war German economy, and the policy of appeasement of
the Great Powers, can also be considered as rational
%
factors contributing to the rise of Nazism.
E. One could on no account overlook a series of
"historical accidents" all leading towards Nazism. One of
these was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on
January 30, 1 9 3 3 . ^
(1)
There is a current opinion that HitlerTs appointment 
was in the last instance a matter of political intrigue;
"he was jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue......*
by a shoddy deal with the "Old Gang", writes Alan Bullock. 
(Hitler; A Study in Tyranny. Oldhams Press, London,
1952. Quoted by Sir Lewis Mamies in "The Megalomania of 
Adolf Hitler. Listener February,12, 1953, p.251.)
Hindenburg made a grave decision and took on himself a 
responsibility which most probably another head of the State 
would have avoided. His friend in arms, Ludendorff, wrote 
to him on that occasion "By the appointment of Hitler to 
the Reich Chancellorship you have put our holy Fatherland 
at the mercy of one of the greatest demagogues of all times. 
I prophesy that this unholy man will plunge the Reich into 
chaos, will bring unimaginable misery to the nation, and 
coming generations will curse you in your grave for what 
you have done." (Gilbert op.cit. p.72). It is difficult 
to assess how much Nazism owes to Hindenburg, to his 
judgment and character, but it certainly owes something.
C H A P T E R  I¥
PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN NAZISM.
Say what you will about Hitler, but donft accuse 
him of being moral*
Goering.
General Considerations. Nazi society was a rich 
ground for psycho-pathological research. No wonder 
therefore that psycho-analysis has 'given , way ■ JLfca* 
taperial 1st-i-Q..tendea e reduced this political 
phenomenon to a few psycho-pathological concepts, such 
as paranoia, compulsion, obsession, homosexuality and 
others.
In this chapter, we make an attempt to indicate 
some of the main aspects of Nazism which can be described 
as various forms of mental disorder. 1 e shall confine 
ourselves to those psycho-pathological aspects of 
Nazism which offer a safe ground for discussion, such as 
the process of regression and various forms of act ing 
out a basic insecurity, individual and collective. In 
the course of our discussion we shall distinguish two 
aspects of the sources of psycho-pathological phenomena 
in Nazism: a psychogenetic and a sociogenetic aspect. 
Throughout this chapter we shall draw heavily on the
/
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the material supplied by Gilbert in his study of the 
principal Nazi war-criminals at the Nuremberg trial.
Psychogenesis. We propose to describe briefly 
the pathological factor found in four of the top Nazi 
leaders: Hitler, Goering, Hess and Frank.
Adolf Hitler. Since most of the data and the 
suppositions regarding Hitler*s personality have been 
in circulation for the last two decades, we shall confine 
ourselves to a very few points which are, in our opinion, 
indispensable to the understanding of the psychology of 
Nazism. All the psycho-analytical portraits of Hitler 
agree on the important point that he showed strong 
paranoid symptons. Excessive aggression and obsessional 
reactions are among the most important of these. Various 
data regarding Hitler*s private life lead to the 
hypothesis that these manifestations were accentuated 
by a series of unsolved Oedipal conflicts, though their 
origin was probably much deeper. The Oedipal motivation 
of H ’s paranoid hostility consists,according to a 
psycho-analytical point of view, in his repressed hatred 
towards his father - which sometimes is interpreted 
as a defence against his homosexual attraction towards 
him. His father's violent character, his alcoholic 
addiction, and the fact that H. was aware of the rumour 
that his father was a bastard with Jewish blood in him 
are the main data brought in support of this supposition.
T a.Later on in life H # often remembered the humiliation he
lie had to go through as a child because of his fatherrs 
character. In the same unsolved Oedipal conflict lies
lits*
the source of a series of other traits of E Ts^  
personality such as:(a)His mother fixation; (b) his 
latent homosexuality, or as Gilbert very cautiously puts 
it ".... his emotional attachment to men stronger than 
to w o m e n " (op.cit. p.64) and finally (c) a series of 
revulsions from alcohol, meat, etc....
For the understanding of the psychogenesis of his
obsessional character one has to mention the projection
and displacement of his aggression. The excessive
aggression resulting from strongly repressed infantile
conflicts is projected by the Ego upon the external
world. Firstly the Universe as such is for H. imbued
with disruptive and hostile forces. Nature and destiny
were for him layers of a capricious and hostile power.
No human power over nature can be justified. "But a
simple storm is enough and everything collapses like a
iH*£
pack of cards" (Table Talk p.5). In this respect H rs. 
Ego is either in defence or in attack against the world; 
neverx'peaceful co-operation *
In the social world the projection of his repressed 
aggression rs gradually canalised itself in the direction 
of a series of social and cultural factors characteristic 
of post-war Germany. Thus his aggression was first of 
all projected upon the enemies of his country, i.e.,the 
main signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty. This 
process was parallelled by his identification with his /
his own victimised people. But the most effective outlet 
for his obsessive aggression consisted in his antisemitism#
One can distinguish three stages in the development 
of antisemitism. The first, though perhaps not the
most important, is closely connected with the Oedipal 
conflicts mentioned above. The origin of his hatred 
towards the lews and persecution of them lies in the dis­
placement of his hatred towards his father. An important 
detail of liHy life this psycho-analytical
hypothesis. Apparently his father was the illegitimate 
son of a lew in whose house his grandmother worked as a 
servant. Gilbert gives this information, as not yet 
verified. But he rightly points out that the important 
thing is in this case, not the truth itself, but the 
obvious fact that E/ was aware'of this allegation. He 
was blackmailed on this matter by his half-brother,Alois 
Hitler, and according to Frank he even tried to destroy 
the records regarding the alimony payments to his grand­
mother by a lew. The conclusion would be that his anti­
semitism is at least partly prompted by his unconscious 
wish to clean himself from his violent, drunken and morally 
impure father. On the other hand, the displacement of 
his aggression or death wishes on lews might have served 
to modify his negative attitude towards his ,Tbad father”, 
and thus to preserve the good father figure.
The second stage in the development of HMy- anti- 
semitic attitude consists in another traumatic experience 
occurring later in his life. While in Vienna as a young
young painter he became infatuated with a seventeen-year 
old girl. According to Greiner (Gilbert op.cit. p.32) 
this was a deep and desperate love v/hich was met with 
constant rejection by the girl. The end seems tragi­
comic, but was not so to Hitler. The girl married a 
promising young business man, who happened to be of half- 
lewish parentage. Gilbert relates various incidents 
connected with this unfortunate love affair - a threatening 
letter sent by HiJtkrto the young business man, scenes in 
the, street, etc. - all showing H* s,' outbursts of rage 
against the dirty lews who dared to violate Christian girls 
The third stage in the development of If* s anti­
semitism - by far the most important of all - is determined 
by cultural factors. In Vienna during his youth, and 
later on in Germany, Htil?i-had met with strong anti Semitic 
feelings, sometimes antiSemitic ideologies and movements 
(The Christian Socialist Party of Karl Lueger, and a 
series of youth organisations such as the Pan-German 
Burchenschaften, in Vienna, and the German Nationalist 
Party of Anton Sch’dnerer) which gradually crystalised 
his need for objects of aggression. In post-war Austria 
and Germany the lews were gradually transformed into 
scapegoats for the economic frustration of the masses 
for fustrated national pride in the young generations, 
and at the same time for the frustrated need for higher 
profits and the dominance of various German industrial 
groups. The same lews became for Hdki'the principal scape­
goats of his repressed aggression.
In his psycho-analytical portrait of H[il«kFromm groups
his findings round the concept of authoritarian character,
of
which has in fact paranoia as one its aspects. The 
ambivalent attitude towards authority is displayed by Hiller* 
in a multitude of forms. At an ideological level his 
submissiveness is reflected by his conception of man as 
determined by forces outside himself (destiny) while his 
need for dominance is reflected mainly in his political 
ideas. The same ambivalence is manifested at a deeper 
level, in states of excessive shyness, needs for isolation, 
self-accusation, and fears of persecution alternate with 
hysterical outbreaks of aggression, and finally in 
feelings of powerlessness alternating with an excessive 
lust for power. Fromm lays a particular stress on the 
pathological root of authoritarian character,by 
dealing at some length with his masochistic and sadistic 
inclinations.
ijisr
There is no doubt that H,T s personality lends itself 
freely to the psycho-analytical vocabulary. As we have 
already seen the Oedipul Complex constitutes the central 
concept from which radiate traits such as homosexuality, 
sexual impotence, masochism, sadism and others. Since the 
task of discussing the legitimacy of these concepts as 
applied to H. seems to be difficult particularly in a 
postmortem analysis,we have h o  resort to a less ambitious 
scheme for the understanding of H fs abnormal charact er.
To start with we should like to take insecurity as the key
key concept of our analysis and to show the various 
modes under which it was displayed by IPs personality.
For the feeling of insecurity is so deeply rooted in Hiller 
that we can designate him as the proto—type of the 
personality built up on this feeling and consequently as a 
model of Kazi authoritarian personality. His family life 
as a child constitutes the first source of insecurity in 
his personality. His irresponsible father creates by his 
unmannered and violent behaviour a permanent threat to 
II* s expectation for tender affection. The same situation 
is responsible for the fact that IPs mother turns all her 
affection towards himj;hus arousing in him a negative 
attitude towards belongingness and sentimentality. The 
envy and jealousy of his step-brothers, because he 
monopolised the mother1s affection, form an additional 
source of insecurity presiding over his early years of 
development. Later conditions of his life, such as his 
fbilure as an artist, the "tragedy" of his first love, 
economic privations, etc. come to foster this first layer 
of insecurity. One the socio-cultural plane the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the country of his birth, 
the defeat and the humiliation of Germany, the country of 
his /deals, his lack of social status due to his lower- 
middle-class origin, all these constitute further con­
ditions for insecurity.
Mow let us outline the main manifestations of the
_ , 'iKsdi
frustrated need for security in IPs personality.
A. Perhaps the most characteristic of all these
these manifestations consists in his explosive tieeds 
for self-assertion indicating his urge to prove to 
everybody - to himself in the first place - the secure 
basis of his personality. We can call this the desire to 
demonstrate his own existence. His aggressiveness is 
undoubtedly rooted in this aspect of his personality.
His tendency towards adventure - vivere pericolosamente - 
can also be traced to the same basic condition. His 
"iron will-power” his lust for power are but various 
dimensions of his need for self-demonstration, On the 
phantasy level his projection of himself as the pro­
vidential leader of the blaster Race is rooted in the same 
basic insecurity. All these forms of insecurity are anti­
social in their character.
B. The frustrated need for security is manifested in
Htffrfalso by the denial of any desire for belongingness and
security. ”1 do not need security”, or ”1 do not care”,
are the usual formulae for this mode of acting out a basic
insecurity. (This is exactly the opposite to the democratic
unassuming character.) Characteristic in this respect
is H fs insensibility, and even hostility, towards -Hie most
important tender bonds in life. Love and family are in
his eyes outweighed by the practical necessity of having
children; religious feelings are signs of weakness;
moral affection are prejudices. The ^ietzschean concepts
of the Super -man can be considered the results of this
particular mode of playing out a basic insecurity. All
rtfcr
anti-social and destructive.
0. A further series of manifestations of the same 
basic insecurity noticed in the so-called "esprit 
certitudien" of which hitler is a typical representative 
is closely connected with what has been said under rB T. 
The main sympton of this trait of Hitler* s personality 
is seen in his readiness to give a "definite" opinion 
011 practically all circumstances of life. Doubt in 
thinking, suspension, lack of opinion, as well as 
"scrupples" in action are for him amongst the worst 
things modern democracy has produced. "Hitler?s real 
superiority"- writes one of the ablest interpreters of 
his life - "rests on the fact that he has an opinion 
in any situation, and that this opinion fits without 
difficulty into his Weltanschauung". (Dr. Hannah Arendt: 
By Hitler zu Tisch. Der Llonat, Heft 37, 0ktober,1951 
p.89.) Not only has he an opinion but he expresses it 
with the strongest conviction possible as if the whole 
world testified to its truth. He shouts it out until 
he produces a fanatical belief both in his own mind and 
in that of his listeners. His mind which has horror of 
doubt, uncertainty and chaos becomes only at this point 
really satisfied.
It is precisely this horror of doubt and uncertainty 
that drives his mind to work out quick answer to every 
problem and thus fill the flaws of his universe. In 
this lies another aspect of his personality, and indeed 
of any "esprit certitudien", namely, his sinplemin &echiess.
Hitler finds everything marvellously simple; the whole 
world is for him a simple "system" of meanings easily 
seen by "virgin" minds. It is only the Jews, the 
intellectuals and the military professionals that 
complicate matters. (Table Talk. p.66.) TI.R. Trevor- 
Roper rightly calls Hitler one"of the most formidable 
among the "terrible simplifiers" of history...” 
(Introduction to Table Talk, p.-^HCV.)
Hitler can easily afford a "simplified" version of 
the Yforld - he is even delighted to talk about this 
particular quality of his mind - for the simple reason 
that his mind is not really interested in "knowledge".. 
His opinions, preceding or following his actions - are 
little more than hasty and superficial justifications 
of his actions. As soon as he is ready for new action 
his imagination flies over the whole field of his 
memory, v/here mutilated ideas and theories are stored, a; 
chooses the one which seems to him most suitable to the 
occasion. In order to justify his racial policy he sees 
it as being rooted in a "natural law" and invokes the 
principle of the survival of the fittest. In this way 
he sets his mind at rest, for "Y/hat holds good for 
monkeys, holds good in the highest degree for the 
human species also".
D. Another mode of playing out a fundamental 
insecurity also seen in consists in the deep desire 
to be accepted and loved by the group. In Hijtathis is c. 
compensation for his repressed desire for belonwiness -
loi>
belonginess, and can very well be considered as
another form of self-assurance. To this aspect belong
H*s excessive need for integration and identification
with the German group and his particular need for
"loyalty". Since the need for loyalty plays an important 
lUgr
part in H*s life we should line to discuss it m  some 
detail.
EitlerTs group identification is facilitated by
certain qualitites of the German people as well as by
certain qualitites of his own personality. During the
inter-war period German society itself had experienced
the feeling of insecurity under various forms. IiTs
modes of reaction to the condition of insecurity lying
at the basis of his personality corresponded therefore
to a main condition of life of the German group as a
i tier
whole. It is worth mentioning in this context H Ts 
remarkable capacity for understanding - feeling or 
sensing seem to be better words in this particular case -
the dominant symbols of the German culture-pattern of his
time. This made it easy for him to produce the fusion 
between the basic conditions of his personality and that 
of the German group and thus to cut for himself the 
figure of a true representative of the nation. His gift 
of oratory and demagaguery are of paramount importance in 
this respect. For he could, so to speak, instinctively 
find the most efficient words to stir up and to intensify 
the basic insecurity of his people. To their feeling of 
inferiority he offered the myth of the master Race, to
■ ........... . t *>t ;
to their repressed security and self-assertion he 
offered an aggressive policy; their guilt was answered
by his strong capacity to create scapegoats. It was
? • <
K  V ?
this capacity for reading the mind of the people that 
brought him outstanding political success in a relatively 
short time, a fact which gave him self-confidence and 
the courage to assume great responsibilities. It was 
therefore easy for him to leap from one extreme to 
another, i.e., from a basic lack of security, self- 
confidence and feeling of belongingness to over-confidence 
and complete identification with the will of the people; 
from an outcast to a providential man embodying the 
highest qualities of his own race.
Now a few words about Hitler's need for loyalty and 
belongingness.
JS
The only obvious fact&7 in this respect,that B. 
expects absolute loyalty to himself from every member of 
his Party. "Heine Ehre heisst TreueM was the oath taken 
by the members of S.S. organisation. In the light of 
psycho-analysis the motives of this need inHliUr’? 
personality spring mainly from his homosexual inclination. 
The Party - at least its nucleus - seems, according to 
this thesis, a strange love affair. Consequently Hitler 
treated the Party .members according to the emotional 
logic of love. The case of Rohm is often cited as a 
proof of this. Yet one can hardly avoid the common 
observation that the need for loyalty is a characteristic
iOZs
characteristic not only of Htf(?rbut of many revolutionaries 
who did not show any sign of homosexuality. Saint Just, 
Robespierre, Lenin, Stalin are only a few of them.
This makes us think that paranoid tendencies offer 
a sufficient basis for the explanation of this need.
Great need for the loyalty of others is one of the 
characteristic traits of that type of personality built, 
up on the feeling of insecurity. Any critical attitude 
towards such a personality is bound to arouse his 
insecurity which at one of its extremes might arouse 
suspicion and fears of persecution. The emotional logic 
of this personality is all or nothing, complete loyalty 
or infidenity and treason.
Hitler's identification with the German group takes 
us to one of the most important traits of his personality. 
This refers to his attitude towards society. Many 
investigators in this field seem to hold in one way or 
another the opinion that Hdlfrhad a strong Superego.
Ihis is a compensation for his weak Ego which was incapable 
of mastering his powerful anti-social drives. If we give a 
rational expression to an unconscious process we can say 
that HiBfcidentifies himself with the German group, he 
builds up a Party, in order to create, in himself the com­
fortable feeling that he is not a "merle blanen and that 
his fundamental tendencies are not anti-social ans immoral. 
Gilbert himself, after classifying H^as a paranoid 
psycho-path, comes to the conclusion that he did not lack 
a Superego. "His extraordinary sensitivity to status and
and approval by tlie in-group bespeaks merely a 
distortion of the Superego function". (Op.cit. p.284).
 ^  ^ According to 0. Benichel the identification with 
one's own group consists in an unconscious process the
effect of which is that the individual overcomes a basic
ambivalence in his personality. By this he objectifies 
and satisfies his aggression in out-groups, and his 
Eros in the in-group. Thus he plays out an inner 
conflict. (0. Eenichei; The Fsychoanly^is of Anti- 
setitism. American Imago,I, 1940).
The way in which the concept of the Superego is used 
in the analysis of H*s personalities involves ambiguities 
in its meaning. If we take the Superego as a mental 
structure whose function is to repress the anti-social
impulses in the individual, by creating at the same time
inter-individual modes of behaviour, then HiiUfhad a 
strong and a very weak Superego at the same time. For 
it is perfectly true that he integrated himself with hi^ 
own group, but the group itself is an anti-social group 
par excellence, and became even more so under h fs rule. 
Morevor Edkpcrented a Party based on the rule of force 
which appealed to the individual in the measure in which 
the individual himself had strong anti-social needs. 
xhe individual joined the Party neb as "homo socialis" 
but rather to cover his lack in this human quality.
In other words created a society of socio-pathic 
personalities organised in the manner of the "Fuks 
Divisionen". In this sense we cannot infer from his 
group identification the existence in his personality of 
a strong Superego structure, he can hardly say that an 
an bi-social psycho-path who joins a "gang" has a stronger
t o  ¥
(i)
stronger Superego than one who acts on his own.
^  This basic ambiguity can be avoided only if one 
creates, a distinction within the concept of the 
Superego, and say that Hi&Had a ”socially” strong 
but "morally” weak Superego - This distinction sounds 
artificial, for tbe simple reason that social integration 
normally implies moral qualities.
The case of HiiWseems to be that of a psycho-pathic 
personality who integrated himself with a group in 
order to gratify his own anti-social tendencies. We 
see in this a victory of the basic impulses of the Id_ 
rather than the victory of the Superego. This is 
characteristic of most personalities built up on the 
feeling of insecurity of which hilhids proto-type. T'his 
is also the most striking feature in the Nazi type of 
authoritarian personality. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, this type of personality suffers from an 
incapacity to project his own experience at an inter­
individual level and thus to create objective noims of 
behaviour based on self-restraint (unassuming character) 
and compromise with others. These personalities form 
outstanding examples of self-centred individualities.
Thus when they integrate themselves with the group this 
is meant to satisfy their anti-social tendencies. The 
only social "order” in such groups is the hierachy of 
power experienced emotionally by the individuals, i.e. 
love or fear for the strong and contempt and ruthlessness 
for the weak. On the other hand,the group itself is self 
centred, and therefore has no moral standards in its
its relationships with other groups.
Hitler's personality is not absolutely deprived of 
the capacity to project social modes of behaviour, The 
image, of an heroic society, the myth of the Master Bace, 
the dream of a united strong latherland are proof of 
this. But they are far too vague and as such unfit for 
the standards of contemporary society. Moreover their 
function was mainly to compensate for the fundamentally 
anti-social tendencies of his Party and to a certain 
extent of the Germanic group. As such it is hard to 
consider them as the manifestation of a well-consfc ituted 
Superego, They suggest in fact the smouldering aches 
of a collective unconscious,a stage in the evolution of 
mankind at which one can hardly distinguish the function 
of the Superego in the individual. Icrat this stage the 
group exists primarily as an "organic1* necessity for the 
individual. The repressing forces - repression being 
taken as a psychological mechanism, i.e., as an 
enodopsychic phenomenon-of the primary impulses are weak, 
lof the individual's life is integrated with a super­
individual order by the pressure of external forces - 
coming from inside {fear of the stronger) and from outside 
the group - rather than by the functions of an inner 
structure of his own mind. In conclusion, the individual's 
identification with an anti-social group cannot be taken 
as a sign of the exietence of a strong social function in 
his own mind.
Hermann Goering. Goering, like Hitler, ness and 
Frank, is considered by Gilbert as belonging to the 
"revolutionist" group within the Nazi movement.
Clinically he is labelled as an aggressive narcissistic 
personality. As a child he was fascinated by military 
displays, uniforms and parades. Later he identifies 
himself with the military -Junkers cast, with its ideals 
of patriotism, glory and war. He is to the last moment 
of his life obsessed by the heroic myth of Siegfried 
and makes a supreme effort to remain as a hero in the 
German history books. Throughout his life he had shown 
a deep contempt for peaceful, ordinary people. "Naturally, 
the common people do not want war ..... it is the leaders
I !i r
of the country who determine the policy I From his
conversation with Gilbert April 16, 1946, Gp.Cit. p. 117.)
With regard to his identification with the German 
people his case is similar to that of "He introcepts" 
writes Gilbert - "the social values of his culture to the 
extent they gratify his egotistical needs and provides 
outlets for his aggressive drives" (Gil. p.284). In 
Speer's words he was "doping himself with morphine and 
stealing art treasures from all over Europe when Germany 
was in agony" (Ibidem p.105.) His Ego-inflated 
personality constituted a perfect outlet for the 
aggressive mood of the German people fostered by the Nazi 
movement. He joined the Nazi revolution "precisely because 
it was a revolution, not because of the ideological stuff",.
(Gilbert p.248) most probably that clinically ke. h *
VHTihic.
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Rudolf Hess, Clinically he is "'hysteric-paranoiac. 
His hysteria is manifested in a series of amnesias; 
the character of his paranoia was passive, mainly as
persecution. The ^azi movement with its myths of
vv.a-tkc w 'n.c fc® i-vvv*
persecutionbwad his need for martyrdom, (I.R. Rees 
deals in detail with riesst personality. - The Case of 
Rudolf IieC^ , London,1947*)
Hans Frank, He is clinically described as a latent 
homosexual. Various fragments from his conversation 
with Gilbert are symptomatic from this point of view, 
,?One must not say that Hitler violated the German 
people, he Seduced them”, or ”he seduces us only to 
destroy us”. (Gilbert Ibidem, p.148).
We have insisted rather disproportionately
1 fa,
upon the psycho-pathological aspects of Id's personality 
The purpose of this was to demonstrate that one can dis 
tinguish in the structure of his personality the basic 
elements of Nazi authoritarian personality. Goering, 
Hess, Frank, and others such as Goebbels an£ Himmler
can also offer material for the construction of this 
type of personality. But the authoritarian behaviour 
of these people can in many respects be considered as
being conditioned by their cultural environment and by
by the structure of the Party in particular. Hitler, 
on the other hand, gives from himself. He uses 
creatively the latent and loosely connected authoritarian 
elements of his social and cultural environment. He is 
himself a proto-type of authoritarian personality and in 
co-operation with a series of factors existing in his 
social environment he builds up an authoritarian 
organisation.
In conclusion the main psycho-pathological symptoms 
found in the chief Nazi leaders can be classified under 
the following points:
1. Aggressive paranoia - sado-masochism - latent
homosexuality. Typical representative: Hitler.
2. Narcissism - typically displayed by Goering.
3. Passive paranoia, latent homosexuality (persecution),
mystic sentimentalism, typically represented by Hess
Sociogenesis. Me come up against, as we did many 
times before, the problem of the relationship between the 
personal and the social. Gan we explain the pathological 
factors involved in Nazism only by the present of a series 
of psycho-pathological traits in its leaders. Or have 
we to resort, for the solution of this problem, to certain 
qualities of German society during the rise and growth of 
Nazism? Although we are ready to answer the second 
question in the affirmative, we cannot hide the feeling 
of difficulty generally involved in this kind of question. 
tie are on safe ground when talking about the presence of 
psycho-pathological elements in Hitler and other -azi ^
Nazi leaders, for the simple fact that a certain 
amount of empirical evidence is available in this sense.
In his study Gilbert made use of reliable psychological 
methods. But when trying to analyse the pathological 
elements involved in the German culture-pattern, during 
the. period preceding Nazism, we cannot rely on any 
systematic research, psychological or anthropological.
The few data made available by Dick's study on various 
Nazi concentration caraps cannot help very much since 
they refer to Nazi post-war mentality. In this case the 
psychologists only choice is to give his own inter­
pretation to a series of historical facts selected by 
him as symptomatic for the mental structure of the German 
group during the period under consideration. The hypo­
thetical elements have to be very strong indeed. And yet 
one can understand very little the function of various 
psychological factors in Nazism, without this hypothesis. 
For H's paranoia personality, or Goeringfs narcissistic 
traits, symptomatic as they were, could hardly create a 
series of mental characteristics in the Nazi group, or in 
the German group, had they met indifferent or hostile 
surroundings. The fact is that they built themselves on, 
and exploited, elements already in the minds of many 
members of German society.
Many psychological researches give the impression that
one could easily find in the structure of German society
the same psycho-pathological symptoms as in T s. , or other
/
other leaders1 personalities. The hypothesis lying at 
the basis of these researches seems to be the following: 
paranoia and narcissistic personalities cannot become 
leaders but in a paranoia or narcissistic society or group, 
ill though we cannot unreservedly agree with this way of 
reasoning in social psychology, we should like, all the 
same, to indicate the most important pathological aspects 
of German society which have a certain significance for 
Nazism.
1 . The concept most accurately covering all the 
important pathological symptoms shown by German society 
during and immediately preceding Nazism, is that of a
x
socio-pathlc group. As mentioned elsewhere, we defined 
this concept in analogy with the concept of psycho-pathic 
personality. As in the case of psycho-pathic personality, 
the socio-pathic character of the group is motivated by a 
basic insecurity, and as in the case of psycho-pathic 
personality again, the acting out of the effects of 
insecurity leads to a morbid urge for self-assertion of the 
group. Hence the authoritarian character of its organ­
isation, its policy based on force, and its anti-social 
behaviour.
Insecurity can be considered as the main cause of 
German society's failure to adapt itself to the twentieth 
century democratic way of life. For this basic insecurity 
prevented the German group from keeping itself in 
permanent contact with the historical level of European^
European civilization and from projecting its 
aspirations as a group on the values created by this 
civilization. This basic insecurity destroyed the 
frame of reference for the aspirations of the German 
group, thus formed the background for the process of 
regression suffered by this group under the Nazi regime. 
For regression is prompted,as we have seen,by the need 
for a new frame of reference. In this particular case
t
the new frame of reference is found in a patriarchal!sbicj 
type of society.
The lack of the frame of reference has a
particular socio-logical importance, which in the case of 
Nazism has received too little attention. This is the 
group trait that can explain to a great ektent the 
importance played by the declasses and psycho-pathic 
personalities in the Nazi movement. For it is this socio­
logical category and this personality type that can more 
successfully crystallise the various mental vectors in a 
group with a lost frame of reference. Its disorientation, 
its fears and revolt against a hostile environment, and 
•finally its urge to escape into adventure, all these find 
their highest expression in that type of personality and 
group described by us as socio-pathic. The insecurity 
renders the group itself socio-pathic, by developing in 
it a chronic incapacity to attach itself to the values i
of the civilization to which it belongs.
Ge hasten to say that we cannot describe the vh ole of
the twentieth century German society as having a well-,
lit'
well-defined socio-patiiic structure. Its general state 
of insecurity and its incapacity to integrate with 
European democratic civilization can be considered only 
as a fertile ground in which a socio-pathic structure 
could develop, A series of latent socio-pathic factors 
existing in German society as a whole have crystallised 
in clearer forms in its classless groups,and finally in 
a series of psycho-pathic personalities,^
(1)
It is the socio-pathic character manifested by 
German society under the Hazi rule that made Gilbert 
consider Nazism as a case of maladjusted group behaviour.
"At the present stage of manTs evolution aggression no 
longer serves the purpose of survival but of extinction".! 
(Ibidem, p.316.)
2, The paranoiac features of the German culture-
pattern have been for a long time a subject of debate.
ih,
Fromm, Laswell and -brickner (R)K(Is Germany Curable?, 
Philadelphia, 1943} among others, make an important point 
of this. Brickner ^ speaks about a paranoic German culture 
wondering whether this is curable or not. (The most 
frequent paranoiac symptoms referred to are: Self- 
glorification (Narcissism) and obsessional forms of 
aggression^.
Gilbert takes a different view - a moderate one - with 
regard to the application of the concept of paranoia to 
the German group and to its culture-pattern. He asks for 
a re-formulation of all clinical concepts when applied to 
social conflicts and disorders. Consequently he speaks 
about a cultural pseudoparanoia as characteristic of
of German society. This means that one can find 
certaih. paranoiac trends in the German group, although 
its members cannot be classified as clinical cases of 
paranoia. He bases his view on the fact that in a 
clinical examination during the nurenberg Trial, only a 
few Nazi leaders showed signs of clinical paranoid 
tendencies. The members of the Nazi group, and, with a 
few exceptions, of the German group as a whole,behaved / 
as if they were paranoiacs because their personalities 
were directed by their culture. Their perceptions, 
emotions and thoughts were conditioned by a process of 
cultural learning to such an extent that they showed 
signs of delusional behaviour. A series of prejudices, 
religious beliefs and myths exercised an obsessional 
pressure upon them. In the totalitarian State created 
by Nazism - Gilbert concludes - the national behaviour 
resembles -paranoia, i.e., behaviour based on systematised 
delusions (innate superiority) and aggression.
It is easy to agree with Gilbertfs general request 
regarding the necessity of re-formulation of the clinical 
concepts before applying them to the group or culture- 
pattern. It is not so easy, however, to follow Min in 
his attempt to establish the difference between clinical 
and cultural paranoia. On this subject he says: "We 
can describe this as a cultural pseudo-paranoia because 
it is only a cultural phenomenon and does not involve the 
breakdown of the mental reality-testing function. The
The possibility of reality-testing has simply been 
artificially limited by the nature of the cultural 
learning process (Idem p.271)* ft seems to us that 
it is precisely the defectiveness of the reality-testing 
function that forms the. most striking trait of modern 
German culture, and that this cannot be explained but 
by the same type of deficiency in the members of the 
German community. Nazism "actualised" this trait in the 
sense that the individuals and the sub-groups suffering 
most from this deficiency emerged as the. ruling stratum 
.of German society. Nazism as the "geniale Moment umu 
of the German people means in this particular context 
precisely that the German people have reached perfection 
in one of their fundamental traits.
, If we understand by the reality-testing function a 
congenial flexibility of the individual's and group's 
behaviour so as to reach compromise between divergent 
factors existing either in their inner structure or in 
their environment, then the defectiveness of this function 
in modern Gorman society is obvious. At the 
level j this is shown by that striking incapacity of modem 
German thought to reach a balance between the mind and 
the external world, and in its almost morbid repulsion 
for dualism. This is the trai£ which forms the core of 
Mario Pensa's study of the German culture-pattern. (Das 
Deutsche Denken, Zurich, 1948) As compared with the 
classical thought (of Greek origin) characterised by the 
balance between object and subject, reality and knowledge,/
knowledge, universal and particular, the main task of 
modern German thought is to upset tills balance by 
creating an over-powering “Self51 with imperialistic 
tendencies towards - against is a better word - the 
external world. The concept of the Self of the German 
mystics, Kant's transcendental Ego, Hegel's theoretical 
Ego, and Nietzsche's practical Ego are. various steps 
towards this end. German idealism on the whole is a clear
sign of dilusional trends within modern European
civilization. The same incapacity for compromise is 
displayed in practice by the "Real Politik"« Self­
centredness of the individual and of the group, to the 
extent of denying the existence of the external world 
in its own right, so characteristic of German culture,
h*-
forms the main symptopa. of defectiveness in the reality- 
testing function. Therefore, there is no difference
between clinical and cultural paranoia from this point of
view; the reality-testing function is defective in both.
The important question arises whether one can describe 
an individual who is perfectly integrated with German 
culture under Nazi regime, as having his reality-testing 
function impaired, therefore not liable to clinical 
paranoia. Would it not be more accurate to take the view 
that his identification with that culture - which shows 
signs of defectiveness in the reality-testing function-is 
a sign that his own mind is defective from the same point [ 
of view? There is in that individual a readiness to 
distort the world in a particular Lianner - paranoiac -
and the Nazi culture-pattern presents a proper medium 
for this. That is why he clings to it and makes out of 
it the "means" of expressing his own mind. That this 
particular individual cannot easily be declared a clinical 
case of paranoia is obviously true. But it seems necessary 
to add to this that the meaning of the concept "clinical" 
is relative. Is there not some value in social psychology 
for viewing the individual who displays symptoms of 
paranoiac behaviour and Y*ho lives in culture-pattern 
impregnated with paranoiac trends, as a clinical ease of 
paranoia?
3. Compulsion is also often connected with Nazism*
It is sho^wn in the rigidity and the repetitiveness of 
behaviour-pattern such as crossing oneself, saluting, 
shaking hands, executing "mechanically" Qieaningless orders 
and in other ways. Gilbert is again of the opinion that 
the compulsive traits in the Nazi group cannot be explained 
as "a ritual set up by the individual and adhered to rigidly 
beyond self-control as a necessary mechanism to deal with 
(his own) anxiety" (Ibid. p.272.) It cannot therefore be 
regarded as a compulsive behaviour in a clinical sense, but 
as a cultural pseudo-compulsion. As to the question in what 
exactly consists the "pseudo-compulsion" character of the 
German group, Gilbert gives a not altogether clear answer. 
One might, however, infer that the main symptoms of com-
f
pulsion are shown in the group's readiness to exhibit 
stereotyped behaviour, in its fondness of "order" and 
discipline, and very vaguely speaking, in its Prussianistic
Prussian!stic attitude to life. The Nazi regime had 
intensified the militaristic character of German culture 
to such an extent that the individual belonging to the 
German community carried on the group behaviour rituals 
with very little or no possibility of resistance. There was 
no scale of values, to put a check to his rigid adherence and 
loyalty to the group. He would exterminate people en masse, 
he would kill children in order to satisfy this loyalty. 
Cultural pseudo-compulsion consists therefore in the 
culturally conditioned tendency in the individual "to carry 
to the extreme the repetition of group behaviour rituals" 
(ibid. p.273). Gilbert makes the point clear that the 
individuals themselves - according to the results of his 
investigation at the Nuremberg Trial - show no sign of 
clinical compulsive behaviour. But, - may we ask,- does 
the concept of clinical compulsion imply something more 
than acting out an amiety in a socially non-conformist 
manner, or a ritual set for acting it out, therefore 
rendering the individual liable to hospitalisation? If the 
members of the Nazi group or of the German community could 
act out their own anxieties - their fears of persecution 
for instance - in a institutionalised form, does this fact 
make their behaviour less compulsive in a clinical sense? 
Concerning this point, there is something else we should 
like to add which is completely overlooked by Gilbert.
The motivation of the compulsive behaviour characteristic 
of the German group lies in the anxieties created in the 
group by a series of historical conditions. It is therefore
therefore the a'cting out of the "general” anxiety that 
leads to a generalised form of compulsion* As long as 
the majority of the individuals belonging to this group 
accept and make this attern of behaviour their own - be 
it under Prussian absolutism, under Bismarck or hitler - 
the right conclusion from this is that they have in 
themselves the condition of compulsive behaviour. This 
is not meant to minimise the part played by a series of 
cultural factors in the behaviour of the Nazi leaders, 
or in the members of the -German group under Hazi rule, 
but rather to re-establish a balance between the 
cultural and personal factors in the determination of 
this behaviour. In order to explain the behaviour of 
the comparatively moral and respectable members of 
Hitler’s entourage", Gilbert resorts to the concept of a 
defence mechanism in value conflicts. These leaders as 
well as the majority of the German people suffered from 
,fsemi-conscious suppression of insight" rather than 
from any pathological disorder. In the conflict between 
their own hostile, ethnocentric group and the democratic 
humanitarian world, they failed to make "full use of 
mature observation and reason for fear of disturbing a 
comforting belief or set of values" (Ibid, p.277). In 
plain words they lost their heads in favour of their own 
group interests. The defence mechanisms referred to by 
Gilbert are: A. The obviation and diversion of insight,
and B. the selective constriction of affect. Due to the 
first mechanisms, the perceptions unfavourable to the
/
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"the N a z i  s%& of values were averted, the contact with * 
reality being confined to those aspects which reinforced 
the social values established by this regime. Gilbert 
found that many Nazi leaders did not know and did not 
believe in'the atrocities committed by the SS. ^he 
second mechanism produces selective empathy, indifference 
and hostility, the result of which consisted in the 
crystallisation of all positive feelings round the in­
group, and of all negative feelings round the out-groups.
There is no doubt that in many Germans cert an 
aspects of behaviour were influenced by these mechanisms* 
and that many such people "knew not what they did". We 
agree that these mechanisms characteristic of the con­
flicts between an authoritarian and democratic culture 
and of social conflicts in general, are taken by, or 
imposed upon, the individuals from outside. But the 
mere fact that these mechanisms take control of the 
individuals' mind, shows that the individuals themselves 
need them and that a series of inner conflicts must have 
been at work in every individual in order to make the 
mechanisms as efficient as they were in many members of 
the German community under the Nazi regime. Therefore 
"the comparatively normal and respectable" people must j f  
have had their own lack of balance in order to become thit 
victims of a series of obviations and diversions of 
insight and of selective constrictions of affect.
In conclusion we are. ready to suggest that cultural
cultural pseudo-paranoia and pseudo-compulsion seem to 
be but the "institutionalisation” of a series of
paranoiac and compulsive dispositions existing in various
y'degrees in the great bulk of the German population and 
in its leaders in particular. For the determination of 
these dispositions we have to look into the process of 
individuation in the conditions offered by contemporary 
German society, and by Nazi society in particular.
This will be the task of the next chapter.
ill
C H A P T E R  V
NAZI AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY.
Trust your sword rather than the portcullis.
(Icelandic Saga).
Tb£ M '■ b;p ■ ■t. Individuation in a Threatened Society.
The structural analysis of various Western societies dealt 
with in several previous chapters has led to the following 
conclusions: "Various processes taking place within con­
temporary Western society in general, and German society in 
particular, have gradually built up a specific pattern of 
development of human personality. The psychological analysis 
of this type of personality can give us the clue to the under 
standing of some important aspects of Nazism and Fascism in 
general.
Though at a later stage of our study we feel the need of 
reminding the reader that do not speak in terms of 
casual!ty and on no account of unilinear causality. The 
social and cultural conditions of twentieth century Europe, 
and of Germany in particular, certainly contain in them- 
” selves the "motives” of a specific structure of human
personality. On the other hand, this type of personality 
forms a suitable "medium” for the manifestation of the
fundamental aspects of the German eulture-pattern under /
/>L-
under Nazism. Yet we have, to stick to a descriptive 
point of view in dealing with these phenomena,, with very 
little knowledge of the causal relationship between them. 
Conveniently one can consider these phenomena, i.e., 
specific cultural factors of contemporary society,.a 
specific personality type, aftnraiif as various aspects in 
the evolution of Western man and his society.
If Yie have to describe in a single word the structure 
of the field leading to that form of individuation which 
contains in itself the basic conditions of authoritarian 
behaviour, we would say "insecurity”. Recent psycho­
logical researches, based mainly on clinical and 
experimental methods, have - we hope - very little to 
quarrel with this general assumption. Nor they nearly 
all stress in one way or another the fact that 
authoritarian personality presupposes individuate ion in 
conditions of insecurity.
The map of main sources of insecurity in con-
SsX-odt
temporary Western world can be as follows:
A. The rapid tempo of change of modern soeiety is 
usually considered as the most general source of 
insecurity in modern man. The frequent crises in various 
aspects of modern society and the general social 
instability are closely connected with this tempo of change.
The twofold meaning of the instability and relativity 
of social forms in a civilisation based on individual 
freedom should be pointed out. Change in itself does not
/
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not produce insecurity as long as it is considered 
for the better. This presupposes either the 
existence of a strong faith in the rational character 
of social evolution, or a sustained empirical proof 
of the increased well-being in the majority of 
individuals, as a direct result of change* When 
these two factors are weak, or do not exist at all, 
change becomes a source of insecurity in the 
individual. This is the case in many contemporary 
Western societies.
In these societies social instability has been 
experienced primarily as lack of scope for individual 
freedom. For the individuals freedom is no longer 
guided and guaranteed fey any creed and by any firm 
social organisation. Consequently the individual 
experiences the feeling of freedom along with the
conviction of its futility. Free for what. ?
"Free to die”,is often the answer. This slogan used 
today by second-rate Marxists is still catching, for 
it translates a deep mental condition of contemporary 
man. Freedom without firm social and psychological 
grounds is’ associated in the individual’s mind with 
fear and insecurity.
Inother important source of insecurity in con­
temporary man can be described as follows; During 
the twentieth century the Western culture-pattern 
offers very few outlets for the individual’s
/
individual’s frustrated need for security. ' In this 
consists one of the main conditions of the process of 
individuation specific of Fascist authoritarian 
personality. This very condition shows also the main 
difference between Nazi, mediaeval and Communist types 
of authoritarian personality. For mediaeval man 
integrates himself with an autocratic social order by 
transferring his need for personal security and 
freedom into a transcendental world, with which he is 
linked by faith. The need for security and freedom 
in Communist man is, on the other hand, satisfied by 
his reliance on the powetof secular reason; the success 
of his action and the security of his existence are 
guaranteed by the rational character of history. But, 
as we have seen before, the structure of the European 
culture-pattern of the twentieth century offers little 
support for the belief in either the transcendental or 
secular order. Consequently the raodes of experiencing 
security and freedom are, in this culture, almost non­
existent. The structuration of personality takes placei 
in an instable background, and at the ebb-tide of a 
rationalistic era.
This is the cultural topography of the individuation 
of Fascist man. Its formula is: man-in-a-hostile-world; 
human life is guaranteed neither by a steady empirical 
progress, nor by a rational order. Human personality 
grows in uhe vacuum, left by the fall of the transcendent,
nr
transcendent, upheld by religion, and a shrinking 
rationalism. In this existential context, insecurity 
oftem amounts to desperation. The main'binding force 
in life seems to be a blind will for existing. The 
grotesque Hitlerian ftwe will for we will”, or ”who 
has, has”, represent a basic mental condition in con­
temporary man.
1 \*st
B. The of the causes of insecurity lying at 
the basis of authoritarian personality is not complete 
without taking into account the specific situation of 
modern German society. The social and economic causes
!
of insecurity in the inter-war period have been dealt with] 
elsewhere. For the moment we should like to emphasise !
i
that source of insecurity which is most characteristic j 
of the formation of the Nazi type of authoritarian 
personality. This consists in the failure of German 
society to integrate with contemporary European 
civilisation. The conflict betT/een the ethnocentric 
German culture and democratic humanitarian - at least 
aa aspiration - European civilisation reaches one of its 
peaks in the twentieth century. This increases in the 
German group the feeling of isolation and hostility 
towards the surrounding world. Parallel to this grows ;
the need for a strong integration of the group within 
itself. This constitutes one of the major motives in 
the formation of Nazi personality.
/
Some Aspects of Individuation under Conditions of
Insecurity*
1* One of the most characteristic features of a 
personality which has grown up in conditions of 
insecurity consists in, a low degree of self-integration. 
The feeling of insecurity constitutes a constant source 
of instability in the structure of'this personality.
The conviction that the circumstances of life are 
stronger than it is itself forms one of its pervasive 
traits. Its self-confidence and self-initiative are 
usually weak save where insecurity is repressed and 
over-compensated.
The relationship established by this type of 
personality with the external world shows signs of 
deficiency in the reality-testing function. Person­
alities formed under conditions of insecurity are much 
more inclined than any other type to blame external 
circumstances for their own failures. They have the 
feeling of being surrounded by a hostile world to which 
they react in an ambivalent manner: expressing either 
excessive aggression, in order to break down the 
hostility, or total submission.
There is considerable projection at work in these 
personalities. (This is the most common reason why it 
is uauallv held that their reality-testing function is 
defective.) Their thwarted self-assertion and their 
excessive number of repressed tendencies form in the
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the Unconscious a pool of aggression which, when 
escaping the repressing forces of the Ego, are projected 
upon other people or upon the external world in general. 
In this case their own impotence is seen by them as 
others* impotence, their own aggression as aggression 
in others.
Concluding this section we can say that the first 
characteristic of the personality grown up in conditions 
of insecurity consists in a weak Ego structure. This 
is sho?/n in its low degree of self-integral ion and in 
the defectiveness of it«l reality function.
2. A personality with a weak Ego structure has a 
particular tendency to form a compensatory structure, 
i.e., to build up a hypertrophied or inflated Ego 
which displays a high degree of integration. This 
phenomenon lies in the "logic" of the process of indiv­
iduation in conditions of insecurity and it is the work 
of the mechanisms of repression, compensation and pro­
jection. The same desire for security v/hich forms the 
basis of inferiority and lack of self-confidence may 
lead, if strongly repressed, to an excessive need for 
self- assertion and superiority. Weakness becomes 
"fear of weakness", (T.¥.Adorno, and others, The 
Authoritarian ^ersonalityyEarpers andf&r&Pvea* , h.X.
1950, p.801) and positive tendency to overcome insecurity.
In this case the centre of the personality is formed by
what we have previously called the urgent need for self-
V
s e l f-demonstration. In common language one would say 
that these people are full of themselves. the social
plane they like to be noticed by others and to enjoy 
prestige. The methods used by them to achieve this vary. 
They often pay particular attention to manners in speech 
and dress, showing a particular fondness for pomp and 
showmanship. They may also resort to aggression in order 
to win approval and pre&ige.
The inflated Ego personality sets high standards for 
himself. He worships great personalities and often 
identifies himself with one of them. Goering,for instance, 
identified himself with Siegfried. Identification with 
the "Fuhrer" was a common phenomenon in Nazi youth.
Repressed desire for security can be compensated by 
a categorical denial of the need for security. In this 
case the individual represses any passivity and need for 
belongingness in'life. He exhibits an exceptional, mostlyi
animal, courage and an intense drive for adventure. Any- 
thing that gives order to life may form the target for his 
aggression. The supreme value to him is "reliance on 
oneself". "Trust your sword rather than the portcullis", 
as the motto of this chapter suggests.
In this way the individuation based on insecurity fo 
a compensatory structure as superiority and grandeur*
For the weak Ego is inflated by modes of behaviour which 
show over-confidence and a high degree of security in life. 
B u t  b e n e a t h  t h i s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  l i e s  a basic stratum
stratum of shyness and cowardliness, which bursts, out from 
time to time.
3. A weak Ego often determines a high degree of inte­
gration with the group, This is a means of escaping 
insecurity and lack of personal initiative. Personalities 
with a weak Ego structure identify themselves preferably 
with those groups which compensate for their need for 
security as well as for their compensatory drives, the 
need for power, adventure,*, showmanship, ete* Military 
organisations are a great attraction to these personalities, 
for they seem to satisfy best the basic drives of this
type of'personality: need for integration and submission 
and need for aggression and dominance. The society built 
up by these personalities is of a military type.
4. Strong repression is another important aspect of the
process of individuation under conditions of insecurity.
The great number of privations and frustrations presiding 
over the process of individuation build up in the structure 
of the mind strong defence mechanisms among Yfhieh re­
pression is one of the most important.
Gomroon observation shows that repression of the funda­
mental tendencies often results in an attitude of frugality 
in life. Yet when repression is strong - and this is the^ 
case in the process of individuation under condition^of 
insecurity - it may result in a certain indifference and 
even aversion towards the manifestation of a series of 
fundamental drives - such as food and sex - and the
/
the emotional states related to them. This can be 
manifested under various forms, such as an attitude of 
superiority towards "vulgar pleasure", or strong aversion, 
obsessional nausea, and aggression towards people indulgin 
in such pleasures. It might also lead to an ascetic 
ideal in life as it did in many Nazi leaders. This last 
attitude was a common trait in "legionari", a Roumanian 
Fascist movement combined with religious revivalism.
Various recent researches on the structure of 
authoritarian personality have brought into evidence rich 
material regarding this point. Else Frenkel Brunswick in 
her study of the "antisemitic personality", which,though 
not identical has many traits in common with the Nazi 
personality, shows that at the question"What would you 
like to do most if you have only six months to live?", 
very few people holding antisemitic views referred to 
sensual pleasure. (Else Frenkel Brunswik R.N.Sanford: 
Some Personality Factors in Antisemitism, J.of PsydHcl- 
1945, 20, pp.271-291 and Ea Personalite Antisemite,
Les Temps Modernes, 1950, 60 pp. 577-602.)
There are two mechanisms which play a predominant 
part in strongly repressed personalities: A. Beaction-
formation and B. Projection.
A. A repressed tendency may turn into its own opposite 
and seek for satisfaction under this new form. A 
strongly repressed hostility is often disguised in 
excessive amiability and politeness; a repressed sexual
impulse may appear as abstention; a desire for dirtiness,/
m  \
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dirtiness, as an'exaggerated cleanliness, etc., •
Strongly repressed anti-social tendencies - aggressive or |
i
narcissistic - may turn into moral rigorism. Loyalty to, ?.
I
and identification with the group,resulting from strongly 3
■ i
repressed anarchic tendency, constitutes a typical reaction •:
?
formation in Nazi personality. |
B. Another mode' of acting out a strongly repressed |
' fta
tendency is by projecting it upon others. A repressed |
I
immoral wish or desire for dirtiness is projected upon j
other people who consequently become targets of hatred. 1
Thus the individual does not only clean himself od dirty S
intentions and immorality but sees himself as a champion 
of morality and cleanliness.
The projection upon others of oneTs own repressed 1
desires, because socially unacceptable, forms the' basis 
of the scape-goat mechanism. This is the main concept 
used by psycho-analysis for the explanation of the antisemitjef 
traits in Nazi Germany and of other forms of national J
prejudice. 1
Concerning the structure of Nazi antisemitism % my I
psycho-analytical studies stress the fact that the anti- I
Semitic personality in general suffers from strong desires I
for dirtiness, moral and physical, which, being strongly I
repressed, are projected upon Jews. Consequently the Jews I
Iare hated because they are dirty,licentious in matters f
of sex or with lax moral standards in matters of money. *
A strongly repressed sexual impulse in Hitler and Julius 
Streicher - to mention two outstanding cases - makes them
/
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tiiera. suffer from the obsession of the rape of 
Christian girls by -Jews.
The value of this thesis is that it stresses the 
role played by repression, as a purely endof>%ychic 
process, in national prejudices. It fails, however, 
to give a clear idea regarding the existence of 
strong repression mechanisms in the great majority of 
the members of the German group. This is usually 
attributed by the representatives of this thesis to 
the authoritarian methods used by German parents in 
bringing up their children. For us the origin of 
repression lies in the nature of the process of 
individuation under conditions of insecurity, of which 
the parental attitude towards the child is only one 
aspe ct.
Heedless to say, the mechanisms of repression and 
projection do not explain away the antisemitic 
attitude in Hazi Germany. A series of cultural factors 
should be taken into account. Chief of all is the 
objective difference and conflict between two ethon-
a)centric cultures: German and -Jewish.
(1) fe do not deal in great detail with the antisemitic 
aspect of Nazism for the simple reason that we- are not 
quite certain whether antisemitism should be regarded 
as a key factor in the structure of authoritarian 
personality or authoritarian group in the way this idea 
is presented by T.w. Adorno and others in fTThe 
Authoritarian Personality” (Harper and Brothers II. 1. 
1950). Antisemitism seems to be a problem of it§£>wn, 
a free floating psycho-social factor in modern civil­
isation. There have been democratic groups shov/ing anti 
semit ism (France) and authoritarian groups which did not 
(Soviet Russia and Italian Fascism.)
5. Individuation in conditions of insecurity con­
stitutes one of the main causes of ambivalent attitudes 
to life, A strong mecnahism of repression is closely 
connected with, this phenomenon.
The most general aspect of ambivalence can be seen 
in the conflict between the open and the deep’’'touches”
of personality. At the deep level one finds immoral
\
tendencies which are covered, at the manifest level, 
by moral rigorism, charity, ascetic aspirations, etc.; 
at the deep level, aggression, anti-social and anarchic 
tendencies, covered at the manifest level by strong 
social feelings, spirit of sacrifice, obsessional pre­
occupations with order, symmetry and social construct­
iveness; at the deep level, insecurity, while at the 
surfi&sv3 woolly optimistic ideas. The deep layers of 
insecurity, craving for help and belongingness are at 
the manifest level covered by a high cult of "discretion”, 
by suspicion towards everybody, and often by a real 
veneration of the "unique and strong man". Sometimes the 
deep "couches" break through the open "couches” and con­
sequently the ambivalent structure of personality 
appears in its nakedness.
The most usual type of ambivalence studied by 
experimental workers in this field, is presented by the 
individual’s attitude towards his own parents. E.
Frenkel-Brunswick has demonstrated by means of the 
Thejrfmatic Apperception fest that the antisemitic persons 
studied by her showed at the conscious level great
IZXf'
great respect, admiration and devotion towards their 
own parents, while in their projections in the ‘TAT 
they manifested hostility towards parental figures.
The relationship with onefs own parents constitutes, 
of course, only one context in which the ambivalent 
dispositions characteristic of a personality grown up 
in conditions of insecurity are manifested. The same 
ambivalence is manifested towards authority, i.e., 
submission and anarchic tendencies at the same time.
At the social level the disposition towards ambivalence 
is acted out under the form of two contradictory social 
roles: a revolutionary, and,at the same time, a well-'
integrated personality with the values of his own 
society: constructed for the future, but with strong 
veneration for tradition and archaic forms of life; 
mystic and atheistic at the same time. (Fer-det-ail-s 
see~~ah&pter--Totalitarxair Trends in -Our Times.. )
Patterns of Individuation under Conditions of 
Insecurity. The main trends of the process of 
individuation in a psycho-social field of insecurity 
can be described as follows:
1. The individual grows excessively self-centred.
The basic formula of this personality type is: f,Eobody 
loves me... I love myself”. The inodes of manifestation 
of this basic formula of individuation are varied.
The individual is highly preoccupied with himself, 
manifesting at the same time a strong tendency to relate
himself to others. His basic need to be accented and
/
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and loved forms a central point in the development of 
his personality. Social abilities are developed to 
the maximum possible in this type of personality.
Exactly what these abilities would be depends much on 
the dominant values of the group. Verbal abilities 
seem however to rank among the top social abilities in 
nearly every group. In this sense the individual will 
show keeness about how to use the cultural symbols of 
his own group. But his urgent need for acceptance direct 
him towards that kind of ideas and that kind of dyle, 
written or spoken, which have the highest power of 
circulation possible. The public platform and- journal­
istic writing are among the most adequate means for 
his ends. He is likely to manifest a congenial aversion 
from heavy and highly eloborated ideologies.
This type of personality possesses certain degree 
of psychological insight, but the limitation of this con­
sists in the difficulty of making others like and accept 
him. For, though in contact with others, he is incapable 
of dialogue. The striving for acceptance by others is 
seen in a series of other traits of this personality 
such as amiability, manners, and inclination towards 
showmanship. In political life this type of personality 
manifests remarkable inclinations towards demagoguery 
and servilism; in religion, strong aptitude for pharisee— 
ism; in art, preference for formalism and grandiloquence. 
In the economic field he makes a good ,Tcontact man”
/
Homosexual trends are often present in this personality | 
always obsessed with the desire to be loved. This is one 
of the dominant patterns of individuation in German society 
during the inter-war period. Goering, von Ribbertrop, 
von Sehiraek... are various examples of these specific 
trends existing in the German culture-pat tern. The 
German group itself showed strong inclination towards self- 
centred affection. Nazi nationalism is usually regarded 
as a case of group Narcissism.
2. Individuation una.er conditions of insecurity might 
form paranoid tendencies in the personality. While 
insecurity and the need for acceptance are the narcissist 
essentially feminine, being displayed in a prostitute 
manner, in the paranoid, they are essentially masculine.
The paranoid*s relationship with the external world, with 
the social world in particular, is dramatic. The basic 
insecurity develops in the individual an excessive need 
for assertion which is discharged aggressively towards 
either the external world or towards himself. The basic 
formula of this pattern of individuation is: "If you do 
not accept me, I kill you all, or I kill myself1*. This j 
is but a paraphrase of what Saint Just once said addressing j 
the enemies of the Revolution, who apparently were the j
whole French nation minus the members of the Jacobine Club. j 
The process of individuation involves in this case an inner 
contradiction: The individuals world is sharply divided ;
into two categories: partisans ana enemies. /
The former category embodies the "security*1 space of 
the individual being wrapped up in his love and con­
fidence. The latter becomes a symbol of insecurity 
attracting to it all the individual’s hatred and 
suspicion. The individual is utterly incapable of a 
de-emotionalised, rational relation with the world.
Though possessed by a morbid need to be in relation­
ship with others this type of personality is incapable 
of being in dialogue. When he dominates or hates, he 
annihilates the other; when he submits, he annihilates 
himself.
This type of personality is dictatorial and 
charismatic in politics, in religion, "visionnaire" and 
"possessed". He displays strong tendencies towards 
nj^ssianic action in every field of life.
Hitler*s personality is based on this pattern of 
individuation. The German group as a whole also show 
similar traits, such as strong in-group positive, and 
strong out-group negative feelings. The "total war" 
formula used by Nazism, corresponds to the basic formula 
of this pattern of individuation;"If I am not accepted I 
kill you all, or I kill myself".
3. k third form of the process of individuation in 
conditions of insecurity can be that of the individual* s 
withdrawal or detachment from the world. The formula is: 
"I do not care, I am not responsible, 1 am in fact nobody 
The personality resulting from this form of individuation
individuation displays schizoid tendencies. The 
individual cuts off his emotional ties with the external 
world to the degree of impassibility. He -suffers even 
more than the two previous types of anti-social tendencies.
A totalitarian society of the Nazi t y p e F s  
     fertile ground for such person­
alities. Their social integration is purely mechanical 
for their social behaviour is controlled by the fbrmal 
principles and discipline of the group, rather than by 
their concrete relationship with others. The author­
itarian group cultivates resistance against respons­
ibility and confined their roles to that of being 
"executants" of orders. Gilbert describes SS Colonel 
Hoess as an outstanding example of this personality type.
As the commandant of the Ausschwig Extermination Camp 
he ordered the extermination of more than two million 
-Jews without the slightest emotional participation# Such 
a personality is completely "desensitised". Its anti­
social actions are carried out in perfectly cold blood.
are
Aggression and crime/with it merely techniques in the 
execution of the laws of destiny hanging over its head.
The German group as a whole had shown schizoid 
features by its self-centredness, isolation and de­
sensitised aggression.
These are the main trends in the process of 
individuation under conditions of insecurity. They can 
be spoken of in terms of psycho-pathology as ITarcissitic,
Marcissitic,paranoid and schizoid trends. It would,
however, be advisable to conceive them primarily as
vectors existing in the psycho-social field of the
process of individuation. The personality structure
tends in such circumstances to develop in the directions
indicated by these vectors. Even when a particular
personality shows no signs of clinical narcissism,
paranoia or schizophrenia, he would manifest in some
way or other preferences towards modes of life compatible
with these. In Germany these preferences were-manifested
in a great majority of the population by their
attachment to,and even identification with, leaders who
showed manifest signs of Narcissism, paranoia or
schizophrenia. These leaders had by their personalities
*•
actualised the most characteristic possibilities or 
patterns of individuation of the German culture-pattern# 
They were, so to speak, ideals of individuation.
We are using here the terms Narcissism and 
Narcissistic not in a strictly psycho-pathological sense. 
Narcissism is not a disease at the same level as 
paranoia or schizophrenia; it is a sympton found in all 
neuroses and psychoses. Narcissistic is not a well- 
defined type of personality either. The emphasis here 
is put on modes of individuation. Individuation is a 
psycho-social term, an intermediary concept between the 
concepts of individuality and that of social environment# 
It is meant to designate a series of trends and vectors
vectors existing both in the individual and in his 
social environment. r%ese trends and vectors are ;
attributes of the psycho-social field, ie., of the i
system of interrelations between the individual and 
his society, and as buch they direct the formation '
of the personality of each individual member of the '
group. !
I
Though clinically different,these types of :
individuation have, from the psycho-social point, a 
common basis. The result of them all is an unethical 
personality and ultimately an unethical group. Since 
this formulation seems to contradict one of the 
fundamental aspects of Nazi personality, i.e., the 
spirit of self-sacrifice, we should like to say a few 
words on this matter.
We consider Kazi authoritarian personality as 
suffering from the incapacity to relate itself to 
others in terms of inter-communication. His relations 
with others are not invested with moral values such as 
altruism and objectivity, lor the authoritarian 
personality has a permanent inclination to see the other 
in the function of his basic need for security, tie is 
guided in his relationships by the pressing question:
Is the other with or against ire'? Does he or does he 
not ascertain my own position in life? This basic i•'c:
need prevents the authoritarian personality from projecting 
his relationship with others into a set of objective
objective values. "The others" are good or bad, not 
because of their intrinsic qualities, or because they 
fulfil social values. They are good or bad because 
they are partisans or because they are not. Even when 
the authoritarian personality judges other in terms of 
values accepted by the group, such as good or bad 
patriots, this is not a morally objective judgment.
For this personality adopts ideas and feelings not as 
social values, but as answers to its personal need for 
security; he identifies himself with the values of his 
group. Consequently hisjalppreciation of others answers 
the same basic question: Are they with or against me?
The psychological reality is the same but the phraseology 
is different. For he would speak not in terms of my 
partisans or enemies, but in terns of the enemies of the 
people or patriots.
One often characterises Ilazi authoritarian personality 
as suffering from split morality in the sens that it 
shows one moral standard for the in-group and another 
for the out-groups. This social aspect of authoritarian 
personality disguised its true nature, i.e., its chronic 
moral crisis. For one of the main characteristics of 
this personality consists in a total absence of moral 
standards. Hitler and all Nazi leaders applied 
essentially the same formula to their relationships with 
Party members and with outsiders. There were no 
objective values by which Party members were considered
considered good or bad people. The leader's personal 
feeling of confidence supplied the only criterion of 
judgment in this matter. A^6oon as the leader-would 
feel that some members were critical, "objective” or 
"neutre" he would throw them into the enemy camp or 
liquidate them, no matter whether or not they had a real 
attachment to the Hazi cause. The test all Party members 
had to pass was to satisfy the Leader1s demand for 
personal loyalty. "The laws are valid only because they 
bear my name", said Hitler to Hans Frank when the latter 
asked him to give a legal form to the H’dhm affair in 
1934. (Gilbert, Op.Git. p.76).
Therefore the behaviour of. Nazi authoritarian 
is
personality/determined by its need for self-demonstration. 
This shows a complete incapacity 'te ing in dialogue.
Even when strongly integrated with the group, this 
personality finds itself in a situation of self-ffefficiency. 
As a Kareissist he is self-sufficient because he polishes 
his own personality with the values of his civilisation 
only to make himself conspicuous and .loved; as a paranoid 
he is incapable of half-way meetings with others, and as a 
schizoid he is incapable of interest in the external 
x^ orld. This incapacity of being in dialogue - while 
integrated in the group - forms the main symptofr of the 
moral crisis of iiazi personality. ■ Mazi society can 
paradoxically be defined as unethical society: (Raubtier 
Geselschaft^ /
The Gyisis 0f Individuation and Authoritarian 
Personality, The spirit of conformity to the degree 
of group identification shows deficiency in thejprocess 
of individuation. As we have already shown the kazi 
personality is easily inclined to take on stereotyped 
modes o-f reaction, i.e., to mould its emotionality 
according to the pattern of the group, to think with 
"official" ideas, to avoid personal responsibility, and 
on the whole to reduce his behaviour to a few cliches 
offered by his own group. "Think for yourself" does not 
apply in this case.
Deep analysis reveals a certain connection between 
insecurity and lack of individuation. According to this 
view, insecurity is reflected first of all on the 
emotional pattern of personality. The insecurity produced 
in the child by his parents behaviour- mother-separation, 
negligence and other factors determining instability in 
the environment - prevents the child from acquiring a 
uni-linear sense of values in life. The first layer of 
ambiguity in the world of values is determined by the 
internalisation of the parental figures. For they are 
internalised as good and bad figures, according to their 
behaviour, at the same time. 2?he other elements of the 
environment being themselves in a state of instability’ 
cannot help the child to escape from this primary 
ambivalence. Many psycho-analysts interpret the spirit 
of conformism and group identification in the authoritarian
authoritarian personality as defences against this 
fundamental ambivalence. In this way the values of oneTs 
own group become the criterion of good and right, while 
those of the out-group, the criterion of bad and wrong.
The basic ambivalence is solved by a rigid distinction 
at the conscious level between good and bad.
Yet, in spite of all this rigid social integration, 
the Aazi personality suffers from laclc of integration.
For the inner integration of this personality is weak.
His weak Ego, his lack of self-reliance, make him adopt a 
conventional Superego. Thus he sticks desperately to 
conventional opinions because he has neither the initiative 
nor the courage to form his own; he adheres mechanically 
to the prejudice® of his group because he fears his anti­
social and anarchic tendencies; he identifies himself 
with the group in order to maintain his precarious mental 
balance. The ideas he holds, the feelings he displays 
and the prejudices he fanatically defends are shields 
against himself. They act as external forces and the 
individual has no power to transform them into an internal 
personal structure. The moment an idea becomes his own - 
not supported by external authority - its sense would • 1
become ambiguous, and consequently the individual would be \ 
no longer sure of its validity. That is why this type of ' 
personality is afraid to individualise itself.
C H A P T E R  I .
THE SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OR 
EUROPEAN COMMUNISM.
Introduction: A careful delimitation of the subject-
matter of this last part of our study is necessary for a 
twofold reason: Firstly, the social and cultural processes
dealt with in the two previous parts explain certain 
aspects in the rise and development of twentieth century , 
Communism; Secondly, it is practically impossible to include 
the whole variety of problems related to contemporary 
Communist societies in a study concerned chiefly with a 
comparative View of European democratic and totalitarian 
societies. Consequently the present study concentrates on 
two main groups of factors which in our opinion occupy the 
key position in the structure of European Comraunist 
societies. The first group' refers to the structure and 
evolution of the modern working class, while the second to 
various aspects in the evolution of modern Russiah society. 
Though we regard contempaary Communism as springing from a 
double source, we gradually concentrate our attention on that 
particular type of Communist organisation which has been 
realised in Soviet Russia. Thus, other Comraunist organ­
isations spread today throughout the world fall into the
IU
the second plane. We might well say that this study 
deals with the psychology of Bolshevism rather than of 
Communism, Bolshevism being a proto-type of contemporary 
Communism.
Economic and Social Origins. Communism is often 
regarded as a purely economic phenomenon, i.e., an answer 
given by contemporary man to a series of economic 
problems characteristic of his society. The system of 
ownership constitute),therefore, the main difference 
between Communism and other types of society. Needless 
to say, this is a reflection of the Marxian view on 
European history which shuts out any attempt at a psycho­
logical interpretation of Communism. This makes it the 
more necessary for us to stress the view, often expressed 
in this studyjthat we regard the economic and social 
factors mentioned below as aspects rather than as causes 
of Goromunism. We can hardly understand the structure of 
■fee Communism, particularly in its last stage as Bolshevism, 
if we cannot see these factors intermingled, throughout 
their evolution, with a series of.psychological fact ors.
Contemporary Communism is often confined to a 
particular type of industrial revolution, started in 1917, 
in Russia, and then extended to other European and Asiatic 
areas. The truth of this opinion lies in the fact that 
industrialisation has actually created a new situation in 
the structure of Western society. Marxists describe this 
as a new type of relationship between the basic factors of
of the process of production. What they have in mind 
is primarily the concentration of the means of pro­
duction in the hands of a small number of individuals - 
industrialists, capitalists or simply, employers - and 
the complete separation of the workers or employees from 
the means of production. In what follows we make the 
attempt to see the psychological aspects of this process.
In other ?*ords, we try to express this process in terms 
of human interrelations.
We cannot reist* the temptation to characterise the 
situation created by industrialisation in terms of two 
factors growing in opposition to each other. There are, 
on the one hand, the owners of the mans of production 
running their own enterprises on the basis of free 
market economy, i.e., in terms of profit-making. They 
have gradually grown into the modern type of "homo 
economicus” for whom the whole field of human inter­
relations is controlled by economic causes. On the other 
hand there are the employees who,being separated from the 
means of production, tend to cut off all relations with 
their employers and their work which cannot be expressed
h
in terms of money. As "wage-owners” their main tendency^o 
form a separate social group and to regulate their 
relations with other groups in purely commercial terms, 
i.e., to integrate themselves with their society according 
to the rules of the market. In conclusion, the 
relationship between employers and employees becomes more
more and more formulated in terras of rational economy.
fiie first main repercussion of the rationalisation of 
human relationships in this sector of modern society is 
shown during the big industrial crises immediately 
following the Napoleonic wars. Though these crises can 
hardly be detached- from the political and psychological 
background of each country, in which they took place, we 
make the attempt to look at their general aspects and to 
point to the psychological factors involved in them.
from the psychological point of view it is important 
to notice that the problem of the responsibility for the 
economic crisis becomes gradually the spring-board of one 
of the main social tensions during the first half of the 
last century. Which of the two groups, the employers, or 
the employees, was to bear in the first place, the reper­
cussions of the crisis? The solution of this problem brings 
out more and more clearly the antagonistic nature of the 
relationship between the two groups. The employers, 
following their own pattern of life, regarded all the 
elements of their enterprise - including the employees - 
from a purely rational viewpoint. Their major concern 
was how to re-adjust the enterprise to the new market con- ! 
ditions. Cuts in the number of employees and in wages - 
sometimes to an !tinhuman level” - came along with other 
"rational” measures such as cuts in profits and expenditures, 
rise in prices and struggle for new markets. The workers, 
were, from the employees point of view, subject to the
/
the same rules as all other elements of the enterprise; 
they were "merchandised”.- This attitude was bound to lead 
to unemployment, and consequently to instability and 
insecurity in the employee groups.
It is apparent, therefore, that one of the main sources 
of the social unrest and conflict which began during that 
period was human inter-relationships, and that the economic 
crisis can be regarded as a preoipiting circumstance of 
this. It is in fact the over-rationalisation of human 
inter-relations that forms the basis of a series of 
tensions within modern societies which in the long run 
leads towards Communism. For today it is easy to see that 
the employers had responsibilities towards their employees 
which could hardly fit into a purely rational scheme 
regarding the functioning of their own enterprise. On the 
other hand, the tie between the employees and their work was 
closer and more complex than could be formulated in terms 
of wage-earning. They had to partake in the fluctuation 
of the economic system much more than they were ready to do 
on the basis of their purely rational attitude towards it.
The consequences of an over-rationalised system of 
human relationships has in this case led to the domination 
of this system by a series of irrational factors. The. 
feeling of insecurity aroused in employees,resentment and 
aggression against their employers, who, in their turn, 
reacted with the same resentment and aggression. This has 
gradually developed into a deep contradiction within modern
modern society that made many people believe that its 
only remedy consisted in a new type of society comepletely 
opposed to the existing one. The need for a closer 
integration of the individual with his society and for 
more social responsibility form, so to speak, the mawtal 
mental material of the new social structure.
The beginning of the modern working movements can be 
dated ©£ about the historical period referred to above, 
i.e., the first half of the nineteenth century. They 
originated in the need felt by the industrial workers to act 
tead an organised for the protection of their own
interests. But from the very beginning their action feswas 
directed mainly against the group of the employers which 
they regarded as the main obstacle lying in the way of 
their struggle. Between 1830-50 there took place the 
first industrial strikes. These were clear signs of a new 
social and psychological phenomenon known today as the 
conflict between capital and labour. Since the nature of 
our study does not allow us to enter into a detailed 
description of this important stage of the development of
-cUs*>
the working movements we have to confine ourselves to the 
following schematic formulation of its main aspects.
The industrialisation of modern society has created a new 
social category, the industrial workers. The more intensive 
the process of industrialisation the larger and better 
defined this category. The fluctuations inherent in the 
industrialisation of European society resulted in instabilit
r J «
instability and insecurity in the position of the 
industrial workers. The degree of their insecurity 
can be judged by the fact that wages constituted their 
only means of subsistance. Payment for their work in 
factories constituted, so to speak, the vital link between 
them and the rest of society. Any cut in their wages, 
any break in their work or any period of unemployment 
threw the workers completely outside society* In this 
phenomenon lies the main condition of the rise of the 
modern proletariat as a specific so^cial group* The 
expression "inner proletariat" lately applied to the same 
social category is only partially adequate. Though as a 
social group the modem proletariat originates in ■
I
industrial society, its mind grows at the periphery, j 
or completely outside this society. After a certain 
time the proletariat comes from "outside" to conquer and 
destroy it. Although this attitude is characterise© of 
a later stage in the development of the proletariat it 
has, nevertheless, been in its structure from the very 
beginning*
There are aspects in the rise and development of the 
industrial proletariat which ask for further qualification 
if this phenomenon is to be regarded as one of the 
sources of Communist society. Two main aspects are to be 
distinguished in the attitude of this nev/ social category 
towards the rest of society. Somd of the industrial 
workers, though constituting a self-contained social body,
/
body, have gradually found "rational" gieans for their 
integration with society as a whole* By rational 
means we understand those means which are pertinent to 
the political and moral structure of modern democracy* 
Tftis attitude is characteristic of the so-called Social 
Democratic movements. Though struggling for radical 
reforms political, social and economic,' these movements 
have, by and large, respected the practices and the 
sense of gradualness characteristic of democracy.
Other workers1 movements have gradually cut off any 
possibility of their re-integration with modern society. 
Their only hope was to see the collapse of the society 
from which they sprang u®, and their action was directed 
towards this end exclusively. These movements led to 
Communist society as we know it ftahy.
It is also worth while distinguishing two stages in 
the evolution of the conflict between the industrial 
proletariat and the rest of society. This conflict is 
in its first stage "localised" between the employees and 
the employers. It was the employers who attracted in 
this first stage all the hatred and all the negative 
feelings aroused in the industrial workers by the process 
of proletarisation. Thus, the world of the proletariat 
was split, according to the logic of emotional states 
of insecurity, into two areas: one belonging to oneself 
and to onefs own friends, and the other, to the enemy. 
This historical position was later spoken of in terms of j
a conflict between two social forces, the employers and 
the employees. The intensification of this conflict 
leads to a second stage in the attitude of the proletariat 
towards society* A deeper degree of frustration and 
insecurity, fostered by a day by day struggle with a 
stronger enemy had led to the generalisation, of the con­
flict, i.e., to a diffuse and incoherent manifestation 
of bitterness- and aggression in the proletariat. All 
society was regarded as the cause of its frustration. 
Consequently the foundation of society itself had to be 
changed in order to make it possible for the proletariat 
to live in a friendly world.
We do not say that this "generalised" aggression is . 
the result of the economic conflict between capital and 
labour, or of the social conflict between employers and 
employees exclusively. There are a series of other 
factors which pour aggression and distrust into the mind 
of the working class. The general dissatisfaction with 
the state of affairs in European society and culture 
during the second half of the last century, is one of 
these factors. The confluence between the nihilistic 
mood created in European "Intelligentsia" throughout this 
period and the state of mind of the industrial workers 
contributed to the generalisation and the intensification 
of the feelings of discohtent and aggression. The 
insecurity and aggression aroused in the employersr group 
by the anarchy of production has also contributed to the
/
the generalisation of the conflict.
There is one aspect of this complex process which 
by far outstrips all others.in its importance. This is 
the growth of the nev/ social category of the industrial 
workers as a self-contained body, as a society within 
society. As' we have mentioned above, the industrial 
workers became conscious of.* themselves as a "class" in an
4yf«v<. •©. (rtdL
attitude of detachment gftk conflict with society. Horn 
this tension between the proletariat and society springs 
the spark of class consciousness which has gradually 
become a factor of prime importance in contemporary 
society. As class consciousness forms one of the key 
concepts in the last part of this study, we should like 
now ee-ty to indicate, in a few words, the historical 
context of its birth, as follows: 1. The industrial
workers became conscious of themselves as a special group 
in a period of social instability resulting in the first 
place from the periodical crises of the economic system 
of modern society. 2. They have grown conscious of 
themselves in permanent conflict with the social and 
ecohomie group of the employers. In time, this conflict 
^ ’"generalised in the sense that the whole of society is 
perceived by the workers as an enemy of the working class. 
Thus the self-consciousness of the proletariat undergoes 
a process of inflation. The proletariat assumes' for 
itself the "mission” of constructing a new society in 
which the condition of all mankind will be improved.
3. In conclusion, one can say that insecurity, aggression
and the need for a radical change in the conditions of
life form a basic layer in the structure of -class con- 
(1)
sciousness. ,
(1)
It is important to notice that insecurity and conflict 
seem to have led to. the rise of individual consciousness 
as well. An intensified conflict between the organism 
and its environment because of the insufficiency of the 
instinctive pattern and adjustment, played an important 
part in the rise of human .consciousness. The rise of the 
self-consciousness of the industrial workers was con­
siderably facilitated by the fact that their professional 
training resulted in a general improvement of their 
education. This fact places the’ industrial proletariat 
in a superior position to any other category of proletariat 
and explains to a certain extent the relatively quick 
development of their 'awareness of the fact that they form 
a homogeneous social group.
That has been said so far constitutes only the first 
stage in the development of the working class consciousness.
We have confined ourselves to a sketchy picture of the 
historical conditions within which the industrial workers 
grew up as a sociological category. ■ This forms the setting v r t t i i -  
-in which takes place the "drama of proletarisation" or the 
traumatic experiences which led to the rise of class con­
sciousness in modern civilisation. The next section will 
show how class consciousness articulates its primitive 
layer, thus becoming a factor of prime importance in the 
building up of Ooirmnism.
The Ideological Articulation of Class Consciousness.
K a u t s k y  is of the opinion that class consciousness,
"socialist consciousness" in his own terms, is an imported 
element in the European p r o l e t a r i a t ,  and that the
» f r 
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the "bourgeois intellectuals" are its authors.
Ufonnerot op.cit. p.39.) The terra "inported" is in this 
case inadequately applied. The contribution of the 
bourgeois intellectuals was mainly to articulate the 
self-consciousness of the working class* i.e. to 
structurise inclinations and.attitudes already existing 
in the members of this class. The "ideology" adopted by 
the working movements grew in fact out of the same ground 
as the working class itself. This ideology gave shape 
to a series of trends existing in the industrial society 
of the. first half of the nineteenth century. That is why 
its immediate effect upon the working movements was to 
create clear ends for their aspiration and actions. It 
is very likely that without ideology the working class 
would have played the role of a capricious and troublesome 
youngster, instead of a vigourous revolutionary.
Before describing the main aspects of the ideological 
factors characteristic of Communism we should like to 
stress the fact that, unlike what happened in Nazism* the 
function of the ideological factor in Communism was of 
vital importance. This seems to be a paradox, for it 
invalidates one of the fundamental principles of the 
Communist doctrine, according to which the material- 
economic factor is the only decisive factor in the 
evolution of human society. In spite of this, Communist 
society and the Communist way of life often give the 
impression of a scientific experiment with the ultimate
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ultimate end of verifying a theory. It gives the 
impression that somebody with a book under his nose shapes 
the course of human society and human life in general so 
as to fit it into the paragraphs and the chapters of his 
book.
In the treatment of the Communist ideology we have to 
confine ourselves to that system of philosophical, 
economic and political thought which is known as Marxism- 
Leninism. Other trends of Communist ideology found 
throughout the evolution of Western civilisation, though 
important in themselves, play a minor part in the under­
standing of the psychological aspect of contemporary 
Communist society. Regarding the development of Communist 
ideology, one fact should be stressed in particular.I
At its very foundation lies the attitude of opposition to
modern European culture. Its first aim is to "demolish”
Western civilisation, and to build up a substitute for it.
Consequently, concepts such as "materialism”, "objectivism”,
"dialectics", "scientific", etc. gain their full meaning
*
only as opposed to idealism, subjectivism, dogmatism, 
staticism, or metaphysicism, which form, according to I!arx? 
the main "idola" of modern Western thought.
According to his temperament, and philosophical training 
Karl Marx belongs to German Romantic philosophy.
Hegelianism was the first and best system known to him. And 
though from an early age he departs from all Romantic 
systems, his own thought remains deeply infused with the
ist
the spirit of romanticism, Marx believes even more than 
his master, Hegel, that the world as a whole can 
adequately be depressed by a closely knitted system of 
ideas, and that ideas reform the world, And yet marxism 
has a quality not possessed by any other Romantic system. 
Refusing to admit that it is a "personal" system, i.e., 
an individualised mirror of the world, it claims to be 
the way of thought of the modern working class in the 
present, and of mankind in the future. Marxists have, 
therefore, organised the working class on the foundation 
of this belief. In other words, the working class as an 
organised political body becomes the executive of an 
ideological system.
It is convenient to distinguish two aspects in the 
Marxist system: A. Dialectical Materialism and B.
Historical materialism.
A. Dialectical Materialism is the explanation of the 
world through dialectical logic. It is a method of under­
standing as well as a general conception of the world.
The fundamental principles of dialectical Materialism are 
firstly, constitutive forms of the external -world, and then, 
categories of the human mind. They are as follows:
1. The priority of matter in the 7/orld constitutes
A i r '
the fi^st principle. By this principle, Marx reverses 
Eegelfs ifldealistic position in metaphysics. Bor, 
according to Marx, life, mind, human consciousness, and 
ideas in general are but attributes of matter. Engels
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1Engels goes as far as to express the hope that it will 
be possible in the future to■demonstrate how life was 
created from the inorganic, hence how consciousness 
appeared. (4nti-Duhring. French Transl. Paris 1946, 
p.99.) Lenin makes in his "Empiric-Criticism" an attempt 
to prove that matter exists before, independently, and 
outside consciousness.
The principle of the materiality of the world, though 
fundamental for the doctrine of dialectical materialism, 
is not clearly worked out. The main difficulty lies in 
the fact that Marxists approach this essentially 
metaphysical problem, in an anti-metaphysical manner.
Thus, they come up against serious difficulties when 
trying to give a definition to the concept of matter.
For Lenin, the only specific quality of matter is that of 
"objective reality". "Matter is a philosophical category 
serving to show the objective reality given to man by his 
sensations, which copy, photograph, and reflect it, 
without its existence being subordinated to them". 
"Empirio-Gr^ticism. French Transl.- Oeuvres Completes. E<J- $<rt 
Paris vol. xiii, p.97). Later, Deborin seems to slip 
slowly into an idealistic position, when conceiving 
the essence of matter as "the sum of mediations, i.e., 
relationships and links". Mitin believes that this
difficulty is solved if matter is defined as"  the
whole world existing independent of us". He seems not 
to realise that the ideas of other people are included in
Z. Barbu ’’Marxist Philosophy and European thought
Philosophical Quarterly. April,1953.)
In the Soviet culture-pattern the principle of the 
priority of matter is in fact reduced to a practical 
attitude towards life. This is expressed in the belief 
that a change in the material (economic) conditions of 
life entails a change in the' whole of society.
2. The second principle of dialectical materialism
principle. According to the doctrine of dialectical 
materialism, Nature and the world as such constitutes an 
organised whole in which things and events are in dynamic 
interconnection. The clearest formulation of this 
principle is found in Lenin’s ’’Philosophical Notebooks”. 
Father A. Wetter who has written one of the best 
commentaries on present-day Soviet/ philosophy is of the 
opinion that Lenin is on this point very near to a 
Plotinian conception of the universe and to a religious 
Russian conception of the world at'the same time.
(II Materialismo Dialettico Sovietico.Turin 1948.)
Recently the integralist xminciple has been re-formulated 
in the principle of ’’partisanship” which constitutes one I 
of the guiding ideas of the Soviet culture-pattern. The 
root of the concept of ’’partisanship” can be found in 
MarxTs conception of the class character of human thought 
and action. Lenin takes a step further in this direction
is the principle of the whole, or the integralist
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direction when considering the. Party, and not the
working class as a whole, as the true expression of a
Communist society. But the concept of "partisanship"
»
hasipnly recently been recognised as one of the, dominant 
ideas of Soviet, culture, This was done by A.Zhdanov 
in 1947. (Problems of Philsophy. No.l Hoscow 1947.) 
According to the principle of "partisanships every 
fundamental idea, scientific or philosophical, should 
involve in itself the conditions of Soviet society as 
these are seen at a given moment from a central point of 
view. This central point of view is the Party, better 
said, the leadership of the Party. The full meaning of 
an idea can be grasped only after it has been completely 
integrated with the structure of Soviet society as 
represented by the Party. Pokovskirs and MarxTs ideas, 
for instance,, were true and objective within social 
structure thoroughly engaged in the struggle against the 
bourgeois residuums characteristic of the early Soviet 
society. After that, their meaning was lost. Zhdanov 
himself criticises G-. Alexandrovfs book, "The History of 
Western Philsophy" by accusing the author of having become 
infected with the nobjec'tivist" spirit of bourgeois 
schools, and having forgotten class warfare and the Party 
outlook in his consideration of Western philosophical 
thought. The fact that Alexandrov allows to Hegelian 
philosophy its progressive aspects is, for Zhdanov, a 
fallacy for the specific reason that this weakens the
i
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the class consciousness of Soviet youth and undemines 
Party vigilance. lienee class, and Party conditions fo>ree 
Alexandrov to; assert that Pi-arx found nothing progressive 
in the whole bourgeois philosophy and that it was he 
who built up everything from the very beginning.
It'is important to stress that the whole to which 
the integralist principle refers is not of a theoretical 
character. Western students of Communism often make 
the.mistake of judging the validity of a Communist 
idea according to its consistency with the theoretical 
system of Uarxism-Leninism-Stalinism. It is in fact 
not the theoretical Yhiole to which knowledge is referred, 
but the empirical, practical, and above all political, 
whole, Thus it would not be absurd to learn that Soviet ■ 
philosophers cannot-give a proper definition to the con­
cept, of "totality”; unless Soviet agriculture is fully ’ 
mechanised. It is noticeable that the discussion of 
"possibility” and "reality”,as categories of matter, 
broke out in the middle, of the struggle between Stalin 
and Trotsky, more stress on "possibility" was frotskysm, 
while more stress on "reality” was’ Stalinism. This 
concrete-integralist meaning of any. concept should never 
be overlooked when judging the truth, or objectivity,' 
of Communist ideas.
3. ‘£he principle of contradiction, or the power of 
the negative is the third principle of dialectical 
materialism, ^ts clearest formulation- is, to- our
/
Iour knowledge, given by Lenin in his philosophical 
notebooks". A "unity of opposites" lies, according to 
Lenin, at the basis of everything and every event.
Every form, of manifestation or affirmation is possible 
only at the expense of a form of repression and negation. 
But, at certain moments, the repressed and negated 
part of things and events wins over the manifest part, 
and consequently things and events turn into their, own 
opposites. This process constitutes the main form and 
source of change and evolution in the world, material or 
spiritual. In the social plane any domination by a 
class involves the repression (oppression) of others. 
Change and progress in the structure of society occur 
when the oppressed classes overthrow the ruling ones 
and organise the whole.of society according to their own 
way of life. Glass struggle is therefore the source and 
the mechanism, of progress in society.
The same principle is re-formulated at the present
level of the evolution of Soviet society by Zhdanov.
Since Communist society is a classless society the
can
source of social progress/no longer lie in the class 
struggle. According to Zhdanov the process of class 
struggle is replaced in Communist society by the practice 
of criticism and self-criticism. By the practice of 
criticism and self-criticism the Party becomes aware of 
the existence within itself of two contradictory positions, 
or groups of factors; the "old" and the "new", the 
regressive and progressive . Thus progress is due to the
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the struggle between the 5toldrf and the "new", i.e., to 
the Party ability to supersede the old foms of life.
It is worth noting that today Gamiranists' no lodger 
talk of society, but of Party. They consider the Party 
not onl,- as the symbol of social unity, but as the social
i
whole itself. The processes taking place in the Party 
decide upon the evolution of the whole society.
4. The principle of evolution is the fourth 
principle of dialectical materialism. Two important 
aspects of the Marxian concept of evolution are of a 
particular interest.
A. Matter - the material aspect of every form of 
existence - constitutes the source of transformation. 
Social and mental forms of life are but reflections of 
material changes. We can call this an infra-structural 
explanation of evolution. This mode of explaining the 
process of evolution has a deep meaning in Communist 
societies. It means, first of all, that any process of 
change takes place upwards, i.e., it staits in the basic 
strata, of reality. Since the material factor of society 
is, according to Marx, expressed by human economic 
activity, any social change should be initiated^ inftu/V1^ *
B. Change and transformation are dialectical. This means 
that change in nature and society cannot be conceived
as continuous lines, but a system of dialectical leaps.
A form of life does not develop by a natural process of 
growth, for at a certain moment it becomes superseded by
ICS
by another fora, and thus a new level in the evolution 
of life appears# Consequently, the contradiction and 
struggle between the forms of reality constitute the 
principle of change. This reveals the revolutionary 
conception of change underlying Communist thought and 
action. Change and progress are possible only by violent 
a'lpion for they always imply the destruction of inimical 
forces. The Communist conception of change is better 
seen in the next section which deals with the doctrine 
of historical materialism.
B. Historical materialism consists in the 
application of the principles of dialectical materialism 
to the historical process. Thus, in accordance with the 
principle of the priority of matter, the doctrine of 
historical materialism stresses the idea that the economic 
factor lies at the basis of human society and civilisation 
By economic factor, or economic activity, Marx understands 
mainly the system of ownership of the means of production. 
Thus the system of ownership forms the infra-structure" 
of society, while human social, political and cultural 
forms constitute a f super-structure”. The changes taking 
place in human society and civilisation are in essence 
determined by the changes in the structure of human 
economic activity. Bor Marx there are five fundamental 
stages corresponding to five economic systems;
V)
1. Primitive Communism, 2, Sclavagist society, 3. 
Feudalism, 4. Capitalism and 5. Corn unism. The evolution
/
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evolution - or better, tlie revolution - from one to 
another occurred in a dialectical manner, i.e., by the 
development of the inner contradictions existing in each 
social and economic structure. The negated social forms, 
the oppressed social classes, grew out of their own 
society. At a certain moment in their development, they 
were able to impose their own way of life upon the rest 
of society and. thus to create a new stage in the 
historical evolution of mankind. Therefore the class 
struggle forms the fundamental condition of the 
historical process.
The last stage in the class struggle is described 
by Marx and Lenin as the struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and working class. Ilarx displays on this point a 
magnificent dialectical skill and an acute sense of 
tragedy which reminds us in many ways of the adolescent 
playwright in him. H-e describes the rise of the modern 
proletariat as the result of the inner contradiction and 
of the power of the negative in modern industrial society. 
The proletariat .is the product - the son - of modern 
Capitalism. But capitalists, as the typical repre­
sentatives of the dominant classes in modern society,are 
at the same time described as the oppressors and therefore 
thenegation of the proletariat. This process of 
negation reaches a dramatic stage when the proletariat 
is robbed of its human quality and becomes a simple 
merchandise. By this the value of a worker, as a man,is 
completely dominated by the value of his work on the
the market.
The struggle and the victory of the proletariat is 
regarded by Marx as the ’’negation of the negation”, as 
the ’’expropriation of the expropriators” the result of 
which is the overthrow of the capitalist stage in human 
society and the forthcoming of its opposite, Communist 
society. To oppose the society from which it has sprung 
up, constitutes in fact the first condition of the rise 
of the proletariat. Thus, while the bourgeois society 
is a class society, Communist society is classless while ■ 
the nation State forms the characteristic of the former, 
the latter is international, and so forth.
We should like to end the description of the ideolo­
gical factor of Communism by mentioning Lenin’s contri­
bution to its political aspect. This concerns the nature 
of historical evolution. Some of Marx’s interpreters held 
the view that since the principles of Dialectical 
materialism lie in the nature of matte^ historical evolution 
leads by itself to its final end, Communism. This way of 
thinking was known as ’’raechanieism” or ”eeonomism” and 
became a central idea of Social Democracy. The ideas of 
class- struggle and revolution play a secondary part in this 
conception of the historical process. Against this inter­
pretation Lenin stresses the active role played by the 
working class in the evolution of mankind. According to 
him the historical process, though based on objective laws, 
must be ”helped’r by the conscious action of the working
/
working class organised by the Party. In Lenin’s view 
the political aspect of the historical evolution seems 
to outstrip by far the economic one. That is why Leninfs 
main interest lies in the political organisation of the 
working class, and in the creation of the Party as an 
•’avant-garde" of this class. He insists on the necessity 
for the working class first to" conquer the political 
power, and then to act upon the economic aspect of society.
THE POLITICAL ARTICULATION OE GLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 
- THE PARTY -
Tiie tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, 
because a partisan was more ready to dare without 
asking why, Eor party associations are not based 
upon any established law, nor do they seek the public 
good; they are formed in defience of laws, from self- 
interest,
Thucydides.
The Party is the totalitarian reality in a Communist 
society. It is "the whole" as Lenin refers to it, i.e., 
the society itself becoming conscious of its unity.
In the Soviet Union, the Party is referred to as "the 
organising and guiding force of the Government", "the 
heart and the brain of the people", "the guide and the 
teacher of the workers"., (The Official Manual of the 
Agitator). The party can at the same time be conceived as 
an organism of its own, a body within the body of society, 
or a "corpus mysticum1* of any Communist society.
The development of the Communist parties throughout 
the world shows the gradual embodiment'.'of class conscious 
ness into a political factor of the first order in 
twentieth century European society, P'or these parties are 
the crystallisation of a series of trends of modern life
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life which could not be absorbed into the structure of 
contemporary society. They are also structurations of a 
series of mental states and habits which could not be 
integrated in the mental structure of the individual living
i
in this society. All these social and mental aspects of 
life have formed a vital centre of their own, and finally 
found their expression in the Party of the working class.
This party can be considered as a new mode of life 
structuration, a new type of organism which strives to 
adjust modern life and society to its specific structure.
The Hussiah Bolshevik Party is the most active, thefroost 
viable of these collective organisms. It is class con­
sciousness in a state of perpetual mobilisation and anxiety.
In what follows we should like to mark the most 
important stages in the development of that Communist 
organisation which finally became the Russia Bolshevik 
Party. We shall concentrate our attention round those 
aspects which show the gradual articulation of class con­
sciousness, so as to prepare a certain basis for the 
psychological considerations following later.
The Social Basis of the Party. The fact that the 
Party has grown up as a political expression of the working 
class tells very little about its structure and particularly 
about its political tactics and programme. The working 
class is merely the raw material ftom which the Party is 
forged. Bor, it is only a small section, the most "conscious” 
elements or the"avant-gar<ae" to the working class which acts
/
acts decisively upon the structure of the Party,
The ref ore the process of becoming conscious of the pro­
letarian condition of one's own class constitutes a basic 
factor in the rise and development of the Party. This 
process implies, in fact, something much more than the 
spontaneous development of the European working class 
within the historical condition of the last century, or 
of the hUSsian working classes during the first decades 
of this century. It implies the damming up of a wide and 
diffuse historical process whose main stages can be 
described as follows: l. The growth of the social
importance of the industrial workers, which is a normal 
implication of the process of industrialisation. 2.
The fo mat ion within the group of industrial workers of 
an upper-stratum which used their social "organisatory" 
and political activities as a means to rise in the social 
scale, and thus to escape the condition of manual workers. 
Their main ambition was to become "leaders’* within their 
own group. 3, The blend of this group of workers with 
elements coming from other social groups, particularly 
middle class intellectuals. 4. This was followed by the 
indoctrination of some of the industrial workers with a 
particular Ideology and by the development from within 
this group of a specific, type of leadership, in which 
religious-messianic elements are intermingled with 
concrete political action. All this amounts to the "trans 
figuration" of th§ working class.
/
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'The first inport ant’ step in the building, up of 
the Communist Party consists in the transformation of 
the anarchic mood and passive nihilism which was at the 
beginning of the last century, one of the basic attitudes 
of the industrial workers towards their own society. In 
psychological terms this can be called the transformation 
of a negative into a positive attitude, The character 
of the nineteenth century anarchism, which is widely 
spread among the industrial workers, is of a reactionary 
nature, Bakunin himself, though a typical representative 
of a combative anarchism is very often obscure with 
regard to the social meaning of the anarchic action, Ee 
criticises Marx, for instance, for trying to impose upon 
the workers a rigid Prussian organisation and an author­
itarian discipline. (Benoit p. Eapner: Bakounine et le 
Panslavisme Revolutionaire‘Marcel*Riviere, i3aris.)
Although Bakunin and -Croudhon took a step further from 
the individualistic anarchism of Stirner, they are tbtally 
opposed to the subservience of the anarchic action to the 
Interest of a social group which strives towards a new 
type of society. The Prou&honist and Bakuninist workers 
are against the use of strikes and against the organ­
isation of the working class even when these are initiated 
by recognised working class authorities* (The First 
International). Though they act in a-group, they refuse 
to acknowledge the unity of the- working class, either as 
a basis of their action or as a basis of a new type of
/
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of society, ^lain Sergent and Jlaude ^aciel (L'Eistoire 
de L* Anarchie Vol.l. -fails. Portulan £&• ^ rightly 
describe this type of anarchism as repressive in the 
social sense, or as the revolt of the individual against 
the type of integration required by industrial society.
At the root of this revolt lies the image of the golden 
era of a primitive society described by ideologues like 
Rousseau. This applied to the anarchic attitude of the 
industrial workers has the following meaning. The 
industrial proletariat, though refusing to be exploited, 
does not know how to change its condition of life into 
something else. It displays a purely negative attitude 
and a' diffuse discontent and aggression.
Marx is not alone in realising the essentially 
reactionary and regressive frame or mind of the industrial 
workers, during the first half of the last century, E0r 
is he alone in demonstrating the neessity of workersT 
organisations for the struggle against the employers and 
the whole industrial society. lie is, however, one of the 
first who understood that this struggle cannot be conducted 
on the basis of compromise and gradual improvements in the 
position of the workers, but on the basis of revolutionary 
action. The meaning of revolution is in l;arxTs mind equal 
to a social cataclysm. Workers "have nothing of their own 
to secure and fortify; their mission is to destroy all 
previous securities for, and insurance of, individual 
property". (Manifesto London, The Gor-imunist Party 1948, 
p.11.)
/
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Marx is, by his origin and b y  his. personality 
structure, detached enough from his society to see a 
positive, meaning in the worker1 s. refusal to integrate 
themselves with the industrial order. Cherishing in his 
heart the proletarians boycott of th* nineteenth century 
society he takes the trouble to justify it. But what 
is important in his thought is not the justification of 
the proletarians attitude in causal,but in teleological 
and prophetic terms. The proletariat is right in his 
boycott of modern society because it can create his o?m 
society, a complete new society. The proletariat is the 
treasurer of a new world. In this lies Marx’s exceptional 
power of intuition which explains his great influence in 
our times. This aspect of his thought inflamed the mind 
of the proletariat and transformed their passive 
destructive nihilism into a constructive attitude towards 
human history.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the prolet­
ariat had in itiself a certain mental readiness for 
messianic ideas. Marxian ideology strengthened those 
inclinations and worked them out into a rational system. 
Marx and Angels produced the design of the proletar iat 
missioi/oy indicating the nnecessaryn stages in the 
evolution of human society as a whole, by syntonising all
this process with the innermost .wishes of the proletariat^ 
at the same time not forgetting to stress the necessity 
for unity and struggle in the working class. Heedless
/
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Seedless to say that under the pressure of the 
messianic idea all these were quickly appropriated by 
the proletariat. It remained only to pass on to the 
action of organisation.
In this mental state created in the proletariat by 
its condition of life and by the influence of Marxian 
ideology lie the. main conditions of a new type of class 
party. This is a party less interested in progressive 
measures than in total revolution, less interested in 
the present, than in the future. From this nucleus 
springs up the Bolshevik type of party.
Therefore, when Lenin at the beginning of the 
present century built up the first party of a "new type" 
he based his action on these mental trends created in the 
proletariat by its own position in modern society which 
is later illuminated by a series of ideologies instilled 
into the working class by various groups of intellectuals 
which have in common with the working class a deep dis­
content and revolt against the order of their own society. 
The party organised by Lenin hast-from the ideological 
point of view only a class character, tenin has to choose 
between two extreme possibilities regarding the political 
action of the proletariat; Courageous and revolutionary 
action carried out by isolated individuals, or slow action 
carried out by the working class as a whole in its . 
"spontaneous" development towards a dominant political 
role. Ee solves this dilemma by creating the Party as a
/
a synthesis between these two extremes, Lenin conceives 
the - arty as a political or,pan of the most active and 
determined elements of the whole society, united in 
their political action by their resentment against the 
existing social order and by their belief in the 
historical mission of the proletariat. The Party becomes 
from the very beginning the medium of political action 
of those individuals who are by their own. personalities 
most inclined to organise themselves in a military 
manner and to live in permanent mobilisation for the 
fulfilment of their goals,
(s^ n conformity with Leninfs idea the eligibility 
the Parley membership, and to its leadershi^JL-n^ 
particular wns restricted, not de jurhe"but de facto, to 
the most advanced sections^f the industrial workers,
confined to the members of the working class. On this 
point, Lenin writes; "be must have our men everywhere, in 
all social strata, in all positions which allow a 
knowledge of the resources and the mechanisms of the 
State. «fe need such men not only for propaganda and 
agitation, but above all for organisation17, (Lenin 
quoted by iVionnerot op#cit, p.40). Lenin refers here in
he highest degree
est of the working class
t the same time, high
itical and social aspiration
Tfeu$ eligibility to the Party was by no means
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in the first place to the members of the "Intelligentsia”, 
irrespective of their social belongingness, who were 
determined to struggle for the proletarian revolution.
Here is included”... a portion of the bourgeois 
ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of 
comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a 
whole”. (Manifesto p.11.)
What Lenin wants most is a stable organisation, at 
least a stable leadership composed by people trained in 
the class struggle. He asks for full-time revolutionaries 
who should stop working in factories and live at the 
expense of the organisation, ”people whose profession' 
consists in revolutionary action”.(Lenin quot. by Monnerot 
op.cit. p.40).
Here comes an important point. The party conceived 
by Lenin though the party of the working class, consists 
of. professional revolutionaries who have become conscious 
of the historical mission of the proletariat. This 
historical mission of the proletariat is in fact an idea, 
existing in their own &efcds for which there was no 
immediate need to consult and to get the approval of the 
working class as a social body. Moreover, they could 
decide ad libitum on the tactics of the political struggle, 
for they have in their own minds the plan of the class war. 
Thus the Party is for, but not necessarily of the working 
class. It forms an advanced detachment in the struggle of 
the proletariat for its historical fulfilment. The Party
/
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Party is the self- consciousness of the working class 
in its high degree of articulation, for it reflects in 
itself not only the present but the whole 'future of this 
class.
Who formed the basis of 'the Party?
To answer this question we have to go back to the 
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concept of jfiaO«^ o&-pathic personality and to apply it in 
this specific context. The "avant-garde" of the working 
class is made up by people who for one reason or another 
failed to integrate themselves with their own society.
The "declasses” in a broad sense, or the "disinherited" 
form the body of elite of the "avant-garde". Though the 
feeling of "disinheritance" is wide-spread in the group 
of industrial workers the adherence to the party cannot 
be considered as being decided by the simple fact of 
belonging to this group. This adherence is rather a 
personal matter, being related to the particular way in 
which the feeling of "disinheritance" is experienced from 
case to case. Those individuals belonging to the proletariat 
or other social groups who could find a social subsb itute 
for their feeling of disinheritance and a positive meaning 
for their resentment against their own society formed, the 
basic strata of the party. The "idea" rather than the 
reality of the proletariat as an elected class provided a 
strong bond between these people and at the same time an 
efficient remedy for their personal feelings of disinherit­
ance. This shows an important trait in the individuals
/
of socialising their personal resentment; the drive to 
form a group of their own in order to provide better con­
ditions for the solutions of their personal problems 
was a common.trait in them. They claim that the new type 
of social group resulted from their unity vaaaseii belongs 
to the working class. But at the same time they stress 
the uniqueness of their group by distinguishing themselves 
from two categories of workers which constitute by far 
the majority of the working class, i.e., the workers who 
accept passively their proletarian condition, whom they
scornfully call "Lum.penproletariat* and the workers who
€ '
desrted their class by integration with the bourgeois
society, called "opportunists".
Once socialised, the resentment in the above-mentioned 
people grows in intensity. The fact that they form a 
group of their own contributes to detach them completely 
from their own society and to create in them a fanatical 
belief in their own aims and ideas. The ideology of the 
group - the Party ideology- was to them not only a body 
of ideas, but the protective shell of their own life. 
Outside it they could perceive nothing but hatred and 
danger. These people fit perfectly the revolutionary type 
described by hitchaev, and they formed the first nucleus 
of the Russian Bolshevik Party.
The following important idea should be noted. The
rov
The basis of the Party is not made up by people who 
belong to, or are integrated with a class, working class 
or any other, but by people who do not belong, it is 
not the reality of belongingness that constitutes the 
driving force of the Party, but the desire for belong­
ingness, It is not the industrial workers as an inte­
grated group, within itself and within its own sooiety, 
that prepares the ground for a totalitarian organisation 
crystallised in the party 5tof a new type% but rather 
their desire for belongingness and their desire for 
unity and social strength, ind finally it is not the 
inner capacity of modern society to create classes that 
leads to Communist revolution,and to totalitarian 
society, but the incapacity of this society to integrate 
its own members in its own structure. In other words, 
it is the capacity of modem society to create ndeclasses'f 
that constitutes the prime moving force in the rise of 
contemporary totalitarian society. The fundamental process 
seems to be the struggle for class rather than the class 
struggle. Therefore the Party is made up by those products 
of modern society, individuals or groups, which over­
socialise their anxiety for belongingness and integration. 
Those who join the Party belong to that psychological 
category who, because of a long period of insecurity and 
frustration, live under pressure of a deep desire for a 
radical change in themselves and in the external world. •
In Benin's opinion when somebody joins the Party he
/
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he undergoes a process of transfiguration. One 
meaning of this .night be ■ that he who is weak becomes 
strong, he who is alone becomes a "comrade'*, he who 
wavers becomes ruthless and dogmatic.
Thus the rise of the Party offers one of the best 
illustrations of the power of the negative. In 
psychological jargon this means the power of the com­
pensatory mechanisms of the mind, or the working of the 
contradiction existing in the structure of the human 
mind between the Unconscious and consciousness. Through 
the Party, the regressive and passive inclinations of
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tne "declasses" become progressive and active and the 
disorganised and impotent passes are transformed into 
a strong and rigid organisation. Through the Party, 
spontaneity turns into sense of direction and consciousness 
revolution^ becomes a systematise! professional action, 
and finallyjthe past is completely darkened by. the future.
The Concentration of Power within the Party. The 
position of the Party within the proletariat and the rest 
of.society becomes clear from the very beginning. The 
Party is the embodiment, and at the same time, the 
instrument of the future society. Therefore its decisions 
have the authority of the absolute truth and of the 
fatality of the historical process.
The expression nth:e fatality of the historical process" 
suggests an important aspect of the evolution of the 
Party. Marx and Ungels point out the fact that Communists
/
Communists are "in their practice the most advanced and 
resolute section of the -working class parties".
(Manifesto p. 13). On the other hand they make it quite 
clear that the-Communist party takes the power from the 
proletariat, and that in a Communist society all the 
power should be .in the hands of the proletariat. But 
the relationship between the party and the proletariat, 
i.e., how the party gets-and maintains power, constitutes 
for a certain period a confusing point in the evolution 
of contemporary Communist society. Lenin himself takes, 
on a purely ideological plane, an ambiguous attitude 
towards the "role" of the Party within.the proletariat.
The Party is according to him, an "avant-grade”, and as 
such it -works out the "line" of the proletariat’s 
political action. But does it take the "line" from the 
proletarian masses, i.e., does it rely on their spontaneity, 
or does it create this line in its Headquarters? Lenin 
is obviously against the spontaneity of the masses, for 
the masses need a brain and that brain is the Party.
But he cannot' solve unambiguously the relationship between
; ' J
the Party and the masses. The problem is solved later 
in the practical field in the struggle between Trotsky 
and Stalin.
In his writings Trotsky gives the impression that had 
it not been for the.appearance of a particular type of 
personality in the foreground of the Party, the proto­
type of which is Stalin, the role of the Party in Russian
' ■'
Russian Gomunist society would have been different.
In other words, the concentration of power in the hands
of a few top leaders, or the personal dictatorship of
one leader, would have been avoided.
This is in fact an academic argument. If one bears
in mind the historical conditions certain psychological 
factors being here included - in which Lenin created the 
Party nof a new type”, one could easily notice that the 
me chan, ism of power and the position of the Party in 
Communist society are decided/1 in nuce". Lenin's Party 
is in the first place the organisation of those individuals 
and groups who are sociologically and psychologically at 
the periphery,of, or completely outside, society. The | 
Party rises as a form of socialisation of the,insecurity, 
resentment and the desire for belongingness prevailing
I
in the mind of these individuals and groups. Iforeover, \ 
LeninTs Party is the meeting point of a series of strong j 
conflicts existing within modern Russiait society.
All this points to the psychological conclusion that only 
a strong authoritarian organisation could completely 
satisfy these types of men and groups, and that only an 
organisation of military type could adequately serve 
their ends.
The main qualitites which made one eligible for the 
Party were determination, ruthlessness, need for domination 
and destruction and a series of others, as they were laid 
down by Mitchaev in his "catechism”. This led naturally
/
naturally to the. rise within the Party and ultimately 
to its domination by' individuals who excelled in these 
qualities. Stalin represented the type of man required 
at its best. His victory is therefore written the birth 
certificate of the Party nof a new type”. In this sense 
the assertion that Stalin is the creation of the Party, 
the first new man, seems to carry considerable weight. 
Phis cannot be said about Lenin. Bor studying his 
personality in the function of his political activities - 
the creation of the Party in particular - one is often 
under the impression that he is himself apart from his 
activity, sometimes bigger, sometimes smaller, sometimes 
dominating, sometimes dominated by his. creation. Stalin, 
on the other hand, fits perfectly into the Party: he is 
nothing by himself, he grows through the Party, and the 
Party grows through him. Stalin can be regarded as the 
prototype of the totalitarian man to the extent to which 
the Party constitutes the "pattern” of Communist society. 
Beutscher significantly calls his biography of Stalin 
in "A political biography".
The structure of the Party decided by itself that the 
holders of power should quickly be reduced to smaller and 
smaller groups. Thus during the revolutionary period the 
Bolshevik Party had quickly assumed all the power for 
itself hy banishing all other parties. Within the Party 
the powei'is concentrated in the hands of a Central 
Committee, consisting during 1917-19, of no more than
/
t i i an 2C members. In the first stage of the revolution 
the Gomiittee itself be came dominate<3. by six powerful 
individuals: Lenin, Zenoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev,
Bukharin, and Stalin, Within the Central Committee there 
were two organisations: The Politburean - fomed in
1917 - and the Grgbireatt (organisatoric bureau), formed 
in 1919, (They represent in fact two influential groups). 
In 1922 came into being the Secretariat of the Committee 
placed at the very top of the pyramid of power. Stalin 
was elected in the Secretariat in 1922, becoming within 
a few years the indisputable leader of the Party.
The concentration of power within the Party can be 
accounted for in many ways. We have so far confined 
ourselves to pointing out that the Party itself contains 
the seed of this phenomenon. One can also look at this 
phenomenon in the light of the process of ifoligarchisationr 
which, according to Bobert Iiichels, exists in every 
European political party. The development of this process 
within the Bolshevik Party seems to illustrate in the 
clearest way possible the general, principle regarding the 
inner organisation of a group under conditions or stress. 
The more difficult it is for a party to take and maintain ' 
power and the more radical are the changes advocated by 
its programme of government, the more rapid and 
intensive the oligarchisation.
In what follows we should like to describe two
/
two mechanisnyof the concentration 0!f power 
characteristic of the Party "of a new type"5 A.
§iffieauc rati sat ion and B. Bolshevisation.
A. The practice of class struggle in Russia 
increased the prestige of the Workers* Committees. The 
main reason for this lies in the skilful propaganda 
these committees made for themselves. Any important 
success was normally attributed to the "excellent" 
leadership, and any failure to the recalcitrance of the 
masses or to the "criminal" action of the class enemy. 
These committees - functioning clandestinely - were con­
stituted mainly of professional revolutionaries, who, 
tkrouoK.
long practice, became experts in the technique 
of organisation. Throughout the conspiratorial period 
the meetings of these committees were held in secret - 
even today the meetings of the Communist committees take 
place preferably during the night - and their decisions 
were communicated to- the other members of the Party, and 
to the fellow-travellers,if necessary, as a fixed line 
■of action which would not allow any debate and change.
One of the main pointA regarding the activity of these 
committees was that their decisions had to be based on 
"unanimity/'. One, and only one, point of view had to 
prevail over all others, otherwise the unity of action 
of the masses could not be assured. A split in Committee 
was regarded as one of the most dangerous things for the
political action of the proletariat. Majorities were
were not enough, for the resentment of the minority 
might have resulted in a definite split, and finally, 
in the collapse of the whole organisation. These con­
ditions regarding the functioning of such a committee 
determined its monolithic structure as well as its 
liability to fall under the exclusive domination of one 
of its members, usually the secretary.
This mode of functioning and organisation remained 
typical for the Party even after the conspiratorial 
period was over. The professional revolutionaries,the 
technicians of political action, formed the Party 
committees in Soviet Russia, and in any other Communist 
society. They took decisions, insisting always on 
unanimous consent, which decisions were consequently 
communicated to the Party as its own line. The rise in 
the hierarchy of the Party of those who v&ere skilful in 
committee-work was thereby assured. The power was 
normally taken by this special type of bureaucrat, by 
thencomitardn as he was sometimes called.
Stalin’s gifts were first of all those of a
"comitard” and of a technician of insurrection. His 
capacity to communicate with the masses was very limited, 
and it was in any case by far outweighed by his ability
to pull the strings in a committe, in order to assure
unanimity for his point of view. His success within the 
Party was obviously based on shrewdness, and innumerable 
machinations, all of them justified by the same principle
principle,i.e., the necessity of unity in action,
"Unity of view in programme, tactics and organisation 
forms the basis on which our party is being built. If 
the unity of view crumbles, the party, too, crumbles". 
(Stalin quoted by Deutjftscherl. "Stalin. A political 
biography,. Oxford Univ. Press. 1949 p.59.)
Krupskaia - LeninTs wife and secretary - obviously 
referring to Stalin, writes: "The "comitard" was a man 
of self-assurance; he was aware of the enormous influence 
of the Committee upon the masses; in principle he did 
not allow any democracy within the party". (Souvenirs sur 
Lenine p.174. Englished. p. 93).
B. A definition of the process of Bolshevisation 
is by no means easy to formulate. To start with, this 
process can be conceived as something similar to the 
radicalization of a political organisation, i.e., the 
taking over of the key positions by those members who hold
extremist views on the specific line of their own organ­
isation. This is naturally followed by the elimination of 
those members who manifest readiness towards compromise 
with other organisations. We can speak about an "acute” 
and a "chronic" aspect of Bolshevisation existing in every 
Communist party. The periodical purges refer to the former 
aspect. As a result of a purge there are eliminated from 
the Party firstly, all those leaders who cannot show
enough flexibility to accept the official line of the
Secretatiat. At the same time, there are eliminated also
those party members who are potentially in conflict with
/
mwith, the official line, as a whole, or with some of 
its points, These are people who were accepted in 
the party on tactical grounds, or as a matter of 
political expediency. 1'he social democrats for instance 
were incorporated with the Party mainly on such grounds, 
and were subsequently purged in various stages. In 
France and Italy many peasants joined the Ooximunist 
Parties on account of their desire for a large-scale 
land-refora, or on various other grounds, none o f  them 
belonging to the specific political p r o g r a m m e s  o f  a 
Communist party. Most of these peasants are far from 
being C o m m u n i s t s .  Xet they are kept on the membership 
lists for the simple reason that the C o m m u n i s t  parties 
i n  France and Italy need action, for the time being,on 
a large basis. A turn in the line of these parties 
might result, at any m o m e n t  in their elimination and 
c o n s e q u e n t l y  in the reduction in the m e m b e r s h i p  list 
to those w h o  joined the Party u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y #  ^here 
a r e  phases in which the Party closes its doors, s h u t t i n g  
out all members accepted under the title of "'relatives**, 
"friends*, or "guests". During, such p e r i o d s  t h e  Party 
is no longer "a. hospitable patriarchal family, welcoming 
any sympathiser in its midst* but *....## a  fortress, 
the doors of which will be opened only to the worthy" 
(Stalin © n o t e d  by D e u t s c h e r ,  o p # c i t #  p # 59).
One can speak, as we have said, about a chronic 
process of Bolshevisation. Any turning in the party line
/
line produces its victims. The result of this is that 
the members who identify themselves with the line, who 
are always where the Party is, rise gradually in the 
hierarchy of the Party and become its leaders. Thus, 
the power concentrates in the hands of those who 
display the greatest capacity for discipline, the 
greatest determination in carrying out the orders, and 
who are ready to sacrifice everything for the unity of 
the Party. The Party becomes in this way a perfect 
medium for the exercise of absolute power by a leading 
group or by a personal leader.
J. iwonnerot seizes upon another characteristic 
aspect of Bolshevisation. According to him, the 
Western Communist Parties undergo a process of 
Bolshevisation to the extent they surrend^nconditionally 
to the supremacy of the Russian Bolshevik Party, to the 
extent to which Moscow becomes the centre of decision 
for all Communist parties, and the Soviet interests 
dominate their political line. The replacement of the 
old native leaders by Moscow trained Communists con­
stitutes an important aspect of this process.
In order to complete the meaning of the phenomenon 
of Bolshevisation we find it necessary to look a& it 
from a purely psychological point of view. What happens 
when a Party member becomes a ”Bolshevikft? How can we 
define this particular type of man?
Combativity is perhaps the most outstanding 
mental trait of a Bolshevik. This does not necessarily 
imply that he is a quarrelsome man or an hysterical 
aggressive. On the contrary, a Bolshevik gives the 
impression of a self-possessed and inhibited man. His 
combativity is socialised in an almost militaristic 
manner, i.e., it is displayed, not at the individual, 
but at the group level. When the Party gives the signal 
for attack, defining the target at the same time, the 
Bolshevik becomes automatically aggressive. Thus the 
Bolshevik, though giving the impression of self- 
possession, is always ready for attack, always in 
search of an enemy. Once the enemy is jdsn, tified and 
the attack unleashed the Bolshevik becomes ruthless in 
the extreme. He does not spare anything to destroy 
his enemy.
It is exactly the lack of combativity and ruthlessness 
that Russian Communists object to in the Western Communist; 
and it is the combative and ruthless type of man that they 
try to create the world over,through the process of 
Bolshevisation. They are aware of the difficulty of this 
task, for they often notice the regretful fact that,in 
the West, not even the Party leaders are Bolsheviks, i.e., 
true Communists. Stalin calls Togliatti "a professor 
who could write a good article, but did not know how to 
rally the people and to lead them to a goal". Of Thorez 
he says; "Even a dog which does not bite, bares its 
teeth when it wants to frighten someone. Thorez cannot
\ w
cannot even do that much11. (From Stalin1 s conver­
sations with a group of Jugoslav Communists. Vladimir 
Dedijer "Tito Speaks" Weidenfeld Nicolson. .London, 1953 
p. 283). Here Stalin obviously touches upon the main 
point regarding the personality of a Bolshevik. For, 
the Bolshevik is a man permanently living under the need 
of biting. It should only be added that he barks very 
little. This is a point which differentiates him from 
a Fascist.
I, rayself, was surprised how far the Western
Communists differ from the true Bolshevik type. Between
1946-48 I had the opportunity of knowing some of the
Western Communist leaders, and being previously well
acquainted with the Bolshevik type prevailing in the
Russian Party, I could hardly help feeling that, with very
few exceptions, all these leaders were in danger of being
"purged". .And I would not be surprised in the least to
see this happening as soon as the Western Parties undergo
(i)
a true process of Bolshevisation.
(X)
My impressions were strengthened by the observation 
made by the leaders of the Roumanian Communist Party 
about various Western Communists who visited Roumania 
during that period. Their "joviality" and their 
incapacity to "bare their teeth" was a shock to the 
Roumanian Communists, who were by then thoroughly 
Bolshevised. One of these Western leaders created grave 
suspicion in the mind of Roumanian leaders as to whether 
he was really a Communist or something else.
Heedless to say, not all the members of the Russiaflt 
Party are Bolsheviks to the same degree. During my
/
my participation in the Paris Peace Conference (1946)
I was often under the impression that Vishinsky*s
aggression and combativity were not exactly of a
Bolshevik type. He, too often and too quickly flared
up into a rage as if everything was to him personal
matters, and not a few times I was really expecting him
to let slip the word ”1 ”, a fatal word for every
Bolshevik. On the other hand, Molotovfs combativity,
dull, even,and conveying the feeling that there was no
retreat, was in itself much more of a Bolshevik type.
fhis can hardly be surprising knowing that Molotov grew 
ay
up asvBolshevik, while Vishinsky, a bourgeois lawyer, 
joined the Party late in his forties.
Communist Totalitarianism. The Communist Bolshevik 
Party has been built up as the political articulation 
of the modern proletariat. It has gradually moulded its 
inner structure in the function of an ideology. Mis­
trusting the f!spontaneity” of the proletariat, the Party 
has detached itself from the masses and become exclusive 
possessor of the idea of a new society completely opposed 
to modern democracy. In feussia first, and then in various 
other countries, this image of society has been enforced 
upon the existing society. Thus, one can say that, at 
the present stage, Communist societies are the product of 
an idea. The Party moulds the individual and his society 
according to an idea which comprises in itself the present 
and the future possibilities of man. This idea of society
society would sooner or later suppress every 
empirically constituted and naturally grown form of 
society. State, nation, family would "wither away", 
and even the Party itself, for the Party will become 
"the whole". Thus human history would become the 
field of technology; instead of a "natural* there would 
be a "manufactured" society, a society machine.
The proletarian ideology rose and spread as the 
imagery of a series of traumatic experiences 
characteristic of the modern proletariat, of Marx, and 
of the Russian people. It bore in many respects the 
mark of "dreamlikeness" and escape from unsatisfactory 
conditions of life combined with the hope for 
absolute happiness. And yet this can hardly be called 
an escape into irreality. The psychological concept 
of "reality-fantasy" has a relative meaning on the 
social plane. In the last century, European society 
has been continually fostering the proletariatfs imagery, 
introducing new contents into it, so that today this 
imagery, this artificial growth, takes the form of 
reality. In the meantime the delirious self-consciousness 
of the proletariat has adjusted itself to its own 
imageries, creating in this way a new type of mental 
balance and a new sense of reality. The individuals 
born and grown in a Communist society have no other 
sense of reality, except that which allows them a satis­
factory adjustment to the social world created after the
proletarian ideology. Another type of adjustment, and /
nj>
and adjustment to another world, seems to them unreal 
and untrue. It is the first time since Christianity, 
in European civilisation, that an idea has given birth 
to a new society and world. There is, however, a 
fundamental difference between the two "revolutions". 
In the former, the idea if transcendental, while in 
the latter, immanent. From the psychological point of 
view this is of a crucial importance, as we shall see 
later.
RUSSIA M m  COMMUNISM.
Having ideas in oners head which can never be 
applied is a torture, a terrible torture.
II. Tkachov.
The outburst and the success of the Communist 
Revolution in Russia constitute even today a surprise 
for many people. The main reason for thi& it that 
the economic conditions of th&H country were not ripe 
enough at the time when this event took place. It is 
obvious that in this case Communism.is regarded primarily 
as an industrial revolution. To hold rigidly to a purely 
economic point of view means to refuse to see the inner 
aspect of Communism as a phenomenon of its own.
Communism is not an industrial revolution, but "the" 
revolution of our time. It is the negation of modem 
society. Marx was obsessionally inclined to Jutrtthings 
f,upside down", and this is the most characteristic 
impulse he could grasp and foster in the working move­
ments of his time. When he learned that his ideas had 
fallen on good ground in nineteenth century Russia, and 
that certain aspects of Russian rural economy supported 
a communist system of ownership, he was quite willing to
to revise some important points in his system of thought so
(i ^as to fit it into the scheme of an agricultural society.1' '
1 This point is dealt with in Pr.lenz*s "Staat und Marxismus"' 
mentioned by O.Spengler in HJahre der Entscheidung” Munchen 
19339 in a footnote, p.89* Lenz puts forward the view that 
Marx was ready to give up his theory about the role of the " 
proletariat and to create another revolutionary theory based 
on the historical mission of the peasantry.
It is very likely that Lenz*s view is based on the often 1 
quoted letter written to Marx round 1880' by the Russian ;
populist Yera Zasulich. In that letter Marx was asked whether;: 
Russia might skip the capitalist stage of evolution on account^ 
of certain features in her system of land ownership. Yera 'i 
Zasulich was referring to the existence in Russia of an old * 
type of commun rural property (the village commune). Marx*s * 
answer to this question has been differently interpreted. i] 
Wetter, analysing the text of both letters is inclined to |> 
think that the answer is in the affirmative. (Op. cit. p.86j.ji 
I agree with this interpretation. It should be added perhaps jj 
that the answer was a diplomatic “yes”, but non the less jj
positive. Later on Lenin being more Marxian than Marx himself 
was of a different opinion on this matter.
If this proves anything, it is that Marx was interested in
"revolution” and not in an industrial revolution, as will
be seen in one of the following chapters, dealing with his
personality.
If we accept the view that the main trait of Communism 
consists in its being the revolution of m o dem society, i.e., 
the explosion of a series of tensions existing in that 
society then we can look at the modern Russian culture- 
pattern as a characteristic, almost unique, centre of 
tensions, and consequently infer that it was good ground 
for this revolution. We have, however, to state from the 
very beginning that, considering the variety of problems 
involved in the study of Russian society and culture, we 
canuhardly do justice to this p "art of our study. We have
to confine ourselves to those aspects of the Russian
culture-pat tern which are most directly involved in the 
development of the Communist type of totalitarian society. 
Our main aim is to show how a series of tensions existing 
in this society had produced in many generations of Russians 
a negative attitude towards modern European society, and the 
desire to create another form of society completely opposed! 
to this.
But before entering into the discussion of this problem 
it would be advisable to say that we are aware of the comple­
xity of the subject and of the great range of possible 
interpretations. The reaction against the absolutist regime 
of the Tsars, the tension between the landlords and a land­
less peasantry, the existence of some communist features in 
the system of landownership, or the lack of education in 
political freedom are very often considered- together or 
separately - as the main contributing factors to the rise of 
Communism. In what follows we shall try to focus attention 
on certain aspects of the Russian culture-pattern and way 
of life which have,in our opinion, contributed to a great 
extent to the rise of Communism and to the formation of the 
Bolshevik type of personality. ,
C©nflict_ be tween two Cultures. The main characteristic 
of the pre-revolutionary Russian political system consists 
in a specific relationship between the autocratic ruling 
group and the rest of society. While the ruling group 
identified itself with various aspects of Western civili­
sation, the rest of society remained all the time integrated 
with a Russian native culture. Consequently the
the conflict between, the ruling group and the Masses, 
naturally existing in any absolutist regime, was in 
this case even more accentuated by a difference in 
culture-pattern. One should add to this the well-known 
tendency in the ruling group to westernise Russian society, 
and above all the specific methods used to this end.
If we had to say in a few words what seems specific of 
the Russian ruling group we should say that this group 
always ha^ an wexperimentalist” attitude towards their own 
society as a whole. As Result of this, Russian society 
had undergone a long series of "planned reforms". In 
other words, its development has always been under the 
pressure of a specific programme or pattern of progress. 
Here are some of the main stages in this characteristic 
mode of development.
M
A. The 'builders of the^Russian State, the Variags, 
came from outside Russia. When they devised their wgst 
programme of political^organisation, the Russian peoples 
looked upon them as complete strangers whose manners and 
language they did not understand. But the building of 
the State went on in spite of the enormous gap between 
the ruled and ruling groups.
B. The same 'process took place under Ivan the - 
who enforced upon'the Russian people the idea of Tsar and 
Tsardom, having in mind the pattern of a Western empire, 
the Third Rome. He could not win over to his "plan” any 
but a small minority of"boyars"and part of the clergy. The
The people remained therefore completely outside the 
pattern of their own state, and of the culture of their 
own rulers. . '
C. Russian feudalism is in many ways an artificial 
product. It was manufactured in a mechanistic 
manner by the rulers of the State. The Tsar sent his duty 
men to various parts of the country where they were given 
land and serfs. This method strengthened in the people 
the feeling of a strange and enforced social order.
D. The reforms of Peter the Great did not but further 
these processes. The forced hair-cutting and .beard-shaving 
are in fact aspects of the same experimentalist attitude 
towards the historical process. Peter the Great offers
a unique example of the way,society can be moulded by a 
"technocrat#”,i.e., a ruler who shapes the historical 
process in the manner a carpenter shapes his wood. His 
action of Westernisation went so fast and deep that one 
could rightly say that he created in Russia a new type of 
man who is in many ways the ancestor of the present-day 
Bolsheviks.
E. There are a series of other important stages in 
this long process. A-Toynbee (Reith Lectures 1952) refers 
to the 1 post - Napoleonic period as another 
characteristic effort made by Russia to catch up with the 
West through a series of quick reforms.
T?st
Communism is obviously the last stage in the process 
of Westernisation, and, in our own opinion, the highest 
stage in the experimentalist attitude towards human
/
human society. Society, culture, the individual, all 
are permanently measured against the yardstick of a 
fixed ideology, and of a pre-established plan of progress.
The action of Westernisation, resulted in one of the 
most intense conflicts, created by the encounter of two 
cultures. It can in many respects be compared with the 
tension produced in the ancient world by the clash between 
the G-raeco-Roman civilisation and Christianity, ^he 
geographical position of Russia explains, at least 
partially,the intersity of this conflict. For, modern
p?-
Russia had to experience and to-solve within herself the 
conflict between Asia and Western Europe. Being in many 
respects Asiatic, the Russian peoples had by historical 
necessity to live under the permanent strain of catching 
up and keeping pace with Western civilisation. Though we 
consider this phenomenon as one of the most specific 
sources of Communist society in present-day Russia, in 
what follows, we can only give a very brief description of 
its most important aspects.
1. The important fact should be noted that the encounter 
between Western and Russian cultures had gradually been 
transformed into an inner conflict in modem Russian 
society in the sense that the two cultures became in time 
two different ways of life open to the Russian individuals 
or groups. A definite choice of one made necessary the 
struggle against the other. Consequently, Russian society 
can,'be considered as a typical case o f a group living for a
7 °t: '
a long period under a condition of stress caused by an 
intense inner conflict.. An analogy with the acting out 
of an inner conflict by an individual may help us to 
understand various aspects of Russian life connected in 
one way or another with the inner conflict mentioned above.
Any period of radical change when two ways of life 
conflict with each other, normally produces a high degree 
of introspection in the individuals belonging to this 
period. The inclination of modern Russian writers towards 
psychological analysis, and the important contribution 
made by them to the knowledge of the human mind, are, in 
our opinion, phenomena closely connected with the inner 
conflict in modern Russian culture.
But an inner conflict results also in a high degree 
of insecurity. One of the basic aspects of insecurity 
resulting•from an inner conflict in the structure of 
society and culture is manifested as a feeling of apathy and 
of a lost meaning of life. This is normally noticeable 
in some outstanding personalities, but it can be seen under 
various forms also in the group.as a whole.
An important symptom of a loss of meaning of life can 
be seen in the inclination of the nineteenth century 
Russian intellectuals towards general and often vague ideas 
and theories, and in their obsession with "ultimate” 
problems. These problems seem to spring up directly from, 
an "under-world”, being in no way derived from a systematic 
philosophical thinking which these writers might have
/
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have borrowed from the West. In this context Spengler is 
right where talking about nthe feeling of the steppe",i.e., 
vague and indefinitestates of mind, as one- of the main 
features of the Russian "soul".
The inclination of Russians towards "totalitarian" 
ideas constitute another sign of the tension and insecurity 
which characterise their culture-pattern. There is no 
other European nation displaying a greater fanaticism of 
ideas than the Russians. They hang on to one idea, stretch 
it so as to comprise in it the whole world, and then play 
out their whole lives around it. Prince Kropotkin was 
obsessed with the application of the Darwinian principles 
of evolution to human life; Lenitet behaved in the same way 
with regard to the philosophical system of Marx. "Having 
in one's head ideas which can never be applied is a torture, 
a terrible torture", says the Russian Jacobin,Tkachov.
The attempt made by Berdiaev and Chestov, among others, 
to find in modern Russian^ thinking the preliminaries of 
contemporary existentialism seems partly justified. Russians 
have, as a rule, displayed a strong inclination to live up 
to one idea. The need of acting out an inner conflict 
existing at the core of their way of life forms the root of 
this characteristic mental trait of theirs. They seemv'to be 
always searching for a f omul a of life, for a total idea, 
with which they identify themselves in order to escape the 
indecision and ambiguity of their culture-pattern. The 
evolution of Russian thought in the last two centuries shows
/
shows an almost obsessional preoccupation with the /
formula of a new way of life completely distinct from the 
existing social forms. This is one of the main mental 
dispositions which has gradually appeared in the mood of 
"total revolution” which forms the basic feature of Communism.
2. A strong inner conflict in a culture-pattern often 
produces in individuals a neutral attitude and indifference 
towards cultural values, This is certainly the case with 
the modern Russian culture-pattern. Nineteenth century
European nihilism as a fashion of thinking, had soon become 
one of the characteristic features of/Russian "Intelligentsia” 
It was there that European nihilism was first worhed out 
into " . a  general attitude towards life, and then made a basis 
for social action under the form of social anarchism. In 
these anarchic movements is to be found the germ of tfiat has 
been later called "active nihilism", of which the Russian 
Communist Party is the last extraction. Through Bolshevism, 
European nihilism becomes rationalised aggression and 
destruction, in the sense that the negation of social values 
becomes itself an ultimate value.
3. The nihilistic trends existing in modem Russian society 
are manifested in the exceptional capacity of this society
to create "deracinated" or outcast people. Generally 
speaking, any quick and radical turning in social evolution 
is bound to sweep aside various groups' of individuals who 
may never catch up with the evolution of their own society. 
Thus one of the factors contributing to the creation of a 
modern proletariat, for instance, consists in the quick
/
io
quick change introduced in modern society by the 
process of industrialisation. The process of Western­
isation brought similar results in modern Russian society.
But the long conflict between a Western and a native ■
way of life can explain by itself the existence of such 3
a great number of outcasts. Many members of the Russian 
upper and middle classes, and many members of the j
"intelligentsia" in particular, could not satisfactorily i
integrate themselves with either of the two conflicting i(
ways of life. The result of this was that they remained ^
in a non-descriptSS© social category, and in a neutral *j
position towards the values of their own civilisation. j
i
The "outcasts”, by their numbers and by their influence, 
formed one of the main problems of modern Russian society.
Very often they are spoken of in terms of a new social J
category, of a new human type. They became favourite 
heroes in literature, described as "superfluous people” when 
they are passive nihilists, or as revolutionaries, when they 
are active nihilists. In their own isolation the outcasts 
dream of, and act for, a new society and culture. And the
i
more they cut themselves off from their society, the more j
i
their idea of. another society is opposed to the listing j
society, and the more they become fanatical believers in \
i
their own ideas. ;
i
One of the main causes of the violent clash between the ■
"old regime" and the revolutionary order in France con- I
pi
sisted, according to Tocquevulle, in the fact that the new
society was primarily the mental product of a carticular ]
/ 1
particular type of man, "les philosophes". These men 
had the courage to place themselves outside their own 
society and to protest against its injustice. The 
Russian "outcasts" are in a similar position with regard 
to their own society. They construct in their own minds 
the image of a new society as a protest against the 
society with which they failed to integrate themselves. 
Emotional factors such as their insecurity, their 
frustrated desire for belongingness, their resentment 
against the society from whidrtthey had been cut off, are 
all woven into their idea of the new society and of the 
men who would compose it.
Historically speaking, the "outcasts" originated a 
series of social movements known under various names, 
yet being in essence very much alike. They all manifest 
an aggressifcfr and s» uncompromising attitude of unique 
intensity towards the oisting social order. For them, 
there was nothing to be spared in the authoritarian 
Tsarist society. These movements constituted the "milieu" 
necessary for the formation of.a man with a completely 
new outlook in life, the fanatic and "total" revolutionary 
?/ho regarded the destruction of his society as a sacred 
duty. Netchaev, one of these"outcasts" who is now con­
sidered as one of the early forerunners of the Bolshevik 
type of revolutionary, wrote in his "Revolutionary 
Catechism": "A revolutionary is a damned man; he has no
personal interest and affairs, no sentiments, absolutely
absolutely nothing of his own, not even a name.* *Kis
name is dominated by one interest only, one thought and
one passion; the revolution. The only science known to
him is destruction. He despises and hates with all his
heart and throughout his life the order of present society".
(Retranslated from the Italian, Netchaev quot. Wetter 
(1)
op.cit. p.68)
(1)
The Revolutionary Catechism, is sometimes attributed to 
Bakunin. See Boris Nicolaievsky and O.Maenchen-Helfen: 
Karl Marx, Manas Fighter.
Methuen and Co. London,1936, p.347. Nicolaievsky 
des&ifbes, Netchaev as an impostor, liar and ordinary 
criminal.
When, at the beginning of the century Lenin launched 
the formula of a party made up of "professional" 
revolutionaries, the mental structure' of such type of man 
had already existed among the outcasts of Russian society.
t r v d y
remained for him to provide such a group of
revolutionaries with an ideology and with precise methods 
of action, ie., to transform this somehow incoherent group 
into a political movement able to face the problems of its 
own time. MaratTs formula, i.e., an absolutism can not be 
overthrown but by another absolutism, was, so to speak, in 
the air.
4. Not less important is the development on the intellectual 
plane of the inner conflict characteristic of the modern 
Russian culture pattern. The most important aspect of the 
conflict produced in the "intelligentsia" by the process of
of Westernisation consists in the split of the 
"Intelligentsia" into "Wsterners" and "Slavophiles" which 
took place in the first half of the last century.
To know which of the two trends contributed most to 
the rise of Communist society in Russian is a difficult 
problem. The important fact is, however, that the split 
itself shows firstly the specific character of the crisis 
existing in the Russian culture-pattern, and, secondly, 
the pressing need for a unifying formula. The Westerners" 
saw this formula in various aspects - trends or ideologies 
of Western civilisation and consequently struggled for 
the reformation of Russian society in this sense. They 
are undoubtedly for change, radical and quick. It is not 
so easy, however, to define the political and sociological 
position of the "Slavophiles". They do not plead by any 
means for a statu quo . For, their discontent with the 
Tsarist Russia, of that time is sometimes deeper than that 
of the "Westerners". Since their belief is that Russia 
does not belong to the West they stress the separatist 
note of the Russian way of life. It is this trait in the 
"Slavophile" group that explains their inclination towards 
various forms of collectivism, which they oppose to the
a )
individualistic trends of Western civilisation.
a)
Dostoevsky deals with this idea in "The Brothers 
Karamazov". The ^rand Inquisitor prefers security to 
individual freedom; prefers the established truth to 
innovation. All the main characters of this novel, 
Aliosha,in particular, demonstrate the idea that the 
individual is responsible in his action for the whole 
human race. Berdiaev significantly writes about himself
himself that "The Ego has been a fatality, both for 
himself and for God"
The same trait explains also their preference for a 
rural way of life as a form of protest against Western 
urbanisation. Both groups, the "Westerners" and the 
"Slavophiles" prepared the idea of a new Russia, a better 
one, in this way fertilizing the roots of the Russian 
Communisy movement.
The outcast character could be extended to the nineteenth 
century "Intelligentsia" as a group. This is, by and 
large, due to the process of Westernisation which created 
a big gap between the educated strata and the rest of 
society. As a result of this, one can often find in the 
Russian "Intelligentsia" the feeling of being suspended 
in the air. Sometimes this feeling is expressed as self­
accusation and guilt for not being able to help the back- 
warded masses. These feelings are particularly 
characteristic of those intellectuals 7/ho belong to the 
nobility, and who are usually called the "repentant 
noblemen". At other times the same feeling of isolation 
and superfluousness comes out in the Russian "Intellige^sia" 
as an intense desire to intermingle with the lower strata.
And as extremism is one o^the characteristics of the 
Russian mind, this desire was experienced by many 
intellectuals as a Messianic calling. Consequently, they 
gave up their own way of life and identified themselves 
with the peasants or with the industrial workers of their
country. Tolstoy, for instance, suffers periodically from
from this feeling. The "populist" movement, as a whole 
can also be considered as an outcome of this impulse.
And, finally, Communism itself has very much..profited 
by this tendency. For Marxist ideology, and later on the 
activity of the Party, offered to the "Intelligentsia” a 
good opportunity for the satisfaction of their chronic 
thirst for humanitarian action, and an excellent remedy 
for their feeling of guilt aroused by their isolation from 
the masses. Even today the Communist parties all over the 
world regard Leninfs demand made upon intellectuals as one 
of his brightest ideas. The intellectual should, 
according to ^ e n i n ,  eradicate any possible difference 
between himself and manual workers. He should live among 
them and as they live. This idea fitted perfectly into the 
frame of mind characteristic of most Russiali intellectuals 
at the beginning of this century. The same idea is found
■in all Communist organisations of today under the form of
a certain mistrust/"and even hatred towards intellectuals, 
and under the well-known Communist drive to level the 
difference between "town" and "village".
5. After this brief description of the contribution made 
by the "Intelligentsia" to the Communist movement, a glimpse
of the growth of the revolutionary idea in Russian imaginative
literature may prove iAoedrf rewarding. One could readily 
agree that there is a certain peculiarity about the 
characters depicted in this literature. One can see in the 
first place a certain incompatibility between the Western 
logical mind and the mental reactions of these characters.
They all seem possessed by vague states of mind, by 
sudden aggressive impulses, by an inexplicable ”apathy”, 
or by a "furorn of action unusual for the mind of 
Western man. These characters radiate also a strong 
feeling of ambivalence in life. For they are either too 
passive or too active, either too humanitarian or too 
destructive, too vague in their own minds or utterly 
obsessed by one precise idea. In the evolution of these 
imaginary characters, one could easily read the same 
stages and aims as in the evolution of Russian society 
and of the "Intelligentsia”. From a vague, almost lost, 
sense of life gradually grows a strong urge for destruction 
which in time becomes enlightened by the aspiration towards 
a new formula of life. Pechorin, Lermontovas hero, travels 
infinitely in order to kill his boredom or silence his 
deep anxiety and insecurity. He does not belong anywhere, 
for he cannot overcome the deep inner conflict of his 
culture. Gogol*s Ghichlkov travels also, and amuses 
himself witiyfche unusual business of buying "dead souls”.
He is a strange individuation of the old culture-pat tern, 
a dead soul himself, who got lost in nineteenth century 
Russia. Gonchatovfs creation, Oblomov,is the quaint 
essence of a loss of the feeling of life. His inner 
conflict reaches such an intensity that it kills in his 
mind anyiinitiative and any inclination to action. &e iS 
"the horizontal” man, a man completely devoid of will.
A way out from this existential stagnation is seen for
/
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for the first time in Bugen Onegin (Pushkin), as a man 
possessed by completely irrational impulses for action 
and diffuse aggression. He kills his best friend and 
then gets lost in the world. His crime is motivated by a 
secret drive for excitement and constitutes the spark of 
an active nihilism. In Raskolnikov (Dostoevsky) the 
elements of the inner conflict come into the open, with a 
clear sense of action at the same time. Raskolnikov 
strives towards the integration of his personality, i.e., 
the elimination of the duality of the Russian eulture- 
pattern, by murdering in himself the pattern of the Western 
world symbolised in the old money-lender. He reaches 
peace of mind in Siberia - the core of the Asiatic way of 
life - and in Christianity, The same way is taken by 
Necludov the hero of ^olstoyTs "Resurrection”. The feeling 
of conflict and duality in life reaches in him a unique 
intensity. There is no solution for him, but in his 
renunciation of the way of life offered to him by his 
society, and in his nre-birthn for another life. The 
spirit of his struggle is Christian, yet his methods and 
means remind us in many respects of those used later on 
by Communists.(For example, he divides his land among the 
peasants who live on it.)
The sense of action increases inytensity and clarity
in later literary products. Sanin, the famous hero of
Artzibashev, is an active nihilist; he lacks only integration
(1)
with a social group to be a perfect Bolshevik.
/
W  ■
(1)
Essenin, the poet of the Revolution experienced in 
himself the same feeling of"duality and a desire to 
eliminate the inner conflict at the same time# He 
confesses that he had always been under the impression 
that a precipice divided his life completely into two, 
and that he had always lived in the uncomfortable position 
of trying to reach the opposite shore with one leg.
We should like to close this section by a short com­
parison between the imaginery and the real aspects of 
Russian life, during the period under consideration. One 
has the impression that the growth of the revolutionary 
idea on the fantasy level, from Pechorin to Sanin, is one 
and the same process with the growth of the revolutionary 
mind from Hitchaev to Lenin. Though at a different 
historical level, Lenin’s action is of the same type as 
Raskolnikov’s. Be kills the way of life of his society 
in order to make room for the world of his beliefs. The 
final scene from Grime and Punishment, i.e., Raskolnikov 
holding the Bible in his hand, can be applied symbolically 
to Lenin as well,
The book in Lenin’s hand is ”Das Eapital”.
Russian Messianism. Space does not allow us to mention 
any but the most important aspects of this phenomenon. The 
idea of a great mission with which Providence entrusted 
to the Russian peoples is inseparable from modem Russian 
history. Under Ivan the Terrible it appeared as a striving 
towards imperium mundi - the Third Rome - then, as the 
aspiration to spread throughout the world the true faith, 
i.e., "Orthodoxy”, and even later, under the form of
/
form of "panslavism", i.e., the belief that Moscow as 
the capital of the united Slavs will "become the guide of 
liberated humanity”. (Bakunin.)
The causes of this phenomenon may vary according to 
the historical periods of the evolution of the Russian 
peoples. We are, however, inclined to think that one of 
its main causes lies in the inner conflict created in 
the Russian way of life by the process of Westernisation. 
More precisely, the repression of the native culture, of 
the traditional way of life, by a forcible and ruthless 
imposition of Western civilisation constitutes the 
formation mechanism of this Messianism. The inferior, 
the barbaric and the repressed Russia, the Russia martyred 
by her Westernised rulers becomes, in the mind of the 
people, "mother Russia”, "Holy Russia" or universal 
Russia. "We are a backward people and therein lies our 
salvation", wrote the poet Mikhailov aroundthe middle of 
the last century. At the root of Russian Messianic 
feelings lies an inflated national consciousness as a 
result of the persecution and humiliation of a national 
group. This is illustrated by the rise of the Jewish 
Messianic idea, and by the rise of Gorman nationalism 
between the two world wars. In modern Russia we cannot 
speak of any specific source of frustration and humiliation 
of the people if not that produced by an autocratic regime 
and by the tension created in her culture by Westernisation. 
The tension created by the drive existing in most of the
the Russian autocrats to catch up and overpass the 
West can be considered as the main cause of Russian 
Messianism.
The universalistic and iviessianie character of 
Communism came as a new promise for the Messianic trends 
of Russian society. The Bolshevik leaders, Stalin in 
particular, were particularly concerned wirh rhe fusion 
between Russian ftessianic feelings and the Messianic 
trends of the modern proletariat. It ought only to be 
said that Communist society constitutes the meeting 
point of three Messianic trends, i.e. that of the modem 
proletariat, of the Russian peoples, and the Jewish 
Messianism brought in by Marx. Thus the dynamics of 
Communism is explicable by the convergence - perhaps a 
unique phenomenon in human history - of three forms of 
inflated group consciousnesss The consciousness of 
persecuted Jewry of all times, the consciousness of the 
frustrated modern proletariat,and the consciousness of 
the Russian peoples whose patriachal way of life was 
ruthlessly repressed by Westernisation. Its exceptional 
power to appeal to the poor, to the failures, to the 
insecure, lies in this web of feelings which led to its 
birth.
II Q
C H A P T E R  IY
THE RATIONAL DYNAMICS OF COMUNISM.
Introduction. According to the followers of 
Harz and Lenin, Communist society emerges from modern 
European society with logical necessity. It is the 
logic of the historical process that leads to this end#
The individual accepts, therefore, the Communist way 
of life as soon as he grasps within his own conscious­
ness the logic of human society. The only psychological 
factor implicated in this process consists in an act of 
AWARENESS on the part of the individual, i.e., a 
reflection in his mind of the historical reason. Once 
this has occurred, the mental life of the individual 
is captivated by the mechanism of history. Thus^ 
psychology is superseded by sociology, and this is, in 
its turn, superseded by economics.
It would"b^^ot entirely accurate to infer froEi this 
that Marx and Lenin ignored completely the role played 
by the psychological factors in the process of history. 
They were aware of their importance,and,in their political 
activities, they often exploited the feelings of 
insecurity, hatred and envy existing in the working class, 
let they do not assign to the psychological factors any
/
any dynamic roles in the historical process* To them, 
the logic of history and society is the logic of the 
economic process, and the psychological factors have to 
follow it. For Marx and Lenin the proletarian dictator­
ship is only a transitory stage in the development of the 
historical process, for the simple reason that they over­
looked completely the essential influence upon the course 
of history of such a factor as the lust for power. They 
also considered "terror” as a simple political means to 
set right and accelerate the rational pattern of historical 
evolution.
Today their onesidedness, because of the under­
estimation of the psychological factor in history,be comes 
obvious. For one easily notices that the psychological 
resultant of terror may lead to the structuration of 
Communist society in forms unforeseen by the rational 
schemes established by Marx and Lenin. The terror 
motivated by the carrying out of a rational plan in society 
usually arouses resistance and "sabotage”. This calls 
for more terror until the whole rational pattern is 
reduced to a series of restrictive measures for the pro­
tection of the ruling group. This means "permanent” 
rather than "temporary” dictatorship. On the other hand, 
the terror characteristic of the Communist rulers arouses 
in the rest of the world fear and disapproval which is 
very likely to result in the co-operation and even 
unification of various "capitalist" countries against
/
against Communism. This is again a point unforeseen 
by the Marxian pattern of history which stresses far too 
much the conflict between capitalist countries and their 
mutual annihilation.
Some Rational ^actors in Communist Behaviour* By 
rational motives in Communist behaviour we understand 
those motives which are based on phenomena and processes 
whose existence in the social environment of the 
individual can be proved in such a manner as to satisfy 
the present scientific methods and the logical require­
ments of contemporary man. Those motives are also 
rational which can be justified in the function of values 
characteristic of contemporary civilisation. Here are 
some of the most important of these rrrtives-
1. The anarchy of production and the periodical crises
inherent in a competitive economic system should be 
mentioned first. The abolition of private ownership and 
its replacement by a collectivist system can at any moment 
be formulated in terms of rational necessity irrespective 
of its practical consequences* Common observation shows
that many people have become Communist or fellow-
travellers solely because they thought it necessary to 
correct the insufficiences of the e c o n o m i c  system of 
private ownership. Many other people, who could not 
formulate these objective difficulties of modem society 
in a rational system, but who saw these difficulties 
a l l  the same, t u r n e d  C o a a i m i s l :  from a  l e c c i t i n a t e  d e s i r e
/
desire to change some aspects of their society, We 
consider also this desire to change an objectively 
unsatisfactory position as another rational motive in 
the acceptance of Communism. ^any Italian and French 
peasants, supporters of the Communist parties, find 
themselves in this position. They have joined the 
Party for the wrong reason, i.e., hoping for a' land 
reform which will make them the masters of the land they 
work and live on,
2, Though they are of an emotional nature, we consider 
sympathetic feelings as belonging also to the category 
of rational motives in Communist behaviour. Compassion 
for those suffering from material privation, the sense 
of social justice and other humanitarian and Christian 
values, belong to this category. There are individuals 
who joined a Communist organisation in the hope that the 
causes of this state of affairs will disappear in the 
society foreseen by such a movement.
3. Two important trends in modern civilisation, 
rationalism and scientism can also motivate the acceptance 
of Com unism.
Communist ideology continues the line of European 
rationalism initiated by the Enlightment. Thus it 
formulates at a new level the conviction of the rational 
nature of history and man. This makes an exceptional 
appeal to many intellectuals of today and for many other 
categories of people. For, this conviction supplies them
with the necessary weapon against mysticism and ignorance.
/
By the acceptance of the Communist ideology, many 
intellectuals have the genuine feeling that they 
integrate themselves with the most valuable and pro­
gressive trends in the evolution of contemporary 
civilisation. Those who are familiar with the logical 
stringency and the scientific armour of Marx's 
"Capital” for instance, can well understand the import­
ance of systematic rational thought and a rationalistic 
attitude in life in the acceptance of Communism.
Communists claim that their ideology is scientific; 
they consider dialectical materialism as nthe science 
of science”. This obviously constitutes another 
rational motive in the acceptance of Communism. For 
many intellectuals have adopted Communist ideology 
on the ground that it is more scientific than any other 
philosophy of today, and that it stands uncompromisingly 
for the supremacy of the scientific values in life. 
Whether this is true depends a great deal upon the 
definition of science. It is nevertheless true that 
Marxism is, by its materialism,against mysticism, 
idealism and religion, which are in the eyes of many 
people the main enemies of modern science and con­
sequently of the modern conception of progress.
There is no other philosophy of today more likely 
to stimulate manfs pride to become the master of 
nature than Marxism. In biology, Lysenko advocates the 
idea that the scientific control of nature enables man '
? 7!
man to create new forms of life, thus foreshadowing 
the image of man-made and man-controlled universe. 
Soviet economists, historians and sociologists work on 
the assumption that human society is rational and 
therefore bound to respond to human rational influence 
upon it. In their scientifically-oriented minds, they 
go as far as to consider society and history as open 
fields for "experimentation". Speaking about the role 
played by the Soviet writers, Stalin significantly 
coined the expression, the "engineers of the human 
mind". "Engineer" is undoubtedly the word which covers 
the most valuable attitude towards life in a Communist 
society.
The lure of science and romanticised scientific 
attitude in life constitute one of the greatest 
attractions of Communism. In backward agricultural 
countries, Communism has the appeal of an advanced 
industrial stage whose fruits will be enjoyed 
by all. Many intellectuals of South ^ast Europe and 
of China, and many peasants as well have joined the 
Communist movements of their own countries as a result 
of having in mind the advantages of industrialisation 
in a collective agricultural system..
Desire to find a remedy for the anarchy of pro­
duction, sympathetic feelings for the victims of 
exploitation and of social injustice, ra^tion from 
mysticism, and the desire for integration with the
/
the rationalistic and scientific values of con­
temporary civilisation have undoubtedly led many 
individuals towards Communism. But these "motives" 
alone cannot explain the-specific psychological aspects 
of a Communist organisation in the way in which this is 
being realised In Russia and in many other countries.
On the basis of the rational motives mentioned above 
one can easily understand the acceptance by many 
individuals of an economic system based on collective 
ownership, or of a social structure based on the 
principle of collective responsibility. But all these 
traits, however, important they are in themselves, are 
nevertheless peripheral for the understanding of a 
Bolshevik type of organisation. Such an economic system 
or such a social structure, can be built up without the 
abolition of the moral value of human personality, and 
by methods acceptable to the moral and intellectual 
standards of Western civilisation. Instead of this we 
see that present-day Communist societies constitute in 
many ways a denial of the fundamental value of Western 
civilisation. They replace the value of personality 
with that of the group, the critical mind with dogmatism 
and desire for freedom with desire for excessive 
domination or excessive submission. These are aspects 
of Communism which cannot be understood in the light of 
the above mentioned rational factors.
The fact is that the Communist Parties often recruit
recruit and select their members in complete ignorance 
of their rational motives for joining these parties. ~ . 
The fact that someone holds a Marxian view in economics 
or philosophy does not necessarily make him a good 
Communist. The most important qualities making him 
eligible and valuable for the Party are ruthlessness, 
aggression, submission, and, above all, a great capacity 
for hatred. The members displaying these traits have a 
far greater chance than any others to. pass the test of 
Bolshevisation. They have the necessary ability of 
retaining their hold on the wagon of the Party however 
winding and jolty the road may be. This shows that 
there are a series of other mental factors, which play 
a greater part than the rational ones in the process 
of becoming a Communist and in the specific structure of 
a Communist group*
2 ^
C H A P T E R  Y 
THE IRRATIONAL DINAMIGS OF COMMUNISM.
The curtain was dropped, my favourite saint 
of saints was sacked, and I had to call for new Gods.
Marx in a letter to his father.
Introduction. In this study we have more than
/
once pointed out that the structure of contemporary 
Communist society could be better understood as the 
progressive realisation of an idea of society, than 
the organic growth of a community of people. This 
idea of society arose as the crystallisation, at the 
rational level, of a series of trends, economic,social 
and psychological, characteristic of nineteenth century 
European society, as these trends were seen by Karl 
Marx. Later on Marx's follower, Lenin, re-shaped Marxfs 
social philosophy in the light of the social conditions 
in Russia at the beginning of this century.
Both Marx and Lenin projected their own personalities 
ih> their work, both theoretical and practical, to such 
an extent that one could rightly presume that without 
them the Cora: mnist movements and the structure of the 
Communist Party and society would have showneL considerable 
differences from irhat they are today. In what follows
t £
we propose to discuss some'.main aspects in the structure
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structure of Marx's and Lenin's personalities which can 
be recognised as elements in the personalities of most 
individuals who integrate themselves with a Communist 
organisation.
Some Significant Aspects in Marx's Personality. It 
is a striking fact that the development of Marx's per­
sonality bears a strong resemblance to the development 
of the working class in the historical conditions of th&. 
last century. There is no wonder, therefore, that he 
became the prophet of the working class.
Marx can be considered as^nique case of frustrated 
and repressed personality. One of the main frustrating 
conditions of his life lies in his Jewish origin. The 
fact that his family decided to become Christian, though 
a common phenomenon at that time, shows all the same that 
the adjustment to German society of that period con­
stituted a problem. Considering the later development of 
Marxrs personality, his political aspirations in 
particular, one can readily agree that this feeling of 
separatedness, the feeling of the "never to be washed 
off Jewg;, as Heine put it,constituted a centre of 
traumatic experience in his life. As in many similar 
eases, this condition led to an uncommon power of intro­
spection, to "more depth" (Heine) to the apprehensiveness 
and irritability which are characteristic of his behaviour.
His multilateral gifts and his difficulties of choice 
in life can be considered as other sources of frustration
/t
frustration for his personality. At the age of 18,
Marx shows clearly the signs of a self-seeking man, 
living permanently at the peak of his need for self- 
assertion. In inexplicable haste he writes poetry, 
lyrical, satyrical, dramatic, as well as volumes of 
metaphysical effusions. His initial intention is to 
become a lawyer, but he buries himself in the study of 
philosophy, and finally becomes an economist. As 
such, he is still open to radical changes in his line 
of interests; he gives the impression that he would 
have done well in history, or in any other social 
science, had chance led him that way. He could have 
arrayed the forces of his great intelligence on any 
front of social life, as soon as he had a glimpse of 
hope for a final vistory which meant for him no more and 
no less than a new world.
But all this considerable intellectual capacity 
proved in the long run of little help for his need to 
succeed, for’his hankerings after fame as a "common 
poetaster” (Franz Mehring parphrasiu^ Marx's father,^- 
Karl Marx, Allen and Unwin,London,1948, p.4). The 
trouble seems to come from the fact that he does not 
like the easy way. Moreover, he seems to throw barriers 
in the way of his success. It is very likely that the 
need of self-assurance and self-assertion reached in 
him, at a very early age, such a high degree of tension 
that he was carried beyond the restrictions of everyday
life. He cannot be satisfied by adjustment to /
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to recognised values. Self-fulfilment can’be
achieved only by revolution, ^arx, like his hero, the 
proletariat always lives under the desire' to break the 
chain of institutionalised life.
Such an intensive need for self-assertion, on the 
one hand, and such a spread of energy in so many 
directions, on the other, were bound to bring frustration. 
Marx is frustrated first of all in his artistic 
aspiration. The poet Chamisso refuses the publication 
of his literary essays. Then in one of his desperate 
raoods, he writes to his father; "The concern caused by 
-Jenny* s illness, the failure of all my work for which 
I* swotted* in vain, the resentment caused by having 
been compelled to make ray own idol from a conception 
which I hated (Hegel), made me ill....” ”0nce recovered 
I burned all my poems and all my sketches for short- 
stories" (Letter to his father. 10 Nov.,1837. Retransl. 
from French. Marx "Oeuvres Philosophiques. Tom II.
A Gostes, Paris, 1935). These states of mind, by no 
means common in a young man of 19, convey with crystal 
clarity how badly Marx took his failures. The fall must 
have come from a considerable height.
This on on account means the end of high hopes and 
desperate strivings for self-realisation. But the 
awareness of failure - of hitting beyond the mark - grows 
steadily in him to the point of forming a centre of his 
own, an insecure, pessimistic Marx. And the more he
/
he becomes aware of this part of his personality, 
the more possessed he becomes with the desire to 
overcome it by a revolutionary act of self-assertion.
When Engels meets Marx for the first time, in 1844, 
he finds in him an arrogant, revengeful and intolerant 
Marx side by side with a pessimistic one. (Marx as 
Writer. Times Lit. Suppl. Sept.8, 1950, p.558). This . 
is exactly the pattern of feelings disclosed by Marx 
himself in the above-mentioned letter written seven 
years previously to this date. A spirit of enthusiasm 
and over-confidence which drive him to attack the 
supreme spiritual authority of his time, Hegelian 
philosophy, alternates with a whole gamut of negative 
feelings, such as n a veritable rage of irony”, doubt, 
insecurity and despair. This ambivalence persists as 
one of the main features in his personality.
There is another source of frustration in Marx's 
personality which illustrates clearly the irrational 
dynamics of a Communist totalitarian. Marxfs highest 
aspiration is to be a political leader and to excel 
as such in the practical field of social life. How this 
ideal of life came to take hold of the mind of a man 
endowed with so many and various intellectual gifts- is 
not easy to understand. It is very likely that this 
strong aspiration springs from the feeling of frustration 
embedded early in his personality. His repressed need 
for security, and self-realisation might well cause him
//
him to make this choice. He might have felt
intuitively that there was no fuller satisfaction for
m
self-assertion thati\the exercise of political power.
But the same drive for political power can be 
interpreted as a form of rationalisation of his basic 
insecurity. By this he seems to throw a series of 
impenetrable barriers across the way leading to self- 
realisation, so that any bitterness, any amount of rage 
and revolt, and finally any failures, become a priori 
justified. This looks very much like the case of the 
pessimistic, grumbling girl who believes the reason 
of her unhappiness eon-ciot-s in the fact that she is not 
a man and therefore cannot become a soldier. When she 
is told that she can, at any moment, join the army, she 
candidly answers that she wants to join the "Foreign 
Legion”, one of the few, if not the only, military 
institutions where women are not allowed.
But whatever its interpretation, this drive in 
Marxrs personality proved to be a source of frustration 
throughout his life. A series of circumstances,internal 
and external, stood in the way of its realisation. Marx's 
Jewish origin undoubtedly constitutes a certain difficulty 
from this point of view. Bat far more important is the 
fact that, contrary to his expectations, no proletarian 
revolution took place during his life-time. And there 
is a third frustrating circumstance, which is of an 
internal nature; Marx has very few Qualities necessary
ViO
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necessary to a man of action,/ho outstanding political 
talents. His work in the First International, between 
1864-1874, showed him an irritable man, with ndtenough 
flexibility for the work of co-ordination Yfhich is 
required even from an authoritarian leader. He "could 
not manage the International except through intermediarie 
(Times Lit. Suppl. Art. cit. 0.557). Marxfs management 
of the International constitutes a controversial issue. 
Mehring for instance is inclined to think that Marx 
displayed enough flexibility and spirit of tolerance and 
that he did quite ?/ell in managing the General Council 
of the International. The fact remains, however, that 
after ten years of existence the General Council lost 
almost all its influence upon the workers* movements in 
England and on the Continent, and that this was perhaps 
not entirely, but to a great extent, due to its leadersifllsg! 
Marx was often accused of intolerance by the leaders of 
the working movements. Giuseppe Mazzini referring to 
Mardhs activity in the International, described him as 
"a German, a man of penetrating but corrupting intelligenci 
imperious, jealous of the influence of others, Jacking 
strong philosophic or religious convictions, has, I fear, 
more hatred, if righteous hatred, in his heart than love". 
(Nicolaievsky, op.cit. p.271). Bakunin builds up his 
own revolutionary movement and calls it, as distinct from 
that of the International, ,?the anti-authoritarian 
Communism”. There is one point in particular on which
/
which Marx shows little flexibility - and this shows 
again his dominant drive to exercise political power - 
namely the political character of the International,
When he becomes aware that his plan to "politicise" the 
International, Le., to transform it into a super- 
ministry of International Affairs, has failed he gives 
a mortal blow to the whole organisation by transferring 
its offices to Hew York.
Marx’s need for power remains frustrated throughout 
his life, ^is mind has the difficult task of creating 
substitutes for it. This makes Marx a typical case of 
a political man "manque", one who can never entirely 
express himself in a substitute role. As a young man 
he gives himself enthusiastically to poetry, but the 
demonic man of action within him soon breaks through the 
poetical imagery. He becomes deeply unsatisfied with 
"this poetry thoroughly Idealistic" where, "real things 
vanish" giving way to "a diluted and shapeless senti­
mentality". (Quoted letter.) This feeling of the 
"unnatural", seems to translate the deep reality of his 
own personality, the desire for power which cannot be 
satisfied in poetry. Later, he attempts to find an 
outlet in philosophy, which proves again to be a poor 
disguise for his need for power. His style is aggressive 
and full of investives, like that of a political debate. 
The prime aim of his philosophical thought is to "de­
molish"" Hegelianism as the official philosouhv of his
/
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his time, and finally to demolish philosophy itself*
For, the highest stage of "philosophy" consists in an
act of self-suppression and in its becoming practical .
(political) action. As a,political pamphleteer Marx
•a,v* Vovht*
shows the same attitude but in ^ extremeh He writes with 
the sword and curses like a proletarian turned^into a
general Coy a revolution!  Marxes ambition as an
intellectual is to 7/rite a book which will revolutionise 
human society and turn the whole world upside down*
And even his ambition which today seems so legitimate 
for the father of Oommunism, led in him to frustration; 
he dies before finishing this capital book, with his 
mind full of doubts as to its final shape and it effect. 
Thus Marx finds in his intellectual emigrations and 
deviations little or no satisfaction for the basic need 
of his personality. With a remarkable intuition of 
the basic condition of his own life he 7/rites at the age 
of 16: "We cannot always take up the profession for which 
we feel ourselves suited; our relations in society have 
begun to crystallise more or less before we are in a 
position to determine them" (Mehring. Gp.cit. p*5). 
Fundamentally he remains a "stranger", a displaced person 
in any of these territories. Perhaps this particular 
aspect of his inner life makes him so apprehensive for 
the process of "self— estrangement" of mankind in general, 
and of the proletariat of his time in particular. However 
we hasten to say that this can hardly be explained as a
t'lh
a mere projection. We are rather inclined to 
believe that one and the same process takes place both 
in Marx and in his own society. Consequently Marx 
grasps the process of self-estrangement in his society 
and in himself at the same time.
It is obvious that interests in poetry, drama, 
philosophy and science constituted for Marx forms of 
self-alienation. Sometimes this deep process rises in 
Marx to a conscious level. He gives the impression of 
looking at himself from outside and perceiving a 
multiplied image of himself, like a series of satellites 
without a sun, or rather like a series of statues of 
himself. "There are moments in life which put a rigid 
barrier to the past, indicating at the same time a new 
direction”, ***n such moments" .... we would like to raise 
a monument to what- we-have-lived, to what is lost from 
the action point of view and remains only in our 
feelings". These are moments when Marx "sacks his 
favourite" G-ods and calls for new ones, (Q,ut.Letter).
He breaks with himself whenever he passes into a new 
field of reality in the search of self-assertion. All 
these passages constitute so many stages in his self- 
e st rangement.
Concluding from what has been said so far, we can 
say that the main characteristic of Marx's personality 
consists in a strong inner conflict resulting from the 
impossibility of self-realisation. It would be perhaps
/
perhaps more accurate to describe this as a 
succession of conflicts and tensions between an uncon­
scious structure dominated by a strongly repressed 
desire for power and a conscious structure (the con­
scious Ego) which can offer only substitutes for the 
satisfaction of this desire. In his own terms the 
inner tension is aroused by an "infrastructure” which 
•is in "permanent revolution" in order to create an 
adequate "super-structure" for itself. The phenomenology 
of .this conflict in Marxrs personality is rich and 
varied. In what follows we can mention but a few 
aspects which are, in our own opinion, revealing for 
the psychology of the Communist totalitarian man.
1. Ambivalent attitudes can be considered as 
among the most characteristic sjmiptoms of this conflict. 
We have already referred to states of enthusiasm, rage 
and omnipotence followed quickly by pessimism, and 
despair. ^arxTs attitude towards Hegel discloses 
ambivalent feelings clearly. HegeJ. is for him the great 
master of dialectics, and, at the same time, the author 
of "an odious philosophy". He shows respect towards 
Hegel but only after turning his system upsidedown.
(See the Preface to the second edition of Capital.
(1)
p.XCY in the Erench Molitor edition. A. Costes, 1946.)
d>
Ambivalence can be seen in his everyday life. % e 
revolutionary Marx shows strong feelings of dependence 
towards his wife.
/
A series of other ambivalent attitudes can be found 
only after a careful analysis of the texture of his thought. 
First of all his style as a writer bears the mark of an 
ambivalent personality. The dry scientific style of "Das 
ICapital" contrasts sharply with the romantic, speculative, 
and frequently sentimental style of his philosophical works.
All his works, the political ones in particular, show a
£>
mixture of objective argument and of the careful con­
sideration of facts, with a tendency towards easy general­
isation, based on a disturbing reliance on personal intuition's. 
MarxTs attitude towards Man discloses another aspect of his 
ambivalent personality, he sees the greatness and uniqueness 
of man in his power to create his own history, in his 
revolutionary substance. But at the same time he writes in 
his last book; "My standpoint, from which the evolution of 
economic formation of society is viewed, as a process of 
natural history, can less than any other make the individual 
responsible for relations whose creature he socially remanis. 
(Preface to the first Ed. of Capital Ed.Git. p. T.mcr).
The ambiguity regarding man's responsibility in history, which 
was later developed as "mechanicism” and "dialectics", as 
irotskysm and Stalinism, moreover the ambiguity of the 
PartyTs position in Communist society - "avant-garde" or 
direct expression" of the masses - are all rooted in Marx’s 
ambivalent attitude towards man.
Another sign of ambivalence can be seen in Marx’s need 
for identification with the social group of the proletariat.
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A man fundamentally incapable of compromise in his 
relations with others becomes the founder of a 
collectivistic way of life. This aspect of ambivalence in 
hi personality becomes, as we shall soon see, an 
important problem in the evolution of the Communist Party. 
Marx himself solves it on a purely ideological level by 
identifying himself with the absolute truth expressed in 
his philosophy of history. Thus his fears of being 
alone and anti-social are dispelled by the fact that the 
Gods - the new Gods - are on his side. Since he isawlHv.!bA\d<t> 
humanity he can afford to be against everybody. When 
he feels that the whole world is against him, he calls 
it "bourgeois1*, therefore condemned to perish according 
to his philosophy of history.
2. According to what we have said so far the reader 
acquainted with contemporary psycho-pathology may be 
expecting us to apply to Marx the clinical concept of 
paranoia. We are, however, not prepared to take this step 
for, on. the one hand, our knowledge of Marx’s life is not 
deep enough to support such a view, and, on the other 
hand, Marx's personality displays such a complexity of 
traits that any separate clinical concept fails to 
describe it adequately. But there are some symptomatic 
manifestations of paranoia worth mentioning. The final 
conclusion remains entirely with the psychopathologist 
who would take the trouble to study Marx's life from his 
own point of view.
/
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Thoughts of aggression and persecution abound in 
his writings. We have already mentioned the "rage" 
followed by disillusion aroused in his struggle against 
the Hegelian philosophy. Sometimes he conveys the 
feeling that he lives surrounded by a hostile world. 
"Free scientific research in the field of political" 
economy attracts upon itself the most violent, mesquin, 
and abominable passion ever experienced by the human 
mind, i.e., the fury of private interests".(Capital 
quoted ^d. p. LXXX). It should be added to this that 
Marx means by "scientific" research his own and similar 
research. A few pages later he describes how the German 
bougeoisie has attempted to organise the conspir- 
at^ eaa. of silence round "Capital(Ibidem'#1.LXZXIX). 
Sometimes he rises above his universal hostility in a 
splendid isolation, comforted by the feeling of his 
superiority. On one of these occasions he quotes Dante: 
"Segui il tuo corso et lascia dir le gente".
But as a rule his aggression cannot be expressed at
such an abstract philosophical level. He more often
projects it on various aspects of the external world.
following his writings one can see how his aggression
becomes systematically organised round the bourgeoisie
(1)
and the bourgeois world.
/
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How iaarx works out the concept of bourgeoisie as 
the chief-object of his aggression is worth careful 
psychological investigation. The process is certainly 
far more complex, than his writings allow us to under­
stand. 'i'he meaning of "bourgeoisie” which is heavily 
loaded with emotional factors, goes far beyond the 
protest against the unjust social order created by 
the conflict between capital and labour. In the 
Marxian concept of "bourgeoisie" one can often grasp 
attitudes characteristic of the early nineteenth 
century' German intellectuals against "philistines”.
The frequent use of the words "philistine" and
"philistinism" in his and Sngel’s writing can be
adduced as a proof of this. On the other hand Marx
owes a great deal in this respect to St. Simon, who
as an aristocrat, looks at the "vile bourgeoise" withprolouwd
le say the bourgeois world because it is not easy to 
make a clear distinction between the "bourgoisie” 
as a specific object of aggression, and the "bourgeoisie" 
as the symbol of the whole external world against which 
Marx pours out discontent and hostility. For, in Marx’s, 
conception the bourgeoisie certainly means a specific 
social group, but at the same time it represents the 
order of modern society as a whole. In this latter 
case Marx’s aggression against the bourgeoisie means 
aggression against the social order of his time. This 
implies a diffuse form of aggression which brings to 
mind the generalised aggression characteristic of certain 
stages in the evolution of the modern proletariat.
Thus, as a result of projection, the bourgeoisie 
becomes for Marx the symbol of hostility dominating the 
external world. It constitutes a mysterious hostile 
power hidden in the "infra-structure" of the world and
and working in a"super-structure” under a series of 
masks, i.e., ideologies, religion, politics, etc.
There is nothing thoroughly friendly, nothing straight 
in the whole (bourgeois) world. That is ?/hy he sets 
for his philosophy the prime task of unmasking the 
enemy, a process which becomes an almost compulsory 
rite in the activity of the Communist Parties of today. 
This task cannot be fulfilled save by the demolition 
of the-whole social world.
W i g  seems, to be a suitable place for pointing out 
that Marx's aggression was systematically directed 
against authority and order. It is almost impossible 
to understand the hatred of his attacks against 
Hegelianism, at a time when he had no real substitute for 
it, and no clear idea about its insufficiencies, if not 
as a result of a deep-seated revolt against authority.
It is this irrational factor of his personality that 
forms the basis of the first point of his philosophical 
programme, i.e., the demolition of the Hegelian con­
ception as an expression of the recognised order of 
German society. This programme is extended later to 
the demolition of the whole of eontemporajrj?' society.
In this way Marx's consciousness of himself grows up in 
permanent disagreement and conflict with the official 
world. In fact, Marxrs consciousness articulates its 
own content in the function of-this basic conflict.
From this point of view Marxrs consciousness follows the
/
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the same line of development as the self-consciousness 
of the modern proletariat: It grows in conflict with
the world and ends by creating its own world.
3 . The conflict with the world fonns a closed 
circle in the development of MarxTs personality.
The discontent and the aggression resulting from his 
own failures were projected on to various aspects of 
the external world as injustice and hostility against 
himself. This increased even more the feeling of 
frustration, and raised the conflict with the world, 
to such a tension that finally no compromise was 
possible. Under the impact of this tension his con­
scious Ego grows outside the real world into a world 
of its own, outside the present world into a world 
of the future. In this lies the source of the 
Messianic character of Marx's thought. The weak man 
in a desperate struggle with an odd enemy comforts 
himself by believing that the Gods are on his side.
Marx inflates his Ug0 so that the world should submit 
to its dictates.
The development of the Messianic character of his
personality follows various stages. One can discover
in the young Marx a pressing tendency towards self-over-
estimation . This looks like an attitude of bravado or
sheer boasting. Characteristic from this point of view
is a passage from the quoted letter to his father:
"During my indisposition I have read h©g@p from one end
/
end to smother, acquiring at the same time a cLose
knowledge of most of his disciples”. What sort
itvoas it,
of indisposition^"and how long/could &  last so as
to give him time enough to read the whole of Hegel,
is a puzzling question. Keeping in mind that at
the time when this letter was written (1332) Hegel
had already published his main works, this is simply
incredible. But such an assertion might have satisfied
the desire of an ambitious young man of 19.
Later on his Messianic tendencies are expressed 
at a socio-cultural level. Marx objectivises his 
repressed desire for success in the struggle for the 
progress of a particular social class, and in a 
philosophy of history. From no?/ on he would speak 
no longer on behalf of himself, no longer on behalf of 
subjective individual factors, but on behalf of the 
proletariat and of a set of objective laws of history 
which would lead the proletariat to its final .victory** 
The proletariat cannot fail in this historical mission 
for the ruler of the world is obviously on its side.
It is curious to notice that Marx is more than 
any other modem thinker - with the exception of 
Feuerbach and Nietzsche - aware of the inner mechanisms 
of Messianic thought. He is convinced that every 
social class uses religion as a support for its own 
interests, i.e., every victorious social class wins 
the Gods over to its own side. And yet Marx is
/
is completely blind to the fact that the proletariat’s 
belief in the absolute truth of its own cause, in 
the pre-established order leading to its victory, is 
a phenomenon of the same kind. He uses Feuerbach’s 
criticism of religious faith (God is man’s son) only 
as far as this does not touch his personal "faith".
For,according to what wd have said so far, it seems 
obvious that he was personally involved in the 
historical mission of the proletariat.
Messianism in general can be described as 
satisfaction at the unreality level. As a cultural 
phenomenon, Messianism is a prospective myth, in the 
sense that the frustrating conditions of the present 
turn the people’s mind towards a golden age of the 
future.
One can distinguish three main components in the 
Marxian Messianic inclinations; his personal situation, 
his situation as a -Jew, and the situation of the 
modern proletariat. All three situations are solved 
in his mind by the formula: oppressed people - 
elected people. The direction in which he resolves 
his own critical situation and that of the proletariat 
is predominantly towards the future. For, with the 
exception of a vague myth of a primitive communism, s 
there is nothing in the past which might bring comfort 
to the present. Personally Marx hated both the present 
and the past. The past, and even less the present do
/
do not contain proper conditions for self-realisation*
On the contrary, life in the past and in the present 
lead to self-estrangement. (Marx knows this only too
well from his own experience).
4. The specific quality of Marx* s genius consists
in his exceptional power of transferring at the rational
level the deep emotional factors resulting from a
series of traumatic experiences in himself - as
individual, and as a lew - and in the modern proletariat.
Perhaps the expression "rational level" is misleading.
It would be more appropriate to say that Marx transfers
in the key of consciousness a series of unconscious
factors. The repressed heed for security and self-
' •
assertion in himself and in the modern proletariat \% 
the most important of these factors. We have a 
particular reason for saying that he transposes a series 
of unconscious factors to the key of consciousness rather 
than to the key of reason. Por, on closer examination, 
one notices that Marxfs thought displays in a very 
curious way a logical deficiency. The impressive 
strength of his argument is not always, and not 
exclusively, based on logical stringency. There is 
always something in Marx which works on the mind of 
the reader from beyond the logical concatenation of his 
ideas. This is a deep conviction, an almost vital 
necessity, ?/hich often puzzles the logical mind. He 
conveys the impression that he knew the answer to all
all problems he deals with, before giving any thought 
to them. Sometimes he is so self-assurfed that the 
critical reader cannot help feeling that he is being 
laughed at and toldi ”Tou fool, you are compelling me 
to prove what a child knows already”. Matters which 
perplex anybody, Marx calls ‘’self-evident”. In this 
specific aspect of his mind is to be found the origin 
of his dogmatism, which we sh&ita to discuss
presently.
We shall deal more adequately with the problem of 
dogma in the next chapter. For present purposes it 
seems enough to give an operational definition of dogma, 
in order to understand the origin of one of the main 
features of Harxf s personality. A dogmatic attitude 
rises from the presence in consciousness of an uncon­
scious factor which cannot be entirely formulated in
rational terms. Dogma is a fundamental truth, i.e., a
/
truth from which one can derive other truths, but which 
is.in itself underivable. Behind this truth lies an 
unconscious factor inconvertible into consciousness.
Marx gives expression to his own, and to the 
proletariates rejjressed desires in the theoretical con­
struction of dialectical and historical materialism.
The final victory of the proletariat becomes, therefore, 
a necessary stage in a rational argument. But at the 
same time, he unconsciously takes ajk| possible measures 
to disguise the emotional substance of his thought and to
to construct defences against its subjective 
character. i_xis materialistic conception of the Y/orld 
and his naive realism in the field of knowledge can, 
from the psychological viewpoint, be considered as 
fulfilling this particular purpose, Marx sincerely 
believes his ideas and theories are but mirrors of an 
external reality. He would call stupid, foolish or 
dishonest anybody who Tsrould think otherwise. But in 
fact he does not question critically his claim to
it
objectivity, for the - simple reason that he takes for 
granted that his own mind and the human mind in general 
are mirrors of the external reality. If this is so, 
how can his ideas be rooted in his own feelings and 
desires? How can they be subjective, when he makes such 
strong provisions for objectivity? And finally, how 
can they be contradicted and ignored, when they are 
written in the nature of things. His ideas are real, 
objective and absolutely true, not because he needs them 
to be so, but because they represent the laws of external 
reality. In this respect Marx is typical of scientific 
dogmatism.
There are some other ways in which Marx disguises 
the emotional and subjective character of his ideas.
He takes a great deal of trouble - perhaps too much 
trouble - to make people believe that he did not reach 
the truth expressed in his philosophy by any mystic, 
personal, or metaphysical process. His thought merely
merely expresses the logic of facts. But he is 
somehow aware that no logic would incontrovera^^SEy 
prove the materiality of the world, the economic laws 
of historical materialism or of the historical mission 
of.the proletariat. Then he would say that the logic 
he speaks of is not the logic of individual consciousness, 
but that of class consciousness. On this point the 
Marxian thought takes a turning never met before in the 
whole history of philosophy. Marx claims that his funda­
mental ideas are meaningful and form a rational vti ole 
only within class consciousness. Thus, the standards 
to which they ought to b© referred are not the standards 
of the individual mind, but the requirements for political 
action of the proletariat which are reflected in the 
structure of class consciousness.
Glass consciousness considers true and objective 
those ideas which enlighten and support the deep-seated 
need of the proletariat for overcoming its insecure 
position. The stronger this need, the stronger the 
attachment to these ideas, and consequently, the more 
dogmatic becomes the truth expressed by them. These 
ideas are not the result of the immediate experiences of 
Marx or of the proletariat. Therefore their validity 
cannot be assessed according to their fitness to the 
empirical conditions of life. They are the projection of 
a"complex",aroused by a series of frustrating experiences 
in the early history of Marx and the modern proletariat.
As such they work as fixed ends in everyday experience. 
That is why Marx, and after him all Communists,do not 
submit their ideas to the test of facts or of every­
day experience;ideas are true or false according to the 
ends they fulfil. Life in a Communist society in s a 
strong resemblance to life in a religious community: 
actions and ideas are eschatologically justified.
Though Marx defines class consciousness in purely 
rational terms, its emotional substance is only too 
transparent. MarxTs hostility towards irrational factors 
in life could certainly be interpreted as a defence 
mechanism. He spares no energy in his war against 
mysticism, religion, dogmatist and subjectivism, stressing 
all the time the mission of his philosophy to replace 
mysticism and religion by reason and science, subjectivity 
by objectivity and dogmatism by dialectics. His 
obsession with the idea of pruning the human mind of the 
weeds of sentimentalism, of utopianism and of "fetishism* 
springs from the same need of self-defence. Significant 
from this point of view is also his obsession with the 
phenomenon of consciousness, with the striving of life- 
social life in particular - to become self-conscious. 
Proletarian society is society perfectly conscious of its
own structure and functioning, a society working like a
+. (1) concept.
The same obsession with the phenomenon of con­
sciousness is noticeable in German Romantics-Marx 
being one of them - who more than any other philosophical 
school based their thought on emotional - personal - 
experiences, and who looked very closely into the uncon­
scious stratum of mental life, What German Romantics - 
including Marx - mean by consciousness is certainly a 
false consciousness or the Unconscious in disguise.
This may be one of the reasons v/hy Hegel’s ideas, for 
instance, though impecably wrapped up in rational 
formulae, led in the long run to mysticism and 
irrationalism, in fascist society, and to dogmatism, in 
Communist society, Hegel’s ideas are over-loaded with 
factors o# an emotional nature which slacken the 
critical mind when accepted. To be with Hegel, or 
with Marx, involves always a certain danger of ”00aversion" 
and total devotion.
If we try to formulate in a general conclusion what 
we have said so far, we would say that the underlying 
process of Marx’s life consists in a deep crisis of 
individuation. Hone of the successive roles taken by 
him throughout his life satisfied his deep strivings and 
aspirations. In order to establish a balance between 
himself and his environment he became, through his 
father, a Christian, then poet, philosopher, economist, 
political pamphleteer, professional revolutionary, etc.
He changes country after country .... but all in vain, 
for there always remained something in himself that could 
not take shape and be satisfied. As a result of this, 
Marx appears throughout his life as a man incapable of 
fulfilling the demand he made upon himself, and incapable 
of giving it up. We think that these demans spring 
from his urge for power and his insatiable need for 
security. The awareness of this insatiable "Self" made
/
made him hate any compromise, any flexible and 
evolutionary progress, and any free and peaceful arrange­
ments between human beings, things and events.
He projects his own situation as a man of power, 
sentenced to perpetual disguise, upon his society and 
formulates the first principle of his social philosophy, 
i.e., the dual existence of human society as infra-and 
super-structure. Social life is for him an intricate 
texture of substitutes, compromises, illusions, and 
mystifications. We cannot be ourselves because of the 
money we possess, because of our class, because of our 
ideas. In their turn, social classes, the State,
pot,
religion, etc. are b.u$t majks/'ofL real life. Reality and 
truth are beyond them, in the "infra-structure" the 
main task of which is to hide itself under the veil of 
illusion and deception. Marx finds a real passion in
disclosing lifers impotence to grow to its proper forms.
\
But at the same time he is fascinated by the problem of 
how to pull off the masks and reveal the reality as "infra­
structure”. Bor as long as it can hide itself it remains 
an essentially evil force, a source of unhappiness for 
mankind. When he finds it, he calls it "capital”, and 
never ceases to denounce its machinatious. He recognises 
in "capital” the greatest source for "power" in his 
society. Is it not a projection of his own "infra-'- 
structure", the lust for power which tortured him so 
much?
/
With his keen power of reading through and beyond 
the appearance of life, Marx's true vocation would have 
been that of a psychologist. But even her© he is the 
victim of self-deception, self-estrangement, in his own 
words. He denies to himself this natural inclination 
of his mind, and this denial is radical, for psychology 
means nothing to him. Thus all his feeling for depth 
was extraverted, leading him towards the foundation of 
depth sociology and socio-analysis.
Lenin's Personality. Three men were very close to 
Marx: Engels, Trotsky and Lenin. They expressed three 
different ways in which his inner conflict could be 
acted out and his personality integrated.
Engels is the first to call Marx a "genius”, i.e., 
the most free of men, a man who creates his own world. 
This would imply that MarxTs personality could have been 
integrated at the fantasy level. Therefore Marx would 
escape from, rather than realise his desire for power 
and security. Though Marx is extremely sensitive to this 
"epithet",he feels all the time that his personality 
remains something apart from his ideology. Ideology is, 
after all, a ‘‘super-structure", a plan for action, not 
action itself, tactics to win the power, not power itself.
Trotsky is the embodiment of Marx*s insatiable desire 
for development and assertion, the embodiment of his 
suspicion of the limiting external circumstances #iich 
might bring the expansion of his own self to a halt,
halt, before its full development. Weaknesses and 
fears might lead the proletariat to compromise with 
the bourgeoisie before its historical mission is fully 
realised. The Marx of Trotsky is "permanent revolution". 
Ultimately this is a Marx based only on his unconscious 
self and refusing any determination in given historical 
conditions. This comes out clearly from Trotsky’s con­
cept of the proletariat. For the first condition of 
the proletariat’s strength and the first guarantee of 
its victory is to remain in permanent consultation with 
itself, and stir its own revolutionary impulses. During 
the revolution, the masses become their own executive 
organ; they cannot share and compromise over their own 
p ower even with their own leaders. Trotsky sees a.Marx 
satisfied in his tendency for security and domination, 
who is at the same time a Marx living in the vacuum 
created by his destructive action.
Lenin alone represents a successful attempt to 
achieve a Marx endowed with tke sense of reality. He 
ignores both Marx the prophet, who had a tendency to 
annihilate himself by identification with an absolute 
order as expressed by his ideological work, and Marx the 
revolutionary, who tends to annihilate himself in per­
manent revolt and aggression. Lenin sees a Marx acting 
at reality level. This is neither a universal nor a self- 
seeking Marx, but a Marx in the concrete historical 
setting of Russia at the beginning of this century. We
We do not suggest that Lenin has a balanced
personality in the usual cleaning of this word* He 
does not eliminate anything essential from Marx, for 
the sake of making him fit into a given sociological 
reality. What he really does is to examine the socio­
logical feasibility of Marx as a system, and to devise, 
by means of a series of compromises between an ■ 
ideology and a sociological reality, the necessary stages 
in the realisation of this system. Lenin is the first 
who had a glimpse of the death of Marx*s philosophy 
qua philosophy and of its transformation into concrete 
reality.
The first and the most obvious idea derived from 
the study of Lenin’s life is that, in contrast with 
Marx, he is' the political man per se. He manifests 
early in his life an anxiety to assert himself against 
authority, i.e., to become authority itself.
Unfortunately we know Lenin only when this tendency of 
his personality is already socially integrated, in the 
sense that he is already a member of one of the many 
Russian revolutionary movements. His resentment and
aggression take therefore, from the very beginning, 
the form of an organised social action with the precise 
objective of over-throwing the i'sarist regime. Whether 
this authority-anxiety is in Lenin a deep personal 
factor remains an open problem for us. What we know is 
that Lenin is the son of a civil servant,(School Master)
and that in Tsarist Russia civil servants were a kind 
of officer in the army. When he was seventeen years 
old, his eldest brother was executed (1887) for having 
taken part in an attempt against Alexander III. As 
a result of this, Lenin is excluded from the St. 
Petersburg University. Apparently, already at this, 
stage his destiny is settled. Being already well- 
versed in Majsjt, he consecrates his life to the 
"revolution.n
We stress the idea that the most characteristic 
aspect of Lenin’s resentment and revolt does not consist 
in their motivation, but in the fast that from an early 
age his revolt was socialised. This means that he 
started at an early age to discharge his aggression 
in socially organised action, being bound to assert 
himself in a concrete historical manner. This is not 
the case with Lm x x or Trotsky.
A series of factors contributed to the dev^opment 
of Lenin’s personality in this specific sense. Pirst 
of all, at a very early'age he assimilates Marxism as a  
theoretical guide for political action. After this he 
is never in doubt or in search of the ends of his revolt. 
Secondly, Russian society v/as a natural sphere for 
revolutionary action throughout last century. In this 
society Lenin finds the most determined and efficient 
type of revolutionary in late nineteenth century Europe.
He himself grows up in this revolutionary atmosphere.
Due to these conditions the fundamental question, 
"What is to be done?", has for Lenin a concrete and 
precise meaning. He wastes far less time than Marx 
with fundamental questions, such as whether and when 
the conditions of revolution are ripe. Lenin knews 
that revolution is necessary in Bussia. Therefore his 
main question is "What is to be done" here and now, 
with these people, against this enemy and within this 
ideological pattern‘d He needs a living dialectics, 
i.e., a method of action by which all these factors are 
made to work together for the revolution.
MarxTs struggle with Utopian socialism is a 
theor^ical argument; Lenin manifests a phobia of 
fantasies. He withdraws at the first moment he feels 
that contact with the ground is not solid enough. "One 
step forwards, two steps backwards” forms his basic 
tactical principle. His favourite mythological figure 
is AntheuS.
Marx studied Klausewitz assiduously, Lenin has 
the science of strategy and tactics in himself. He is 
flexible and unscrupulous; devoted to his own idea and 
at the same time paying full attention to everything in 
his environment which may lead in one way or another to 
its realisation. One of his tactical principles is 
rooted in Marx's advice to the members of the Communist 
League, in 1850, i.e., to make dalliance with the
the "bourgeois democrats" and. to kill them at the 
same time. The proletariate movement is for Lenin 
primarily a question of tactics which like any tactics 
consist® in a series of compromises between the final 
end and the real conditions of the situation, and in 
the capacity for making every factor of the situation 
work for this end as long as this is necessary. Unlike 
Marx, Lenin shows himself as a master of compromise. 
First of all he creates a compromise between the two 
theses which divided the Russian socialists over a long 
period of time, that of the spontaneity of the masses 
and mechanicism. This compromise is the Party T,of a 
new type11 which mobilises the masses and, at 'the same 
time, integrates them in a rigid organization having a 
fixed object of attack. The Party is at the sam/time 
an "avant-garde” of the revolution and a brake put on 
the working class. He builds up a Party based on the 
activity of professional revolutionaries, and yet, he 
is more than once against the ffcomitardsn or the 
"technicians". He is against them whenever he feels 
that the Party becomes, because of their activity, the 
prey of "routine". In 1917, and at the beginning of 
1918 he bases the political line of the Party on the 
"Soviets", (the workers’ organizations), a fact which 
creates a conflict between him and the technical body 
of the Party. Thus he clashes with his own creation. 
The "comitards" accuse Lenin of "Trotskysm" while Lenin
Lenin accuses them of stupidly repeating a formula 
learned by heart instead of studying the originality 
of new and living situations. (B. Suvarin* "Stalin*1 
Q,uot. by Benno Sarel, ”Lenirt$ Trotsky, Stalineet le 
probleme du Parti revolutionnaire", Hes Temps Modemes. 
Bo. 73 1951 p.870). In 1923, just before his death,
Lenin is ready to open an attack against Stalin as the 
chief "comitard” in order to render the structure of 
the Party more flexible and thus capable of absorbing 
in itself the multifarious aspects of the working class 
struggle. It was not his "democratic" feelings, as 
Trotsky suggests, but rather his strong sense of reality 
that determines this attitude in him. He regards the 
bureaucratic and monolithic structure of the Party as an 
artificial construction. In Lenin*s hands dialecta&c^ 
become tactics. This is undoubtedly the result of his 
outstanding capacity to seize upon the weak aspects of 
his enemy, and to grasp at the same time the community 
of interests between himself and his enemy. All these 
elements are fused together by LeninTs mind and used as 
weapons in the battlefield. He never loses his quality 
of a tactician even in his intellectual work. As soon 
as he feels that his ideas get the better of him he 
beats a retreat. "One step forwards, two steps back­
wards", remains always his first tactical principle.
He applies it during the NEP, making a quick return to 
liberal economy, and on many other occasions. /
Lenin writes books as a tactician, not as a dealer 
with ideas. With the exception of his "Philosophical 
Notebooks", where,due to his isolation leu Switzerland, 
(1914-16) he gives himself up to intellectual activities - 
all his books spring from, and are meant to solve concrete 
situations in the political struggle of the Party. The 
ad hoc character of his books always prevails over their 
ideological structure. Consequently, these books are 
primarily guides to political struggle. In this respect 
his intellectual production is far more homogeneous than 
that of Marx. E¥en his main philosophical work,
"Empirio-Criticism", is a polemic with his political 
opponents.
Kow can we account for this high sense of reality in 
Lenin?
We have already mentioned that, unlike Marx, Lenin 
is not a displaced political man. This means that he 
possesses the proper inner and external medium to act as 
a political man throughout his life. Therefore he does 
not need to displace his mental energy in other fields 
of activity. It also means that he has social gifts which 
were lacking in Marx. Though irritable and quarrelsome 
he possesses that degree of flexibility which enables 
him to find points of contact with others. He starts by 
assuring for himself a safe position from which he then 
manoeuvres individuals and groups against each other.
/
When his own organisation squeezes him into a tight 
corner - and this happened more than once in his life - 
he strengthens his position by relying on outside 
individuals or groups, as lorn as he needs to defeat the 
inside opposition. One occasion on which this took place 
was between 1907-9 when Lenin relied on Mensheviks in 
his struggle against the opposition coming from his own 
organisation - Bogdanov Rykov and Krassin. Sarel Op. 
cit. p. 867.) ^ne should mention in addition to his own 
social gifts those of his wife, Erupskaia, who manifests 
a keen interest in his political activities.
We realise that by saying that he has social.gifts 
we do not explain the origin of Lenin*s sense of reality. 
This simply means that his sense of reality is applied 
in the political field. In the explanation of Lenin*s 
particular sense of reality, of his gifts for compromise 
and his power to create social forms we have to start 
from the fact that he grew up in an organised group of 
revolutionaries. Whether these qualities of his are the 
result of education exclusively constitutes a particular 
question which we cannot answer- now. What is important 
is the. fact that his revolutionary tendencies were at a 
very early age integrated in a socially organised action. 
In, this way he never experienced the drama of Russian 
revolutionary "Intelligentsia" expressed in fkachovfs 
words: "Having ideas in onefs head which can never be 
realised is a torture, a terrible torture". Bor him the
/
the revolutionary Russia with its Marxist ideology 
and its political organisation is a reality, we can say 
reality itself. He cannot think and act hut through 
this reality.
Somebody - Plechanov we think - said of Lenin 
that he talked and thought so much about revolution that 
he was $ound to make one. This is true in the sense 
that Lenin had in himself as data of his own personality, 
the fundamental conditions of revolutionary Russia,
Thus fee can correctly be called a "national type" (the 
expression belongs to Sarel). As Trotsky says, he 
represents not only the Russian worker but the Russian 
peasant as well. We can add that he has in himself the 
basic elements of a Russian and a Westerly revolutionary : 
intellectual. Perhaps this heterogeneous charadter 
of his mental structure explains to a certaih extent his 
capacity for compromise and his flexibility in the 
realisation of his political programme.
We have to stress once again the idea that Lenin*s 
concept of reality is, in the social field,identical 
with the revolutionary Russian society. In this respect 
he is a genius of realisation. He grasps the vague 
revolutionary forces diffused throughout the Russian 
social environment and i^uigates them into powerful
or«3K
revolutionary CHrttlisation. Ho one before or after him 
could/-easily findyaio?d the way from potentiality to 
actuality, in the social field, i.e., the passage from
/
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from vague aspirations and a variety of almost 
meaningless discontents to an efficient and organised 
revolutionary movement. This subterranean reality was 
his own reality, and his work led to its expression in 
the Party. While .Marx grasped in the modern proletariat 
the seed of revolt, and developed from it the idea of 
revolution, Lenin sees this idea in reality and helps 
it to grow into the tree of revolution.
Because reality is for Lenin the reality of the 
revolution, his meaning of the concept of compromise 
and his capacity for compromise is limited. Lenin 
uses all the elements of'Russian society - inner con­
flict, classes, feelings - with the express purpose of 
creating the Communist reality. But throughout his 
activity he is never in real compromise with non­
revolutionary society. He never goes half way to meet 
the non-revolutionary elements of society. His meaning 
of eompranise can be formulated as follows: BeMend
your enemy, your opponent in order to liquidate him more 
easily. And this is the meaning of compromise instilled 
by him into the Communist Party all over the world.
Lenin is ruthless and unprincipled, but eminently 
factful from the point of view of political action. 
Towards the "bourgeois" world he has no morality, though 
he is completely integrated with the values of his own 
world, the revolutionary world. His behaviour can be 
described paradoxically as a form of moral immorality.
/
For lie is so closely integrated with his Communist 
order that he can claim - he did in fact - that his 
disruptive activities are moral and even humanitarian.
Though at the moral level he completely identifies 
himself with the idea of Communist society, he seems 
to preserve a certaih, intellectucal flexibility which 
is completely lost in his followers, as we shall 
presently see.
• Stalin1-s Personality. When Lenin died Communist 
society was still in a state of fluidity. He preserved 
to the very end of his life the character of a tactician. 
He was always ready to exploit new possibilities, to try 
new movements and to engage new forces. This 
differentiates Lenin both from marx, who is wrapped up 
in his "idea" of a new world, and from Stalin, who is 
caught in the reality of the new society. Due to the 
historical stage of the Revolution and to a series of 
factors involved in his personality, the rise of Stalin 
means the absolute end of the "idea". In Marxian terms, 
Stalin represents the self-suppression of philosophy and 
its displacement in practical action. The Party as a 
stable f o m  or organisation is the only reality in 
Stalinfs eyes. His only task is to make it work 
efficiently. To exploit possibilities and let the Party 
open itself to new forms of organisation and to new 
modes of life is against its own interests. Less debate 
means less disseniion whicji results in a greater capacity
capacity for action. As early as 1911 Stalin called 
the polemic between Lenin, Trotsky, Martov and Bogdanov, 
concerning vital points of orientation,-a "storm in a 
glass of water”. Lenin himself after his quarrel with 
Bogdanov Bykov, and Krasin, fearing that much discussion 
would harm the unity and the efficiency of the Party, 
turned towards Stalin as to a saviour. And it was at 
Lenin*s recommendation that Stalin was in 1912 co-opted 
in the Central Committee and made responsible for the 
delegation of this Committee in Russia.
One usually refers to Stalin as to a bureaucrat 
and a consolidator. This means that once he takes the 
leadership the Party, as the expression of Commuhist 
society, can no longer grow from within, its potenti­
alities being exhausted. Kor can it change its 
structure as the result of its contact with the external 
environment. There is no inner effervescence in the 
structure of the Party, because the Party has already 
produced its type of man and its type of action. Thought 
and action become f,clich!” and routine in character.
Stalin is the first outstanding example of the new 
type of man. His mental elements are almost identical 
with those of class consciousness, which will form the 
subject of the next chapter. But before this, we should 
like to say something more about the relationship between 
Stalin’s personality and the structure of the Party.
If from what we have said so far the reader will
understand that Stalin as a personality had no influence
upon the structure of the Party, we are ready to make a
fair recognition that our own ideas regarding this
particular point can hardly be organised to such a degree
as to lead unambiguously to a clear-cut conclusion.
This situation seems to arise from the difficulty of
using in this context the concept of personality as an
individual having Lts own feelings, its own ideas and
will which leave their specific mark on society and
history. Though recognising that in this way we throw a 
*
serious obstacle in the way of psychology, we are tempted 
to suggest that, at this stage in the evolution of the 
Party and of Communist society, it would be profitable 
to abolish the classical concept of personality and to 
replace it with the concept of the Party, as a collective 
personality. For whenever we try to analyse the influence 
of Stalin on the evolution of the Party we have to face 
the same difficult problem. Is his action prompted by his
passions and by his impulses, or is that action the
resultant of a general atmosphere, of a series of trends, 
habits of mind, mechanisms existing in that collective 
organism called the Party? One thing seems certain*
Stalinfs success is not due to his popularity in the Party
and even less to his populatity in Soviet society. We 
are inclined tolhink that his success is due to the fact 
that he always was "the Party man" the man who knew how to
to ride on the line indicating the."necessary" 
evolution of the Party. His utterly "anti-democratic" 
attitudes are certainly rooted in the fact that he never 
sought to.accord his action with the opinion of the 
individual members of the Party, but rather to the spirit 
of the Party, i.e., to a complex of factors economic 
and psychological which held together that strange 
collective organism. Those who know something about the 
role played by the LIKE in a Communist society, about 
its power, its independence and its caprices will under­
stand that such a position is possible.
In his biography of Stalin, Deutscher seems to be 
involved in the same kind of difficulty. Healing with 
the conflict between Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders - 
Bukharin in particular - he starts by making certain 
allowances for the role played by StalinTs "private 
ambitions" in this conflict. Then he stops abruptly as 
if surprising himself treading on a wrong path. He closes 
this episode, so important in the evolution of the Party, 
by the enumeration of a series of objective conditions 
written in the nature of Soviet society which made Stalin 
act in the way he did. (Op.cit. Chap.VIII The Great Change.)
But this is not the 7/hole truth. For there is 
another perspective, completely opposed to the one 
mentioned above, from which Stalin's personality can be 
viewed. This is Stalin as an individual with an iron 
will, who works his way up to the top of the Party most
most of the time struggling with individuals and 
groups representing views opposed to his own. This 
is the roan who finally creates a new stage in the 
evolution of the Party and of Communist society called 
Stalinism. The mental make up of this Stalin, if 
analysed, may disclose important psychological factors 
in the composition of contemporary Communist society.
Since a choice between these two views is difficult, 
we would rather leave room for both and conclude the 
present chapter as follows: If Stalin’s political
activity proved that behind it there was a personality 
having its private interests and ambitions, this might 
be considered as the last case in which a personality, 
in the usual sense of the word, stood at the head of 
the Party. After Stalin’s death the Party can no longer 
be considered as an agglomeration of individuals shaped 
by the will of one leader. The Party, and the C.C. in 
particular - is itself an organism which functions like 
an integrated personality. We would not hesitate to 
look upon it as upon a new form of life individual ion.
Its leaders bear less and less the mark of personalities. 
The struggle between them, if there is any, will look 
less and less like a struggle between independent 
individuals which might pub the Party in danger, and more 
and more like a struggle between the cells of an,organism. 
Malenkov, fjeria or Molotov are cells rather than organisms. 
Who can sense the pulsation of a personality under words
/
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words and phrases like the following:- 
"Our friends respect us because we are strong, and will 
respect us only as long as we are strong* The weak are 
not respected. If we are respected it roeans that we 
shall not be hindered in our task of construction. It 
is wrong and dangerous to overestimate oners strength, 
but still worse to underestimate it, because then one is 
liable to be stricken by panic".(Quo! ■ Hand**6. ^ juawijaarK*»Ay?^
Stalinfs elementary and depersonalised style is 
pushed here to an extreme. Malenkov is literally the 
mouthpiece of the Party and it becomes more and more the 
only personality in Communist society. There is little 
wonder that Malenkov has started his own regime with the 
battle against "the cult of personality", and against 
"the mastery- of individual formulations and quotations" 
of Marxist-Leninist theory. The positive aim of this 
battle consists in the confirmation of "the collective 
character" of'Party's leadership. (See Beria's accusation 
act. Italics ours.)
C H A P T E R  YI 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DOGMA.
Dogma and Myth. In Part II of this study we have
shown that the most striking feature of the Hazi way of
life consisted in the inclination of the individual
belonging to it towardsmythical thinking on one hand,
»
and in the readiness of his culture pattern to provide 
his mind with myths on the other. If we have to define, 
in the same way the specific psychological feature of a 
Communist way of life this undoubtedly consists in the 
individuals dogmatic attitude to life, and the readiness 
of his culture-pat tern to provide his mind with elements 
of dogmatic thought.
One usually defines dogma as an idea which can neither 
be checked by the' logical 'functions of the individual 
mind, nor revised in the light of subsequent experience.
It should be added that dogma implies the imposition of an 
idea by means other than the stringency of the rules of 
human understanding.
For Marxists, dogma has a specific meaning. They 
call dogmatic any-idea or any ideology which persist after 
the material conditions which gave rise to it have been 
superseded. In this specific context Stalin speaks (The
/
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(The Problems of Leninism) of two kinds of marxism: 
dognatic and creative Marxism. V/hile the forner turns 
Llarx* s ideas into dead formulae, the latter transposes 
them into a giving organism, by their uninterrupted 
adaptation to the concrete situations of life. Soviet 
Communism belongs, according to Stalin, to the latter.
We cannot enter into a full discussion of this problem, 
but we should like to make the following two- points:
A. Recent experience has shown that, although material 
conditions were quite different in South East Europe, 
the Communists applied the same precepts and the same 
methods as in the Russia of 1917. The Soviet attack on 
Tito offers a recent example of a dogmatic rather than a 
creative llarxism. B. The material conditions referred to 
by Marxists follow in their evolution the fixed pattern 
prescribed by Historical materialism. The ideas describing 
the changes which take place in the material condition of 
Communist society belong to a dogmatic body of doctrine. 
Consequently, the concept of change cannot be opposed to 
that of dogma since the pattern of change is dogmatically 
established and asserted.
Myth stands for hope or horror, dogma for the most 
rigorous form of knowledge, i.e., for concepts. Myth­
making rests on the power of the imagination to mould 
emotional factors; myths may serve as guides for reason, 
but very seldom do they replace it entirely. Dogma, on 
the other hand, rests on the power of the intellect to 
transpose emotional factors into its own key, yet failing
26?
failing to change their irrational nature. The 
fathers of the Church moulded the emotional need lying
at the basis of Christianity into a set of fundamental
/ _
truths, Marx, Engels and Lenin did the same with their 
own emotional tensions and with those of the modern 
proletariat as well. While in myths we have to do with 
more or less complex projections of emotional factors, 
in dogma we are faced with the CONVERSION of emotionality 
into reason, or with, the conversion of unconscious into 
conscious forms of experience. Thus myth reveals itself 
for what it really is, while dogma is a false 
merchandise, i.e., emotionality and irrationality dis­
guised as intellect. The process of conversion explains 
to a great extent the compulsory and intolerant 
character of dogma. The certitude, the university, and 
the rigidity inherent in dogmatic knowledge is the reflex, 
at the level of consciousness, of a repressed emotional 
situation resulting from precarious and insecure con­
ditions of life. This arises as a defence mechanism 
when the admission to consciousness of the emotional 
situation of insecurity makes the adjustment to life 
difficult or impossible. From this primitive basis, 
dogma-making develops into an autonomous mechanism of 
the mind in the sense that the individual or the group 
develop negative attitudes towards anything subjective 
and emotional, and against anything unstable and cir­
cumstantial. This goes hand in hand with the growth of a
a compulsory need for putting any experience of life 
under the protection of an objective and absolute order*
Marxian dogma is rooted ,in the need of Marx and 
of the modern proletariat to repress their emotional 
experience of insecurity, created in them, by various 
conditions of life. It expresses, at the same time, 
the need, deeply seated in Marx and the proletariat, 
to convert their "cases" into general problems, i.e., 
the desire of the proletariat to become "universal".
The result of this repression is that, today, the pro­
letariat justifies its ideas and actions not by its 
traumatic experience and the emotional result,but by 
the objective qualities of the working class, and by 
the universal laws of history. Its emotional need has 
been converted into the objective and rational order of 
the world which cannot fail to assert itself. ^
(1)
Psycho-analytical thinking offers another example 
of dogmatism in contemporary civilisation whose origins 
are similar to those of Marxism. It is know that Freud 
arrived at the formulation of the basic concepts of 
psycho-analysis by self-analysis, i.e., by the awareness 
of his own "disorders". This particular and subjective 
basis of the psycho-analytical concepts has been con­
certed into a set of objective laws of the human mind. 
The concept of the Oedipus complex can be taken as an 
example. For Freud, the Oedipus complex is a con­
stitutional element of the human mind, existing in all 
individuals and in all historical times. In this way 
the subjective and circumstantial character of Freud*s 
knowledge becomes a lav/ of the psychological- universe. 
Freud’s great concern with the "scientific" character 
of psycho-analysis is significant in this respect.
He wanted psycho-analysis to be neither more nor less 
than a rigorous science whose object is the universal 
laws of the mind.
A great proportion of psycho-analysists are like
Ill
like Freud, They are converted to psycho-analysis 
because they have personal experiences which fit into 
the psycho-analytical pattern. But almost instantaneously 
they reach the conviction that psycho-analysis is the 
only explanatory system of mental life and consequently 
psycho-analysis is ;rthe science" of the mind. ’This 
phenomenon cannot be understood but by assuming that 
the conversion of their ov;n "complexes" into objective 
laws of psyche constitutes for them a form of acting 
out of their "trauma" and therefore is an inner 
necessity, fhey find a real help in their solidarity 
with others. In this way they try to escape their 
"peculiarities" by generalising them by the means of a 
theory. The modern proletariat proceeds in the same 
way; it generalises its own case and transforms the 
world into a universal workersr society.
The dogmatic attitude of psycho-analysists does not 
consist in the personal and subjective source of their 
knowledge, but in their tendency to subtract this 
knowledge from under the influence of any personal and 
relative factor. They mistrust and suspect anyone who 
discriminates between various aspects of their doctrine.
If psycho-analysis is accepted it should be accepted as 
an indivisable truth, and its practice carried out in 
an "orthodox" manner. Like Communists they have their 
own heretics, and like Communists also, they systematically 
fail to see the point of view of their opponent. A' 
Freudian would explain any anti-Freudian attitude as a 
"defence mechanism", i.e., as a refusal to recognise the 
sexual essence of psyche. A Marxist would call his 
opponent a "bourgeois" meaning by this that he has strong 
economic and social reasons to oppose ifarxism.
Marxian Dogma and the Displacement of Religion.
J. Monnerot uses "le deplacement du sacre" as the key 
psychological mechanism in the rise and the development of 
Communism. He understands by this, the repression of 
religious experience which takes place in modern man 
under the impact of science, on one hand, and the dis­
placement of the repressed religious need into various ■ 
fields of secular activity on the other. This constitutes, 
in our opinion, a useful application to sociology of two 
fundamental psycho-analytical concepts, that of repression
and that of displacement. Since this is closely connected
connected with the origin of Communist dogma, we 
should like to put forward our own point of view on 
this matter.
From the cultural point of view one can distinguish 
various stages in the repression of the religious mode 
of experience in modern man.
During the Enlightment the religious mode of 
experience is repressed to the extent that its sub­
stance is irrational. It is, however, accepted by the 
individuals consciousness to the extent that it can
become an element in the rational scheme of the universe.
>
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boundaries of reason", raiie The French Revolution 
suppresses the religious mode of experience in principle 
and Replaces it with the cult of reason. Robespierre*s 
attitude towards religion, for instance, is characteristic 
of a culture-pattern dominated by science. He accepts 
religion as a need of the people. Thus, he spares the 
religious feelings of the masses to the extent that he 
can use them in the service of the Revolution. Religion 
is, therefore, a "means”-which should be used within the 
rational scheme of the Revolution.
The specific Relationship between religion and 
Communism is rooted in the critique of religion made 
by the Hegelian group of the leftj Marx being one of them.
The starting point of this stream of thought consists 
in Hegel*s view on Christianity. Christianity marks 
for Hegel a particular stage in the evolution of "Idea", 
i.e., a historical embodiment of Reason. Starting from 
this general statement Strauss makes the attempt to 
determine the historical element involved in- the structure 
of Christianity. The empirical conditions of -Jewish 
society and of the Graeco-Roman world constitute for him 
important elements in the rise and the development of 
Christianity. Thus the sacred and transcendental 
character of religion is according to Strauss always 
intermingled with a series of empirical conditions of 
life, Feuerbach is the first to formulate a radical 
critique of religion from this specific point of view.
He denies in principle any transcendental element in the 
composition of religion and consequently explains it as a 
purely empirical phenomenon rising from the material 
conditions of human life. "God is manrs son" is the 
inevitable conclusion of Feuerbach’s point of view.
Feuerbach’s critique constitutes the starting point 
of Marx’s view on religion. ■ But the idea should be 
stressed that it is a starting point only. For Feuerbach, 
though maintaining that religious modes of representation 
are projections of the material conditions of man, does 
not go deeply enough into the implications of this 
assertion. He declares himself incapable of understanding 
the transition from unconscious matter to consciousness.
In other words, he shrinks from the analysis of the
\
process according to which certain material conditions 
of human life are transformed into religious representations.? 
moreover he explicitly says that he is aware of the j
vacuum existing between the Unconscious and consciousness. (
j
Or, it is precisely on this vacuum, that Marx wants to j
build up his own view of religion. To start with, he
arbitrarily fills this vacuum with reason. Consequently 
religion becomes, for him, a purposive action. It is, 
in fact, a tool created and used by the ruling class for 
their economic and political purposes. Thus, being a
i
product of class society it will necessarily disappear 
in a classless society, i.e., in a proletarian society.
It is worth while analysing the bearing of this con- !
ception on religious experience and on its repression in 
particular, in a Communist society. '
Marx has an ambivalent attitude towards religion.
As a representative of scientific rationalism, he sees ■ •; 
in religion a simple "mystification" of reality and as 
such he opposes it as he opposes any form of fideisft.
&e places himself - and so do his followers - in the 
"avant-garde" of the struggle against mysticism and ;
ignorance. Marx is, in this respect,in a far more advanced 
position than his master Feuerbach. Feuerbach’s criticism :
resulted undoubtedly in a paralysis of the transcendent 
element of religious experience. According to him there
1j
was no basis for the sacred character of religion. But,
But,and this is an important point, the religious 
mode of experience was in principle possible as a 
natural phenomenon. Marx, on the other hand, takes a 
short cut by declaring- religion not only a disturbing 
phenomenon for the rational order of the universe, 
but also an ill-intended action, an important source 
of manrs exploitation by man. Eere Marx is in almost 
the same position as Freud. Religion is for Freud 
simply maladjustment and, as such, it should be con­
trolled and finally "suppressed” by reason.
Marx lived in a period of enthusiastic belief in 
the power of science, and of reason in general.
This made it easier for him to find outlets for 
repressed religious feelings and needs. The rational 
order of history, extracted from the "scientific" 
analysis of modern European society and expressed in, 
the doctrine of historical materialism, captures all his 
faith and power of worshipping. Therefore, unlike 
^euerbach, who apparently stops at the first crisis of 
the need of the’ sacred in man, Marx shows signs of an 
exceptional power to displace religious need in other 
fields of mental activity. For Feuerbach God is dead, 
and in that he is a representative of European nihilism. 
MarxTs mind cannot be kept for long in a negative 
position. If God is dead he "calls for new Gods"; he 
even sees the concrete image of Him in the modern 
proletariat.
Marx*s attitude towards religion is that of a dis-
disillusioned fanatic, rather than that of a cold 
scientist resigned to a Godless universe* He uses the 
rationalistic critique of Christianity only to pave 
the way for another Messiah.
It is exactly the same psychological pattern which 
works in the modern proletariat. The position of the 
proletariat towards* religion is only indirectly affected 
by the progress of science. Its faith is shaken 
primarily by its misfortunes which resulted in its 
desolidarisation from modern society whose God fails to 
come to its rescue. The Marxian doctrine and the 
activity of the Communist Party precipitated the re­
pression and the displacement of the proletariat's need 
for religion. At the same time they produced a positive 
and negative transference of religious need. For, 
according to the Marxian doctrine, the God who failed 
to help the proletariat is not its own God, but the God 
of* its enemy, the ruling class. Thus the old God became 
the bad God, and as such it was expelled from con­
sciousness. But in spite of this, the modem proletariat 
Is eYen less prepared than 'Marx to accept a Godless 
universe. For the same doctrine, which helped it to 
expel the old God, helped it to create "its own1* God.
The new Messiah is preached by Marx in the form, of a 
new society, from which the redeeming of the proletariat 
must come.
It is worth while mentioning that the part of the
the Marxian doctrine which describes the new world 
as completely devoid of mysticism and religious modes 
of experience has only superficially touched, the mind 
of the proletariat. The operation.which takes place 
is the displacement, rather than the suppression of 
religious need. Once the religious need is detached j 
from a transcendental object it is successively dis- ’ 
placed upon various empirical objects such as the 
"Human species", the proletariat as a social class,the
Party, Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov.........  This process
is still operating in various forms, depending on the 
historical setting of various Communist societies.
The formula is: Your God is dead, long live "our" God.
We have purposely confined the displacement of religious 
need to what seems most characteristic of modern 
Communist society. Ilonnerot rightly shows that the 
phenomenology of this process in modern society is much 
larger. He treats the secular myths of modem man as 
among the most conspicuous results of the displacement 
of religious feelings. The Ayths of "nation” and of 
"people" were both launched by the French Revolution, the 
myth of "human species" formed the core of the socialist 
movement of the nineteenth century, the myth of 
"individuality", characterised Romanticism, and finally 
the myths of."race" of "collectivity" and that of State 
are various concrete forms of this process.
There is another myth, however, overlooked by 
Llonnerot, which has an important bearing on Communism.
This is the myth of science, which has grown steadily 
since the Renaissance, with a sharp spurt in the nineteenth 
century. In its struggle against the sacred character of 
religion science has assumed for itself this character.
I.Iarx and Engels express but a current opinion when 
claiming that the salvation of mankind will come from 
science. That is why they consider it only right that in 
the society conceived by them the throne of religion 
should be usurped by science. "In the history of natural 
science - writes Engels- God is treated by his defenders 
as Frederik Wilhelm II was by'his general and servants in 
the campaign of Fena. Little by little the whole army 
capitulates; the fortresses one after another fall in 
front of the advance of science which ends by conquering 
the infinite domain of nature with no place for the 
Creator's refuge" (Dialectique de la Nature. Liar cel 
Riviere et Cie^Paris^1950, pp.264-265.) Considering 
the impressive progress of science, it is only natural for 
Marx and Engels to put their own ideas under the tutelage 
of science. But, surprisingly enough, they do this not 
because they feel the need to verify them in every-day 
experience, or to justify them in the light of reason 
applied to experience, but, in order to endow them with 
the highest authority possible, and thus to protect them 
from criticism based on experience and reason. This shows
shows an important feature of their minds, which has 
become characteristic of Communist man. Scientific 
laiaguage is for this man a cloth which covers his 
dogmatic thought, i.e., it is a way of declaring their 
ideas sacrosanct.
The Critique 0f the Critique of Religion. According 
to an opinion supported in many psychological and 
sociological quarters, Russian Communism is in essence 
a religious phenomenon. More precisely, it is an 
example of secular religion. The roots of this 
phenomenon lie in the repression of religious experiences 
taking place in modem society in general, and in 
Communist society in particular, and in the displacement 
of religious need upon a series of empirically definable 
situations such as an ideology, a political party or a . 
leab.er.
We do not question the existence of the processes 
of represession and displacement in Communist society.
Yet we can hardly agree that this results in a real 
religious phenomenon. Since the analysis of such an 
important question of principle would take us far 
beyond the purpose of this study, we have to confine 
ourselves to the main points of our own position as 
follows;
The transference of the repressed need of sacredness 
does not mean that a new religion is created, nor even 
that a new kind of religious experience is in coir se of
of development. This means only what it really says, 
namely, that man is in need of an absolute point of 
reference in life, in need of a dogmatic knowledge, 
or in need of establishing a relationship of absolute 
dependence between himself and a certain empirical 
condition of life. There is more than one way of 
fulfilling this need; it can be fulfilled by 
metaphysics, by art, by se’ience, or by a political act.
‘It can also be achieved by the simple act of friend­
ship or love. But, though all of these manifestations 
are motivated by the human need for absolute depend­
ence and security, none of them can' be said to touch 
the essence of religion. For, apart from its 
motivation, religion consists in a particular expression 
of 'human inner experiences rooted in the-need for 
absolute dependence. In this expression, which takes 
place at the conscious level of mind, lies the essence ! 
of religious experience. Briefly speaking, the essence;
of- religious experience consists in the freedom of the I 
■ / 
individuals consciousness to link itself by "faith" /
with a transcendent world, to call that Yrorld "God",
and to' base the meaning of life on this. Religion is
opposed to any act by which man limits himself to an
empirical condition of life.
The mistake of those who consider Communism as a 
religious phenomenon springs from the fact that they 
take too narrow a view of religion. They reduce
reduce reli'cion to some particular condition of mind 
sucii as projection, compensation, or, generally 
speaking, the urge to escape an empirically definable 
insecurity. All these are, in our own opinion, aspects 
of religion, but they do not make religion. They 
form the contents of the psychology of religion, not of 
religion itself.
The psychology of religion starts off from the 
point that religious belief is an answer to a state of 
.insecurity. Consequently, it studies certain 
, empirically definable states of insecurity, in children 
or in certain collectivities,and infers from this the 
rise and development of religious behaviour in general. 
The interest of psychology is concentrated on motivation, 
which is defined as a certain state of insecurity in 
the human mind. But the psychologists often gloss over 
the important fact that, from this angle, they can never 
grasp the essence of religion. For at this motivational 
level they cannot quite distinguish between a religious 
experience, a crime, or incest. An historically 
empirically conditioned state of insecurity can express 
itself as an outburst of religious feelings, as an 
aggressive war, or as a collapse of any kind of faith.
This is the reason why we consider that religion 
is not historically conditioned, It is true that 
religion, as the need for sacredness in life, is the 
answer to a state of insecurity in man. Yet this state
/
state is not a ?Icertain'1 state, i.e., created under 
certain empirical conditions. It is rather the state 
of insecurity and incompleteness which characterises the 
human condition as a whole. Religious experience trans­
cends the human condition in that it answer^ the 
insecurity of the human condition in general. We hasten 
to say that this insecurity of the human condition in 
general is not a metaphysical phenomenon. Its 
peculiarity is that it is far more difficult to define 
than any specific state of insecurity and thus it cannot 
readily form the object of an empirical science.
These are the main reasons why vie think that 
Communism, though displaying a series of religious 
symptoms, is not a religious phenomenon. Communist 
dogma manifested in the Gomiiunistsr belief in the Marxian 
doctrine, in. their readiness to accept the words of their 
leaders as sacred, is rooted in a certain need for 
security, created in the modern proletariat and in the 
Russian people by specific historical conditions. The 
immanent rational order as described by historical 
materialism, the belief in the historical mission of the 
working-class, and the worshipping of Communist leaders 
satisfy this particular state of insecurity. These 
manifestations are no more religious than the child's 
belief in the strength of his father, or the adolescentTs 
worship of his girl-friend. They do not answer the 
fundamental need for the sacred and transcendent in man.
The first proof of this is the fact that in Coranunist 
society religious need is experienced by people along­
side political dogmatism. The 1935 Constitution makes 
only a start in the acknowledgment of the existence 
of a genuine religious need in Soviet Russia.
In conclusion one can say that Communist society 
displays a crisis for the sacred in life, rather than 
an impulse to make life sacred. True religion can not 
exist in a culture-pattern where life is deprived of 
its transcendental dimension. The dogmatic assertion 
of an immanent rational order, and the belief in the 
Party and its leaders, as the agents of this order, do 
not have a religious meaning. They do not express a 
need to transcend an empirical condition, but rather a 
strong need for the rationalisation of an empirical 
state of insecurity created in a group.
Communist Dogma as_ aSymptojT'of Over-Rationalisation. We
have said already that dogma and dogmatic inclinations 
result from the invasion of consciousness by uncon­
scious irrational factors, disguised in rational forms. 
The emotional conditions of Marx and the modern pro­
letariat, their fears, their insecurity and hopes 
crystallised at the conscious level of the mind in a 
series of scientific laws which demonstrate the rational 
articulation of the world. How can we prove that the 
fundamental concepts of the Marxian doctrine are dis­
guised emotional factors? The main proof consists in
11H
in the fact that their acceptance or refusal are on no 
account conditioned on the logical norms of human 
understanding, Who can prove empirically, or who can 
conclude from the logical analysis of the data furnished 
by nineteenth century science, the materiality of the 
universe, or the economic substance of human society, 
or the destiny of the modern proletariat which is 
described in such precise terms by Marx? Manrs 
decision on issues like these comes from behind, some­
times in spite of the rational laws of his mind.. It 
is faith, rather than scientific proof, that has the 
last word on these big issues. The modern proletariat 
regards the fundamental ideas of Marxian philosophy 
as absolute truth, and not as empirically founded con­
cepts, for- the simple reason that they justify^ in an 
objective manner its emotional situation, its fears, 
aggression and hopes. In this lies the main source of 
the dogmatic character of these ideas, and of the 
unflinching belief Communists have in the truth which 
they express. Any doubt about these ideas, and any 
allowance made for their opponents, constitutes a 
relapse to insecurity and darkness over the future of 
the proletariat and of those identified with it.
We cannot understand the origin and the function
except J
of dogma in Communist society tet as an excess of
rationalisation, or an over-rationalisation. This 
process can be viewed from two main aspects, a cultural 
and. a psychological one. /
lie have already mentioned that Gorammiist ideology 
crystallises in a period of strong belief in reason 
and science. One. of the main characteristics of this 
period consists in nianTs tendency to establish scientific 
laws in the field, of history and of social sciences.
Marx himself extends the power of reason, under its 
most precise formulation, as scientific laws, in the 
field of economics and sociology. By implication he 
extends the same rational pattern in the field of 
psychology, to the extent to which he considers 
psychological phenomena causally connected with social 
and economic factors. In this field, however, rational 
laws, functioning according to the model of physical
i
science, cannot be maintained without falling into a 
dogmatic attitude, i.e., without entrusting these laws 
with power which does not entirely derive from the facts 
to which they refer. This is precisely what Marx does.
He bases his scientific claim in the field of sociology 
.and psychology upon a set of absolute truths. The 
materiality of the universe is the first and the most 
important of these truths. ' If every sociological and 
psychological phenomenon depends ultimately on material 
factors, then the claim of treating the field of 
sociology and psychology in the manner of physical science 
is fully justified., Thus, the prestige of science 
characteristic of his period made Marx apply its pattern 
in all fields of life, the result of which being an
/
an excessive rationalisation which is inherited by 
his followers.
From the psychological point of view the process of 
over-rationalisation is rooted in the emotional state 
of insecurity, intensively experienced by the modem 
proletariat. Rationalisation is, in this case, something 
like a compulsory ritual, by which the proletariat acts 
out a deeply repressed desire for security. Thus, 
the mind of the proletariat is in permanent need of 
accepting and creating schemes of understanding'and 
action, by which its position in life is assured in 
advance with mathematical certitude. The proletarians 
apprehensions and fears becomeIbaseless because they 
are against the object laws of history; its hopes will 
certainly come to fruition, for they are supported by 
these laws.
This is the proper place to say something about the 
almost obsessional concern with ,?reasonrf and "conscious­
ness" so characteristic of Communists, le have already 
mentioned that one of the main features of Marx*s 
personality consists in his effort to bring the whole 
realm of existence under the control of consciousness.* 
This remains also as afmain impulse in Communist man and 
society. Communists flatter themselves that in their 
own world the economic, social and political processes 
are very little, if at all, subjected to chance. As 
a contrast with-Fascists, they never base their actions
actions on feelings or momentary impulses. Conse­
quently they are never too tired to state to 
themselves and to others the "reasons" of their action, 
Any task given to a Communist has to be based on 
rational motives. He is asked to repeat and to 
appropriate the whole range of reasons presented 
according to the Party line until it is made certain 
that there is no place for doubt and no need for further 
debate in his mind. At their meetings, Communists 
debate for hours and days on points, which for any out­
sider seem trivial details, until the reasons for their 
final decision appear clear in the mind of each member.
The Communist trials illustrate best their 
excessive need for rationalisation. In the first place, 
they never pass sentence without trial, as the N a z i s  
often did. Moreover, they are never satisfied if the 
defendant accepts his sentence pafcively. They ask him, 
to analyse himself and to find the reasons for his 
offence or crime, and they prepare him to this end by 
various techniques. He has to argue and to plead against 
himself. Bukharin can be mentioned as a typical example.
Heedless to say, the "reasons" offered by defendants 
have a peculiar character. They appear to the logically- 
constituted mind understandable and not understandable 
at the same time. They are intelligible to the mind 
which can accept as dogma, firstly, the principles of 
dialectical materialism, and secondly, the norms of/
of another kind of consciousness completely different 
from individual consciousness. For when a Communist 
rationalises, he does not justify his action or his 
intention in the light of logical thought, but interprets 
his own problems according to the norms and requirements 
of class consciousness, with the structure of which we 
shall deal in the next chapter.
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS.
A New Point of Contact; Between ^an and the WorlcU 
The ^ommunicat "lives" for His group as tlms-organised 
by the Party. Consequently the content of His mind 
is shaped and com ami cate d according to the structural 
conditions of class consciousness. This condition of 
the Human mind is acknowledged by Soviety psychology 
which is avowedly against any kind of depth psychology 
or, the psychology of the Unconscious, and at the same 
time, against the psychology of consciousness to the 
extent that consciousness means a structure of the 
individual’s mind. The Unconscious in itself does not 
count, because there is nothing in the individuals mind 
that is not a reflection of the rational structure of 
his society. Consciousness is, on the other hand, an 
inter-individual rather than an individual structure, 
for the simple reason that the individual cannot exist 
Isolated from his society. The true object of p^chology 
is class consciousness, i.e., the mode under which human 
beings become aware of themselves as a group.
The position of Soviet psychology is by no means 
clear. As a science it is still looking for its birth
birth certificate, for in a culture-pattern, where the
mind is the reflection in man of the., mate rial conditions
of life, psychology could easily be reduced to economics
and sociology. But we know that the oblent of Soviet
psychology is a new type of man, the concrete man or
nan as society. The' mind of this man is structurised in
what we call class consciousness. As an operational
concept, class consciousness can be described as a mental
t Kxa
structure whose functionsvi;o guide and organise!-contact 
with the world of the human group. . Whether the existence 
of such a structure is possible may be disputed. The 
anthropologists (Levy Bruhl) have brought various data 
regarding a primitive stage in the evolution of human 
society where the mind of the individual is completely 
submerged in that of the group. Historians such as Jakob 
Burckhardt conceive medieval man as existing as class 
rather than as individual. In principle there i^nothing 
against the occurrence of a stage in the life of a 
community at which the individuals mind is articulated 
by those experiences which are significant for the life 
of the group exclusively. The existence of class con­
sciousness should, therefore, be regarded in the light of 
this probability.
Considering the Marxian doctrine from a purely 
psychological point of view, we can say that class con­
sciousness is the psychological aspect of the world.
It is in fact the only psychological factor that reflects 
the world from the right angle, i.e., the world as a
a historical process. It follows from this that 
the human being as adequately integrated (adjusted to) 
in the universe to the extent he thinks, feels and acts 
as a group.
Bor the definition of class consciousness it is 
worth noting that the concept of the natural human group 
is for Marx identical with the concept of_social class, 
and that the social class rather than the individual is 
the natural unit of human existence. Marx's argument 
on this point is by no means psychological. The human 
being becomes, he says,a factor in the process of pro­
duction, and therefore an entity in the historical process, 
only as class. Since for Marx the difference between man 
and animal consists in the fact that "men create their 
own history" it becomes obvious that man is not himself 
except as social class, for only as such can he become a 
determining factor in his own history. In other words, 
man as class creates and masters his own history,while 
as individual, he is created and mastered by it.
The social class is, according to Marx, an economic 
category - a decisive factor in production - it can, 
however, become a psychological one to the extent that 
the individual identifies himself with his class and 
becomes by this an active factor in history. It is not 
seldom that Marx gives the impression that the social 
class is an nincarnatedft economic category and as such 
it behaves as a personality having its own Ego, and, at
at any rate, its own consciousness. Sometimes the 
bourgeoisie is depicted by him as a hero disguised as a 
Roman (The Eighteenth B'rumaire) and the proletariat as 
an invincible soldier marked ?/ith cicatrices.
Yet neither Marx nor any of his followers give any 
clear idea ahout the structure of social class from a 
psychological point of vie?/. All we can say is -• and 
this is in our own terms - that the social class 
represents the tfindividuation” of the historical process, 
that it is the basic unit in the battle field of human 
history, and that the individual by hiraself represents 
nothing more nor less than a soldier lost from his own 
unit. The last part of ”Capital” where Harx promises to 
deal with the structure of the social class ends before 
he says anything significant.
The Sistorical Tonography of Class Consciousness, 
According to the doctrine of Dialectical Materialism, 
Communist society, or the Communist stage in human society, 
is the expression of the working-class. Therefore, what 
Communists designate as class consciousness, and what con­
stitutes the psychological structure of Communist man, 
is in fact the self-consciousness of the working-class*
We have shown in an earlier chapter that the self-
consciousness of the working-class is a historical product
of European industrial society. Since this particular
historical context explains to a great extent the com­
position of class consciousness we repeat in a ghort
short version the argument of that chapter. The modern 
proletariat became conscious of itself as a class, 
during a period of economic crises in Western soc iety. 
The-main psychological effects of these crises on the 
proletariat are two: (1 ) a deep feeling of insecurity
and (b) aggression firstly diretged against the rulers 
of Industrial society, the employers, and then gradually 
extended to the whole social system. As a result of 
this situation, the proletariat has gradually detached 
itself from the rest of society and created from its own 
condition of life a new type, of society meant to sub­
stitute the old one. Thus the process of separation from, 
and conflict with, a hostile world lies at the basis 
of the self-consciousness of the modem proletariat.
To this fundamental condition is added an impulse in the 
proletariat as a class to create a way of life of its 
own. At this stage intervened another important factor 
in the structuration of class consciousness, i.e.,
Marxian ideology, which gave a rational expression to the 
proletariat’s attitude against an industrial society of 
the nineteenth century and to its drivings for a new 
type of society.
From the psychological point of view it is important 
to know that what Communists call class consciousness is . 
the result of an historical process by which a social 
group - the proletariat - grew conscious of its own 
specific position, in specific historical circumstances.
Of ^ particular importance are the proletariat1s relations
relations with other social groups and with society
as a whole. In these experiences lies the main source
of the traumata which dominate the mind of the
European working-class. For the inner experiences
aroused by the historical conditions referred to
formed a "complex” which unceasingly generates the
mental categories by which the modern proletariat ;
interprets the world. The categories of class con- j
sciousness are therefore rooted in a "historical complex” j
specific of modern European civilisation. This means
that what happened once at a specific stage in the •
»
evolution of European society has become, in Communist 
society, a general situation: what was once a concrete |
experience has become a mental category in the modem I!!
working-class. j
Marx has an ambivalent attitude towards the 
historical character of class consciousness. The rise 
of the self-consciousness of the modern proletariat •,
i)
is, according to hiraf conditioned by certain historical 
circumstances. And yet., orice constituted, class con- I
sciousness loses its historical character. It is no 1
longer the self-consciousness of a specific group, but ;
human consciousness in general. Thus, Marx transposes the 1 
historical condition of the modern proletariat to the j
human condition in general. Without knowing it, Marx
;
has thus recognised the tendency of every psychical 
complex to become a general condition of the mind,
The Structure of Class Consciousness. We have 
already mentioned the fact that at the basis of class 
consciousness lies an emotional condition created in 
the modern proletariet by a series of sohial circumstances 
characteristic of the nineteenth century. This takes us 
back to the idea that class consciousness is false con­
sciousness, in the sense that its structure and 
functioning is greatly conditioned by irrational factors, 
i.e., a repressed emotional condition of fear and 
insecurity. The mental structure that controls and 
enlightens the relationship pf a Communist with his world 
is impregnated by the projections of this unconscious 
emotional state. That is why class consciousness shows 
important symptoms of an unconscious structureJ it is 
collective, it is not reflexive but exclusively active, 
it is not theoretical but practical.
It is not easy to define the collective, super­
individual character of class consciousness, but we can 
talk about primitive-irreflexive and reflexive collective 
features of the human mind. The former is predominantly 
unconscious and expresses itself as emotional belongingness 
to the group. The latter is on the other hand rafc ional.
It rests on the individual's capacity to accept and ?fork 
with values, social and moral, common to a whole, group.
The inter-individual character of the laws of intellect - 
the logical laws - forms the largest basis of this 
collective feature of the human mind.
Glass consciousness obviously belongs to the 
primitive level of collective tendencies in the human 
mind. The proletariat's solidarity, -which has been 
transmitted to Goimiiunist societies, is rooted in the 
emotional state of the solodarity of a group under con­
ditions of danger. The Communistf s identification "with 
his Party, and his unconditional surrender to the 
requirements of his society show nothing of a rational 
type of integration. An^ f, yet, class consciousness is 
expressed also by the rational laws of dialectical 
materialism. The order based on these laws is different 
from that of the classical Aristotelian logic but it 
can be regarded as a rational order all the same. And, 
in spite of this, class consciousness is not a rac ional 
structure. Respsomible for this is its basic practical 
character.
nThe question as to whether human thought is 
objectively true is a practical, not a theoretical, 
Question”, says Marx (Theses on Feuerbach II). Or it is 
exactly the definition of "praxis11 that discloses the 
irrational character of class consciousness. For, in the 
last analysis, the criterion of "praxis" is rooted in a 
sort of instinct which guides the working-class 
organised by the Party - towards a dominant posits, on in 
modern society. The laws of dialectical materialism are 
permanently controlled by a fundamental emotional 
situation, defined either as fear and suspicion, or as an
an aggressive need for security. True and 
objective is everything that satisfies this emotional 
situation. ' :
One of Leninrs ideals was to create a political 
party which has the capacity o£ organising itself intt^tcMl^ 
^action, i.e., the capacity to completely adjust its i
final ends to the concrete situations of life. This *
was for Lenin the highest expression of political £
tactics. !e are under the impression that this type of |f
I’ :
organisation is an embodiment of class consciousness. [
For class consciousness has no formal laws of organ- ji
I1:n;
isation and no inner standards. It has only a set of f
final goals. Logic, as a settled rule of its own e
activity, has no meaning for it. In its activity, it j*
takes various shapes and it uses various standards; it |
might appear as' its very opposite, as during the HEP. |
period or during the Soviet-German alliance of 1939. Ij
The only criterion of irpientation consists in final I;
success (of the Party) and anything which can be f|
instrumental to this is good, true, real and primarily i
ft;
practical. Though speaking the language of the p
universal laws of dialectic^/ materialism, the activity 
of class consciousness is dominated by rough emotional 
categories. Anything contradicting itself is 
immediately wrapped up in an emotional state of "danger” 
and "enemy”, while whatever fits into its own structure 
becomes a "friend" a "fellow-traveller”, Divergence in
/
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in views signifies for it "split** and danger rather 
than just another opinion; error means heresy and 
treason, rather than ignorance.
The Categories of Glass Consciousness. One normally 
equates consciousness with a logical structure and 
opposes it to the Unconscious. This does hot hold good 
for class consciousness. For, if class consciousness 
is a logical structure, then its logic is different 
from, and in many respects opposed to, the traditional 
concept of logic. The main difference consists in the 
fact that the categories of class consciousness can by 
no means be described as the formal laws of human 
thought. The meaning of this will be revealed by what 
follows.
The first categories of class consciousness const st 
in the main principles of dialectical materialism: the 
materiality of the world, the principle of the whole, 
the principle of contradiction, or of the power of the 
negative, and the principle of evolution. Thus, in the 
light of class consciousness, everything has a material 
cause. This means that its laws cannot be satisfied 
unless this principle is clearly confirmed in every 
field of human knowledge. In the field of philosophy and 
psychology, mind is the product of matter, in the. field 
of sociology, the underlying causes are of economic 
nature, in the field of biology - as the case of 
Lysenko has recently demonstrated - the material con-
/
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conditions of life form tiie basis of explanation.
The principle of the whole constitutes another con­
dition of truth. This implies that knowledge based on 
the structure of class consciousness is _not adequate 
until each particular phenomenon becomes a function in 
the structure, or a momentum in the evolution of the 
universe as depicted by dialectical materialism. This 
is the totalitarian principle of class consciousness.
The third condition of truth is laid down by the 
principle of movement,of evolution. Glass consciousness 
is not satisfied unless it is fully aware of the fund­
amental fact that neverything is in transformation".
The principle of contradiction or of the power of the 
negative constitute^bhe fourth condition of truth.
This implies that the relationships between things are 
more adequately expressed in terms of their opposition 
than of their identity. The elements of the dialectical 
universe condition each other by mutual struggle.
The important fact should be noticed that these 
categories do not behave like formal laws of human con­
sciousness but like concrete categories of existaice.
The reasons for this assumption are two.
A. The Communists hold the belief that the categories 
of class consciousness are external realities. Matter 
itself is constituted according to the principles of 
dialectical materialism, and class consciousness does not 
but mirror the dialectical articulation of th^iuiiverse.
Engels in "Anti-Duhring” and Lenin in "Bmpirio- 
Griticism" can, on this point, be classified as 
typical representatives of a naive realism. (For 
Engels, even the Aantian categories exist in the 
external world.)
B. As a consequence of this attitude, the Communists
”reityn the categories of class consciousness, i.e.,
they conceive them as material forces working in the
universe. One of the concrete forms of the category of
matter is' identified with the economic factor of human
society. Therefore the universe of man is the product
of the material conditions of life, as they are organised
under, various forms by human economic activity. The
category of the whole is materialised by the Party, "that
great whole" as Lenin called it. One of the main
"reifications" of the category of movement consists in
the pattern of social evolution as described by historical
materialism. The category of contradiction is "reified”
as the class-struggle, as class society, and as the
struggle between the new and the old, in a classless
society. If Communists cannot see the world in the
function of these material forces, their theoretical and
practical certitude is completely lost. What is the
position of a particular phenomenon in the process of
production, what stage does it represent in the process
of evolution, what is its connection with the social 
whole'as represented by the Party, are fundamental
fundamental questions for the mind of a Corm/unist.
There is another feature of class consciousness 
which increases the concrete nature of its categories. 
Glass consciousness is primarily action,:and then 
understanding. Therefore these categories are rather 
"drives" or voluntary forces than forms of understanding: 
they worlc for their own realisation in the world.
The activity of the Party consists in the acceleration of 
the process of evolution along the lines of dialectical 
materialism. Glass consciousness is therefore the 
embodiment of the constitutive principles of the universe 
and of the driving forces towards the realisation of 
these principles as well. It follows that the categories 
of class consciousness are not only the intellect but 
also in the will of the individual. They engage him 
totally.
Here we come to an important point regarding the 
structure of class consciousness, i.e., its emotional 
aspect. Even from a superficial observation one could 
conclude that the categories of class consciousness are 
endowed with a certain emotional tonus. This: is, 
however, not enough for the understanding of hie part 
played by emotionality in the structure of class con­
sciousness. In our own opinion one has to speak of a 
second set of categories of class consciousness which 
are of an even more concrete character than those 
mentioned so far. These are emotional categories. Con­
sidering their concrete character we can call them,.
them existential categories, for their structure and 
functioning bear close similarity to those structural 
factors of human consciousness which Kierkegaard and 
his followers opposed to the formal laws of reason. 
Kierkegaard spoke of faith as the main existential 
category whose principal function was to promote 
emotional participation, or identification with the 
truth, thus leading to the total commitment of the 
individual.
This is the proper place to make a special note 
concerning the Russian contribution to the structure of 
class consciousness. We have shown in some previous 
chapters how Communism is a double product of modern 
Western and Russian culture-patterns. The main idea 
was that certain trends in Western European society,such 
as the political anarchism of the working-class and the 
anarchical movements in general, have been rapidly 
assimilated to the social and spiritual conditions of 
modern Russia and gradually developed into contemporary 
Communism, here one can see again how the Russians 
assimilated another product of Western culture, i.e., a 
specific type of consciousness, an emotionalised con­
sciousness. Needless to Say Russians have always 
regarded Western Rationalism as completely incompatible 
with the human condition in general. They have aLways 
shown their preference for a different, a more integral 
contact between man and his world than that allowed by^
by the formal laws of the intellect. DGstfcettskyT s 
criticism of Western civilisation can be adduced as a 
proof. Russians have been permanently yearning r a 
world shaped by human wishes and aspirations. Con­
sequently, the type of emotionalised consciousness 
characteristic of the modern proletariat fulfils pre­
cisely the demand made by Russians upon the human con­
sciousness in general.
Faith -1% undoubtedly one of the features of class 
consciousness, as we. have already demonstrated when dis­
cussing the displacement of religion characteristic of 
the CQ12niunist way of life. Ther are, however, a series 
of other emotional factors, even more concrete than faith, 
guiding .the activity of class consciousness, ‘^hese are 
the most important.*
1. Inimical feelings constitute the most intense 
emotional factor in the structure of class consciousness. 
The presence of an enemy is a condition of life for a 
Communist individual or group. This attitude can never 
be explained factually, i.e., by the analysis of the 
empirical conditions of a given conflict. Hostility is 
in fact a category of class consciousness. As such it 
is a condition of the CommunistTs perception of the world 
and a presupposition of its action, in precisely the same 
way as causal determination is a condition of the 
scientific perception of, and action upon, the material 
world. /
The modes in which this emotional category 
work are very varied. The most general one can be 
described as a tension aroused by the "permanent 
awareness of a danger or of an enemy which, if not 
already facing the individual or the group, must be 
round the next corner. Glass consciousness is never 
satisfied unless it identifies and engages the enemy. 
From the same emotional category derives the com­
bative and aggressive attitude characteristic of a 
Communist. Ruthlessness and determination are to a 
Communist simple techniques fof dealing with situations 
in which the presence of bitter opposition is a 
necessity, therefore, to strike first and mortally is 
a condition of adjustment in a world built up by class 
consciousness. Conciliation, appeasement and com­
promise, if they ever occur, should be regarded as 
tactical steps and by no means as abrogation from the 
fundamental law of hostility.
' Suspicion is another manifestation of this 
emotional category of class consciousness. Since we 
are going to deal more adequately in the next, chapter 
with this phenomenon, for the moment, we confine our­
selves to pointing out that suspicion is a generalised 
attitude in a Communist society. For it is suspicion 
that defines the essence of the inter-individual con­
tact in such a society. TIThe other” is first of all
all,a potential enemy. It is necessary to mention 
that this attitude is shown not only to outsiders but 
also to the.Party members, ho one mho ever joined a 
Communist Party could escape the feeling-that, for a 
period of time, he was under heavy suspicion from his own 
"comrades”, and that the intensity of this attitude cauld, 
in time, decrease, but the attitude as such never dis­
appeared. Due to this attitude the new convert has 
always the feeling of expiation,. and, quite frequently, he 
becomes suspicious of himself.
The identification of the enemy is, as we have 
already mentioned, a condition of life in a Communist 
' group. For, the enemy certainly exists. It remains 
only to be identified and fought. This is one- of the 
main tasks of Communist leaders, of the secret police 
which exists in every Communist organisation, and of 
every Party member. This is the meaning of Communist 
"vigilance”. The internal enemy cannot so easily be 
identified as the external one, the class enemy. That 
is why in a Communist group there have been developed 
special techniques for the discovery of the internal 
enemy. Special agents are entrusted with the task of 
engaging the Party members in discussion on various points 
concerning the "line", heedless to say, these agents ?/ork 
on the assumption of the necessary existence of the 
internal enemy. Consequently, their technique is that of 
a "provocateur". The result of this is seen in the 
periodical "purges" taking place in every Communist
vvv
Com:,miiist organisation.
One can tala also about directions and mechanisms in 
the process of enemy identification. It is usual for a 
Communist organisation to identify the enemy outside - 
itself as a,class enemy, counter-revolutionary movements, 
or as the capitalist world in general. Consequently the 
fears, the suspicions and the aggression existing at the 
basis of class consciousness are projected on these various 
inimical objects. But the same suspicion and aggression 
can take quite an opposite direction by being projected on 
the organisation itself. The outcome of this is the "self- 
criticism" which is one of the fundamental techniques of a 
Gomnmist Party. The increased importance attributed to 
the technique of self-criticism in the Russian Communist 
Party is worth noting. In 1947 Zhdanov pointed out a new 
form of progress and evolution in Soviet society. (Problems 
of Philosophy Loskow. No.l 1947). He says that in a class­
less society the dialectic of class struggle is replaced 
by the dialectic of criticism and self-criticism. This 
implies, in our own view,a sharp twist given to the process 
of enemy identification in the Bolshevik Party. After the 
disappearance from Soviet society of social classes and of 
the reactionary groups, the suspicion and aggression 
inherent in the structure of class consciousness are more 
intensely directed towards the Party itself. In Zhdanov's
Id
terms, the Party grew more capable of &iscrirninatingv its own 
structure, between the "old" and the "new", between the 
regressive and progressive. Consequently the Party displays
displays a greater ability to identify its own enemy with 
the '-'old1 and at the same time to identify itself with the 
l,newif. ^n the light of what we have said so far with 
regard to the structure of class consciousness, self- 
criticism is undoubtedly another mode of manifestation of
the emotional category of hostility. Psychologically, it
:
is a form'of self-aggression which has been translated 
bv Zhdanov at the cultural level into a fundamental
a)
principle of progress in Soviety society.
u)
Iran the pathological point of view, class con­
sciousness would adequately be described as a paranoiac 
structure. Since fears, suspicion and aggression are 
permanently projected either on to the external world or 
on itself the individual and the group have to adjust 
themselves to a world richly populated with evil forces 
coming from outside, or from within, lie are inclined to 
go a step further and to describe class consciousness as a 
paranoia-making - structure in the sense that any individual 
joining a Communist Party would sooner or later be con­
ditioned to paranoiac behaviour, i.e., would have to adjust 
itself to a world in which the presence of inimical forces 
constitutes a main condition of life.
3. The feeling of change can be considered as the 
second existential category of class consciousness. This 
cannot simply be reduced to the abstract category of 
evolution. Communists trliveu the change and transformation; 
they experience day by day this dimension of life,and express 
it under countless forms such as increased production, 
better organisation, growth of the Party, etc. Life in their 
world has certainly acquired a new tempo which can be com­
pared only with that of the early days of the Renaissance or 
of the industrial revolution. But,while in the former two
two cases the new tempo touched primarily, if not 
exclusively, town life, in Soviet Russia it includes 
country life as well. The tower clock beating every 
quarter, so characteristic of the Italian cities of 
the Renaissance, has become in Soviet Russia one of the 
masters of the Kolhoz-life. For, when Communists aim 
at the aboli^ta&nt of the difference between town and 
village, they mean among other things to indu|b/an '
agricultural worker wirbh the same sense of time as a 
factory worker or a clerk. •
The feeling of change engenders an optimistic state [
i
of mind in Communists. This is because one of their 
inner tensions- the frustrated desire for change in the 
modern proletariat - is reduced. Consequently they are f
able to bear any strain and' to work hard for any length ji
of time if they only feel that the world is changing.
No wonder that the word "progressive" carries such a 
heavy meaning with them. Activity, in a Communist 
organisation, has always something of a neurotic character, j. 
as if it were motivated by unconscious conflicts. The \
Party members are almost permanently on the job, and it ;
is not seldom that they collapse of exhaustion, like ?
soldiers aftef a hard battle. Hardly is a job finished, 
but their consciousness is worried about what is to be ■
done next, fhere is always' something important that has 
not yet been done. One of the greatest dangers in a •
Communist society is to "get drunk with victory”.
/
Tlie feeling of change, in a Gom:mnis t society, 
though powerful, is not disruptive. At least this is 
the way the Party members experience it. This is because 
change is kept under the check of a pre--established 
pattern. What happened to the category of hostility 
has happened to the feeling of change as well. Glass 
consciousness has established it. on the cultural level 
as a philosophy of change and evolution. This is 
another source of optimism and "vitality” in Cormiunist 
society. For as a result of it Communists believe that 
the objective laws, of history and of the universe work 
for the victory of the working class; (Stalin "Le 
Materialisme Dialectique et le Materialisme Eistorique"
Ed. Sociales Paris 1945 p.17),
3. The.need for unity is another existential category 
of class consciousness. Whoever lived in a Communist 
society could easily make the observation that the 
mental capacity of the Party members rises to a higher 
level when they work in a group. Dull, uneducated, 
impulsive and superficial individuals, when in "committee" 
take decisions which reveal clearsightedness and power of 
understanding which can hardly be attributed to any of 
them separately. It seems obvious that their behaviour 
reaches a higher capacity for adjustment when in a group.
Like the feeling of change, the feeling of unity 
is deep-seated in the structure of class consciousness.
The reactions springing from it are not less neurotic 
than those springing from the need of change. Reaction/
Reaction in group, united ffont, etc. seera to be 
forms of acting out of the fear of aloneness, and 
separatedness in the modern proletariat. Stalin was 
successful with his early slogan "unity above all” 
precisely because he appealed to a category of class con­
sciousness. The ritualistic appeal to unity occurring 
in every Communist society - Malenkov made one at StalinTs 
death - has one and the same source. It does not really 
mean the presence of an inner opposition and rebellion, 
as many are inclined to believe, but rather an outcome of 
a basic feature of class consciousness. The same feature 
of class consciousness explains in its negative aspect 
the fear and ideosyncrasy manifested by Communists towards 
opposition and split. It also explains a great deal of 
the defendants’ reaction in a Communist trial. A disgraced 
Communist is prepared to do anything in order to regain 
the favour of the Party, be that favour only a motherly 
look before he dies.
"Isolation” is one of the main methods of punishment in
a Communist organisation. The isolated individual is,
without being told beforehand, regarded as polluted; nobody
would speak to or contact him. From our own observation
of a series.of cases of isolation in a group of Communist
prisoners in Roumania (1943-44) we came to the conclusion
that this method has an immediate and disastrous effect on
the individualT s mind. In a matter of days, the victims
showed clear signs of powerful mental conflicts, Their
moral collapse was a certain!v. Sooner or later thev
 ^/
they were capable of doing anything to escape the 
situation; they asked to be put on trial, to be sentenced ... 
Some of then attempted suicide. The emotional symptoms 
are on the whole those of an infant separated from hi's 
mother.
We should like now to draw some general conclusions 
as to the function of the existential categories of class 
consciousness. Their most outstanding trait consists in 
their universality. L For it is quite possible to meet good 
Communists whose activities show little or no use of the 
first set of categories formulated by the basic principles 
of dialectical materialism, but it is almost impossible 
to meet one whose behaviour is not impregnated with the 
second set of categories. Juiyone who deals with Communists, 
no matter his own purposes, has to bear in mind that their 
consciousness is structurally conditioned by a set of 
existential categoTies, functioning in the way described 
above.
The origin of these categories lies in the historical 
complex which gave birth to European Communist movements. 
Glass consciousness has therefore grown up as opposed to 
modern social order under the vital necessity of unity '" 
among the disinherited, and under the pressing desire for 
better conditions. Hence its enemy-anxiety, its acute 
sense of unity and change. In this way the traumatic 
experience of the modern proletariat laid down the pattern 
of class consciousness.
/
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The first set of categories forms a superficial 
layer in the structure of class consciousness in the sense 
that it can be seen as a reflection at the rational level 
of the existential categories. Thus- the category of con­
tradiction and the power of the negative can be regarded as 
a rationalised form of the category of "hostility”, the 
category of transformation as the rationalisation of the 
need for change, and the category of the whole as a rationalised 
feeling of solidarity.
The Dialectical Structure of Glass Consciousness. Every 
main trait of class consciousness is opposed by another 
trait. This makes class consciousness work like a balanced 
structure. To start with the desire for change and the 
category of transformation are counterbalanced by the 
category of the whole and unity. Communists desire, and work 
for change and novelty, and yet, the pattern of any possible 
change is laid down in their philosophy of history and their 
almost maniac inclination for planning. Their febrility 
cannot simply be conceived as activity for activity*s sake, 
or progress for the sake of progress. For they are in 
favour of destruction and revolution and vet, very far from . 
favouring chaos. i'heir action can at any rate be regarded 
as "dereglemeniraisonne".
The belief in the materiality of the world which under­
lies the necessity of a specific form of evolution is 
counter-balanced by the conscious and voluntaristic activity 
of the Party as a whole, and of each member, which -
/
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- paradoxically - help and accelerate the realisation of 
what should necessarily take place. Thus the impulse for 
action and change lying at the basis of class consciousness 
is counter-balanced by the existence of fixed immanent 
ends, "Praxis” itself is counter-pointed by a world of 
ultimate ends which form an "oasis” of ideals within the 
structure of class consciousness.
The only category not adequately counter-balanced within 
the structure of class consciousness is that of "hostility”. 
One might believe that the Communistsr aggression towards 
out-groups is counter-balanced by their identification with 
their own group and by the tie of love which the members of 
a Communist society manifest towards each other. But 
they do not really love each other. In a Communists organ­
isation there is much more inter-individual and inter-group 
conflict, much more competition, mutual suspicion and 
distrust than in any other form of society existing today.
It might also be said that their aggression is com­
pensated by their love for peace. And yet, it seems easy 
to see that Communists do not mean peace as often as they 
use this word. In conclusion, we are under the impression 
that hostility is the only trait showing signs of imbalance 
in the structure of class consciousness. This is very 
likely to lead the Communist groups of today to a form of 
maladjustment to the present world. By maladjustment we 
mean that class consciousness will work against itself, by
/
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by creating interminable conflicts and thus engaging 
Communist societies in a permanent state of war, internal 
and external.
Concluding this chapter we can regard class consciousness 
as a new type of consciousness. It is, in our opinion, a 
different structure from that of individual consciousness for 
the principal reason that it shows different modes of 
organising human experience„ Class consciousness does not 
know formal lav/s, i.e., its activity is not satisfied by the 
fulfilment of certain laws regarding the activity itself, 
but by the fulfilment of certain ends which are part of its 
own structure, '^ 'hese ends are projected rational forms of 
a series of emotional states which lie at the origin of class 
consciousness. The basic states of mind characteristic of a 
particular section of modern society all saturated in the 
feeling of insecurity, fear of social disintegration and 
desire of change have gradually become categories of human 
experience in general.•
The function of class consciousness being that of making 
possible human adjustment as a group, its services are: 
necessary to the extent to which contemporary civilisation 
asks for this type of behaviour. For the moment, one thing 
seems certain - many problems of life which could have been 
solved not more than fifty years ago,by the individual alone, 
today ask for the co-ordinated reaction of the group. I'ixis 
happens in all fields of life, economic, religious, 
scientific, etc. The main question is whether class con-
consciousness is an appropriate instrument for this . 
type of behaviour or not. The next chapter will deal 
with this problem.
C H A P T E R  VIII
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND DEMOCRACY...
"To our grandfathera house, a well, a tower, 
even their clothes were infinitely more familiar.
Every object was for them a vase in which they found 
and preserved something human. Nowadays we are invaded 
from America by empty and indifferent things, things 
which are the product of imitation and which deceive us 
by their likeness to life. A house in an American sense, 
an American fruit, and there even a vineyard have nothing 
in common with the house, the fruit and vineyard which 
moved the feelings and the thoughts of our ancestors".
Rainer ^aria Rilke.
As Communist society has grown up in opposition 
to the individualistic social pattern, of Democracy, so 
has class consciousness articulated its structure in 
opposition to individual consciousness. Thus, class con­
sciousness is totally impervious to the category of 
"individuality", incapable of critical activity, of 
objectivity and the contemplative attitude in life. In 
order to demonstrate this, we shall discuss the relation­
ships existing between class consciousness and the main 
features of individual consciousness.
SIJ
Ind i v i clua 1 i t y. The crisis of the category of 
"individuality” or of the category of the "personal”, 
has reached in Communist society an intensity unknown 
in the history of European civilisation* The phenomenon 
of "Gleichschaltung" characteristic of Nazism, can be con­
sidered a superficial change in the mental structure of 
man as compared with the effects of class consciousness 
upon the individual’s mind* There are many features of 
class consciousness which testify to its incapacity fpr 
working with the category 0 1  individuality. Here are the 
most important of them.
A* As we have shown elsewhere, one of the main traits 
of conscious behaviour consists in the individual’s capacity 
to take into account the multiplicity of conditions involved 
in his field of reaction. The motives of behaviour-drives, 
desires, aspirations - are kept in suspense until the mind 
discriminates, compares and compromises between the con­
ditions of the situation leading to satisfaction. The 
schemes of behaviour are, at the conscious level, flexible 
and refined so as to involve ,in the final solution as many 
and as varied conditions as possible.
This type of bevahiour is not possible within the 
limits of class consciousness. The individual behaving on 
the basis of his class consciousness is always under' the 
pressure of a certain anxiety and of a fixed goal for his 
action. He finds it difficult" to discriminate and com­
promise between various conditions presented by the
the situation. As soon as lie lias to face conditions 
opposed to his goal, his power of discrimination and com­
promise leaves him altogether* His mind grasps in the 
situation only two categories of factors: those absolutely 
identified with, and those opposed to his goal. Between 
these two categories there is a vacuum, for the schemes 
of his mind fail to grasp the ,Tdifferent”, the relatively 
opposed, or the “gradual”. Thus a Communist cannot under­
stand the otherfs point of view, save under two forms* as 
absolutely identical or absolutely opposed to his own*
In both cases Tthe other”, as an individual, is annihilated. 
Human dialogue is non-existent in Communist society; the 
choice is between unison and breach of relations,
B, Glass consciousness works with global schemes, 
cognitive and emotional, which are rigidly applied to 
reality. It distinguishes classes or categories of things 
rather than things in themselves. The result of this 
attitude towards the world is a sort of “factorial analysis” 
of reality, in the sense that the whole variety of phenomena 
is organised in the function of a few fundamental concepts 
such as class struggle, revolutionary and reactionary 
factors, the transition of quantity into quality,etc. 
Sometimes the whole Communist world is conceived in the 
function of two concepts such as heavy versus light industry, 
Stalinism versus Trotskysm, Stalinism versus Bukharinism 
and so forth, anything existing as a “nuance”, or having 
an individuality of its own is absorbed in one of these
/categories. /
The schemes of class consciousness are similar 
ho the -archetypes^ of the Unconscious, as described by 
Jung. Their operation is analogous to that- of the Holy 
Ghost in Hysantine paintings, where the individual forms 
of reality are transfigured. In a Communist society it 
is the Party that plays the role of the Holy Ghost. Eor 
it is the Party that establishes the contents of class con­
sciousness, in the Party line, and infuses the individuals 
mind with the archetypes according to which he organises 
his own experiences. To ensure that scientific ideas, for 
example, correspond to class consciousness, Communists have 
introduced the system of collective elaboration of scientific 
knowledge, on the ground that group activity is nearer to 
class consciousness than individual activity. E. Tarle, 
the well known historian, has been surrounded by a group 
of conscientious Party men in order to keep him within the 
limits of class consciousness.
G. As opposed to democracy, where the dominant process 
is that of individuation, in Communist society the dominant 
process is that of depersonalisation. Living in a 
Communist group one is often under the vivid impression that 
human inter-relations do not take place from one individual 
to another. The reality which gives substance to human 
inter-relations is the Party; the individuals themselves 
are but "hieans” of com. uni cat ion of the contents of class 
consciousness whose only bearer is the Party. The
/
The individuals cannot separate each other from the 
Party. Two Communists in conversation very seldom and 
very reluctantly put and answer "personal"- questions*
Their own language seems to have lost the capacity of 
expressing such questions. When an "active" Gommunist 
happens to address one of his comrades withi-simple formulae 
such as "How are you getting on?" or';THbw is your wife?", 
it would be completely wrong to think that he is interested 
in whether his comrade or his comrade's wife feel "fine", 
"well" or "bored stiff". The real meaning of his question 
is:tfSIow are you getting on with your task as a member of 
the Party?" In other words the interlocutors* interest 
is in the "principle" of life as expressed by the Party, 
rather than in the way of life is experienced by a partie- 
ular individual*
There are other important symptoms of depersonalisation 
in Communist society. On the level of practical action the 
individual is not an entity. In'the political field, for 
instance, Communists have no use for the individual as an 
agent of decision or as "vote". The political concept of 
majority has no meaning in a Communist way of life, for 
the simple reason that it implies that the individual is a 
factor of decision. Unanimity forms the basis of any 
decision and action. If unanimous decision cannot be taken 
the meeting is postponed until the conditions for unanimity 
are ripe. A curious case of this kind is related by 
Ignatio Silone. According to him, Stalin costconed the
/
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the meeting of the Comintern several times and re-shaped 
its composition so as to make possible an unanimous 
condemnation of Trotsky. (The G-od that Wailed. Six.studies 
in Oomr»iunism. Hamish Hamilton, London 1850).
An important aspect of the process of depersonalisation 
is reflected by the structure of language in a Communist 
society, A special section of the Party, "Agitprop*1 is 
entrusted with the coinage and the dissemination of 
stereotyped expressions of "cliches" so as to enable 
individuals to express their experiences in a standardised 
manner. Communists seem to have ready-made expressions for 
all important aspects of life. Those individuals who fail 
to adjust their experiences to the meaning of these 
expressions become liable to serious "deviations".
The evolution of the Hussian language since 1917 shows 
some characteristic aspects of the process of depersomal- 
isation taking place in Soviet society. We refer in the 
first place to the inclination of this language to form 
abstract terns by the combination of the initial letters 
or syllables of two or more words. There have been coined 
over 3G©0 such expressions since the Revolution. Most 
important from our own point of. view is the fact that 
nearly all these compound words or abbreviations, as they 
often are called, refer to various aspects of social life.
It seems therefore that the driving force lying behind this 
linguistic phenomenon consists in a tendency to codify the
/
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the main factors existing in the social field such as 
SOTOHP, Z.COJBOMOL, AGIT?ROF,KEVD, TARZAKirSSTlICL!, etc, (This 
trend in the language is in fact aspect of the process 
of over-rationalisation dealt with in a previous chapter)*
It is easy to see that in a social field so carefully 
organised round a series of impersonal factors, the 
individual as an active agent in the field,no longer counts, 
he is lost under the influence of one of these factors or 
classes, i.e., he is IiOMSOMOL, SOVDEP , HOT)., etc. In 
such a culture-pattern the dynamics of social life is con- 
ceaared as rational concatenations of superindividual factors 
rather than as a system of inter-individual relationships.
Por the understanding and the control of the social field, 
the Communist works with his formulae in the same manner 
as the chemist does with his. More C0NS0I.IGL, less SGYDEP,
a)
and the composition of society changes accordingly.
(i)
A series of trends in the french language during tie 
Revolution shows the general tendency to codify the nature.
(See E.Brunot: Histoire de la Langue Trancaise. Vol.X p.62).
Speech tonality shows another symptom of depersonalisation 
in Communist society. Speech tonality there is usually 
even, with no rising or falling, perfectly monotonous as if 
a permanent censorship acts upon the individuals voice.
In conclusion, the whole structure of the language in a 
Commonist society prevents the individual from appearing 
as 5fhiniselfM; he has to appear in an official mask, i.e., 
in cliche expressions and with a depersonalised tone, hot
/
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Lot to tall: loudly, not to tall: much, not to talk according 
to tie colour of onet s feelings, are by now important 
canons of behaviour in suck a society. (For details:
Z. Barbu, Language in Democratic and ’Totalitarian society. 
Orbis, June 1953.)
The Critical Mind. We have devoted a whole chapter 
to prove the dogmatic character of class consciousness.
We could therefore easily draw a general conclusion by 
saying that class consciousness is diametrically opposed 
to critical activity. But this would not tally with the 
opinion held by Communists regarding the activity of dtegss 
consciousness. For they make frequent use of words such as 
criticism and self'-criticism which seem to indicate specific 
critical abilities possessed by class consciousness.
This makes it even more necessary for us to demonstrate that 
the critical mind is in no wav a quality of class conscious­
ness.
Criticism is a practice of the Party. The objects of 
criticism may be the PartyTs attitude towards various 
problems - known as the criticism of the TlineT - the 
attitude of the Party members,' and the * lineT of another 
party. It should be noted that, in the conflict with its 
members, the Party is never on the wrong side, and therefore 
the result of criticism is known beforehand. With regard 
to its own Tline*, the Party very often recognises its 
mistakes, and criticism results in a change, which might 
be a Tturning * of the Party line, or a withdrawl to a 
previous position.
change in the line is only a formal recognition of an 
error, and . that Communist experience has shown that these 
Tturnings* and * withdrawals’ start from, and end in .a 
tactical attitude, not in a substantial correction of the 
Party line, therefore these phenomena can hardly be con­
sidered as fruits of the critical mind.
The European critical mind, as opposed to dogmatism, 
is rooted in the fundamental conviction that the human 
mind, although possessing the power of knowing the truth, 
can make errors. The chance of error can be reduced by 
the exercise of a permanent control over the activity of 
mind. The very notion of control implies an attitude 
towards the ways and the results of our mental activity. 
Doubt, as a feature of the critical mind,, and as the most 
powerful antidote to dogmatism, is a negative attitude in 
that it rests on the consciousness of the possibility of 
error. Tut this is counter-balanced by a positive attitude 
manifested in a permanent measure of precaution with the 
object of avoiding an incomplete or wrong application 
of our logical mind. The criterion of certainty consists, 
for the critical mind, in the observation of the rules of 
its own activity, not in the results of this activity, i.e., 
in the ideas. V/hen these rules are not kept, the ideas, 
whatever they nay be, have to be changed.
There is a series of other features which contribute to 
the meaning of the European critical mind. &rteg&,y Gasset,
Gasset, for instance, deferring to critical idealism as 
one of the expressions of the critical mind, characterises 
it as a trading philosophy. It is obviously hard to deny 
that the critical mind contains features very much akin to 
the buying and selling attitude, to compromise, or to 
adjustment to the concrete situations of life. But it is 
equally difficult to confuse the critical mind with the 
exclusive self-interested attitude of tradesman. It is 
here, 0 1 1  the moral plane, that Ortego y &assetfs 
characterisation is insufficient. W2, think that in H e  notion 
of the critical mind there is reflected the Christian faith 
in original sin. This is the main reason why it nece ssarily 
implies a full recognition of, and responsibility for 
human errors and inperfections. From the moral point of 
view, the critical mind leads to modesty and straining for 
self-improvement.
Communist dialectics rests on the idea of Ttacticsf, not 
on that of the critical mind. This means that Communist 
ideas and aims are fixed as guiding stars, and that only the 
ways towards them can be changed. Communists do not see the 
wrong side of their ideas, and controversial discussion with 
them makes no sense, since they can never resort to a real 
correction of their mind. Their notion of error is purely 
tactical, i.e., the turnings in the line mean nothing but a 
preparation for new attacks by the same idea. Here lies 
the root of their ’monotony*, ’stubbornness* and ’strength’.
For anyone living amongst Communists it is impossible to 
notice that there is nothing more unusual for a Communist
Gommnni st than the attitude of doubt towards his mind.
His failures do not nalce him modest, and it is not his 
virtue to be prudent or wise in his thought, because he 
is not concerned with the fright1 way* The virtue he 
really values is the shrewdness which leads at any cost 
to his aim*
Hr on the practical point of view, the critical mind 
leads to compromise. Marxists practise the method of 
compromise, but they hold a particular view of it. Lenin 
made a compromise with liberal economy during the N*E.P.; 
Roumanian ^om:munists made a compranise with the monarchy 
from 1944 to 1947; Hrench Communists made a compromise 
with the■Oathelic Church, etc. But all these were 
essentially tactical arrangements, and sooner or later the 
Teternal CommunismT swept away any trace of Russian liberal 
economy, Roumanian Monarchy, etc. One can never see that 
substantial correction of Communist ideas which would at 
any rate be an elementary sign of critical activity.
Sometimes the Party speaks openly about its own mistakes
but only after working out a special system of explanation.
The outsiders, be they counter-revolutionaries, or unmasked
traitors, are usually responsible for any error. The Party
cannot bear the repercussions of an error, or the feeling
of guilt, and as soon as an error is committed, the
responsibility is thrown oifsomebody outside itself. The
notion of duality, so characteristic of the critical mind, -
according to which one side watches and corrects the other, 
is completely alien to a Com uni str s mental structure. The
3-d I
The Party is not Ta moose with two wings* says Lenin.
T Self -criticism1 is a tern used when a Oonmunist 
recognises his deviations from the•line of the Party.
It cannot be called critical activity because it is not 
based on freedom. The conclusion is always given at the 
very beginning, in the sense that the Party is always 
rigiiv. What the accused has to do is to rqualify* his 
own attitude as. a hostile action against the Party.
J,he idea should be stressed that a simple recognition of 
fault is not enough; the accused has to perform a .duty 
towards his party. He has to confess according to the 
Party requirements in connection with the trial in 
question, whatever the personal meaning of his mistake may 
have been. In the first phase of his trial,Bucharin 
recognised his error of being too much of an independent 
thinker. But this was not the right attitude. He had to 
put a real strain on himself to see in his earlier thoughts 
and actions the picture of a counter-revolutionary Bucharin, 
or even of a German spy. In a passage of his last confession, 
addressed to Western intellectuals, he lets slip an 
illusion to ftlyosho- Karamazov, who took on his own 
shoulders the sins of all his fellow-men. The intellecfucal 
Bucharin spends his last moments struggling with this con-' 
ception of error and responsibility.
The conclusion of this section is the following:
Goronunism has not eliminated dogmatisn, Communist thinking 
is guided by already-constituted ideas laid down by a
a philosophical system. Communist critical activity does 
not consist in a search for truth, or in a verification 
and correction of ideas. Truth is given, the only human 
task being that of finding the ways of its realisation at 
any cost. A Gon unist knows the ultimate content his mind 
has to attain, he is convinced that:-, possibly hidden 
behind various tactical appearances, the whole of history 
leads there. This fundamental attitude makes his pre­
cautions at least partly superfluous. The Communists* 
frequent talk about criticism and self-criticism very often 
reminds of the coraplete title of Beaumarchais1 s comedy:
IX
Be Barbier de Seville, ou, sur la precaution inutile.'
Qbjectivity. The Communist conception of objective 
knowledge is very near what is normally called naive realism. { 
Communists believe that the human mind "iairrors" the 
external reality. But one should not forget that they 
understand by human mind class consciousness, llarx goes as 
far as to assume that any civilisation based on the individual 
as the fundamental unit of life, is incapable of objective 
knowledge. He, and after him, all Communist ideologues, 
make use of a great variety of arguments in order to prove 
how individual consciousness "mystifiesw reality, and how 
class consciousness grasps it adequately. we feel,however,
i
that this is not the right way to discuss such a problem.
What we should like to do instead is to answer the following 
two questions: A. Is class consciousness capable of
objective truth? B. What is the attitude of present-day 
Communists towards the problem of objectivity? ' /
First of all .class consciousness* criterion of 
objectivity is practical not theoretical. This gives a 
specific meaning to what is objective and what is not 
objective for a Communist.
The definition of the concept of practice is by no 
means an easy task, for this concept is not clearly 
formulated in Marxist writings. But since 1917 Soviet 
experience has made it clear that "practice** is somehow 
synonymous with the material condition of the working class 
development towards its historical goal, i.e., Oormiunism. 
Hence an idea, or an action are objective to the extent to 
which they are adapted to the conditions of the working 
class development. The main implication of this is that 
any action - class consciousness is primarily action - 
carried by men organised in a group is objective, i.e., 
corresponds to an objective order of things, if it leads 
to the improvement of the life condition of the group. 
Further, any • scheraatisation, any fragmentation, organisation, 
and finally any distortion of reality which facilitates the 
historical goal of the group corresponds to reality in 
itself, i.e., it is objective. For instance, if the working 
class, organised in a political party, decide that five 
million "bourgeois*1 should die, their decision corresponds 
to an objective order of human history.
To brand this conception of objectivity as absurd does 
not take us very far towards its explanation, let there 
is not very much else to be said about it. Perhaps it would
would be helpful to re-state at this point that this 
particular attitude towards objectivity is rooted in a 
"paranoiac" concept of reality, i.e., a reality which 
should at any cost identify itself with one's own ideas 
and expectations from it.
If by objective truth one means adequatio rei 
intellectus, as it is maintained by Marx and, with small h p. 
variations, by his Soviet^ interpreters, that class con­
sciousness is obviously not an adequate epistemological 
function. This is primarily due to the fact that its 
logical schematism and its psychological texture are far 
too simple and rigid to be adapted to the complex system 
of reality. As we have already mentioned, the schematism 
of class consciousness is incompatible with the individual 
forms of existence. Consequently the knowledge enabled 
by it is objective only if one agrees a priori that the
i
structure of reality is archetypical or "elementaristic", 
This, however, contradicts our common observation. It 
seems to us that the belief that the world is, at an 
elementaristic or factorial level, more real than at the 
more differenentiated level of individual forms, is 
analogous to a nominalistic conception of reality, or to 
the belief in the objective reality of the schemes and con­
cepts devised by modern science for the understanding of 
Mature.
Marx rejects the activity of individual consciousness
on the ground that this mental structure is addicted to 
mystification, i.e., it coins a series of ideas aoout
frx?
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about reality, and later on believes in their objective 
reality. This is even nore tie case with class consciousness, 
a e iiave saovii in an earlie r crap u^r guo u class consci. ousness 
represents reality in the function of a serien of ends, 
which regulate the historical development of Communist 
society, and that these ends are projections of the traumatic 
experience of the proletariat. Therefore, even if LIarxTs 
assumptions concerning the function of individual conscious­
ness were true, we can hardly see the advantage of class 
consciousness from this specific point of view.
As a consequence of the difficulties involved in the 
practical criterion of objectivity, contemporary Communists 
reject the term "objectivity" altogether. In their view 
the recognition of an internal or external reality in its 
own right is a bourgeois weakness called "ob jectivism", to 
which they oppose the partisan character of human knowledge.
In his criticism of G. Alexandrov1 s book "The History of 
Western Philosophy" Zhdanov (op.cit) touches upon the problem 
of truth. He accuses Alexandrov of having become infected 
with the "objectiwst" spirit of bourgeois schools, and hev ing 
forgotten class warfare and the Party outlook in his views 
on Western philosophy. Giving as example the fact that 
Alexandrov admits Hegelian philosophy its progressive aspects, 
Zhdanov accuses the author of weakening the class consciousness 
of Soviet youth and of undermining party vigilance. Hence 
class and party conditions force Alexandrov to assert that 
Marx found nothing urogressive in the whole bourgeois
^ 2 ^
bourgeois philosophy, and that it was he- who built up 
everything from the very beginning#
In conclusion, we can say that the concept of 
objectivity, like many other concepts of Western 
civilisation, has been solved in the concept of "parti sera - 
ship". Objective is everything which fits into the party 
picture of the world# (Details on the concept of partisan-, 
ship in "The Social and Ideological Background of 
Oom.iuni smI? — “SKth-ftrfrfcewing. )
0# The Sense of Leisure. The fact that class con-' 
sciousness is primarily practical implies that the sense 
of leisure and the contemplative attitude are not among 
its attributes. There is a term very much in use in a 
Communist society which can be adduced as a proof of this, 
namely, the concept of "task". 0very Communist should 
have a "task" at any moment of his life# This means that 
he has always something to do for the Party and for his 
community. He never finds himself in the category of the 
"personal", but always in that of "functional" or 
"instrumental".
It was Trotsky who made the .observation that the 
Bolshevik Party could never get rid of the militaristic 
habits acquired during the Revolution. This seems perfectly 
true. A Communist society lives in permanent mobilisation 
with all its members on duty. The sense of duty is so 
deep in their minds that they have no adequate meaning for' 
words such, as "forced labour" or “holiday*1. The
/
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The individual there spends most of his life in group- 
organised activity, or activity FOR something which lies 
outside himself. Forced labour is but a species of this 
genus of activity.
If holiday implies the individuals temporary relief . 
from his social tasks, this carries no meaning to 
Gorx unists. "Holiday" is for Communists just another way 
of performing their tasks in the community. The highest 
form of leisure consists, for them, in a form of purposive 
rest. This means that the individual has to take a rest in 
the interest of his community, and in the manner that this 
is arranged by his community.
The Emotional Pattern of Glass Consciousness. .Whi1e in 
democratic society the individual patterns his emotionality 
according to his personal relationships with things and 
persons, in Communist society his emotionality is modelled 
according to.the reality of the Party which exists between 
him and things, and between him and persons. The Communist 
has little or no sense of personal feelings, as we defined 
these in the first part of this study, he makes contacts 
with persons and things mainly in his capacity of a Party 
member, and forms his emotional attitudes accordingly.
At this stage of our study it would look less of a 
paradox to say that a Comuni st lives as a "principle" not 
as a person. Cq hasten tosay that this is not a conscious 
process, i.e., that lie consciously injects himself with joy,
/
joy, enthusiasm or sorrow whenever the Party requires 
him to do so. On the contrary, a real Communist - feels 
elation or sorrow "naturally5' at the Party success or 
defeat. The reason of this lies in the fact that the 
Communist does not relate himself to things and events 
as a person, Caen he does so - and this may happen in 
any Communist society - he is in fact an emotional 
"deviationistThe recent history of the Communist 
movements in South East Europe shows many cases of this 
kind of deviationism. The main trait of the so-called 
nationalist Communists, of which Tito is an example, con­
sists in a displaced emotionality. They are emotionally 
fixated to their own ethnic group, and as such they have 
failed to pattern their emotionality according to the 
requirements of the Party, There is no other object of 
love in Communist society, save the Party and the objects' 
it stands for. The fact that in the Soviet Union "Russia" 
and "Fatherland" have recently become objects of love 
should be understood in a specific way. "Russia” is 'an 
object of love .only to the extent that the content of this 
concept have been completely remodelled by nearly forty 
years of Communist rule. He who is acquainted with the 
work done by proaganda in order to re-create an image 
of historical Russia so as to fit into the Party life, or 
with the work of "re-interpretation" carried out by Soviet 
historians, will certainly understand this peculiar 
phenomenon. But apart from "Russia" no other fatherland
fatherland lias yet become'an object of love for Communists. 
One can sav that "Russia” has become the image of
(X)
"Fatherland" for all Communist movements in the world.
(1)
Our own opinion is that rhe wave of nationalism 
noticed during the war is a tactical step rather than,a 
structural element in Soviet society. Its reasons are:
A . To neutralise the effects of German nationalism.,
B* To counter-balance any possible mood of fraternisation 
with the (bourgeois) West, and 0. To combat in advance 
the "cosmopolitan" aspirations which come so- naturally in 
a post war period.
The real reason of this phenomenon might be found in 
the Stalinian dialect*of power. Bor it lies in the 
nature of these Stalinian dialectics to lift from time 
to time a series of repressive measures for the simple 
reason that in an interim and partial regime of freedom 
tne Party can better feel the pulse of the masses. These 
periods enable the Party to see how far or how near the 
people are to its own. line. Consequently the Party knows 
what screws should be tightened in order that the line 
snould ds main c ai neci.
There are a series of other minor emotional deviations 
in a Communist society. Many marriages and friendships 
are broken because one of the partners is not a faithful 
member of the Party. Wives denouncing their husbands for 
not being faithful to the Party, or children denouncing 
their own parents are cases -known by now to everybody.
We have already mentioned the idea that the Communist
emotional pattern is archetypically organised, and brat
this is. one of the features of class consciousness.
This means that the emotional behaviour of Communists on
the whole is based on big and rigid schemes which are
grouped round two poles: The first pole is defined as
love for the Party leaders, while the second is defined 
as hatred against anything non-Communist. When we say
say archetypical we mean that the emotional .pattern 
of a Jon mist has no schemes for small private feelings. 
Sis world is devoid of simple enjoyments, of small and 
often inexplicable sorrows of 'private melancholies, of 
any kind of personal moods. These may exist, but his 
culture-pattern has no symbols for them, For Communists 
are utterly against .lyrical moods which are rooted in the 
intimate contact of the individual with things and persons. 
These are called T,petty-bourgeois,f feelings, and the 
Party irons them out from the minds of its members. They 
■are emotional moods which by their personal quality are 
inappropriate to the emotional pattern of a Communist. 
Lyrical pejptry, which springs from the poetfs intimate' 
contact with the world - love for another person, love 
for things, love for Mature, etc. - is formally ignored or 
even forbidden. Only those emotions which arouse in the • 
poetTs contact with things having a certain significance 
for the Party are worthy of the name of peltry. The 
struggle against personal feelings goes so far that in. 
the recent Soviet novel the heroies are 1 1 0 longer 
individuals; the general tendency is to create so- called 
ncollective heroes” such .as a factory a k&lkhoz, and 
above all the Party. (Helen BappJ The Post-War ^ovel in 
Russia. 10Listener April 1953, p.725.)1 A ? JT
friendship as an emotional attachment between two 
individuals qua individuals is not allowed in a CommunistWa.
society. If two Party members appreciate each other for
for personal reasons and consequently build up an 
emotional tie, between themselves, they are liable to 
emotional deviation. Communists have a special name for 
these forms of emotional behaviour. They call-them ,Tsmall 
churches5* and consider them as incipient splits of the 
Party. Friendship must be made under the auspices of 
the Party, i.e., between individuals who never lose sight 
of the fact that they are Party members. Friendship with 
members of out-groups is, of course, serious deviationism.
In conclusion one can say that friendship as a 
specific type of human relationship is almost non­
existent in Communist society. Party members are dominated 
in their emotional relationship with each other by the 
category of partisanship. In their relations with non- 
members they manifest, if not hostility, a sort of de­
tachment which precludes any emotional tie. Stalin himself 
used to meet people in his own house who were not directly 
concerned with the activities of the Party. His attitude 
towards these people can be considered as typical. At 
these meetings he always took the attitude of an onlooker; 
the ot hers seemed to him actors rather than real people in 
real life. It is most probably that he had the feeling 
of reality only along his comrades. (References to 
Stalinls behaviour in circumstances described above are 
given by AHLIED AMBA, in ”1 was Stalin*s Bodyguard”.
Fredricife fuller, l^SS.)
There is no other feeling more dominated by the
the category of partisanship than love. Plenty of 
illustrative examples .can be found in Soviet literature,
A young man, in the act of confessing his love to his 
sweetheart, stops suddenly and says: "This is not the 
right moment; I have to go to vote on the resolution taken 
by the factory committee". A film shows a young couple 
meeting after five years of separation, Eis first words 
are* "What a beautiful crop there is going to be this 
yearIw (Examples given by Valeria Gerasimova in 
Literatunia Gazeta. 1952. } Orwell has grasped an important 
aspect of the feeling of love in communist society in his 
novel "1984", The protagonists feel guilty when they 
fall in love with each other, as if they have, by this 
very fact, broken a rule or neglected an important duty.
Two important facts are closely connected with the 
individual1s emotional pattern in.Communist society.
The first consists in the little importance accorded to 
the family in the development of the individual. The 
second consists in the technique of "deracination" or 
"uprooting" practised by the Party with respect to all 
members of the community.
The emotionality of a member of a Communist society, 
as opposed to that of a member of a democratic society, 
is very little, if at all, patterned on the family system 
of inter-relations. The emotionality of a child,naturally 
captivated by. his. parents, is, from a very early age, 
disturbed by, and finally displaced uoon far more d o i t erful
/
powerful objects of love, than the parents themselves,i.e., 
the Party leaders and the Party as such. The first effect 
of this is that emotionality grows from an early age 
round persons, things and situations in general with which 
he has no direct and intimate contact. In other words, 
his emotionality is patterned after symbols rather than 
after concrete human beings- which surround him. ' He loves 
the Party leader because of what he r?representsn for the 
country, moreover he loves the Party rather than any 
particular member of it. ■ If he happens to love a particular 
member this is certainly not because of his own relations 
.with him, but because this member symbolises the Party. 
whe net of personal relationships is, in this way, from 
the very beginning, ;ff actorisei**, i.e., reduced to a series 
of super-individual symbols. The ultimate end of this 
process consists in the transference of the individuals 
emotional capacity outside the sphere of inter-personal 
contacts.
h. Bona 1 a. L. ^airbairn in. his study "The Sociological 
Significance of Communism considered in the light of 
1 sychoanalysisn(in Psychonalytical Studies of the Person-, 
ality. Tavistock Publications Ltd. London 1952.) points out 
the attempt made by Communists to integrate the individuals 
emotionality in the largest human group possible, i.e.,
'that of the family of nations. He stresses in this'way 
the internationalist character of the working class 
movements, and of the early Bussian Com -.unist -arty. Today,
/
Today, after the Stalinian period, this character is 
less visible. This is why it seems more accurate to say 
that in a Communist society, the individual is emotionally 
integrated with the Party and with what the Party stands 
for. We should like to stress in this way the idea that 
the factors and the symbols round which the individual's 
emotionality is structurised are in a state of perpetual 
change. After a period of broad internationalism and 
humanitarianism the Bolshevik Party has introduced into its 
own structure symbols such as "nation", "fatherland",
"Russia" which mean a new turning , in the emotional pattern 
of the Sovietcitizen.
The feeling of "deracination" prevailing in Communist 
society is primarily the result of a 'well-known technique of 
the Party, by which its members are submitted to frequent 
changes regarding the place and the nature of their work.
In this way, the only lasting bond in the life of a Communist 
is that existing between himself and the Party. The 
-Communist is never allowed contacts with persons, places 
and things long and intimate enough to become "personal".
The clothes he wears - normally a uniform - the-desk he 
writes at, the glasses he drinks from'.... are seldom long 
enough with, or near enough to him to become really "his", 
and thus to make him indulge in personal feeling about them. 
Por. he as a rule does not live with things and persons; he 
uses them in the same way the Party uses him. This reveals 
a crucial feature of the mind of a Communist. He is not. 
allowed to think and to feel about himself as a value, or
or as an end, but as a means in the structure of the Party.
/■
Consequently he suffers from an incapacity to regard his 
own connection with tilings as having any intrinsic value 
whatsoever. The Party systematically destroys, by the 
technique of "deracination", any emotional "couche” and 
any nest of warm feelings which, at one moment or another, 
an individual may build up in his intimate contact with 
persons and things. Paraphrasing Rilke, quoted at the 
beginning of the chapter, we can say* The'wo rid of a 
Communist is invaded by empty and indifferent things.
There a house, a fruit or vineyard have nothing in com ion 
with the house, fruit and vineyard which move the thoughts 
and feelings of Western man. In Communist society the 
drama of depersonalisation reaches the point of perfection. 
Tt is not only an undesirable result of industrialisation, 
as suggested by Rilke, but a systematic work done by a 
political organisation. The final result of this work 
consists in the blockage of all personal feelings in the 
members of Communist society.
Suspicion. The blockage of the personal feelings has 
important repercussions in' the minds of the members cf a 
Com unist society. In this blockage lies perhaps the 
greatest source of frustration in the life of a Communist. 
The repressed desire to be oneself, to speak with onels own 
voice, and in the colour of onefs o?m feelings, can be con­
sidered as the main cause of one of the most characteristic 
emotional attitudes in Communist society, i.e.that of
of suspicion, '^lie individual acts out this deep desire 
by projection; he sees the desire to escape from the rigid 
impersonal rule of the Party in other persons, in 
practically everybody, d'hus suspicion dominates the 
pattern of inter-individual relations in Communist- society. 
Everyone suspects everybody of not being ”orthodox", and 
of harbouring hostile attitudes towards the Party. Moreover 
every Communist feels in one way or another that he is 
hated by others just because he is a better Communist than 
they are. His feeling of guilt for wishing to get jid of 
the oppressing rule of the Party can be accepted by his 
consciousness only after this radical distortion.
Technological Consciousness. Communists refer to 
SoVlet man as a new type of man. In an earlier chapter we 
have also expressed the* inconvenience aroused by the 
application of the concept of personality to the present 
leaders of Russian Communist Earty.
At the present stage it is, however, difficult to Enow 
for certain whether the Comiuunist civilisation contains in 
itself the basic conditions of a new type of human mental 
structure in general, and whether this will lead to a 
psychological mutation in the human species. We are under 
the impression that the "old man’1, the historical man, with,! 
his instincts and feelings, still exists in the Soviet, man. 
But, being repressed, he forms the unconscious structure of 
the mind of the Soviet man. Hhat is undoubtedly new in the 
mental structure of the Soviet man is his type of con-
/
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consciousness. Consequently it would be more adequate to 
speak here about a new type of consciousness, rather than 
a new type of man. f'his is by and large class consciousness, 
as we have described it so far. But, since the concept of 
class consciousness includes in itself too many features 
characteristic of the working.class movements preceding the 
realisation of Communist society, we have decided to apply 
another name to the consciousness of the Communist man, 
which suggests’ by itself the essence of this new type of 
mental structure, we call it technological consciousness.
Its main traits are the following:
A. I he structure of technological consciousness is 
nelementaristic5i. It reflects the world in its broad lines, 
in 13a ck and white. In fact technological consciousness is 
not a cognitive structure. Its prime concern is not with 
what and how the world is, but with how action upon the-., 
world is possible. Its cognitive activities are therefore 
limited to the requirements of immediate action.
B. Ihe man with technological consciousness is never 
satisfied with merely knowing things and events, for he is 
always under the urge to transform the world; he suffers ■ 
from action - anxiety. What -^ arx said about class con­
sciousness in general applies to this aspect of technological 
consciousness. Glass consciousness, is practical, says Marx, 
Its function is to transform rather than to understand the 
universe.
G. The man with technological consciousness has an
/
an "experimentalist” attitude towards life. He is 
pressed by the desire to master and shape the world, 
physical, social and psychological. As a ruler, he is a 
11 techno crate”; as an artist or a writer, he is an 
"engineer of the human soul”; as a simple citizen he is an. 
"expert”. This man is incapable of contemplating and 
enjoying things as they- are; he can never let himself 
float freely in the stream of life. Even his ait is ”a 
manual of life to men”. (Chernyshevsky.jtyu$4 by R-O-pf 0 ^ 0
B. . ^he man with technological consciousness has a 
particular inclination or taste for the "artificial” and 
"manufactured” in life, which goes hand in hand with a 
certain detachment from nature. In this trait there is 
something similar to Baudelaire* s negative^towards nature, 
his horror for free running water, for instance. Baudelaire 
could not stand water unless safely imprisoned in pipes.
In Soviet Russia anything manufactured is worthy of 
the name of "culture”. A tractor is worth worshipping; an 
armoured carf becomes the principal character - almost a 
national hero - in a novel. Electric lamps are far more 
beautiful than stars, as one of Azhaiev's heroes emphat ically 
demonstrates. (Far from Moscow, mentioned by Helen Rapp 
Gp.cit.) Man1 s direct contact - with nature is systematically 
blocked. He becomes more and more surrounded by, and 
imprisoned in a universe of his own production.
It remains only to be said that many elements entering 
into the composition of technological consciousness can be
/
/ .
be found in every industrial civilisation. In Communist 
society, bov/ever, these elepients form a lasting structure 
which dominates the hiind of Gommunist man.
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